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Doktorska disertacija obravnava vprašanje, kdaj nudenje državne pomoči tujim oboroženim 
silam ali drugim oboroženim skupinam v situacijah oboroženega spopada, ki vključuje izvršitev 
mednarodnih hudodelstev, prekorači mejo med pravno dopustno zunanjo politiko in kaznivim 
nudenjem pomoči ter podpore storilcem mednarodnih hudodelstev (tj. kaznivo udeležbo). 
Določitev te meje predstavlja eno najtežjih aktualnih vprašanj v mednarodnem kazenskem pravu 
in ima daljnosežne normativne posledice, v praksi mednarodnih kazenskih sodišč pa ostaja 
predmet ostrih razhajanj.  
V tem okviru je temeljna premisa disertacije, da sodobno mednarodno kazensko pravo in sodna 
praksa puščata odprto vprašanje, ali lahko zgolj nudenje vojaške pomoči tuji državi ali 
nedržavnemu akterju v oboroženem spopadu šteje za pomoč (tj. udeležbo v ožjem pomenu) pri 
izvršitvi mednarodnih hudodelstev v takšnem oboroženem spopadu. Eden od ciljev disertacije je 
zato pojasniti mednarodno pravo de lege lata glede individualne kazenske odgovornosti vojaških 
ali političnih voditeljev, ki uveljavljajo državno politiko nudenja vojaške pomoči, kot tudi 
odgovornost države v tem kontekstu.  
Ob preučevanju dokumentov, sodb različnih mednarodnih sodišč, dejstev in doktrine, disertacija 
predstavi izvirna, kritična in na mestih inovativna stališča in sklepe glede vprašanja 
mednarodnopravne ureditve udeležbe države in posameznika pri izvršitvi mednarodnega 
hudodelstva v obliki čezmejnega nudenja vojaške pomoči (situacije, za katere je v disertaciji 
uporabljen izraz “primeri tuje pomoči”). Pri preučevanju omenjenega vprašanja se ugotavljanje, 
kaj je že obstoječe mednarodno pravo (de lege lata) in kaj naj bi mednarodno pravo postalo (de 
lega ferenda) prepeta. 
Namen disertacije je med drugim izpostaviti in razjasniti očitno napetost med obstoječimi 
normami, ki se nanašajo na nudenje vojaške pomoči, kot izhajajo iz mednarodnega kazenskega 
prava, na eni strani, in iz prava odgovornosti držav za mednarodno protipravna dejanja na drugi 
strani. Sodobna mednarodna praksa je osredotočena na individualno kazensko odgovornost 
posameznega vojaškega ali političnega voditelja, medtem ko odgovornost držav ostaja nejasna. 
Omenjeno napetost disertacija preučuje zlasti v luči sodobnih normativnih sprememb na 
področju mednarodnega kazenskega prava.  
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Normativni okvir državne odgovornosti in individualne kazenske odgovornosti za pomoč pri 
izvršitvi mednarodnega hudodelstva disertacija proučuje tudi s ciljem opredelitve ustreznega 
odnosa med dvema ločenima režimoma mednarodne odgovornosti v obravnavanem kontekstu. 
Analiza obstoječih modelov odnosa med odgovornostjo države in individualno kazensko 
odgovornostjo kaže, da (pravna) doktrina kot dominantno izhodišče opredeli tradicionalni 
dualistični model obravnavanega odnosa. Ta pristop upošteva, da med obravnavanima dvema 
režima odgovornosti obstaja določena povezava, hkrati pa izključi možnost njune formalne 
soodvisnosti. Medtem ko dualistični pristop priznava dvojno pripisovanje odgovornosti in 
medsebojno dopolnjevanje kot poglavitni dve oznaki obravnavanega odnosa, analiza kaže, da ne 
ponuja ustreznega odgovora pri opredelitvi odnosa med odgovornostjo države in individualno 
kazensko odgovornostjo za mednarodna hudodelstva v t.i. “primerih tuje pomoči”. Dualistični 
pristop namreč izpostavlja, da bi morale vse razprave o odnosu med državno odgovornostjo in 
individualno kazensko odgovornostjo izhajati iz predpostavke, da sta obravnavana režima 
medsebojno neodvisna, ločena sistema, odločitve, sprejete znotraj enega, pa nimajo nikakršnega 
vpliva na sprejemanje odločitev znotraj drugega režima odgovornosti.  
Upoštevajoč, da ugotovitev individualne kazenske odgovornosti pred mednarodnim kazenskim 
sodiščem ni pravno prepričljiv argument pri ugotavljanju odgovornosti države pred pristojnim 
mednarodnim sodiščem, pravna, politična in moralna povezanost obeh oblik odgovornosti 
vendarle kliče k bolj celovitemu pristopu k uveljavljanju mednarodne odgovornosti v tem 
kontekstu. Ena od temeljnih premis disertacije je ta, da bi morali biti odgovornost držav in 
individualna kazenska odgovornost vojaških ali političnih voditeljev v t.i. “primerih tuje 
pomoči” obravnavani kot medsebojno soodvisni, da bi se izognili neskladnim ali nasprotujočim 
si izidom, ki bi postavili pod vprašaj legitimnost različnih mednarodnih sodišč, ki ugotavljajo 
odgovornost različnih akterjev. V tem kontekstu disertacija ugotavlja, da trenutna 
mednarodnopravna ureditev ne zagotavlja primernega normativnega okvira za uveljavljanje 
odgovornosti zaradi udeležbe pri mednarodnih hudodelstvih. Disertacija razkriva tudi 
pomanjkanje koordinacije med obema normativnima okviroma, ki vodi v neskladnost pri 
uveljavljanje mednarodne odgovornosti za udeležbo pri mednarodnih hudodelstvih. Zato je 
ključnega pomena uskladiti normativne okvire individualne kazenske odgovornosti in 
odgovornosti držav, tako da bi omogočali uveljavljanje odgovornosti države kot tudi 
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uveljavljanje individualne kazenske odgovornost vojaških in/ali političnih voditeljev za isto 
ravnanje. 
Poleg teoretične normativne analize, doktorska disertacija vključuje tudi empirično študijo 
ključnega “primera tuje pomoči”, izhajajočega iz oboroženega spopada v Bosni in Hercegovini 
med leti 1991 in 1995 (tj. primer Tožilec v. Momčilo Perišić pred Mednarodnim sodiščem za 
vojne zločine na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije), ki vključuje vprašanje vloge tretjih držav (v tem 
primeru nekdanje Zvezne republike Jugoslavije) in njihovih vojaških poveljnikov kot morebitnih 
udeležencev v mednarodnih hudodelstvih, storjenih v oboroženih spopadih. Izbrani primer 
Perišić predstavlja pomemben mejnik v razvoju individualne kazenske odgovornosti za pomoč v 
mednarodnem kazenskem pravu: prvič v zgodovini je bil vojaški poveljnik ene države zgolj 
zaradi čezmejnega nudenja pomoči v obliki orožja in osebja spoznan za individualno kazensko 
odgovornega za pomoč pri izvršitvi mednarodnih hudodelstev, ki so jih v oboroženem spopadu 
izvršili pripadniki oboroženih sil druge države oziroma nedržavni akter na ozemlju druge države. 
Disertacija izpostavlja, da je s tem sodni senat Mednarodnega sodišča za vojne zločine na 
območju nekdanje Jugoslavije ambiciozno začrtal meje individualne kazenske odgovornosti za 
pomoč pri izvršitvi mednarodnih hudodelstev in določil (pre)nizek prag za odgovornost v t.i. 
“primerih tuje pomoči”. Medtem ko je pritožbeni senat v obravnavanem primeru Perišić zavzel 
nasprotno stališče in določil strožji pravni standard t.i. ‘specifične usmerjenosti’ (angl. specific 
direction) dane pomoči, nadaljnja sodna praksa ad hoc mednarodnih kazenskih sodišč temu 
stališču ne sledi.  
Disertacija ugotavlja, da je večinsko stališče sodne prakse ad hoc mednarodnih kazenskih sodišč 
neustrezno, saj ne upošteva razlike med nudenjem vojaške pomoči pri izvrševanju specifičnih 
mednarodnih hudodelstev in splošnim nudenjem pomoči in podpore v oboroženih spopadih, ki 
samo po sebi ni nujno kaznive narave z vidika statutov različnih ad hoc mednarodnih kazenskih 
sodišč in Rimskega statuta stalnega mednarodnega kazenskega sodišča, zlasti kadar je nudena 
pomoč splošnega značaja. 
Smiselno bi bilo spremeniti uveljavljeni pravni standard, v skladu s katerim kakršnokoli nudenje 
vojaške pomoči stranki v oboroženem spopadu, ob hkratnem zavedanju obdolženca, da obstaja 
verjetnost, da bo prejemnik pomoči udeležen pri izvrševanju mednarodnih hudodelstev, 
vzpostavi individualno kazensko odgovornost ne glede na humanitarni namen, specifičnost in 
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pomen, usmerjenost ali dejanski učinek dane vojaške pomoči. Disertacija namreč opozarja, da 
neupoštevanje pravnega standarda ‘specifične usmerjenosti’ ali vsaj standarda ‘z namenom 
olajšanja izvršitve’ (angl. for the purpose of facilitating the commission), ki ga predpisuje Rimski 
Statut stalnega mednarodnega kazenskega sodišča, vzpostavi prag individualne kazenske 
odgovornosti za pomoč, ki omogoča nevarnost za vdor objektivne odgovornosti v področje 
mednarodnega kazenskega prava.  
Upoštevajoč omenjeni primer Perišić in vzporedni primer Uporabe Konvencije o preprečevanju 
in kaznovanju zločina genocida (Bosna in Hercegovina v. Zvezna republika Jugoslavija) pred 
Meddržavnim sodiščem, disertacija na praktičnem primeru raziskuje povezave med 
mednarodnim kazenskim pregonom najvišjih vojaških in/ali političnih voditeljev in sodnim 
postopkom ugotavljanja odgovornosti države za identično dejansko stanje in v kontekstu 
primerljivih pravnih okvirov. Disertacija ugotavlja, da bi morala mednarodna sodišča, ki 
ugotavljajo individualno kazensko odgovornost, in mednarodna sodišča, ki ugotavljajo 
odgovornost držav, zavzeti celovitejši pristop pri presoji pravnih posledic dejstev, ki potencialno 
lahko vzpostavljajo tako individualno kazensko odgovornost kot odgovornost države.  
Upoštevaje nejasno opredelitev odnosa med državno odgovornostjo in individualno kazensko 
odgovornostjo na področju mednarodnih hudodelstev, se disertacija osredotoča na argument, da 
so v kontekstu t.i. “primerov tuje pomoči” mednarodna hudodelstva praviloma izvršena v okviru 
državne politike in s sodelovanjem državnega aparata. Preučevanje primera Perišić namreč 
obravnava predpostavko, da posameznik mimo obstoja državne politike nudenja vojaške pomoči 
ni zmožen nuditi takšne vojaške pomoči drugi državi ali nedržavnemu akterju v oboroženem 
spopadu, ki bistveno pripomore oziroma znatno prispeva k izvršitvi mednarodnega hudodelstva. 
Analiza elementov kazenske odgovornosti za pomoč pri izvršitvi mednarodnih hudodelstev kaže, 
da objektivni element (actus reus), in znotraj tega zlasti standard ‘znatnega prispevka’ (angl. 
substantial contribution) k izvršitvi mednarodnega hudodelstva, kot pogoj za vzpostavitev 
individualne kazenske odgovornosti postavlja (kvantitativno in kvalitativno) določen prag 
nudene pomoči. Namreč, kaznivo je nudenje zlasti tiste vojaške pomoči, ki znatno prispeva k 
izvršitvi mednarodnih hudodelstev. Analiza prakse ad hoc mednarodnih kazenskih sodišč pa 
kaže, da je tovrstna vojaška pomoč predvsem sistemsko (in politično) vprašanje in vselej zahteva 
aktivno podporo državnega aparata. Analiza primera Perišić jasno pokaže, da je pri ugotavljanju 
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objektivnega elementa individualne kazenske odgovornosti vojaškega voditelja presoja obstoja 
državne politike nudenja vojaške pomoči s strani sodnega senata v pretežni meri nadomestila 
presojo ravnanja posameznika (obdolženca), s tem pa zameglila meje med dvema ločenima 
režimoma mednarodne odgovornosti v t.i. “primerih tuje pomoči”. Disertacija tako med drugim 
izpostavlja, da v t.i. “primerih tuje pomoči” odločitev o obstoju individualne kazenske 
odgovornosti vojaškega ali/in političnega voditelja temelji, vsaj posredno, na predhodni presoji 
identičnega dejanskega stanja, ki je predmet presoje pri ugotavljanju državne odgovornosti 
zaradi nudenja vojaške pomoči. 
To ne pomeni, da je individualna kazenska odgovornost odvisna od predhodne ugotovitve 
odgovornosti države, temveč da bi moralo ugotavljanje individualne kazenske odgovornosti 
vključevati predpostavko odgovornosti države za isto ravnanje. Veljalo bi poenotiti pravne 
standarde obeh režimov mednarodne odgovornosti za nudenje vojaške pomoči drugi državi ali 
nedržavnemu akterju. Ob individualni kazenski odgovornosti vojaškega ali političnega voditelja 
za uveljavljanje državne politike glede nudenja vojaške pomoči tuji državi ali nedržavnemu 
akterju v oboroženem spopadu, bi morala biti za isto ravnanje odgovorna tudi država. 
Nadalje disertacija raziskuje ali bi lahko nedavne poskuse ožanja meja individualne kazenske 
odgovornosti za udeležbo v ožjem pomenu v “primerih tuje pomoči” z uporabo standarda 
‘specifične usmerjenosti’ šteli za poskuse zbliževanja obeh režimov mednarodne odgovornosti. 
Disertacija pri tem izhaja iz premise, da pogoj ‘specifične usmerjenosti’, ki ga je uporabil 
pritožbeni senat Mednarodnega sodišča za vojne zločine na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije v 
primeru Perišić, vključuje zahtevo, da je pomoč ali podpora usmerjena v izvršitev hudodelstev, 
torej zahtevo po povezavi med dejanji obtoženca in izvršenimi mednarodnimi hudodelstvi. 
Disertacija izpostavlja, da bi z uporabo tega standarda mednarodna kazenska sodišča približala 
standarde ugotavljanja individualne kazenske odgovornosti za udeležbo pri izvršitvi 
mednarodnih hudodelstev standardom mednarodnega prava odgovornosti držav. Medtem ko v 
luči različnih normativnih temeljev individualne kazenske odgovornosti in odgovornosti držav 
popolna izenačitev obeh normativnih okvirov ni niti zaželjena niti možna, je zavrnitev poskusa 
zaostritve standardov ugotavljanja individualne kazenske odgovornosti za pomoč pri izvršitvi 
mednarodnih hudodelstev preko standarda ‘specifične usmerjenosti’ razkrila razhajanje med 
obema režimoma mednarodne odgovornosti v tem kontekstu. Na podlagi tega pristopa daje 
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vojaška pomoč eni od strani v oboroženem spopadu ob zavedanju, da bo ta stran v spopadu 
verjetno izvršila mednarodno hudodelstvo, podlago za ugotovitev kazenske odgovornosti ne 
glede na morebitni humanitarni namen, težo, specifičnost, usmeritev ali vpliv takšne vojaške 
pomoči. Upoštevajoč te pomisleke je v disertaciji zavzeto stališče, da vodizavrnitev standarda 
‘specifične usmerjenosti’, ali celo nižjega standarda ‘z namenom olajšanja izvršitve’ (kot ga 
zahteva Rimski Statut Mednarodnega kazenskega sodišča), v prag odgovornosti, ki je povsem 
drugačen od tistega za odgovornost države.   
Disertacija izpostavlja pomen uskladitve mednarodnopravnih okvirov individualne kazenske 
odgovornosti in odgovornosti držav za udeležbo pri izvršitvi mednarodnega hudodelstva v obliki 
nudenja vojaške pomoči. Ločenost in zaprtost obeh režimov odgovornosti, oziroma vzdrževanje 
vtisa nepovezanosti in medsebojne neodvisnosti teh dveh režimov, najverjetneje vodi do 
nepotrebnih omejitev razvoja pravil odgovornosti v mednarodnem pravu ter zavira progresivni 
razvoj načel, pravil in postopkov, namenjenih čim večji zaščiti človekovih pravic.  
Vloge Meddržavnega sodišča in mednarodnih kazenskih sodišč so avtonomne, pa vendarle 
medsebojno dopolnjujoče in njihov učinek bi bilo mogoče izboljšati, če bi imele te različne 
institucije bolj kompatibilna pravila glede ugotavljanja odgovornosti držav in ugotavljanja 
individualne kazenske odgovornosti. Če so standardi ugotavljanja slednje znatno nižji od tistih v 
pravu mednarodne odgovornosti držav, obstaja tveganje, da je posameznik spoznan za kazensko 
odgovornega za ravnanje, ki je za državo dopustno. Z namenom izogniti se takšnim neskladjem 
in s ciljem vzpostaviti bolj usklajeno uveljavljanje mednarodne odgovornosti, disertacija 
predlaga razrešitev dileme ad hoc mednarodnih kazenskih sodišč glede mej individualne 
kazenske odgovornosti za sodelovanje pri mednarodnih hudodelstvih v obliki nudenja pomoči in 
podpore z upoštevanjem standardov, uveljavljenih v Rimskem Statutu Mednarodnega 
kazenskega sodišča, ter standardov mednarodnega prava odgovornosti držav, kot so zapisana v 
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The magnitude of the catastrophes often coincides with the grandeur of the legal concepts in 
which refuge is sought: humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect or 
countermeasures in the collective interest. In this perspective, the issue of complicity is 
frequently overlooked. The extent of such crises may, however, be reduced if more emphasis is 
put on the concept of complicity. If States scrutinize their connections with wrongful conduct at 
an early stage, the need for recourse to more intrusive mechanisms may be reduced. One could 
also argue that, before States take any action, they should have scrutinized possible complicity 
with the situation they wish to affect. When they are not complicit themselves, they may remind 
other States of their obligation not to assist the wrongful acts of the State or non-state actor 
engaged in the commission of international crimes. This would require a greater awareness and 
clarity of the issue of complicity among international lawyers and, more importantly, decision-
makers. This dissertation contributes to that end. 
This dissertation examines the question under what conditions does provision of material aid to 
another State or a non-state actor in an armed conflict situations involving the commission of 
international crimes give rise to individual criminal responsibility and/or state responsibility for 
complicity in these crimes. Moreover, this work explores whether political decisions of States to 
provide such military aid qualify as acts of States and are to be addressed within the framework 
of the international law of state responsibility, or whether they are to be dealt with as acts 
entailing individual criminal responsibility within the framework of international criminal law. 
Accordingly, the analysis is methodically limited to the provision of military aid by one State to 
another, or by one State to the non-state groups operating in another State in an armed conflict 
situation. The scope of this dissertation therefore does not include other aspects of the topic at 
issue, such as the regulation of international trade in conventional arms, international cooperation 
and legitimate trade in materiel, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, and illicit arms 
trade.1 Moreover, analysis will not focus on situations in which military aid consists of items 
                                                          
1 Obligations set out in the Arms Trade Treaty, regulating international trade in conventional arms are not the focus 
of this dissertation, as they give rise to direct responsibility of the State Parties for violation of obligations 
prohibiting States to transfer, for example, conventional arms if such transfer would violate its obligations under 
measures adopted by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in particular 
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whose use is wrongful. Rather, it will focus on assistance consisting either of weapons (including 
ammunition), military equipment, monetary grants or other items whose use could be lawful. 
Additionally, for reasons of scope, this study does not address a number of emerging issues and 
areas in international law related to, or even falling within, the notion of complicity. Firstly, it 
does not address corporate complicity. Secondly, it does not deal with the responsibility of 
international organizations that allegedly aided and abetted international crimes committed by 
States or non-state actors. Thirdly, it does not address the ways in which international law holds 
States or individuals jointly responsible (i.e., shared international responsibility2). Fourthly, this 
work does not deal with situations where a State directs and controls the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by another State or coerces such an act. Moreover, it does not 
provide a comprehensive overview of state practice relating to state complicity or of the modes 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
arms embargoes or if the State has knowledge at the time of authorization of the transfer that the arms would be used 
in the commission of core international crimes.  
2 The concept of shared responsibility refers to the responsibility of multiple actors. These actors include States and 
international organizations, but may also include other actors such as multinational corporations and individuals. 
The term refers to the responsibility of multiple actors for their contribution to a single harmful outcome. Such an 
outcome may take a variety of forms, including material or nonmaterial damage to third parties. The issue of shared 
responsibility is related to the question of how to apportion responsibility among these actors. Particularly, it 
addresses plurality of wrongdoing actors and the question of how to distribute responsibility among two or more 
States, international organizations, and individual perpetrators when these States or organizations conduct joint 
military operations in which some soldiers violate international humanitarian law. The term shared responsibility 
examines the problem of allocation of responsibilities among multiple states and other actors. The ILC, in its work 
on state responsibility and the responsibility of international organizations, recognized that attribution of acts to one 
State or organization does not exclude possible attribution of the same act to another state or organization, but has 
provided limited guidance on allocation or reparation. Furthermore, the term shared responsibility strictu sensu 
refers to situations where the contributions of each individual cannot be attributed to them based on causation. If 
individual causal contributions could be determined, the allocation of responsibility could fully be based on 
principles of individual criminal responsibility, rather than shared responsibility. In this sense, shared responsibility 
is an antidote for situations where causation does not provide an adequate basis for responsibility. Another defining 
feature of shared responsibility in this broad sense is that the responsibility of two or more actors for their 
contribution to a particular outcome is distributed to them separately, rather than resting on them collectively. If the 
responsibility rested on a collectivity, it would no longer be shared, but rather would be the responsibility of the 
collectivity as such. To refer to situations of shared responsibility, the term joint responsibility is also used. This is a 
different question from the relationship between state complicity and individual criminal responsibility for 
complicity by way of the provision of military aid conducted in pursuit of a state policy of provision of military aid 
to another State or a non-state actor. For the phenomenon of shared international responsibility among multiple 
actors that contribute to harmful outcomes that international law seeks to prevent, see e.g., Nollkaemper, A., and 
Jacobs, D., Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework, 34 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 359, 2013; Zyberi, G., The Practice of Shared Responsibility in relation to Responsibility of States 
and Individuals for Mass Atrocity Crimes, in Nollkaemper A. and Plakokefalos, I. (eds.), The Practice of Shared 
Responsibility in International Law, Cambridge University Press (SHARES Research Project on Shared 
Responsibility in International Law), 2016; Nollkaemper, A., Principles of Shared Responsibility in International 
Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 6-7: The concept of shared 
responsibility for mass atrocities is based on the premise that international crimes are caused by joint or concerted 
action. This can involve concerted action of two or more States; of a State and political or military leaders of armed 
groups in another State; or of a plurality of individuals. 
18 
of responsibility in international criminal law. 
Instead, this study seeks to understand how international law regulates state and individual 
complicity by way of extraterritorial provision of military aid (situations referred to in this 
dissertation as “foreign assistance cases”). It places the rules into analytical framework based on 
the particular type of complicit conduct prohibited, the nexus between the accomplice’s acts and 
the principal’s wrong, and the fault required of the accomplice. While the analysis is focused on 
primary norms, it includes its impact on rules of State attribution, which form part of secondary 
norms of international law. Responsibility for complicity in international crimes is taken as the 
basis for the concept of state and individual criminal responsibility. Within this framework, the 
goal of the dissertation is to expose and clarify the apparent tension between the existing rules 
relating to the provision of military aid as they derive from international criminal law, on the one 
hand, and the law of state responsibility, on the other. In contemporary international law practice, 
the focus seems to be on the individual criminal responsibility of (an) individual (military or 
political) leader(s) while the responsibility of a State remains unclear.  
In addition to the normative analysis, the dissertation includes an empirical study of the 
landmark “foreign assistance case” arising out of the contemporary armed conflict (i.e., the 
Perišić case3) and the role of a third State and its military leader as potential accomplice in the 
international crimes committed in that conflict. The selected case marked a milestone in the 
development of accomplice liability in international criminal law: for the first time in history a 
military leader of one State had been found individually criminally responsible as accomplice for 
the crimes committed by members of the armed forces of another State or entity. Accordingly, 
prior to Perišić, no political or military leader had been charged before the international 
tribunal(s) with aiding and abetting international crimes of another State or armed groups 
operating in another State merely for the reason that he supplied them with arms or personnel.  
Moreover, this particular case has been chosen for this study as it represents the only “foreign 
assistance case” whereby both regimes of international responsibility had been invoked. Namely, 
the provision of military aid by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter: FRY) to the 
Republic of Srpska (hereinafter: RS) and its army during the armed conflict in BiH between 
                                                          
3 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-T (hereinafter: Perišić case). 
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1991-1995 led to the only instance, thus far, of concurrent adjudication of individual criminal 
responsibility (for complicity) by an international criminal tribunal and adjudication of state 
responsibility (for complicity) by the ICJ. Particularly, the Perišić case and the Genocide case4 
offer an unparalleled example of exercise of parallel jurisdiction over the same set of facts. In the 
Genocide case the ICJ resorted to the criminal law notion of ‘aiding and abetting’ when 
determining under what conditions provision of military aid by a State to a non-state actor 
invokes state responsibility. This decision serves as an important ground to initiate a discussion 
on the comparison between these two different regimes of international responsibility in cases of 
complicity. 
Using the Perišić proceedings before the ICTY and the parallel Genocide inter-state proceedings 
before the ICJ as a case study, this dissertation examines the links between international criminal 
prosecutions implicating top military leaders and judicial proceedings addressing state 
responsibility that involve similar facts and legal norms. In the Genocide case, state 
responsibility claims were accompanied by prosecutions of individuals whose acts led to the 
responsibility of the State. Not only are the Perišić/Genocide cases a good example of such 
parallelism; they offer, in fact, the only example of a military leader being actually convicted 
before an international criminal court while parallel legal proceedings were pending against his 
State before another international court. The lessons that can be drawn from these parallel 
proceedings may help us better understand the practical and theoretical issues raised by the 
simultaneous pursuit of individual and state responsibility over the same set of acts (or omission) 
before different adjudicative mechanisms. At a minimum, the Perišić/Genocide proceedings 
clearly demonstrate that international courts concerned with individual and state responsibility 
over the same facts should adopt a more comprehensive approach when adjudging legal 
consequences of acts capable of triggering individual and state responsibility.  
This thesis attempts to explore the consequences of the expansion of the domain of individual 
criminal responsibility in cases of complicity for the law of state responsibility. A State’s 
possible involvement in a number of core international crimes is generally recognized.5 The 
                                                          
4 ICJ, Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43 (hereinafter: 
Genocide case). 
5 Nollkaemper, A., Concurrence between Individual Responsibility and State Responsibility in International Law, 52 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2003, p. 621. 
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criminal character of an act remains constant regardless of whether the State or an individual is 
the main actor. This creates a presumption that if an act is recognized as entailing individual 
criminal responsibility, the same act, in the right context, might also entail state responsibility. 
Establishment of individual criminal responsibility (for complicity) does not necessarily mean 
that the State is atomised and that the State could negate its own responsibility by having 
responsibility shifted towards individual State organs – state responsibility can exist next to 
individual criminal responsibility.6 Accordingly, if certain acts that essentially boil down to 
implementation of state policy entail criminal responsibility when committed by an individual, 
the same acts should also entail responsibility when committed by a State. To conclude 
otherwise would allow States to shield themselves behind an individual. Thus, the work proposes 
that, in the “foreign assistance cases”, the whole of the international law norms concerning the 
prohibition of complicity in international crimes should operate at both, inter-state and individual 
level. As a result, there would be no legal loopholes given that State and individual criminal 
responsibility operate as complementary instruments aimed at suppressing complicity in 
international crimes. 
The thesis aims to show that in addressing accomplice liability when dealing with provision of 
military aid, there is a direct connection between state responsibility and individual criminal 
responsibility. The question to be examined is whether the mere provision of military assistance 
to another State or a non-state actor (e.g., rebel forces) engaged in an armed conflict can be 
equated with aiding and abetting the crimes committed during such a conflict. The subsequent 
analysis is based on the premise that the provision of military aid by a State in contemporary 
armed conflicts, which involve the commission of international crimes may, under certain 
circumstances, be characterized as complicity in those crimes. As regards the rules concerning 
individual criminal responsibility of political and military leaders in this context, some guidance 
can be found in the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. In particular, the recent 
judgment of the ICTY in the Perišić case ambitiously drew new boundaries and set stricter 
standards in terms of accomplice liability of military and political leaders when providing 
military aid to another State or non-state actors operating in another State. This dissertation aims 
to show that new developments of international criminal law should affect the rules governing 
the responsibility of States in this regard: if military or political leaders are to be responsible for 
                                                          
6 Ibidem. 
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implementing the state policy concerning the provision of military aid to another State/non-state 
actor in an armed conflict situation, then the State should equally be held responsible for that 
conduct. In other words, the determination of individual criminal responsibility for complicity in 
the commission of international crimes by way of provision of military aid should entail the 
presumption of state responsibility for the same act. 
While perfect alignment is neither desirable nor feasible given the fundamentally different 
underpinnings of state and individual criminal responsibility, recent international case law has 
rejected an attempt to raise the aiding and abetting standard that insisted on a purposive element 
for complicity. Such rejection exposed the disconnection of individual criminal responsibility 
from state responsibility in this context. The premise of this dissertation is that the element of 
specific direction advocated in Perišić requires that the assistance be directed/aimed towards the 
crimes, thereby establishing the requisite nexus between the acts of the accused and the crime(s) 
committed. Moreover, it is argued that by adopting specific direction standard in Perišić, the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber adequately brought individual criminal responsibility for complicity 
closer to that of state responsibility. This dissertation will show that it is conceptually 
problematic to disconnect the responsibility of a military or a political leader, whose acts can 
only be explained by the fact that he acted for the State, entirely from the responsibility of the 
State itself. 
This dissertation explores the proposition that extraterritorial provision of military aid qualifying 
as complicity in international crimes necessarily entails the implementation of a state policy, and 
should therefore be considered as an act of a State rather than (or in addition to) an act of an 
individual. The premise of this analysis is that provision of (substantial) military aid to another 
State or non-state actors operating in another State is not an act which can be perpetrated by a 
single individual in isolation from the State apparatus. It is submitted that the case of individual 
complicity by way of provision of military aid by definition requires the substantial involvement 
of the State (military apparatus) in its perpetration. This is not to claim that individual criminal 
responsibility is dependent upon the previous establishment of state responsibility, but rather that 
individual complicity entails a clear overlap between state responsibility and individual criminal 
responsibility, since the same conduct triggers both kinds of international responsibility.  
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The aim of this dissertation is to show that in cases of complicity by way of provision of military 
aid international crimes are generally perpetrated at the State level or in the framework of a state 
policy or with the involvement of the State apparatus. As a rule, international criminal courts 
have no jurisdiction to adjudicate on issues of state responsibility and are very rigorous in 
applying the principle of individual criminal responsibility. However, when they establish facts 
pertaining to the general criminal context, and in particular facts in which a State is involved, this 
can have a deep impact on the parallel establishment of state responsibility for international 
crimes. Accordingly, in such cases both regimes should be examined and viewed concurrently 
when addressing accomplice liability for provision of military aid. Throughout Part II and Part 
III the dissertation argues for the need to better align the normative frameworks of individual and 
state responsibility for complicity. Confinement of distinct and separate sets of responsibility 
rules for different types of international actors – or maintenance of a perception that these 
regimes are unrelated and not co-dependent – is likely to impose unnecessary restrictions on the 
development of theories of responsibility in international law, impeding the progressive 
development of principles, rules, and procedures that extend the fullest protection possible to 
human rights and impose the greatest cost on those actors that violate the most fundamental 
norms of international law.7 
From a methodological point of view, the inquiry into the relationship between state and 
individual criminal responsibility for complicity in international crimes will be carried out on the 
basis of a three-step analysis.  
Part I examines theoretical framework of the relationship between these two regimes of 
international responsibility. First, a definition of basic notions is set forth, illustrating the legal 
framework in which the inquiry will be developed. Second, the concepts and (separate) evolution 
of respective doctrines of state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility are 
introduced. Third, various doctrinal approaches8 to this relationship will be examined and 
                                                          
7 Reid, N. L., Bridging the Conceptual Chasm: Superior Responsibility as the Missing Link between State and 
Individual Responsibility under International Law, 18 Leiden Journal of International Law, 2005, p. 828.  
8 The kind of legal research prominent in professional legal writings, such as handbooks, monographs, 
commentaries, and textbooks of law that implements a specific legal method consisting in the systematic, 
analytically evaluative exposition of the substance of public international law and international criminal law, is 
called »legal doctrine«. Although an exposition of this kind may contain historical, sociological, philosophical, and 
other considerations, its core consists in the interpretation and systematization of valid law. More precisely, it 
consists in a description of the literal sense of statutes, precedents, etc., intertwined with many moral and other 
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evaluated. Accordingly, the works of international law scholars will be taken into account, 
expressing different views on specific issues raised by this relationship. Neither a systematic 
analysis of the relationship between these two responsibility regimes entailed by the commission 
of international crimes nor a general theory of this relationship is to be found in the international 
law literature.9 Thus, Part I attempts to provide such a systematic analysis by examining the 
applicable works of different international law scholars in order to identify the conceptual 
schemes aiming to explain the relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility 
and to evaluate which of these conceptual schemes best corresponds to cases of individual and 
state complicity by way of provision of military aid. While different questions concerning the 
relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility for international crimes have 
been addressed by various international law scholars10, this dissertation contributes to the 
existing research and debate by examining this relationship in cases of individual and state 
complicity by way of provision of military aid (i.e., in the “foreign assistance cases”). 
Particularly, the contribution of this dissertation should be seen in its examination of the possible 
application of the adequate doctrinal model of this relationship, in cases of individual and state 
complicity by way of provision of military aid.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
substantive reasons. See, e.g., Pattaro, E., The Law and the Right, in Roversi, C. (ed.), A Treatise of Legal 
Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Volume I, Springer, 2005.   
9 To this day the only coherent treatise, the author was able to identify, on mutual relationship between state and 
individual responsibility is work by Bonafé, B. I., The Relationship Between State and Individual Responsibility for 
International Crimes, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009. 
10 These are, for example, the risks of an increasing focus on individual criminal responsibility at the detriment of 
state responsibility for the same acts (See, e.g., Evans, M. D., International Wrongs and National Jurisdiction, in 
Evans, M.D. (ed.), Remedies in International Law: The Institutional Dilemma, Hart Publishing, 1998, pp. 173–190); 
the risk of a compartmentalized conception of state and individual criminal responsibility under international law 
(See, e.g., Trindade, A.A.C., Complementarity between State Responsibility and Individual Responsibility for Grave 
Violations of Human Rights: The Crime of State Revisited, in M. Ragazzi (ed.) International Responsibility Today: 
Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter, 2005, pp. 253–270); the question of whether the establishment of individual 
criminal responsibility of state organs also entails state responsibility (See, e.g., Dominicé, C., La question de la 
double responsabilité de l’Etat et de son agent, in E. Yakpo and T. Boumedra (eds.), Liber Amicorum Judge 
Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 143–157); the different degrees of the 
relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility (See, e.g., Dupuy, P. M., International Criminal 
Responsibility of the Individual and International Responsibility of the State, in Cassese, A. et al. (eds.), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, Volume II, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 1085–
1099); the underdevelopment of aggravated state responsibility for international crimes when compared to 
individual criminal responsibility (See, e.g., Bos, A., supra note 49, pp. 221–237); the impact of the development of 
international criminal law on state responsibility (See, e.g., Nollkaemper, A., supra note 5, pp. 615–640), and the 
question of the application of similar defences under both state and individual criminal responsibility for 
international crimes (See, e.g. Dupuy, P. M., International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual and 
International Responsibility of the State, in Cassese, A. et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court. A Commentary, Volume II, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 1085–1099). 
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Part II examines individual criminal responsibility for international crimes, focusing in particular 
on the treatment of aiding and abetting as a mode of criminal responsibility by the ad hoc 
tribunals and the ICC. Primarily, by a systematic analysis of international jurisprudence and 
some particularly problematic aspects of the individual complicity by way of provision of 
military aid, Part II seeks to identify a general legal framework of individual criminal 
responsibility for complicity. The results emerging from the analysis of jurisprudence of 
international criminal tribunals will be examined by application of the normative framework on 
the landmark case of individual complicity by way of provision of military aid. Accordingly, the 
second part of Part II engages these normative dimensions of the “foreign assistance cases” 
through an appraisal of the legal elements that have played a central role in judicial and scholarly 
efforts to set the boundaries of complicity. By illustrating the competing approaches to aiding 
and abetting it is suggested that the most adequate resolution of the “foreign assistance cases” 
inevitably resists easy encapsulation and requires proof beyond the mere provision of military 
aid. Thus, Part II turns to the much-debated specific direction standard applied in Perišić that 
plays a particularly important role in the “foreign assistance cases” and considers it in the light 
of proper and adequate application of the actus reus requirement of substantial assistance. 
Part III explains a general legal framework of state complicity in international law. State 
responsibility for complicity is addressed specifically for violations of international law 
committed by States and individuals or groups that have received some form of aid or assistance 
from a State. The normative structure of state complicity will be looked at from the practical 
perspective, namely from its application in the context of provision of military aid by the ICJ in 
the Nicaragua case11, the Armed Activities case12 and the Genocide case.  
Finally, Concluding remarks address the basic question of the existence of a relationship between 
state and individual criminal responsibility for complicity. The results of the inquiry into the 
existing doctrinal models identified in Part I will be evaluated in light of the results of the 
analysis of normative framework and international practice of complicity conducted in Part II 
and Part III. By examining the landmark case of complicity by way of provision of military aid 
                                                          
11 ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA), Merits, 
Judgment, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986 (hereinafter: Nicaragua case). 
12 ICJ, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 
ICJ Reports 2005 (hereinafter: Armed Activities case). 
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in international practice, the dissertation explores the overlap and interaction between these 
forms of responsibility, and considers whether the attempted narrowing of individual criminal 
responsibility under aiding and abetting through the insistence on a “specific direction” element 
can be seen as an attempt to bring these two regimes of international responsibility closer. 
Inevitably, this final part presents a selection of the most significant problems entailed by the 
relationship between these regimes in the “foreign assistance cases.” In particular, these regard 
the diverging standards of state and individual criminal responsibility for complicity in 
international crimes, and the potential for parallel establishment of state and individual criminal 
responsibility for complicity by way of provision of military aid. Since the various connections 
between state and individual criminal responsibility for complicity in international crimes 
revealed by the case study and the study of international practice show a certain complementarity 
between these regimes, concluding remarks argue for establishment of a comprehensive 
framework capable of securing a more effective co-ordination between them. 
A central question of this dissertation concerns the structure of complicity rules in international 
law. As a normative matter, complicity rules ought to hold accomplices responsible for their own 
contribution to the principal’s wrong, rather than for the wrong committed by the principal. This 
normative claim is married to an analytical assessment of complicity rules structured around a 
particular form of complicity (i.e., complicity by way of provision of military aid), the nexus 
between the accomplice’s acts and the principal's wrong, and the fault of the accomplice. The 
normative claim of this dissertation is that doctrines of complicity ought to give rise to individual 
as well as state responsibility and sanction for the accomplice’s contribution to the principal’s 
wrong. Furthermore, if doctrines of complicity in international crimes by way of provision of 
military aid give rise to individual criminal responsibility, than the same act should give rise to 
state responsibility.  
The analysis will also be conducted from the historical perspective. It will chart the evolution 
and development of complicity norms in the field of individual criminal responsibility and state 
responsibility, respectively. The legacy of the international military tribunal (hereinafter: IMT) 
and jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals will assist in outlining the concept of 
individual criminal responsibility for complicity, whereas travaux preparatioires and the ILC 
Commentary to the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
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(hereinafter: the “Articles on State Responsibility” or the “Articles” or “ARSIWA”)13, the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter: Genocide 
Convention)14, Geneva Conventions15, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter: Torture Convention)16, General Assembly 
resolutions and Security Council resolutions concerning provision of aid and assistance17, and 
the ICJ rulings adjudicating cases of state responsibility for provision of military aid18 will assist 
in outlining the concept of state responsibility for complicity. The research material is also 
extended to books, law reviews, articles and relevant international and national jurisprudence on 
complicity.  
                                                          
13 The Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, as contained in ILC Report on the 
Work of its 53rd Session, YILC, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, UN Doc A/55/10 (2000) (hereinafter: ILC Report on the 
Workd of its 53rd Session) and annexed to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/83 (12 December 2001) 
and corrected by document A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4. 
14 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, art. VI, 78 UNTS 
277. 
15 ICRC, Geneva Convention (I) on Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949), 75 
UNTS 31; ICRY, Geneva Convention (II) on Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 
August 1949), 75 UNTS 85; ICRC, Geneva Convention (III) on Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949), 75 
UNTS 135; ICRC, Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, (adopted 
12 August 1949), 75 UNTS 287. 
16 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 
1984, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). 
17 See, e.g., the first principle of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 
2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, annex); Report of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the Third 
Committee of the General Assembly, draft resolution XVII (A/37/745), p. 50; UN SC Resolution 1970 [on peace 
and security in Africa], U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011), adopted by the SC at its 6491st meeting, on 26 February 
2011; UN SC Resolution 217 [Southern Rhodesia], UN Doc. S/RES/217 (1965) adopted by the SC at its 1257th 
Meeting, on 20 November 1965; UN SC Resolution 1315 [on the Situation in Sierra Leone], UN Doc. S/RES/1315 
(2000) adopted by the SC at its 4186th meeting, on 14 August 2000; UN SC Resolution 824, U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 
(1993) adopted by the SC at its 3208th Meeting, on 6 May 1993; UN SC Resolution 465 [the situation relating to 
settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem] U.N. Doc. S/RES/465 (1980) adopted 
by the SC at its 2203rd meeting, on 1 March 1980; UN SC Resolution 276 [the Situation in Namibia], U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/276 (1970) adopted by the SC at its 1529th meeting, on 30 January 1970; UN General Assembly Resolution, 
UN Doc. A/RES/38/180 of 19 December 1983 (on the situation in the Middle East); UN General Assembly 
Resolution, UN General Assembly Resolution UN Doc. A/RES/39/146 of 14 December 1984 (on the situation in the 
Middle East); 
18 Nicaragua case, Armed Activities case, Genocide case, East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment of 30 June 
1995, ICJ Rep. 90, para. 29 (hereinafter: East Timor case); Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company 
(Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Report, (hereinafter: Barcelona Traction 
Case); ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136 et seq. (hereinafter: the Wall case). 
27 
 
PART I - THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN STATE AND INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
1. Introduction  
The relationship between state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility for acts or 
omissions that constitute at the same time internationally wrongful acts as well as crimes under 
international criminal law forms one of the most fascinating, yet underdeveloped, questions of 
international law. While both state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility have 
generated considerable debate in literature, the articulation of these two forms of responsibility in 
the realm of international crimes remains, for the most part, unclear.19  
The thesis will focus on a particular mode of responsibility, namely complicity by way of 
provision of military aid. For a more coherent analysis only core international crimes (i.e. crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and the crime of genocide) will be taken into account. The mutual 
relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility for international crimes has 
been subject of attention of international doctrine for various reasons over time. The early era, 
confronted with the establishment of the first international criminal tribunals, had to substantiate 
the very existence of an individual as a separate legal person in international law.20 The next 
period, marked by the introduction of international crimes of States21, had to evaluate their link 
to the well established categories of crimes under international law. Finally, the current increased 
doctrinal interest in the field can be reasoned by parallel legal proceedings before various 
international courts concerning state and individual criminal responsibility for international 
crimes.  
                                                          
19 Bonafé, B. I., supra note 9, p. 56. 
20 Similarly Nollkaemper, A., supra note 5; Bonafé, B. I., supra note 9, Franck, T., Individual Criminal Liability and 
Collective Civil Responsiblity: do they reinforce or contradict one another, 6 Washington U. Global Studies Law 
Review, 2007, p. 567; Jørgensen, N. H. B., The Responsibility of States for International Crimes, Oxford University 
Press, 2003, Dupuy, P. M., supra note 10. 
21 The controversial notion of “international crimes of state” was introduced to indicate the category of crimes for 
which state involvement is a constitutive element of their definition, in the sense that they cannot be established 
factually without the implication of the state. In those cases, state involvement is a necessary precondition of the 
establishment of individual criminal responsibility. The use of the term is not intended to make any reference to the 
now obsolete concept of state international crimes reflected in Draft Article 19 of the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility (that was partly substituted by the notion of “aggravated” state responsibility), nor to the concept of 
criminal responsibility of the state, which has as of today no basis in international law.  
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Following an examination of international practice in Part II and Part III of the thesis, the various 
points of contact between state and individual criminal responsibility for complicity in 
international crimes revealed a certain degree of co-dependence and complementarity between 
these regimes. This dissertation argues for a need of a full appreciation of the mutual relationship 
and coexistence of the two regimes of responsibility.  
1.1. Definition of Basic Notions 
The dissertation has the limited purpose of examining the relationship between state 
responsibility and individual criminal responsibility for complicity in international crimes, 
focusing on the particular form of complicity by way of provision of military aid to another State 
or a non-state actor operating in another State. Thus, Definition of basic concepts used in this 
dissertation is necessary in order to enhance its consistency and prevent potential 
misunderstandings.  
The notion of ‘complicity’ comprises a range of terms used to describe an actor’s participation in 
a wrongdoing committed by another actor (e.g., aiding, abetting, assisting, advising, persuading, 
counselling, inducing, instigating, soliciting, helping, giving comfort, procuring the commission 
of an offence). These may be termed modes or forms of complicity.22 Together these terms 
prohibit complicity as a particular way of contributing to a wrongdoing. As the concern of this 
work is primarily responsibility for provision of military aid and assistance, this dissertation 
limits the usage of complicity to a particular mode of participation in a wrongdoing committed 
by another actor, namely (i) aiding and assisting by a State to another State or a non-state actor 
operating in another State and (ii) aiding and abetting by an individual to another State or a non-
state actor operating in another State. In the law of individual criminal responsibility, there is no 
uniform use of the terms mentioned. Whether understood as complicity, accessory or secondary 
liability, this dissertation is ultimately focused on individual complicity not for the direct 
perpetration or commission of crimes under international law, but for aiding and abetting 
international crimes committed in another State by way of provision of military aid.  
A broad understanding of the principle of complicity is adopted so as to conduct a proper 
comparison of how States and individuals, respectively, incur responsibility for their complicit 
                                                          
22 Smith, K. J. M., A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity, Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and 
Justice, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 31. 
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conduct. Complicity in a wrongdoing thus occurs when an actor violates a rule that was designed 
to prevent it from influencing that wrong. Out of three modes of aiding and abetting under the 
law of ad hoc tribunals, individual complicity in this work studies practical assistance, but not 
encouragement and moral support.  
Second, the notion of ‘international crimes’, referring to both state and individual criminal 
responsibility, may need some preliminary clarification. For the sake of simplicity, international 
crimes is a very short and clear expression that will be employed herein to refer to those very 
serious breaches of customary international law rules entailing both state responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility. In no way is this intended to suggest that, when referring to 
breaches entailing state responsibility, international law provides for a criminal regime of state 
responsibility.23 It therefore encompasses crimes under international law committed by 
individuals24 and international crimes stricto sensu contained in former Article 1925 of the 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.26 This solution is practical 
since it escapes usage of current terminology under Articles on State Responsibility, namely 
Article 40 (serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms of general 
                                                          
23 The International Law Commission (hereinafter: ILC) has used this expression for years in connection with state 
responsibility, and in particular in the attempt to codify special consequences to attach to very serious breaches of 
international obligations. From the very beginning, the ILC has made it plain that referring to international crimes 
did not imply the establishment of a criminal regime of state responsibility under international law (see the ILC 
Commentary on Article 19, ILC, Report of the ILC on the Work of its 28th Session, YILC (1976), vol. II(2), pp. 104, 
119) (hereinafter: ILC Report on the Work of its 28th Session). Nonetheless, the use of this expression raised some 
concern, because it could suggest the development of such a regime (see the general commentary on Articles 40 and 
41, p. 111, paras. 5–6). Thus, the ILC decided to abandon this terminology in favour of a more neutral one. See 
Crawford, J., First Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/490/Add.1, para. 60, and UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/490/Add.2, paras. 68–71; Crawford, J., Third Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507, para. 9, 
and A/CN.4/507/Add.4, para. 407; Crawford, J., Fourth Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/517, 
paras. 48–9. See infra Section 1.2.2. 
24 Principles of the Nüremberg Tribunal 1950, Report of the ILC (Principles of International Law Recognized in the 
Tribunal), July 29, 1950, UN GAOR, 5th Session, Supplement (No. 12) 11, UN Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in 4 
American Journal of International Law 126, 1950 (hereinafter: Nüremberg Principles), Principle I. 
25 The famous Article 19 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility has produces floods of ink, See e.g. Wieler, 
J.J.H., Cassese, A. and Spinedi, M., International Crimes of States, 1989. The debate resumed with the new Special 
Rapporteur Professor James Crawford (See, Crawford, J., First Report on State Responsibility, supra note 23) where 
all useful references will be found. 
26 Spinedi, M., International Crimes of State. The Legislative History, in: Weiler, J.J.H., Cassese, A. and Spinedi, 
M., (eds), International crimes of state: a critical analysis of the ILC's Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility, 
Berlin, New York, 1989, p. 138. DASR Article 19 (2) defined international crime as an internationally wrongful act 
which results from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental 
interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole. 
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international law), traditionally described as the “twin brother”27 of previous concept under 
former Article 19. The term ‘serious breaches of obligations arising under peremptory norms of 
general international law’ is used only to remove repetition of wording ‘international crimes’ and 
refers strictly to the branch of state responsibility.28  
Third, state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility for complicity will be taken into 
account only for acts that constitute at the same time internationally wrongful acts as well as 
crimes under international criminal law: aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide and torture. Only international crimes prohibited under customary international law 
will be examined, focusing on the “core international crimes” in order to limit the analysis to a 
small number of well-established rules establishing binding obligations on all the members of the 
international community.  
Additionally, the analysis concentrates on particular elements developed under international law 
for the complicity rules in the regimes of state and individual criminal responsibility, 
respectively. Accordingly, it essentially focuses on the relationship between state responsibility 
and individual criminal responsibility for complicity by way of provision of military aid under 
international law. As will be discussed below, these regimes both originate from the breach of 
primary norms aimed at safeguarding the same collective interests of the international 
community and can thus be compared.  
In accordance with international theory and practice, state responsibility is envisaged here as a 
legal institute, which is “neither civil, nor penal, but simply international”.29 State responsibility 
is connected only with the reparation of damages and in no way implies punishment of the 
State.30 On the other hand, responsibility of an individual is defined in a strictly criminal sense, 
without any reference to its potential civil character which may be found in some domestic legal 
                                                          
27 Wyler, E., From "State Crime" to Responsibility for "Serious Breaches of Obligations under Peremptory Norms 
of General International Law, 13 EJIL, 2002, pp. 1147. 
28 The ILC had always referred to obligations owed to the international community as a whole until the provisional 
Draft adopted in 2000 (see Article 41 of the Articles on State Responsibility provisionally adopted by the Drafting 
Committee on second reading, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L 600). All of a sudden a year later, the final version of Article 40 
emerged, referring to “serious breaches of peremptory norms of general international law” (ILC Report on the Work 
of its 53rd Session, p. 112). According to Wyler, E., Ibidem, p. 1159, the substitution of ‘crimes’ with ‘serious 
breaches’ “has been nothing more than a ‘cosmetic’ change in the law of responsibility”. 
29 Pellet, A., Responsabilité de l’état et responsabilité pénale individuelle en droit international. Guest Lecture 
Series of the Office of the Prosecutor, The Hague, 30 May 2006, p. 4. 
30 Cassese, A., International Criminal Law, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 19. 
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orders.31 A unified term ‘responsibility’ shall be used throughout this dissertation when referring 
to either responsibility within the law of state responsibility as well as individual criminal 
responsibility under international criminal law. The concepts of state responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility are briefly described here in order to set out the general 
framework in which the following analysis will be structured. 
1.2. The Concepts of State Responsibility and Individual Criminal Responsibility 
1.2.1. The Evolution of State Responsibility 
State responsibility assigns responsibility to a State that breaches its international obligations.32 
In its traditional sense, it provided remedies to a State for internationally wrongful act committed 
by another State. Thus, state responsibility has long encapsulated the simple but vital principle of 
attaching legal responsibility to every legal wrong.33 Judge Huber in the Spanish Zone of 
Morocco Claims (Spain v. United Kingdom) stated: ‘Responsibility is the necessary corollary of 
a right. All rights of an international character involve international responsibility. If the 
obligation in question is not met, responsibility entails the duty to make reparation.’34 State 
responsibility is therefore essential to the authority and effectiveness of international law.  
As the principal institution of international law, state responsibility results from the general legal 
personality of every State under international law, and from the fact that States are the principal 
bearers of international obligations. One of its early predecessors is the concept of just war and 
reprisals developed in the 14th and 15th centuries, which posited that a State was entitled to wage 
war, as a matter of last resort, to enforce its rights against another State and, that a State which 
waged an unjust war had the obligation to pay damages to the injured State.35 The principle of 
state responsibility originates from the nature of the international legal system, which relies on 
                                                          
31 Murphy, J., Civil liability for the commission of international crimes as an alternative to criminal prosecution, in: 
12 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 1999, p. 28.  
32 Shaw, M., International Law, 5th Edition, 2003, p. 694. 
33 Baderin, M. A., and Ssenyonjo, M., International Human Rights Law: Six Decades After the UDHR and Beyond, 
Ashgate, 2010, p. 397. 
34 1923, 2 RIAA 615, 641. 
35 Brownlie, I., System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility, Part I, Clarendon Press, 1983, p. 3.  
32 
States as means of formulating and implementing its rules, and arises out of the twin doctrines of 
state sovereignty36 and equality of States.37  
Historically, state responsibility was developed with the aim of protecting the rights of aliens. 
Before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 194838, the incursion by one 
State into the sovereignty of another State was permissible only where that State sought to 
protect the rights of its nationals threatened or violated in that other State. The doctrine of state 
responsibility was thus developed as a device aimed principally at protecting the rights of aliens 
in a foreign State.39 Foreign nationals were entitled to be treated equally with nationals or at least 
in accordance with minimum international standards of justice.40 The doctrine was enforced by 
States through diplomatic means and at times through international arbitration, adjudication or 
force.41 The consequence of the doctrine of state responsibility for injury to aliens was also to 
deny any other State but the national State of the alien a right to act for the rights of that alien.  
These traditional conceptions of state responsibility have altered in two fundamental ways. The 
first concerns the status of the individual in international law and the second relates to the range 
of States, which can enforce rights in international law. When individual criminal responsibility 
emerged after the end of World War II as part of a process of transformation of international law, 
individuals eventually came to the fore as subjects of the international legal order with their own 
set of rights and responsibilities.42 The idea that individuals have duties that transcend national 
                                                          
36 The doctrine of state sovereignty requires that States refrain from issuing binding orders towards other States. The 
purpose of this immunity is to protect state actors while they perform their duties without foreign interference, as 
well as protect their State's dignity. See Wirth, S., Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ's Judgment in the Congo v. 
Belgium Case, 13 EJIL 877, 882 (2002). Because heads of state or foreign ministers carry out much of international 
relations, protection of state functions requires that sovereign immunity be extended to these officials. (See Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961) Before the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, the doctrine of state sovereignty served as a shield to protect States from international scrutiny in 
matters concerning the domestic protection of human rights. Issues of human rights within the domestic sphere fell 
within the boundaries of state sovereignty, and, by operation of its sister doctrine of the equality of all States, no 
state had a right to question the status of human rights in another State.  
37 Baderin, M. A., and Ssenyonjo, M., supra note 33.  
38 GA Res. 217A (III), UN Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). 
39 Garcia Amador, F.V., State Responsibility: International Responsibility, 2 Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1956, pp. 173-231, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 
40 Ibidem, p. 201. 
41 Brownlie, I., supra note 35, p. 3.  
42 Ever since the 1966 edition of Principles of International Law Brownlie has asserted, 'There is no general rule that 
the individual cannot be a “subject of international law”, and in particular contexts he appears as a legal person on 
the international plane (See 7th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2008 p. 65); For the doctrinal debate on the 
question whether individuals are to be considered 'subjects' of internaitonal law, see e.g. Clapham, A., The Role of 
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boundaries, set forth in the Nüremberg judgment,43 paved the way for the consolidation of their 
autonomous status under international law. Furthermore, in 1970 the existence of obligations 
towards the international community as a whole was affirmed by the ICJ in the Case concerning 
the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd44 in a generally accepted dictum:  
“[a]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international 
community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. 
By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga 
omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of 
acts of aggression, and of genocide, and also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights 
of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination.” 45 
Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general 
international law46; others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-
universal character.”47 Accordingly, not only an injured State, but all States may evoke state 
responsibility for a breach of obligations erga omnes. 
The progressive development of international law and its codification have been one of the major 
aspects in the evolution of international law since the Second World War, one in which the ILC 
has played a central role. In 1962, it was recommended that the ILC identifies the general rules 
governing state responsibility for breaches of international law.48 Thus, in the early sixties, the 
ILC changed its approach to the question of state responsibility. The emphasis was no longer on 
the international responsibility of States for violations of obligations concerning the treatment of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Individual in International Law, Eur J Int Law, 2010, 21; Assenza, C.M., Individual as Subject of international 
law in the International Court of Justice Jurisprudence, University of Heidelberg, 2010 (pointing out the doctrinary 
discrepancy regarding the concept of international subjectivity and identifying four possible criteria for its 
attribution to a person; this study asserts how it is possible that in a gradual way, over time, due to the existence of 
new conditions in the international arena, the individual evolved from being considered a mere object of law into a 
subject of international law, endowed with rights and duties under international law.); Trindade, A.A.C., The 
Emancipation of the individual from his own State: The Historical Recovery of the Human Person as Subject of the 
Law of Nations, Human rights, democracy and the rule of law, 2007, p. 156. 
43 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Vol. 1 (Nüremberg, 1947), p. 223 
(hereinafter: Nüremberg proceedings).  
44 Barcelona Traction Case, para. 33. 
45 Barcelona Traction Case, paras. 33, 34.  
46 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 
I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 23. 
47 Barcelona Traction Case, paras. 33, 34.  
48 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1963, Vol. II (Part One), UN Doc. A/CN.4/152, p. 228, para. 5. 
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aliens. The approach became to define the rules of international responsibility of the State in 
general, namely the rules defining the conditions for the existence of internationally wrongful 
acts and its consequences.49 In 1973, the ILC began its consideration of the Draft Articles 
submitted by its Special Rapporteur, Roberto Ago, dealing with the rules. The basic assumption 
of the Articles was a distinction based on the importance to the international community of the 
obligations involved, and accordingly on the acknowledgement of a distinct and more serious 
category of internationally wrongful acts, which could be described as international crimes. For 
over more than four decades, the ILC has been examining the underlying concepts of state 
responsibility: attribution, breach, excuses, and consequences.50 While the rules on state 
responsibility started its development in customary international law, in 2001, the ILC adopted 
the Articles on state responsibility, which seek to formulate, by way of codification and 
progressive development, the basic rules of international law concerning the state responsibility 
for internationally wrongful acts. Accordingly, under customary international law as codified by 
the ILC Articles, state responsibility is invoked whenever the breach of an international 
obligation is attributable to a State; that is, liability and the obligation to make reparations to 
other States are triggered by an internationally wrongful act by a State.51 
State responsibility originally dealt with international wrongful acts in general, without 
distinguishing between different classes of wrongs. However, there have been efforts to 
introduce the idea of “international crimes of States” into this notion.52 In the early attempts of 
                                                          
49 Bos, A., Crimes of State: In Need of Legal Rules?, in G. Kreijen (ed.), State, Sovereignty, and International 
Governance, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 230. 
50 The law of international state responsibility addresses the consequences arising from the breach of international 
obligations. Primary obligations trigger the law of state responsibility, i.e. obligations owed among States under 
international law, whereas secondary obligations deal with the consequences arising from the breach of primary 
obligations. The law of international sate responsibility is exclusively concerned with secondary obligations. It does 
not attempt to codify the entirety of international obligations owed among states. Thus, only the consequences 
arising out of the breach of a primary obligation belong to the law of state responsibility. See, e.g., Joyner, D. H. and 
Roscini, M., The law of state responsibility, in Joyner, D. H. and Roscini, M. (eds.), Non-Proliferation Law as a 
Special Regime: A Contribution to Fragmentation Theory in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 
pp. 173–174. 
51 See Article 1 and 2 ARSIWA.  
52 The question of "crimes of State" has generated a substantial literature: see, e.g., Abi-Saab, G., The Uses of Article 
19, 10 EJIL, 1999, p. 339; Bowett, D.W., Crimes of State and the 1996 Report of the International law Commission 
on State Responsibility, 9 EJIL, 1998, p. 163; De Hoogh, A., Obligation Erga Omnes and International Crimes – A 
Theoretical Inquiry into the Implementation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States, The 
Hague, 1996; Dominice, C., The International Responsibility of States for Breach of Multilateral Obligations, 10 
EJIL, 1999, p. 353; Graefrath, B., International Crimes and Collective Security, in Wellens (ed), International Law: 
Theory and Practice, Essays in Honour of Eric Suy, The Hague, 1998, pp. 237-52; Jørgensen, N. H. B., supra note 
20; Pellet, A., Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!, 10 EJIL 2, 1999, p. 425; Rosenne, S., Further 
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the ILC to codify general rules governing state responsibility, one of the more controversial 
elements proved to be Article 19 which appeared in the 1980 Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, introducing the concept of “international crimes of States”.53 These were defined 
as breaches of an international obligation ‘so essential for the protection of fundamental interests 
of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by the community as a 
whole.’54 The approach of defining “state crimes” objectively as breaches of obligations that are 
essential for the protection of interest of the international community was a step forward from 
the definition given to the character of jus cogens norms, which the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties determined not by their content but by their effect: namely, the impossibility to 
derogate from them by special agreement.55 However, when the Articles were adopted in 2001, 
the concept of “international crimes of States” was abandoned.56  
The ILC Articles represent a major step towards the codification of international rules on state 
responsibility and have contributed to the development of certain basic concepts of international 
law, in particular the concepts of peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens)57 and 
obligations owed to the international community as a whole (obligations erga omnes).58 Despite 
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the traditional aspects of the Articles, however, this area of progressive development in their text 
is particularly important for the task of establishing a link between state responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility. Some of these jus cogens norms (or peremptory norms) of 
international law pertain to classic inter-state rules, such as the prohibition on the use of force 
codified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, while others involve obligations imposed on States to 
refrain from, prevent, and punish certain grievous harms to individuals. These latter include the 
prohibition against genocide, slavery, torture, and crimes against humanity, namely the human 
rights-related peremptory norms. This area of state responsibility concerns the set of obligations 
imposed on States by rules of customary international law relating, inter alia, to the physical 
integrity and dignity of the human person, albeit within the territorial jurisdiction of the State. 
This category of duties was denominated as obligations erga omnes.59 These rules, because of 
their substantive content and their recognition of the individual as the subject of international 
law, demonstrate an obvious potential for overlap with the rules of primary obligations of 
individuals under international criminal law. 
When the wrongful state act amounts to a serious breach of obligations owed to the international 
community as a whole, customary international law provides for a particular regime of 
aggravated state responsibility.60 Interestingly, the term aggravated state responsibility is given 
the same meaning as state responsibility for international crimes, which distinguishes it from 
ordinary state responsibility connected with less serious violations of international law. The main 
characteristic of aggravated state responsibility is that it has developed around the concept of 
obligations erga omnes.61 
                                                          
59 Barcelona Traction Case, paras. 33, 34.  
60 See infra Section 1.2.4. 
61 Ibidem. See, e.g., De Hoogh, A., supra note 52, Dominice, C., supra note 52, Crawford, J., supra note 58, Bonafè, 
B. I., supra note 9, p. 19: For years, the ILC has strived to find an agreement on both the definition of the most 
important obligations whose breach would amount to an international crime, and the definition of the most serious 
consequences that would attach to the commission of international crimes by States. In the end, the ILC realized that 
it had to adopt a different approach more in line with international practice. Leaving aside those controversial 
‘substantive’ aspects, it focused instead on ‘procedural’ aspects, that is, explaining which subjects are entitled to 
react against serious breaches of obligations owed to the entire international community. Thus, it concentrated on a 
particular category of international norms, i.e., obligations owed to the international community as a whole. 
Accordingly, aggravated state responsibility originates from the breach of obligations characterized by a particular 
structure. Contrary to most international norms, which establish bilateral relations between States, the legal relation 
underlying such obligations is between a State and the entire international community. Therefore, when such 
obligations are violated, the injured party is the international community, which is also the party entitled to react 
against such breaches.  
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While the ILC recommended the General Assembly of the United Nations to convert the Articles 
into a convention, no convention has been adopted to date. Therefore, the ILC Articles are not 
binding law as such but, despite their nature, they are an essential codification in the area of state 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and to a large extent they codify international 
law.62 Reflecting the existing case law and state practice in this area, the Articles have been 
described by some legal scholars as generally providing evidence of established and evolving 
customary international law,63 while others have even suggested that they could be said to have 
authoritative force since they represent the views of highly recognized publicists in international 
law.64  
1.2.2. The Doctrine of International Crimes of States 
The idea of criminal jurisdiction over States for the "international crimes of States" reaches far 
back in history and initially enjoyed great popularity.65 The basis was that the original concept of 
international law started to regulate exclusively the relations among States. Correspondingly, the 
laws and customs of war at the beginning emphasized the obligations of States. The law aimed at 
preventing and provided States with all legal means to prevent violations of the international 
humanitarian law through their military forces. The main aim of those regulations at that time 
was not to create an individual obligation under international law for each member of the armed 
forces. In the beginning, violations of these laws resulted only in a responsibility of the States 
allowing for sanctions (e.g., reprisals).66 The UN Charter is still based on this conception, since 
the articles in Chapter VII do not mention any responsibility of natural persons.67 However, the 
growing importance of international humanitarian law developed the notion that humanity on the 
battlefield was a question of individual criminal responsibility as well. Since World War I, the 
idea of holding individuals directly responsible for violations of international law, especially 
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those who acted as heads or organs of States or as commanding military officers, has 
continuously gained support. This was able to develop, as more rights and duties were assigned 
to individuals by international law. Consistent with this principle, the Nüremberg and Tokyo 
practice of exercising for the first time international military jurisdiction over individuals, 
seemed to be the most effective way to enforce international criminal law and to prevent the core 
international crimes. This preference continued for decades after Nüremberg.  
Even during all those decades when individual criminal responsibility for crimes under 
international law was favoured, the idea of holding the State responsible as well as the 
individual, was continuously kept alive.68 Developments of international criminal law continued 
when great parts of the laws and customs of war were formulated in the Four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949. Individual criminal responsibility was promoted, but responsibility of 
States to fulfil the duties of the conventions and to prevent and punish grave breaches was 
equally developed. States violating their duties can be held responsible in addition to the 
individual perpetrator. The drafting commission for the Genocide Convention openly discussed 
the possibility of exercising jurisdiction over States. 69 It rejected the embodiment of the principle 
in the proposed Convention only for pragmatic reasons, the inappropriateness of articulated 
conventional criminal sanctions, and the lack of an international criminal court with an 
enforcement power over States.70 The same reservations arose during the discussions with the 
ILC on the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (hereinafter: Draft 
Code of Crimes or Draft Code)71 up until 1954. Once more, for pragmatic reasons, the ILC 
favoured the principle of individual criminal responsibility, omitting state responsibility in the 
Draft Code. However, the inclusion of the concept of “international crimes of States” in Article 
19 of the 1976 Draft Articles72 reopened the debate as to whether the exclusion of state 
responsibility from the Draft Code in particular could still be maintained.73 Article 19 referred to 
“international crimes of States”, describing them as a breach by a State of an international 
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obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community 
that its breach is recognized as a crime.74 Thus, Article 19 proposed a distinction between 
‘normal’ internationally wrongful acts, called “delicts” and exceptionally grave breaches of 
international law, termed “international crimes”.75 Despite strong and passionate opposition,76 
the ILC maintained this distinction when it completed the first reading of its Draft Articles in 
1996.77  
Strong reservations as to the terminology of ‘crimes’ were expressed within the ILC and in the 
comments of many governments. Yet, there was no particular difficulty in terms of the current 
state of international affairs in accepting the idea that some obligations are held to the 
international community as a whole and not only to individual States, as that grave breaches of 
those obligations should attract special consequences. The problem was merely how to translate 
that idea into the text of the Articles in a generally acceptable way. Thus, the doctrine on 
"international crimes of States" introduced by Article 19, in addition to causing controversy and 
raising a number of problems78, has been abandoned in the final version of the Articles, adopted 
in 2001, to be replaced by the notions of ‘serious breaches of obligations under peremptory 
norms of general international law’79 and of breach of obligations ‘owed to the international 
community as a whole.’80 Crawford and Bodeau specify that the chapter on serious breaches is 
‘aimed at reflecting the values inspiring Article 19 without going into the issues of “crime”’.81 
Articles 40 and 41 do not raise the difficulties inherent to the possible confusion between two 
kinds of ‘crimes’ committed by States and individuals, respectively. This terminological 
differentiation aims to clarify the respective legal regime of the international responsibility of an 
individual for crimes and the corresponding state responsibility for the violation of peremptory 
norms. While one of the main reasons for the removal of “international crimes of States” was the 
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desire to have a unique objective regime of state responsibility, the 2001 Articles nevertheless 
create an aggravated regime for ‘serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of 
general international law’. Whereas Article 19 sought to establish an aggravated regime of state 
responsibility for the violation of jus cogens norms, Articles 40 and 41 reintroduce a second 
category of responsibility with special legal effects.82 
The major objective in deleting “crime” and replacing it with the concept of “serious breach” 
was to free the Draft Articles of a concept of criminal responsibility inspired by domestic law. 
According to many commentators, the distinction introduced in Article 19 between “crimes” and 
“delicts” led to a criminalization of state responsibility.83 Decriminalizing state responsibility 
was the option finally adopted, on the grounds of embryonic state practice in the area and the 
inconsistency of the Articles, which, while maintaining the distinction between crimes and 
delicts, had failed in its task of establishing a legal system specifically tailored to international 
crimes.84 Accordingly, the law of state responsibility does not recognize the ‘crime of State’ as 
part of its regime. States cannot be held criminally responsible under international law, as the 
law of state responsibility has remained essentially reparational and not punitive in its scope.  
Thus, classical international state responsibility remains conceived in terms of an essentially 
reparational view, as well as a sort of civil liability in the international order. It does not have the 
object of punishing the State. It is, however, doubtful whether the earlier reference to 
international crimes of States could be seen as an indication of the theoretical view that a State 
can be held criminally accountable for a crime. The Articles did not envisage any criminal 
sanctions. Rather, the basic idea was to distinguish between different kinds of internationally 
wrongful acts, and the duty of the State to make reparations for its consequences.85 The reference 
to international crimes of States was meant to reflect that the violation of a substantive norm of a 
fundamental character weighted more heavily.86 It related to the international community as a 
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whole, and compensation could thus be claimed by all States. Nevertheless, although an 
aggravated form of state responsibility, it still indicated the civil liability of States, rather than a 
penal form of responsibility.87 This view was affirmed by a final set of Articles88, which, 
referring to serious breaches, emphasize its nature as a tort. According to Pellet, the original use 
of the terms “crime” and “delict” has been misleading.89 
1.2.3. The Evolution of a Doctrine of Individual Criminal Responsibility 
Whereas the notion of state responsibility has a long pedigree under international law,90 the 
concept of individual criminal responsibility is more recent. The concept of individual criminal 
responsibility and the designation of certain individuals as hostis humani generis already existed 
in Grotius’ time.91 However, this concept was applied almost by definition, to individuals 
operating outside the purview of the State apparatus, such as pirates, slave traders, and 
subsequently, terrorists and drug traffickers.92 International criminal law initially focused on 
crimes of an intrinsically international concern, which were perpetrated by individuals or groups 
operating independently of States, typically in areas beyond the latter’s reach (such as the open 
sea or the African terra nullius).93  
Historically, international law was concerned only with actions of States, while the individuals 
through whom States acted remained almost entirely outside its purview. However, the 
traditional state of affairs has undergone a dramatic change in the 20th century. In the aftermath 
of the two World Wars, attempts were made to put on trial those leaders most responsible for 
breaching the peace (jus ad bellum) and violating the laws of war (jus in bello). While efforts to 
try the German Kaiser and senior Turkish leaders implicated in the Armenian massacres failed 
for a variety of legal and political reasons in the aftermath of World War I,94 the Nüremberg and 
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Tokyo trials addressed the criminal responsibility of the Nazi and Japanese leadership and 
removed any immunity that may have resided with their office.95  
According to the classical rules of the law on international responsibility of States, imputing to a 
State an internationally wrongful act committed by one of its organs amounted in principle to 
concentrating responsibility on the public person, thereby ignoring that of the individual(s) who 
actually acted on its behalf. The individual, as in general terms in the whole of classical 
voluntarist international law before the international affirmation of rights of the human person 
(1945), does not exist independently of the State to which he is attached by the bond of 
nationality. This is all the more so where he is perceived not just as a national of the State but as 
one of its organs, de jure or de facto, acting not on his own personal behalf but for the State 
apparatus he serves.96 What has sometimes been called the ‘Nüremberg Revolution’ reverses this 
logic, even if war crimes had already been considered in terms of their individualized authors.97 
Moreover, the individual criminal responsibility of a Head of State had already been 
contemplated in Article 227 of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, which provided for Wilhelm II to 
be accused and judged: ‘The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of 
Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality 
and the sanctity of treaties.’ It is still the case that the Nazi leaders were judged as individuals, 
for the crimes they had themselves decided, commanded, or organized, even if the position each 
of them occupied within the State apparatus was carefully analysed by the Nüremberg Tribunal. 
At Nüremberg the German State criminals were not judged in the place of a State. While it is 
true that the Third Reich had disappeared after the defeat, Germany itself was declared liable for 
war damages. In the same way, the Japanese State, which nobody claimed to have been legally 
eclipsed in the slightest after the war, was also declared liable as such under international law. 
Personal condemnation by the Tokyo Tribunal98 of the Japanese military, therefore, clearly 
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shows that their responsibility was not conceived of as a substitute for that of the State they had 
served; if the Japanese military leaders were judged, it was indeed for acts for which they were 
held individually responsible. Their responsibility was distinct from that of the State whose 
agents they were. Accordingly, the Nüremberg and Tokyo Tribunals laid the groundwork for 
modern international criminal law. They were the first tribunals where individual violators of 
international law were held responsible for their crimes. They also recognized individual 
criminal responsibility and rejected historically used defences based on state sovereignty.99 
The aspirations of the Nüremberg and Tokyo Tribunals to achieve future peace and security, 
however, have only had limited success.100 The first forty years after Nüremberg was a period of 
slow progress in developing international criminal law. There is no doubt that international 
criminal law has developed in the last two decades. Indeed, if international criminal law is 
defined as the prosecution of individuals for ‘international crimes’ then there was no such law 
for most of the twentieth century. On the eve of the twentieth century attempts to regulate 
warfare in The Hague Conference of 1899, and again in 1907, were constrained by notions of 
state sovereignty. As the Nüremberg judges pointed out in 1946, ‘The Hague Convention 
nowhere designates such practices [methods of waging war] as criminal, nor is any sentence 
prescribed, nor any mention made of a court to try and punish offenders.’101 While the Genocide 
Convention and the Four Geneva Conventions were adopted in 1948 and 1949 respectively, 
almost all other efforts to codify international criminal law have been rather slow and 
unsuccessful. However, since the end of the Cold War, the driving ideas behind the Nüremberg 
and Tokyo trials were restored.102 In 1991, the ILC passed the First Reading of the Draft Code of 
Crimes, which was finally discussed in 1996. The Draft Statute for an International Criminal 
Court was completed in 1994, to be approved in 1998. The establishment of the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) by the 
UN Security Council in 1993 and the development of hybrid, internationalized criminal tribunals 
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such as the one for Sierra Leone finally culminated in the creation of a new, permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2001.103 
With respect to individual criminal responsibility, it is beyond question that today serious 
breaches of certain obligations owed to the international community as a whole entail individual 
criminal responsibility.104 Customary international law provides for a regime of criminal 
responsibility with respect to individuals who commit certain international offences considered 
by the international community to be serious violations of its most important rules.105 As for the 
offences entailing individual criminal responsibility, there is general agreement over the 
recognition of the existence of at least three categories of customary international crimes 
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committed during armed conflict, namely, the so-called Nüremberg crimes: crimes of aggression, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.106 International individual criminal responsibility is a 
traditional regime of criminal responsibility providing for the punishment of individuals who 
have perpetrated international crimes.  
Indeed, since the creation of the ICTY in 1993, followed by a line of newly created ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals, international law has made strides in establishing individual 
criminal responsibility for crimes against international law as one of its most fundamental 
principles. These developments towards individual criminal responsibility for international 
crimes provide the greatest success since Nüremberg and Tokyo for the enforcement of 
international criminal law. In international law the actions of criminal individuals are most often 
considered in relation to the nature of the links these individuals had to the State apparatus or to 
conflicts in which the State is implicated. Accordingly, the new designation of the individual as a 
person responsible in public international law, by the ad hoc Tribunals or the ICC, has ended by 
designating the individual as a full subject of public international law, eligible to defend his 
rights, but also to be responsible for the breach of obligations incumbent on him vis-à-vis other 
individuals. The dependency of an individual to a State apparatus may be exercised by the 
maintenance of links that the individual criminal responsibility has with the State concerned. The 
relevant facts may in particular concern the individual’s statutory position vis-à-vis the State at 
the time of the commission of the crime. It must however generally be noted that the case law of 
the ad hoc Tribunals, still more than that of the Nüremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, does not 
necessarily require the individual’s strict membership in the State apparatus. More broadly, it 
requires a link of sufficient connection between the action of the individual accused and the 
collective action attributable to the State he referred to in so acting. The Statutes of the 
Nüremberg and Tokyo Tribunals authorized them to consider only cases of individuals who 
acted ‘on behalf’ of the Axis countries. This formula, contained in Article 6 of the Statute of the 
Nüremberg Tribunal, covers both individual State agents and those who, while not its de jure 
                                                          
106 Sunga, L. S., The Emerging System of International Criminal Law, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1997; 
Bassiouni, M.C., supra note 104; Barboza, J., International Criminal Law, 278 RCADI, 1999, pp. 9–199; 
McDonald, G.K., and Swaak-Goldman, O., supra note 104; Kittichaisaree, K., International Criminal Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2001. See Articles 16 (aggression), 18 (crimes against humanity), and 20 (war crimes) of the Draft 
Code of Crimes (ILC Report on the Work of its 48th Session, pp. 44, 49, 56); Article 5 of the ICC Statute listing 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 
<untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>. 
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agents, de facto acted for the Nazi State. The London Agreement setting up the Nüremberg 
Tribunal was aimed in its preamble only at the ‘major criminals’.107 The declarations of 
criminality were to be understood as excluding members of organizations who were unaware of 
their criminal goals or acts, as well as non-voluntary members. In the new generation of 
international criminal courts, the ICTR has been prosecuting the main members of the Hutu 
government in power at the time of the genocide in 1994 according to the political 
responsibilities they exercised.108 The ICTY, for its part, has ‘the power to prosecute persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law’109 without restriction to 
persons occupying a high post in the hierarchy of organs of the State concerned. Accordingly, in 
the case of the ICTY it is the nature and legal description of the crimes that count, more than the 
position of an accused. Similarly, with regard to the jurisdictional basis ratione personae, Article 
1 of the Rome Statute declares that the Court "shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction 
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, 
and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions." However, all these developments 
of the past two decades dealt with individual and not state responsibility for international crimes. 
Indeed, it was precisely the need to remove from culpable individuals the protective shield of the 
State, which caused the development of individual criminal responsibility in international law.110  
While the promoters of the various international criminal courts undoubtedly intended, by 
punishing individuals, also to punish the actions of the State to which the acts may be attributed, 
there is also the individual as such who is persecuted and condemned when committing criminal 
acts under contemporary public international law. Individual criminal responsibility is not solely 
linked to that of the State he served, but also frees itself therefrom to become autonomous, 
completing the constitution of the individual as a subject of international law. Now, when 
                                                          
107 London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (hereinafter: 
London Charter). 
108 See e.g., ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4, Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and 
Gerard Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17, Prosecutor v. Gacumbtsi, ICTR-01-64, Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, 
ICTR-98-44A, Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, ICTR-99-54A, Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., ICTR-98-44-AR73, 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, ICTR-95-1, Prosecutor v. Muhimana, ICTR-95-1B, Prosecutor v. 
Musema, ICTR-96-13A, Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, ICTR-00-55A, Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., ICTR-99-52, 
Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, ICTR-01-71, Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, ICTR-96-14, Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al., 
ICTR-99-46, Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-03, Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, ICTR-98-44C, Prosecutor v. 
Semanza, ICTR-97-20, Prosecutor v. Simba, ICTR-01-76. 
109 Article 1 of the ICTY Statute annexed to UN Security Council Resolution 827, supra note 104. 
110 See, e.g., Ratner, S.R. and Abrams, J.S., supra note 103, pp. 3–14; Dupuy, P.M., supra note 10, pp. 1085 et seq. 
47 
individual criminal responsibility is enforced by ad hoc international tribunals and the ICC, the 
consideration of state responsibility and the creation of a jurisdictional authority over States for 
crimes of States should not be neglected. As long as States are supporting such crimes, their 
prosecution is an indispensable part of measures to effectively prevent such crimes.111  
1.2.4. Separate Evolution of the Two Regimes of International Responsibility 
Identifying the individual criminal responsibility of natural persons who have committed crimes 
under international law leads to a system of international responsibility, evolving in the direction 
of increasingly disassociating the respective responsibility regimes for the individual and the 
State.112 The position defended even recently in legal scholarship113, that the growing affirmation 
of the individual criminal responsibility is only a way of implementing that of the State on whose 
behalf they act, displays the difficulty these authors have in detaching themselves from the 
classical conception (pre-1945) that there are no legal persons in international law apart from the 
State. This conception reduces the individual to an organic dependency on the State, 
independently of which the individual cannot exist. According to Dupuy, this sort of view, 
plainly marked by the ideology intrinsic in classical legal positivism, seems increasingly out of 
step with the actual evolution of law.114 
There is a radical difference in foundation between individual criminal responsibility, founded 
on fault and intention, and state responsibility, founded on the internationally wrongful act. The 
development of international criminal law has enabled cases in which intention constitutes a 
constitutive element in the State’s international responsibility. Thus, when a State was accused of 
genocide before the ICJ, it was incumbent to show the genocidal intent of the State that ordered 
actions falling within the framework of those listed in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention. The 
fact remains that intention is essentially individual and is only in a sense communicated to the 
State because the origin of the latter is, as the Nüremberg Tribunal said, ‘men and not abstract 
entities’. Moreover, intention is the primary foundation of the individual criminal responsibility, 
                                                          
111 See infra Chapter 16 on enforcement mechanisms of state and individual criminal responsibility. 
112 Dupuy, P. M., supra note 10, p. 1091.  
113 See Maison, R., La Responsabilité individuelle pour crime d’É tat en droit international public, Bruxelles, (Ed. 
de l'Université de Bruxelles), 2004, 69 et seq. 
114 Dupuy, P. M., supra note 10, p. 1091.  
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whereas it is a mere subsidiary element in state responsibility, to be found only in a limited 
number of international wrongful acts.  
Furthermore, while the individual criminal responsibility is fundamentally criminal, that of the 
State remains, at least in the present stage of development of the international law, linked to the 
classical foundation of responsibility for an internationally wrongful act.115 This explains why it 
remains distinct from that of the individuals who are at the origin of the wrongful acts. It is this 
latter aspect that the ICJ had occasion to highlight in the Genocide case.116 Rejecting the 
argument that the Genocide Convention established only individual criminal responsibility for 
genocide, the Court observed the responsibility of a State for acts of its organs is not excluded by 
Article IV of the Convention, which contemplates the commission of an act of genocide by 
“rulers” or “public officials.”117 
The affirmation of the individual criminal responsibility completes the evolution begun after 
1945 by introducing international human rights protection into the international order. The 
quality of being a subject of a legal order depends on the possibility to defend the rights of which 
one is the bearer. But simultaneously, it is based on legal capacity to be a bearer of associated 
obligations as they result from norms established in that legal order. The most contemporary 
developments in international criminal law verify this evolution. They equally show that the 
same type of wrongful acts, like aggression or genocide, can give rise to two distinct types of 
responsibility coming under mutually autonomous legal regimes, the first constituting the 
individual criminal responsibility of individuals, the second that of the State in the name of 
which these same acts were committed. The further evolution of the two types of responsibilities 
is preserved by Article 58 ARSIWA, stating that the provisions of the Articles on state 
responsibility ‘are without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under 
international law of any person acting on behalf of a State’. Indeed, according to the ILC, state 
responsibility and individual criminal responsibility are considered as distinct in international 
                                                          
115 See supra Section 1.2.2. 
116 Genocide case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 595: the Court dismissed the preliminary 
objections and found that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide 
Convention and that the Application was admissible. 
117 Genocide case, para. 151. 
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law.118 Similarly, the Rome Statute provides that ‘[n]o provision in this Statute relating to 
individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international 
law’.119 Similar language was used in Article 4 of the Draft Code of Crimes, adopted by the ILC 
in 1996.120 Such clauses are illustrative of the way in which the two forms of responsibility have 
evolved.  
The long codification process of state responsibility attests to the difficulties of adjusting the old 
fashioned and rather rudimentary responsibility schemes (as they have emerges particularly as 
regards the treatment of aliens) to the evolving realities of international law.121 The ILC has 
always been very careful in indicating the difference between the individual criminal 
responsibility of organs of a State and the international responsibility of the State for the same 
acts. They have given priority to elaborating the individual criminal responsibility by completing 
first the Draft Code and the Statute for the ICC. The ILC had indicated that the punishment of 
individuals in charge of the State machinery, which committed international crimes, does not 
relieve the State itself from its responsibility. Nor does any act committed by an organ of the 
State for which the perpetrator is held individually responsible automatically entail an 
international responsibility of a State. The attribution of a wrongful act to a State is quite 
different from the incrimination of certain individual organs for committed crimes.122  
While the exact standards of the regime of aggravated state responsibility remained largely 
unsettled, a suggestion to separate between different classes of wrongful acts and the ensuing 
modes of reparation, depending on the gravity of the acts, made a development in the field of 
state responsibility. As argued in Section 1.2.2, the idea should not be misunderstood as a mode 
                                                          
118 The ICJ has observed that the duality of state and individual criminal responsibility 'continues to be a constant 
feature in international law.' See Genocide case, para. 173. 
119 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998 (entered into force 1 July 2002), UN Doc 
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of criminal responsibility. The ILC's discussion and its codification efforts show that the concept 
of state criminal responsibility was overwhelmingly rejected. Moreover, international courts 
have repeatedly rejected the idea of criminal state responsibility.123 The international criminal 
tribunals established since the Nüremberg have been concerned only with the prosecution of 
individuals.124 They do not try or penalize States for their breaches of jus cogens norms of 
international law.125 As the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Blaškić explained “[u]nder international 
law it is clear that States, by definition, cannot be the subject of criminal sanctions akin to those 
provided for in national criminal systems.”126 Finally, the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to 
natural persons.127  
Concerning the procedural differences between the two regimes of international responsibility, 
prosecution of international crimes committed by individuals depends on universal competence. 
In connection with the competence of the ICTY and ICTR, their great originality lies in the fact 
that the prosecutions may be totally unilateral and not subordinate to prior assent by the State of 
nationality of the accused. This position, however, remains exceptional. For in the absence of 
legal action brought by a State, the ICC is in principle competent only within the framework 
defined vis-à-vis the States Parties, and under the rather restrictive conditionsset out in Article 12 
of the Rome Statute. This brings us close to the conditions for legal action within the framework 
of state responsibility, premised upon the state consent to jurisdiction.  
Accordingly, the individual criminal responsibility, confirming the innovation brought by the 
international military tribunals of Nüremberg and Tokyo, is separated from the state 
responsibility. We are thus seeing an evolution towards the individualization of criminal 
responsibility in the international legal order that closely parallels the one municipal legal 
systems underwent long ago. It would be misleading, however, to conclude that the two separate 
regimes of responsibility never intersect or overlap.128 Nevertheless, since the individual criminal 
                                                          
123 Genocide case, para. 170. 
124 Ibidem, para 172;  
125 See the ILC commentary on Article 19, ILC Report on the Work of its 28th Session, p. 110. 
126 Blaškić Appeals Judgment, para. 25. 
127 Article 25(1) of the Rome Statute. 
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responsibility system has expanded faster than the law of state responsibility, the gap between 
the two inevitably increases.  
2. Doctrinal Approaches – Different Theoretical Models of the Relationship between 
State and Individual Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes 
This Chapter analyses doctrinal approaches129 toward the relationship between state 
responsibility and individual criminal responsibility for international crimes. Compared to state 
responsibility, individual criminal responsibility is a recent development. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between the two regimes of responsibility has already undergone various stages of 
definition. As no explicit theory on the relationship between state and individual criminal 
responsibility for international crimes has been put forward, identifying the general approaches 
to the relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility is a challenging task. 
While various international law scholars have addressed isolated questions concerning the 
relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility,130 no comprehensive theoretical 
framework, explaining the various connections between the two responsibility regimes, exists.131 
Essentially, the literature on this issue is fragmented and the tendency is to emphasize the 
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130 See supra note 10. 
131 Trindade, A. A. C., supra note 10, pp. 253–270; Dupuy, P. M., supra note 10, pp. 1085–1099; Bos, A., supra 
note 49, pp. 221–237; Nollkaemper, A., supra note 5, pp. 615–640; Rosenne, S., supra note 52, pp. 145–166; 
Degan, V. D., Responsibility of States and Individuals for International Crimes, in S. Yee and W. Tieya (eds.), 
International Law in the Post-Cold War World: Essay in Memory of Li Haopei, London, New York, Routledge, 
2001, pp. 202–223; Rao, P.S., International Crimes and State Responsibility, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International 
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H. G., International Responsibility of the State and Individual Criminal Responsibility in the International 
Protection of Human Rights, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar 
Schachter, Leiden, Boston, M. Nijhoff , 2005, pp. 151–160. 
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difference between state and individual criminal responsibility for international crimes and, in 
this regard, to highlight the peculiarities of international criminal law. At the same time, more 
traditional views insist on the primary role of States in international law and seek to bring 
individual criminal responsibility back into the framework of state responsibility as a particular 
consequence of the commission of international crimes by State organs.132 
Existing doctrinal approaches represent various models as well as opposite perspectives on the 
relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility for international crimes. As 
such, they can hardly be sustained in their theoretical comprehensiveness. Rather, more nuanced 
views better reflect international practice. Nevertheless it is important to conceptualize these 
opposite perspectives of the relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility in 
order to identify their basic assumptions and their limitations. The following Section articulates 
various doctrinal approaches that have historically been elaborated, with a view to examine the 
possibility of identifying a general rule concerning the relationship between state and individual 
criminal responsibility. 
2.1. The Initial Approach: Monistic Model or Mutual Exclusiveness 
Classical theories took as a starting point a monistic conception, which called for the mutual 
exclusiveness of state and individual criminal responsibility. The monistic approach is built on 
the basis of traditional international law with States as the only legal persons on the international 
scene and thus the only legal entity facing responsibility in international law.133 According to the 
classical perception of international law, individuals do not exist independently of their State of 
nationality, especially when they act on behalf of the State. Traditionally, international law 
attributes acts of individuals who act as State organs exclusively to the State. While in factual 
terms States act through individuals (the Permanent Court of International Justice stated: ‘States 
can act only by and through their agents and representatives’134), in legal terms state 
responsibility is born not out of an act of an individual, but out of an act of the State.135 
                                                          
132 Bonafè, B. I., supra note 9. 
133 Maison, R., supra note 113. 
134 Case of Certain Questions relating to settlers of German origin in the territory ceded by Germany to Poland, 
Advisory opinion, PCIJ Series B, No 6, 22. 
135 Dupuy, P. M., Dionisio Anzilotti and the Law of International Responsibility of States, 3 EJIL (1992) 139, pp. 
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The monistic approach is based on the assumption that individual criminal responsibility 
constitutes the mere form of state responsibility;136 individual criminal responsibility is thus 
absorbed into state responsibility. Nollkaemper talks about the “invisibility of individual in the 
traditional law of state responsibility”,137 which means that an unlawful act of an individual in a 
position of State organ was attributed only to his nation State. Penal action against an individual 
performed at the domestic level was considered as satisfaction by which a nation State realized 
its own obligation of reparation.138 The sanction against an individual was a prerogative of a 
nation State. Thus, all other members of the international community were excluded from 
sanctioning by reference to a traditional international legal axiom pars in parem non habet 
iurisdictionem. Protagonists of the monistic approach postulated a rule, according to which a 
serious violation of international law implicated a breach of otherwise inviolable principle of 
sovereign equality of States; the lack of a nation State’s action activated a right (not a duty) of all 
other States to initiate penal proceedings against the organs of a third State.139 
While the monistic approach is connected mostly with works from the mid 20th century,140 
references to monism can nevertheless be traced in the 21st century as well. Maison in her work 
from 2004 advocates the monistic approach, even in the light of an unprecedented evolution in 
the field of international criminal law.141 In her opinion international criminal tribunals, which 
act in the name of the international community as a whole, constitute tools of centralized 
repression, which only replaced a duty of a nation State and the right of all other States to initiate 
penal action against an individual.142 The monistic approach can be detected both in primary 
norms (the obligation to criminalize certain unlawful conduct)143 and in secondary norms 
(punishment of an individual as a form of satisfaction) addressed to and adherent with the State. 
                                                          
136 Monism/dualism dichotomy is used by Starita, M., Amnesty for Crimes Against Humanity: Coordinating the 
State and Individual Responsibility for Gross Violations of Human Rights, The Italian Yearbook of International 
Law, vol. 9 (1999), p. 104. 
137 Nollkaemper, A., supra note 5, p. 617. 
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140 Bonafé, B. I., supra note 9, pp. 54-57. 
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143 Genocide Convention, Article I, Article V. 
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2.1.1. State Responsibility as a Substitute to Individual Criminal Responsibility 
In classical international law, the State was the only subject recognized as possessing rights and 
obligations on the international sphere. The individual had neither legal personality nor locus 
standi outside the domain of domestic jurisdiction. Thus, initially state responsibility was 
considered to absorb individual criminal responsibility for conduct that constituted an 
international crime and could be attributed to the State. The positivist doctrine that prevailed 
especially during the nineteenth century recognized the State as the central (and exclusive) actor 
on the international scene.144 Individuals were viewed solely as the object of legal regulation, 
whose rights and obligations were realized only through the spectrum of the State.145 As a result, 
state responsibility was the only form of responsibility recognized under international law, and 
individual criminal responsibility was a matter of exclusively domestic concern. In this context, 
the “act of State” doctrine146 functioned as a substantive defence, relieving the individual 
perpetrator from responsibility, because the criminal acts were considered as acts of the State, 
and not as their own. According to this approach, “the State is the only entity internationally 
accountable for an internationally wrongful act of one of its agents acting on its instructions, the 
issue of the responsibility of the individual agent being irrelevant under international law”.147 
Individual criminal responsibility is thus excluded.148 
                                                          
144 Shaw, M., supra note 32, p. 196, 258; for a historical overview of the prevalence of collective responsibility see 
Gattini, A., A historical perspective: from collective to individual responsibility and back, in Nollkaemper, A., and 
Van der Wilt, H. (eds.), System Criminality in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 101-126, pp. 
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145 Shaw, M., supra note 32, p. 258. 
146 The "act of State" doctrine has been described variously as a doctrine of judicial prudence or deference, judicial 
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147 Bianchi, A., State Responsibility and Criminal Liability of Individuals, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford 
Companion to International Criminal Justice, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 17. 
148 Dupuy, P. M., supra note 10, pp. 1085-1099. 
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2.1.2. Individual Criminal Responsibility as a Substitute to State Responsibility  
The previous approach was abandoned in the aftermath of World War II, along with the 
emergence of human rights and international criminal justice, which caused a breach in the 
traditional doctrine of international law by bringing the individual to the fore and gradually 
granting them with legal personality, recognizing the individual as a bearer of both rights and 
obligations. Accordingly, individual criminal responsibility was considered as the most 
appropriate means of punishing violations of international law that constitute crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole. For a while, individual criminal responsibility 
overshadowed state responsibility, a concept principally objective and prima facie incompatible 
with the criminal nature of the imputed conduct.  
The theory underlying the Nüremberg proceedings, which still serves as the foundation of 
modern international criminal law, is that the traditional focus on state responsibility failed to 
deal directly with those State agents whose acts, omissions and decisions actually shape unlawful 
State policies.149 The attempt to generate a better fit between moral agency and legal 
responsibility150 may be supported by considerations of morality and efficiency: piercing the veil 
of state responsibility renders it more difficult for individuals in positions of authority to act with 
a sense of impunity and lack of moral blameworthiness.151 Moreover, shielding the individual 
from responsibility undermined the efficacy of international law. Ever since the development of 
international criminal courts, international law leaves it no longer to the national legal order to 
determine which individuals are subjected to obligations and responsibilities and confronts 
individuals directly with the legal consequences of their acts. This is also true if the individuals 
act as State agents.152 
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According to this initial approach, individual criminal responsibility works as a substitute for 
state responsibility; in the case of international crimes, responsibility of the individual 
perpetrator is the only form of responsibility that is relevant. Individual criminal responsibility 
was meant to replace state responsibility which, being conceived as collective as well as 
objective, could neither respond to the criminal nature of the atrocities committed by fulfilling 
the functions of criminal justice, nor comply with the principle of justice, which is contrary to the 
imposition on an entire nation of the guilt of individual leaders.153 In the Nüremberg Judgment 
emphasis was placed on individual criminal responsibility, as  
crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced […]. 
[I]ndividuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed 
by the individual State.154  
Under this approach, the “act of State” doctrine is no longer accepted as a defence precluding 
individual criminal responsibility of State officials for acts committed in official capacity and 
which constitute international crimes. This provision is reproduced in the Statutes of all 
subsequent international criminal courts and tribunals.155 Similarly in the Genocide case, on the 
issue whether the fact that the Genocide Convention envisages individual criminal responsibility 
implies there is no room for state responsibility, Judges Shi and Vereshchetin declared: 
The determination of the international community to bring individual perpetrators of genocidal acts to 
justice, irrespective of their ethnicity or the position they occupy, points to the most appropriate course 
of action. We share the view expressed by Britain’s Chief Prosecutor at Nüremberg, Hartley 
Shawcross, in a recent article in which he declared that ‘There can be no reconciliation unless 
individual guilt for the appalling crimes of the last few years replaces the pernicious theory of 
collective guilt on which so much racial hatred hangs’ (International Herald Tribune, 23 May 1996, 
8). Therefore, in our view, it might be argued that this Court is perhaps not the proper venue for the 
adjudication of the complaints which the Applicant has raised in the current proceedings.156 
                                                          
153 Barboza, J., State Crimes A Decaffeinated Coffee, The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and 
Universality, Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab, in Boisson de Chazournes, L. and Gowlland-Debbas, V. (eds), 
The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality-Liber Amicorum Abi-Saab, G., Nijhoff, Leiden, 
2001, p. 365. 
154 Nüremberg IMT: Judgment and Sentence, reprinted in (1947) 41 AJIL 172, p. 217. 
155 Gattini, A., supra note 144, pp. 101-126. 
156 Genocide case, Joint declaration of Judges Shi and Judge Vereshchetin, ICJ Rep 1996, para. 631-632. 
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According to Nollkaemper, the argument need not be rejected offhand. If a breach of 
fundamental rules of international law is brought about by a small group of leaders of a State, 
against the apparent wishes of the population, and these leaders have been taken from behind the 
veil of the State and held individually responsible, the question can be asked whether it is still 
useful to strive for separate responsibility of the State.157 Removal of the leadership of a State 
may be sufficient, would spare the innocent parts of the population and prevent primitive 
collective responsibility.158  
2.2. Alternative Approaches in the Context of Complementarity: Subordination 
and Interdependence  
The theories of mutual exclusiveness were soon surpassed and the duality of the two forms of 
responsibility became evident.159 Thus, it is maintained that state and individual criminal 
responsibility often coexist and complement each other, by obeying to different rules and 
pursuing different goals. In the context of the duality, various theories have been elaborated, 
specifying the concept of complementarity and parallel existence of the two forms of 
responsibility. Such theories for the most part refer to the relationship between state and 
individual criminal responsibility in terms of subordination and/or interdependence, either by 
viewing the latter as a specific consequence of the former, in terms of reparation, or by 
considering state responsibility to be a precondition of individual criminal responsibility in the 
case of international crimes; as a result, the individual criminal responsibility is said to depend 
on the state responsibility.  
2.2.1. Individual Criminal Responsibility as a Form of Reparation  
Based on the conceptual and practical role of the State in the majority of core international 
crimes, a doctrine has developed according to which individual criminal responsibility for 
international crimes is a consequence of an exceptional regime of state responsibility for crimes 
of States (i.e., aggravated responsibility).160 This doctrine starts from the assumption that 
individual criminal responsibility is internationally recognized only for State crimes, and views 
                                                          
157 Nollkaemper, A., supra note 5, p. 622.  
158 Cassese, A., supra note 30, pp. 6-8. 
159 Duality is meant in a sense of distinguishing the individual criminal responsibility from the responsibility of the 
State for which or under the control of which the individual acted. 
160 For a critique of this approach, albeit in the context of Draft Article 19, see Jǿrgensen, N. H. B., supra note 20, p. 
154-157. 
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the latter as a form of reparation, more specifically as an aggravated form of satisfaction, as a 
guarantee of non-repetition, or even as a restitution.161 According to this approach, an individual 
committing crimes in a context of State criminality may be considered as de facto State organ.162 
This theory considers individual criminal responsibility as a centralised sanction by the 
international community as a whole, as a reaction to the breach of erga omnes obligations.163  
The limitation of this theory is its erroneous assumption that international criminal law is only 
concerned with the punishment of State organs. While the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals is 
limited to those who bear major responsibility for international crimes, such does not form a 
prerequisite for establishment of individual criminal responsibility under international criminal 
law. Individuals may commit international crimes irrespective of their status as State organs, and 
State involvement in the commission of such crimes does not per se fulfil the criteria of 
attribution required under international law, so as to automatically generate state 
responsibility.164  
The Commentary of the ILC Report on State Responsibility (hereinafter: Commentary or ILC 
Commentary) to Article 37 ARSIWA states that penal action against the individuals whose 
conduct caused the internationally wrongful act is an example of a form of satisfaction. 
However, neither the text of the Article nor the Commentary view penal action as a special 
consequence of the regime of aggravated responsibility pursuant to Article 41 ARSIWA.165 
Rather, the obligation to punish the individual perpetrator(s) is stipulated as a separate obligation 
in most relevant treaties, including the Genocide Convention and the Torture Convention, in the 
form of a primary norm establishing state responsibility. As such, it does not form part of a 
specific regime of state responsibility.166 On the other hand, the obligation to punish the 
individual perpetrator(s) applies to all breaches of international obligations by States; its 
                                                          
161 Maison, R., supra note 113. 
162 Ibidem, p. 326. 
163 Ibidem. 
164 See Chapter II ARSIWA. The general rule is that the only conduct attributed to the State at the international level 
is that of its organs of government, or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation or control of those 
organs, i.e., as agents of the State. The attribution of conduct to the State as a subject of international law is based on 
criteria determined by international law and not on the mere recognition of a link of factual causality. 
165 Bianchi, A., supra note 147, p. 17; Zimmermann, A. and Teichmann, M., State responsibility for international 
crimes in Nollkaemper, A. and Van der Wilt, H. (eds), System Criminality in International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, 298-313, p. 303. 
166 Zimmermann, A. and Teichmann, M., supra note 165, p. 305; Tams, C. J., Do serious breaches give rise to any 
specific obligation of the responsible state?, 13 EJIL, 2002, pp. 1161-1180, at p. 1178.  
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application is not limited to the serious breaches regime (pursuant to Article 40 ARSIWA).167 
Moreover, the ILC rejected any connection between state responsibility and punishment of 
individuals.168 Therefore, this approach has been rejected as manifestly inconsistent with 
contemporary international practice.169 
2.2.2. The Accessory Model - State Responsibility as a Prerequisite to Individual 
Criminal Responsibility  
Under the accessory model individual criminal responsibility is perceived as a separate regime 
which is nevertheless dependent on a previous conclusion about state responsibility.170 Namely, 
the accessory model treats individual criminal responsibility as a category flowing directly from 
rules of international law (i.e. not resulting only from State obligations, as monism contends), but 
at the same time makes its realization dependant on a previous conclusion about state 
responsibility. Applicability of this model is nevertheless limited to war crimes171 and a crime of 
aggression, which is based on the axiom “no State responsibility for an act of aggression, no 
crime of aggression by an individual.”172 The theory of state and individual criminal 
responsibility does not apply this approach to other core international crimes.  
2.2.3. Individual Criminal Responsibility as a Prerequisite to State Responsibility 
Another model abstracted from international theory and practice is a reflection of the previous 
accessory approach. According to this approach, individual criminal responsibility is perceived 
as a separate regime (i.e. not as a monistic form of state responsibility), highlighted by the 
assumption that state responsibility for international crimes is formally dependant on a previous 
conclusion about individual criminal responsibility. 173  
                                                          
167 Zimmermann, A. and Teichmann, M., supra note 165, pp. 305-306. 
168 Some ILC members spoke about humiliation of state. YILC 2000, Vol. 1, p. 213, para. 33. 
169 Bianchi, A., supra note 147, p. 17. 
170 This approach is applicable in relation to the crime of aggression and in certain circumstances to the war crimes – 
compare Wilmshurst, E., Definition of the Crime of Aggression: State Responsibility or Individual Criminal 
Responsibility, in The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression, 2004, p. 93 and Zimmermann, A., 
supra note 165, p. 219. 
171 Zimmermann, A. and Teichmann, M, supra note 165, p. 308 – Zimmermann points to the importance of reprisals 
in international criminal law. Compare Cassese, A., supra note 30, p. 255. 
172 Wilmshurst, E., supra note 170, p. 93 
173 Gaeta, P., On What Conditions Can a State be Held Responsible for Genocide?, 18 European Journal of 
International Law, 2007, pp. 645-46. 
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The arguments of this school of thoughts were echoed in the declaration of Judge Skotnikov 
annexed to the judgment in the Genocide case. Namely, the formal interdependence of state 
responsibility and individual criminal responsibility was pointed out in the Genocide case by the 
FRY, whereby it presented the argument that in order for the Court to uphold a claim of the 
responsibility of a State for an act of genocide it is necessary, as a matter of law, a finding of 
genocide by a court or tribunal exercising criminal jurisdiction is necessary. The FRY argued 
that “the condition sine qua non for establishing State responsibility is the prior establishment, 
according to the rules of criminal law, of the individual responsibility of a perpetrator engaging 
the State’s responsibility.”174 The Court promptly rejected this line of argumentation, reasoning 
that:  
“The different procedures followed by, and powers available to, this Court and to the courts and tribunals 
trying persons for criminal offences, do not themselves indicate that there is a legal bar to the Court itself 
finding that genocide or the other acts enumerated in Article III have been committed. Under its Statute the 
Court has the capacity to undertake that task, while applying the standard of proof appropriate to charges of 
exceptional gravity.”175 
 
Furthermore, the Court underlined such an interpretation would enable situations, where hiding 
of responsible individuals before criminal justice spills over to the other branch of international 
law, namely to the law of state responsibility.176 However, according to Judge Skotnikov, the ICJ 
as the inter-state court has exceeded its powers, when admitting that “it can itself make a 
determination as to whether or not genocide was committed without a distinct decision by a court 
or tribunal exercising criminal jurisdiction.”177 Similarly, Groome argues, that “the ICJ should 
and must wait until such final [criminal] judgments are rendered [by the court competent to 
exercise jurisdiction over the alleged crimes] before it commences its work on the merits.”178 
Groome contends that the ICJ has no competence in criminal matters and by reserving it179, the 
ICJ points to in absentia trial without adequate guarantees provided in criminal proceedings.180 
                                                          
174 Genocide case, para. 180. 
175 Ibidem, para. 181. 
176 Ibidem, paras. 181, 182. 
177 Ibidem, Declaration of Judge Skotnikov, p. 6. 
178 Groome, D., Adjudication Genocide: is the International Court of Justice Capable of Judging State Criminal 
Responsibility?, 31 Fordham International Law Journal, 2008, pp. 985-86. 
179 Genocide case, para. 181. 
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61 
2.3. The Unitary Model - A Merging of Primary Norms 
The unitary approach to the relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility has 
been put forward by Bonafé.181 According to this approach, state responsibility and individual 
criminal responsibility for international crimes both derive from the same primary norm. Therein 
lies a theoretical basis for the bridge between responsibility regimes. It is indisputable that the 
parallel developments of state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility have occurred 
in relative isolation from each other, with little substantive overlap and few theoretical links. 
Nevertheless, a basic foundation for the establishment of a link between state and individual 
criminal responsibility is apparent: both types of responsibility seek to ensure the observance of 
international law by identifying and assigning liability to those actors responsible for its 
violation. Both regimes deal with the evaluation and imposition of responsibility for international 
legal wrongs.  
When the focus on state responsibility is narrowed to responsibility for violations of obligations 
erga omnes, the parallels between the two regimes of responsibility are even stronger, as both 
responsibility regimes share substantive origins in the primary obligations that they seek to 
endorse. In Barcelona Traction, the Court described the criteria for obligations erga omnes182 as 
obligations deriving from the outlawing of acts of aggression, genocide, and from the principles 
concerning the basic rights of the human person.183 Aggression, genocide, and slavery have been 
criminalized by international law.184 Crimes against humanity and torture, moreover, 
unquestionably fall within the description of ‘principles and rules concerning the basic rights of 
the human person’. Additionally, the rules relating to almost all these norms have been codified 
in conventions ‘of a universal or quasi-universal character’185, and all are generally accepted as 
part of customary international law.186 Customary international law therefore imposes the same 
obligations on both States and individuals, prohibiting both from committing the violations listed 
                                                          
181 Bonafè, B. I., supra note 9. 
182 See supra Section 1.2.1. 
183 Barcelona Traction case, para. 34.  
184 See, e.g., Article 5 of the Rome Statute. 
185 UN Charter, Article 2(4) (aggression, 191 parties); 1948 Genocide Convention (137 parties); 1956 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
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humanity are customary international law). 
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above. It is from this shared source of primary obligations that the concept of double 
responsibility is born: for example, violations of the prohibition against genocide or torture, if 
conducted by agents of the State or otherwise attributable to the State,187 might give rise to both 
individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility for a violation of an obligation erga 
omnes.188 While state responsibility for violations of obligations erga omnes has only been 
imposed once (i.e. by the ICJ in the Genocide case, whereby Serbia was responsible for having 
breached the obligation to prevent genocide), the principle has gained acceptance by both 
commentators and international jurists189, and has been repeatedly recognized by the ICJ since its 
dictum in Barcelona Traction.190 
While aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility both stem from the 
serious breach of obligations owed to the international community as a whole (obligations erga 
omnes) and thus share a common origin,191 a breach of the same type of international obligations 
by a State or individual nevertheless triggers different sets of consequences.192 This unity of state 
and individual criminal responsibility at the level of primary norms193 does not necessarily mean 
that primary norms entailing aggravated state responsibility are identical to primary norms 
entailing individual criminal responsibility under international law. Rather, it means that both 
these regimes originate from the breach of primary norms aiming at the protection of the same 
collective interests of the entire international community, and having the same structure, that is, 
                                                          
187 ILC Articles, Arts. 4 – 11 for the rules governing attribution of conduct to a state. 
188 Furunđija Trial Judgment, para 142. 
189 ILC Articles and accompanying text; ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 48; Furundžija 
Trial Judgment, para. 151. 
190 East Timor case; Genocide case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 11 July 1996, ICJ Rep. 595, para 31; 
Genocide Case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997 on the Admissibility of Counter-Claims by 
Yugoslavia, 1997, ICJ Rep. 243, para. 35. 
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same phenomenon. Cassese refers to ‘community obligations’ (Cassese, A., supra note 30, p. 15), while Dupuy 
speaks of ‘normes communautaires’ (Dupuy, P. M., Droit international public (7th edn, Paris, Dalloz, 2004), pp. 
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192 Nollkaemper, A., supra note 5, p. 627 (“Both individual and State responsibility are consequences of breaches of 
fundamental norms of concern to the international community”). 
193 The distinction between primary and secondary norms was proposed as a general criterion to codify the law of 
state responsibility by Special Rapporteur Ago in his ‘Second Report on State Responsibility’, YILC (1970), vol. II, 
p. 179. Primary norms are obligations under international law. Secondary norms are the legal consequences attached 
to the violations of primary obligations. 
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establishing a legal relation between the State or the individual and the international community 
as a whole.194 
In order to identify the overlap between state and individual criminal responsibility with respect 
to specific categories of core international crimes, a comparison between the list of wrongful acts 
entailing both aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility under 
international law must be drawn. Such dual responsibility is conditioned upon the overlap 
between the material (or objective) elements195 of breaches entailing state and individual 
criminal responsibility as well as the overlap between their subjective elements196 (i.e., the 
prohibited conduct must be attributable both to an individual and to a State) of international 
crimes. There is an overlap between aggravated state responsibility and individual criminal 
responsibility with respect to the following international crimes: aggression, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide and torture. Thus, the carrying out of such prohibited conduct gives 
rise to a dual responsibility under international law. The core international crimes will be 
examined from this perspective. 
Aggression 
The international legal order prohibits the use of force in international relations, in particular it 
prohibits aggression. According to the UN Charter,197 the practice of the SC,198 the ICJ case 
law,199 and the 1974 UN Definition of aggression,200 States committing a very serious violation 
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195 Material’ (or ‘objective’) element of international crimes consists of the description of the prohibited conduct. 
War crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, etc. are broad categories covering specific sub-categories of 
prohibited conduct. Accordingly, the material element of international crimes can be considered as formed by, on 
the one hand, specific elements of the offence (murder, torture, etc.) and, on the other, general pre-requisites (nexus 
with an armed conflict, systematic attack against the civilian population, etc.) allowing the specific offence to be 
listed in one of the broader categories of international crimes. 
196 The ‘subjective’ element of international crimes concerns the subjects who can commit the international offences. 
197 Article 2 para. 4 of the UN Charter, and GA Resolution 2625(XXV), Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, adopted on 24 October 1970. 
198 For UN SC resolutions explicitly dealing with acts of aggression, see Resolutions 83(1950), 326(1973), 
386(1976), 387(1976), 405(1977), 411(1977), 418(1977), 419(1977), 424(1978), 445(1979), 455(1979), 496(1981), 
507(1982), 527(1982), 546(1984), 568(1985), 571(1985), 572(1985), 573(1985), 580(1985), 581(1986), 611(1988), 
and 667(1990), <www.un.org/Docs/sc>. 
199 See, in particular, Nicaragua case, p. 14 et seq.; ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226 et seq.; ICJ, Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Iran v. USA), 
Judgment, 6 November 2003, ICJ Reports 2003, p. 161 et seq.; Wall case; Armed Activities case, <www.icj-cij.org>. 
200 UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), adopted on 14 December 1974. (Aggression is the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.) 
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of international peace trigger an aggravated regime of international responsibility.201 On the 
other hand, the Nüremberg trial recognized that the commission of crimes against peace (i.e., 
crimes of aggression), entails individual criminal responsibility under international law.202 
Individual criminal responsibility for such crimes was confirmed in the codification of the 
ILC,203 and in the Rome Statute.204  
The crime of aggression, more than any other of the crimes within jurisdiction of the 
international criminal courts, involves the participation of a State. It has been generally 
recognized that the crime of aggression cannot be committed by an individual unless a State is 
internationally responsible for an act of aggression, however that responsibility is recognized: no 
State responsibility for an act of aggression, no crime of aggression by an individual.205 
However, the concept of state responsibility for an act of aggression committed by a State needs 
to be distinguished from the concept of individual criminal responsibility for the crime of 
aggression committed by an individual.206  
With respect to the ICC Statute, Article 5 on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court gives no 
definition of aggression. The Final Act of the Rome conference established a Preparatory 
                                                          
201 See, in general, the ILC Commentary on ex-Article 19 (ILC Report on the Work of its 28th Session, p. 95 et seq.) 
and to Article 40 of the Articles on State Responsibility (ILC Report on the Work of its 53rd Session, p. 112). 
202 Aggression was first recognized as an international crime resulting in individual criminal responsibility under 
international law in the Charter of the IMT. Its Article 6 (a) gave the IMT jurisdiction over crimes against peace, 
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treaties, agreements or assurances, or preparation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of 
the foregoing.” See, e.g., Werle, G., Principles of International Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 
481, para. 1323. 
203 See Article 16 of the Draft Code of Crimes (ILC Report on the Work of its 48th Session, pp. 44–45), which 
reads: “An individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in or orders the planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of aggression committed by a State shall be responsible for a crime of aggression”. 
204 Article 5 of the Rome Statute provides that “1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this 
Statute with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes against humanity; (c) War 
crimes; (d) The crime of aggression. 2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a 
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under 
which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations” (A/CONF.183/9, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>). 
205 Wilmshurst, E., supra note 170, p. 93.  
206 According to the 1974 UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 on the definition of aggression, participation in a 
war of aggression constitutes the crime of aggression. Article 5(2) of that Resolution provides that a “war of 
aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility.” The Article 
thus clearly differentiates between aggression (giving rise to international responsibility) and a war of aggression 
(which is a crime by individuals against peace).  
65 
Commission (hereinafter: PrepCom)207 and entrusted it with the task of drafting the elements of 
all crimes falling under the Court’s jurisdiction (1999–2002).208 With the entry into force of the 
Rome Statute, the Assembly of the States Parties decided to continue and complete the work on 
the crime of aggression, and established a Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
(SWGCA).209 Thus, the PrepCom first and subsequently the SWGCA have been entrusted with 
the difficult task of preparing a provision on aggression. In their proposals, an act of aggression 
“means an act referred to in the GA Resolution 33 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974 which is 
determined to have been committed by the State concerned”.210 
Under international law, acts of aggression always entail a dual responsibility. Concerning the 
material element, only acts involving the use of armed force by States amount to aggression and 
give rise to state and individual criminal responsibility under international law. Accordingly, 
aggression is characterized by a complete overlap between aggravated state responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility as far as the material element is concerned. The same is true 
with respect to the subjective element. Namely, the crime of aggression entails both the 
responsibility of the author State, and the individual criminal responsibility of the political and 
military leaders of the State who have planned, prepared, initiated, or waged a war of 
aggression.211 Indeed, under international criminal law only political and military leaders can be 
held accountable for this crime. International practice reveals a conception of aggression, which 
is strictly defined in terms of State action. The Nüremberg judgment held that possible 
perpetrators of crimes against peace were members of a government, persons having high-level 
posts in the military, diplomats, politicians and industrialists. International criminal law has not 
departed from this principle, and today aggression is commonly regarded as a ‘leadership 
crime’.212 
                                                          
207 Resolution F of the Final Act of the Rome Conference, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>. 
208 For the final proposal, see UN Doc. PCNICC72002/2/Add.2, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>. 
209 ICC-ASP/4/32, Annex II, p. 371, <www.icc-cpi.int>. 
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Audiencia Nacional, Scilingo case, Sentencia por crimenes contra la humanidad en el caso Adolfo Scilingo, 19 April 
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in Article 16 of the Draft Code of Crimes. According to the ILC commentary, “the perpetrators of an act of 
aggression are to be found only in the categories of individuals who have the necessary authority or power to be in a 
position potentially to play a decisive role in committing aggression” (ILC Report on the Work of its 48th Session, 
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Only decision-makers can be held accountable; all other participants are excused. The 
individuals who can be held accountable are those who represent the State. State leaders are 
responsible for deciding state policy, and they can entirely posses the required mens rea. 
Therefore, they are the only ones who can properly bear the responsibility on behalf of the State, 
even if they have not committed any atrocity with their own hands. By contrast, it is a priori 
excluded that executioners in the broad sense possess the requisite mens rea and the defence of 
obedience to superior orders is consequently available to all of them. It is the fact that aggression 
can only be committed by the State apparatus which justifies such a different conclusion. 
It is noteworthy that participation in any unlawful use of force by a State does not constitute the 
crime of aggression by an individual. In the line with customary international law, it is only a 
"war of aggression" which constitutes the crime of aggression in international law. The 
consequence of this is that there may be a violation by a State of an international law rule against 
the use of force which does not give rise to individual criminal responsibility for the crime of 
aggression.213 It must be asserted that war is not any unlawful use of force by a State. Had the 
ICC been given jurisdiction over individual participation in any unlawful use of force by a State, 
such would lead to the situation that whenever a State had a dispute with another State which 
included use of force by the latter, the former would be able to refer the situation to the ICC, 
alleging participation by individuals. If the provisions on aggression would allow a State to refer 
any allegation of unlawful use of force by another State to the ICC, the Court would be burdened 
by highly political questions, involving complicated determinations of State responsibility. This 
could create in effect an inter-state court our of a court that has been agreed to exercise 
jurisdiction only over individuals.214  
War crimes 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
p. 45, para. 2). This clearly shows a complete adherence to the approach of the Nüremberg judgment and subsequent 
trials. Moreover, the fact that aggression is a leadership crime was one of the few uncontroversial starting points of 
the PrepCom working on Article 5 of the ICC Statute, see UN Doc. PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, p. 4, para. II, 
<untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html> (“the perpetrator was in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political and military action of the State which committed an act of aggression”). The PrepCom lists only 
two principles governing individual criminal responsibility for aggression which are well-established, and the first 
one is the “principle under which the crime of aggression is committed by political or military leaders of a State” 
(UN Doc. PCNICC/2001/L.1/Rev.1, 9 March 2001, p. 20, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>).  
213 Wilmshurst, E., supra note 170, p. 95. 
214 Ibidem, p. 96.  
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A dual responsibility for war crimes is well established under international law.215 While the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols explicitly provide for the punishment of 
persons committing ‘grave breaches’, state responsibility for the same war crimes was regarded 
as corresponding to customary international law. Due to the ‘intransgressible’ character of the 
basic rules of IHL,216 their violation is viewed as entailing an aggravated state responsibility.217 
In particular, aggravated state responsibility was derived from the conduct of State organs 
committing such crimes as well as from the violation of specific obligations by States concerning 
the punishment of perpetrators.  
However, the overlap between state and individual criminal responsibility for the breach of such 
obligations is not complete as it varies with respect to the subjective and material elements of 
war crimes. Concerning the material element, the overlap between these regimes is limited to 
customary offences entailing individual criminal responsibility.218 In respect of the subjective 
element, war crimes can be committed by both private individuals and State organs, thus the 
overlap between state and individual criminal responsibility is limited to war crimes committed 
by State organs.219 War crimes committed by private individuals only entail individual criminal 
responsibility and do not lead to an overlap between state and individual criminal responsibility. 
Furthermore, war crimes not amounting to ‘grave breaches’ of the Geneva Conventions will only 
entail state responsibility; thus there will be no overlap between state and individual criminal 
responsibility under customary international law.  
Crimes against Humanity 
Crimes against humanity also give rise to a dual responsibility under international law. The 
universal recognition of the need to protect human rights at the international level has led to the 
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agreement of the international community with respect to the erga omnes nature of the most 
fundamental human rights and, accordingly, to the affirmation of international rules on the 
aggravated regime of state responsibility – and on the criminal responsibility applicable to 
individuals – in the case of their violation.220 This is confirmed in national and international case 
law and in various international documents embodying rules of customary law.221 Aggravated 
state responsibility for crimes against humanity has been recognized by the ILC with respect to 
both ‘old’ Article 19222 and ‘new’ Article 40.223 The overlap between state and individual 
criminal responsibility is limited to offences constituting crimes against humanity and entailing 
individual criminal responsibility under customary law when such crimes are committed by State 
organs. 
Genocide  
Genocide is now included as an independent international crime in the most important 
documents of the last decade, such as the ICTY Statute, the ICTR Statute, the Draft Code of 
Crimes and the Rome Statute.224 International case law confirms that both States and individuals 
can be held responsible for genocide. With respect to genocide, the overlap between state and 
individual criminal responsibility is limited to criminal acts (corresponding to definition of the 
crime of genocide, provided for under the Genocide convention) perpetrated by State organs. If 
genocide is committed by private individuals, no overlap between state and individual criminal 
responsibility occurs. 
Torture 
Torture has emerged as autonomous international crime giving rise to a dual responsibility under 
customary international law.225 With respect to the autonomous crime of torture, the expression 
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‘official torture’ is generally used to distinguish this autonomous crime from torture as one of the 
offences regarded as a crime against humanity, and despite the fact that official torture gives rise 
to a separate claim, it continues to be considered a crime against humanity. Admittedly, 
international practice concerning official torture is not abundant, but international scholarship 
and jurisprudence seem to agree that two different crimes, with different definitions and 
requirements, now co-exist in international criminal law.226 The definition of the crime of torture 
provided for under the Torture Convention and corresponding to customary international law, 
makes it much easier to identify the overlap between state and individual criminal responsibility. 
With respect to torture, there is an overlap from the viewpoint of the subjective element, as the 
definition of ‘official torture’ establishes that only State organs can commit such a crime. But the 
overlap is limited from the viewpoint of the material element, as aggravated state responsibility 
is established only if the act of official torture reaches a certain degree of seriousness. 
To conclude, it is nevertheless clear that the relationship between state responsibility and 
individual criminal responsibility differs according to the crime and the context in which it is 
committed.227 It is clear that concurrence is possible only in situations where the prerequisite 
ratione personae and the prerequisite ratione materiae are met. The former is met where 
wrongful act is committed by a person, whose conduct can be attributed to the State. In cases of 
perpetrators of core international crimes the circle of potential perpetrators is limited to State and 
military leaders, whose conduct shapes the final aspects of mutual relation between both 
responsibility regimes. Concurrence between state and individual criminal responsibility in a 
proper sense of the word is meaningful only where identical duties are prescribed for a State and 
an individual by international law (prerequisite ratione materiae).  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Ascensi, H. et al. (eds.), Droit international penal (Paris, Pedone, 2000), p. 369; Cassese, A., supra note 30, pp. 136, 
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2.4. The Dualistic Model as Prevailing Approach 
Examination of various approaches towards the relationship between state and individual 
criminal responsibility shows that the dualistic model represents a prevailing opinion on a 
parallel existence of state and individual criminal responsibility in international law. Both 
regimes of international responsibility are embraced as separate regimes which complement (and 
not exclude) one another.228 When compared to the monistic model, the dualistic approach is 
based on exactly antipodal presumptions: a legal personality of an individual is taken as self-
evident,229 activity of international tribunals is not construed as a sanction against a State and, 
finally, punishment of an individual is not taken as part of secondary obligations of a State.230 
Although a common goal is usually highlighted (i.e., a suppression of international criminality), 
it is clear that both responsibility regimes are based on different material and procedural rules,231 
which reveal their dissimilarity – whereas state responsibility holds its reparative nature,232 
individual criminal responsibility has a typically criminal character with mens rea as a 
cornerstone of the whole discipline. Individual criminal responsibility is responsibility for 
international crimes, whereas state responsibility pertains to internationally wrongful acts.  
Despite various distinctions between both responsibility regimes, the protagonists of dualism 
admit that “some degree of overlap may occur.”233 The dualistic approach nevertheless rejects 
the opinion that a determination on state responsibility is formally dependent on a previous 
conclusion about criminal responsibility of an individual. A previous criminal decision can be 
used for evidentiary purposes, but it cannot in any way predetermine the outcome of inter-state 
proceedings.234 Namely, the foundation of a State conduct rests in behaviour of individuals 
acting as State agents, but it can not act as a factor of de jure subordination between both 
regimes – here, State organ conduct has relevance only for the fulfilment of the objective and 
subjective elements within the state responsibility for wrongful act, but has no connotation as far 
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as criminal guilt and individual criminal punishment are concerned. Accordingly, both 
responsibility regimes are independent, separate and do not influence conclusions adopted in the 
other area of international law.235  
2.4.1. Dual attribution  
The dual nature of the regime of international responsibility is now established as a general 
rule.236 It is generally accepted that international crimes give rise to dual responsibility, of the 
State as well as of the individual.237  
Some scholars argue that state responsibility neither depends on nor implies the legal 
responsibility of individuals. They contend that the traditional notion of indivisibility between 
individual and State action has gradually evolved into a regime of parallel responsibility for 
individuals and States. For example, Nollkaemper argues that only “a limited number of acts can 
lead both to state responsibility and individual responsibility,” including “planning, preparing or 
ordering wars of aggression238, genocide239, crimes against humanity240, killings of protected 
persons in armed conflict241, terrorism242, and torture243.”244 These acts can be attributed twice: 
both to the State and the individual. 
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Current international law is called upon to solve “special unlawful situation” where identical 
conduct activates parallel legal consequences both in the province of state and individual 
criminal responsibility. If an individual acting as a State organ, whose conduct is therefore fully 
attributable to his home-State, perpetrates an international crime, his unlawful performance gives 
rise not only to his own individual criminal responsibility, but initiates as well state responsibility 
for serious violation of peremptory norms of international law. Such is evidenced by concurrent 
legal proceedings before inter-state court (International Court of Justice – ICJ) and criminal 
tribunal (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia – ICTY) which pertain to 
identical factual situation – genocide in Srebrenica. Notably, in its judgment in the Genocide 
case the ICJ adopted the concurrent approach to responsibility, observing that the duality of 
responsibility continues to be a constant feature of international law.245 It should be emphasized 
that the concurrence of the two responsibility regimes does not mean that state responsibility is 
criminal in nature. This possibility was decisively rejected by the ICJ in the Genocide case.246  
Notwithstanding their distinct historical origins, the concepts of individual and state 
responsibility are closely intertwined as a legal and practical matter. Most significantly, under 
the accepted doctrine of state responsibility, conduct attributable to any State organ can generate 
international responsibility of the State.247 This is true even in cases in which the official has 
overstepped his authority and acted without the support of higher ranks in the State 
bureaucracy.248 Thus, in addition to the individual criminal responsibility, the very commission 
of an international crime by a State official automatically generates legal responsibility for the 
State.249 Moreover, a number of international instruments prescribing international crimes – 
including the Geneva Conventions, the Torture Convention and the Genocide Convention – 
require States to prevent and punish crimes committed by individuals situated within its territory, 
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including its own State officials.250 Failure to address international crimes and punish their 
perpetrators may therefore constitute an independent basis for designating state responsibility. 
General acceptance of dual responsibility is evident, inter alia, in the law on war crimes. Article 
29 Geneva Convention [IV] provides that: ‘The party to the conflict, in whose hands protected 
persons may be, is responsible for the treatment accorded to them by its agents, irrespective of 
any individual responsibility which may be incurred’.251 Thus, the grave breaches provisions of 
the Geneva Conventions specify that the fact that a grave breach has been committed by a State 
organ does not exonerate the respective State from responsibility for the said crime. Accordingly, 
no form of responsibility absorbs the other, and the duality of responsibilities is maintained. This 
duality may be caused by the violation by an act of one single norm generating both State and 
individual criminal responsibility, or by the breach of two separate rules addressing the State and 
the individual respectively. 
The Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and the ILC Draft Code of Crimes expressly allowed for 
the punishment of individuals for acts of State, which means ‘acts committed on behalf of the 
State or in their capacity as members of the government, State administration or high command 
of the armed forces’.252 The act of the individual derived its unlawful character from the 
unlawfulness of the State act. Both in its work on the Draft Code of Crimes and on State 
Responsibility, the ILC has taken the position that responsibility of individual State organs does 
not exclude state responsibility. In its commentary to former Article 19, the ILC said that 
individual criminal responsibility ‘certainly does not exhaust the prosecution of the international 
responsibility incumbent upon the State for internationally wrongful acts which are attributed to 
it in such cases by reason of the conduct of its organs’ and that ‘the State may thus remain 
responsible and be unable to exonerate itself from responsibility by invoking the prosecution or 
punishment of the individuals who committed the crime’.253 It also stated that ‘the criminal 
                                                          
250 See e.g., Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 146, 75 
UNTS 287; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 
1984, art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984); Genocide Convention, Art. VI. 
251 See generally on state responsibility for war crimes: Kalshoven, F., State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the 
Armed Forces, 40 ICLQ, 1991, p. 827; Rosenne, S., supra note 52. 
252 Brownlie, I., International Law and the Use of Force by States, Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 165-6. 
253 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Forty-Eighth session (Doc A/51/10), General 
Assembly Official Records Fifty-First Session, Supplement No 10, 30).  
74 
responsibility of individuals does not eliminate the international responsibility of States for the 
acts committed by persons acting as organs or agents of the State.’254 
Furthermore, state practice leaves room for a proposition that, in cases where responsibility has 
been allocated to an individual, there can be attribution to the State as well. After the Second 
World War, both Germany and Japan were declared liable, even though the political and military 
leaders were prosecuted for individual crimes.255 The fact that four individuals, who were 
assumed to be agents of Libya, were held responsible for bomb attacks in a bar in Berlin in 
1986256 did not discourage the suggestion that Germany should claim compensation from the 
State of Libya. The prosecution and conviction of the individuals responsible for the Lockerbie 
bombing, considered to be an agent of Libya,257 did not preclude subsequent claims against 
Libya for compensation by the United Kingdom and the United States.258 The effectuation of 
responsibility of individual agents of Yugoslavia for acts during the armed conflict between 1992 
and 1995 in the ICTY and national courts did not preclude claims by BiH and Croatia in the ICJ.  
Other authorities have recognized the non-exclusive nature of individual and state responsibility. 
The ICTY Trial Chamber in the Furundžija case laid down a general theory of responsibility for 
the crime of torture.259 In support of the existence of dual state-individual responsibility for the 
crime of torture, the Chamber held that “under current international humanitarian law, in 
addition to individual criminal responsibility, State responsibility may ensue as a result of State 
officials engaging in torture or failing to prevent torture or punish torturers.”260 When carried out 
on an extensive scale, torture may constitute a particularly grave wrongful act generating state 
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responsibility.261 This passage is quite illustrative of the way in which the ICTY looks at 
responsibility for the crime of torture. Emphasis is placed on the ‘importance of outlawing this 
heinous phenomenon’262 and state and individual criminal responsibility are complementary 
instruments to suppress torture. Along similar lines, under human rights law, although 
international responsibility is primarily focused on States, States are under obligation to punish 
torture as a criminal offence under domestic law and to exercise their jurisdiction to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish offenders.263 
Furthermore, in its judgment on Preliminary Objections in the Genocide case, the ICJ said with 
respect to Article IX of the Genocide Convention: 
The reference in Article IX to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any other acts 
enumerated in Article III does not exclude any form of State responsibility. Nor is the responsibility of 
a State for acts of its organs excluded by Article IV of the Convention, which contemplates the 
commission of an act of genocide by ‘rulers’, or ‘public officials’.264 
2.4.2. Complementarity (and coexistence) between State Responsibility and 
Individual Criminal Responsibility 
According to proponents of dualism, state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility 
are not mutually exclusive, but rather complement each other. This is so because a State agent 
operates on behalf of the State, and both the State and its agent answer for the acts or omissions 
imputable to both respectively. The international criminal responsibility of the individual does 
not exempt that of the State; the two co-exist, an acknowledgment of this being of crucial 
importance to the eradication of impunity. Both the State and its agents are the direct addressees 
of norms of contemporary international law; the conduct of both is foreseen and regulated by it. 
Thus, both the State and its agents ought to be accountable for the consequences of their acts and 
omissions. 
While an international tribunal on human rights (such as the European and Inter-American 
Courts, and, in the future, the African Court) or an inter-state court (ICJ) cannot determine the 
international criminal responsibility of the individual, and an international criminal tribunal 
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(ICTY, ICTR, ICC) cannot determine the responsibility of the State, impunity is most likely 
bound to persist, being only partially sanctioned by one and the other. Yet, there does not appear 
to be any juridical impediment for the associated determination of the international responsibility 
of the State and the international criminal responsibility of the individual, despite the insufficient 
development of the matter, reflected in the persistent compartmentalized approach to these two 
regimes of international responsibility.265  
The State, as a juridical person and an international legal subject, has rights and duties under 
international law; its conduct is directly and effectively foreseen by the law of nations (droit des 
gens).266 Thus, both the State and its agents ought to be accountable for the consequences of their 
acts and omissions. The determination of the individual criminal responsibility is not, thus, 
sufficient, as the State, in whose name its agents committed a crime, contributed itself, as a 
juridical person of international law, to the perpetration or occurrence of such a crime. At a 
conceptual level, it is surely difficult not to admit the occurrence of a crime of State in general 
international law, above all insofar as there is intention (fault or guilt), or tolerance, 
acquiescence267, negligence, or omission, on the part of the State in relation to grave violations of 
human rights and of international humanitarian law perpetrated by its agents, in pursuance of a 
state policy. In such circumstances, societas delinquere potest.268 The juridical personality of a 
collective entity (such as the State) is a legal construction, and constitutes a unit of imputation of 
its conducts, undertaken by the individuals who compose this collective entity and act on its 
behalf; thus, both the juridical persons as well as those individuals ought to be accountable for 
the consequences of their acts or omissions, particularly when they bring about grave violations 
of human rights and humanitarian law. 269  
Article 40 ARSIWA characterizes aggravated responsibility by the fact that it flows from ‘a 
serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general 
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international law’270. The underlying characteristic will be that the acts that led to the breach of 
international law were part of a systematic policy of the State. A majority of cases in which the 
international community is concerned with individual criminal responsibility will be part of a 
systemic policy of the State. Crawford noted that ‘it is a characteristic of the worst crimes of the 
period since 1930 that they have been committed within and with the assistance of State 
structures’.271 In the cases of Germany and Japan after the Second World War, Cambodia after 
the Khmer Rouge regime, and Yugoslavia after the armed conflict in 1991-1995, the individual 
transgressions of international law could not be separated from the acts of the State. In particular, 
in cases of aggression, genocide and crimes against humanity272, it will mostly be impossible to 
separate the individual from the State.273 Nollkaemper notes that in certain cases it may be more 
important for the enforcement of ‘the provisions of international law’ to address States, rather 
than to confine legal responses to single individuals who carry out a state policy.274 
The practice of holding State officials criminally responsible under international law has largely 
developed in reaction to frustration with the practical difficulties in holding States responsible 
for violating their international obligations and with the limited deterrence that the law on state 
responsibility seems to have generated. Indeed, States, being, as the Nüremberg tribunal 
observed, mere “abstract entities",275 may be less amenable to pressure and punishment than 
individual leaders, who may fear trial and imprisonment.276 Thus, efforts to increase the 
compliance-pull of international norms277 may support the move towards imposing legal 
responsibility not only on international law-violating States, but also on those individual leaders 
who played a key role in orchestrating or executing such violations. According to this line of 
thought, individual criminal responsibility complements state responsibility and compensates for 
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its shortcoming in preventing and punishing violations of international law.278 At the same time, 
state responsibility may address some of the structural limits of individual criminal 
responsibility, such as the lack of a comprehensive victim compensation scheme, and the 
inability to prosecute all responsible individuals.279 This complementary view of individual and 
state responsibility has been expressed by the ICJ. For example, in the Bosnian Genocide case 
Judge Tomka sounded an optimistic note about the complementary relationship between his 
court and the ICTY: 
“The activity of the Court has thus complemented the judicial activity of the ICTY in 
fulfilling the Court’s role in the field of State responsibility for genocide, over which the 
ICTY has no jurisdiction. Hopefully, the activities of these two judicial institutions of the 
United Nations, the Court remaining the principal judicial organ of the Organization, 
contribute in their respective fields to their common objective – the achievement of 
international justice – however imperfect it may be perceived.”280 
There is, however, another possible explanation for the move from state to individual criminal 
responsibility. The growing emphasis on individual criminal responsibility in international law 
may derive from the increased aversion of States to applying collective forms of legal 
responsibility.281 In an age of human rights, where international law is increasingly viewed as a 
vehicle for enhancing individual welfare, imposing sanctions on State may be regarded as a 
crude form of collective punishment of a particularly large magnitude – punishing millions of 
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281 See e.g., Van Sliedregt, E., The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, 2 JICJ (2004) 929-938. 
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citizens whose involvement in the unlawful state policies may have been marginal at best.282 
Imposing individual criminal responsibility, which focuses attention and retribution on those 
having the “greatest responsibility” for the violation,283 could thus be viewed as preferable from 
a normative perspective. Thus, according to this view, individual criminal responsibility should 
eventually displace state responsibility.284  
There is a definite link between state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility in 
terms of certain of the criteria used to determine which acts are criminal. Indeed, it could be 
argued that all acts which constitute international crimes may in principle entail individual or 
state responsibility, or both, depending on the nature and circumstances of the breach, and that 
the two notions can complement each other. As Jennings and Watts have pointed out, although 
the Draft Code of Crimes is related to the international criminal responsibility of individuals 
rather than of States, ‘a number of the particular acts giving rise to such international criminal 
responsibility are likely by their nature be as much, it not more, State acts as acts committed by 
individuals in their private capacity’.285 In the report prepared for the ILC it is stated: 
Under the Draft Articles, states as juridical entities may incur responsibility if they breach 
fundamental rules of conduct securing a civilized state of affairs in international relations. 
Additionally, for the same acts, those who hold leadership positions in the governmental machinery of 
such states may be made accountable in their individual capacity….There is no denying the fact that 
rules imposing obligations upon states must be framed differently from rules that address individuals. 
Notwithstanding this technical difference the substantive background is the same. In both instances, 
the foundations of the international community are at stake.286 
                                                          
282 See e.g., Drumbl, M. A., Looking Up, Down and Across: The ICTY's Place in the International Legal Order, 37 
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The State as such is inevitably involved in any crime against peace and security of mankind, 
either directly as the active and, in some cases, the sole agent, or indirectly because of its failure 
to act or its own improvidence.287  
3. Conclusion 
The review of relevant literature reveals a scholarly consensus regarding the main characteristics 
of the relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility, namely, the dual 
attribution and complementarity. There are certain acts that may be attributable to both States 
and individuals, and thus entail dual responsibility under international law.288 Complementarity 
entails that individual and state responsibility for serious breaches of the most fundamental 
norms of international law are viewed as complementary regimes and the emphasis is generally 
on the fact that individual criminal responsibility cannot exhaust state responsibility for the same 
serious wrongful acts.289  
 
Any approach which purports to apply a single model of connection between state and individual 
criminal responsibility broadly to all categories of crimes is bound to fail. International crimes 
differ with regard to the role of the State in their commission. It follows that a distinction must 
be made between those international crimes whose nature implies a direct involvement of a State 
apparatus, or at least a collective organization, and those crimes which, while being directly 
related to actions of the State, are liable autonomously to be imputed to an individual. It is 
generally accepted that aggression, genocide, and most cases of crimes against humanity belong 
to the former category, while war crimes belong to the latter.290  
Concurrence between state and individual criminal responsibility was discussed by the ILC 
during its codification work on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and 
individual criminal responsibility for crimes against the peace and security of mankind. Both 
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documents, ARSIWA (2001) and the Draft Code of Crimes (1996), contain a provision expressly 
defining their scope which differentiates them from responsibility rules applicable towards an 
individual or a State, respectively. In particular, Article 58 ARSIWA (without prejudice clause) 
states that “these articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual criminal 
responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a State.” The identical 
wording is used in the Draft Code of Crimes: its Article 4 provides that “the fact that the present 
Code provides for the responsibility of individuals for crimes against the peace and security of 
mankind is without prejudice to any question of the responsibility of States under international 
law.” Commentaries of both codifications reveal that the ILC highlighted the non-exclusive 
character of state and individual criminal responsibility (without prejudice clause)291 and the 
principal distinction existing between them.292 While concurrence between state and individual 
criminal responsibility is claimed by the ILC as a matter of fact, there is no detailed analysis of 
the mutual relationship between both regimes anywhere in the aforesaid codifications. Whereas 
points of contact between both regimes were explored by the ILC, the relationship between state 
and individual criminal responsibility is nevertheless characterized by separateness. That is, the 
ILC rejected any conceptual links between state and individual criminal responsibility and 
emphasized their dissimilarity.  
It is undisputed that the Articles on state responsibility are one of the most important and 
elaborate projects of codification and progressive development of international law.293 
Nevertheless, important developments of individual criminal responsibility for international 
crimes were not taken into account by the drafters other than by a mere insertion of the ‘without 
prejudice' clause. While a clear separation of state and individual criminal responsibility would 
be but artificial, it cannot be overlooked that the group of most prominent international law 
scholars could not agree on including the notion of parallel responsibility for States and 
individuals in the most recent restatements of international law in the relevant field. Regrettably, 
the ILC did not analyse the mutual relation between state and individual criminal responsibility 
regimes in more detail, and was satisfied with a mere superficial enunciation of their 
simultaneous existence. 
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General statements on the difference and separateness of state and individual criminal 
responsibility for international crimes do not provide a clear picture of the relationship between 
these two regimes. While these statements do not necessarily exclude some kind of relationship 
between them, they do not reveal which are the characteristics of such a relationship. The 
approach(es) favouring separateness respond to a concrete need to prosecute those responsible 
for international crimes and develop a regime of individual criminal responsibility separate and 
independent from state responsibility.294 They are essentially focused on the differences between 
state and individual criminal responsibility for international crimes. Under such approach, it is 
crucial to dissociate the conduct of the State from that of its organs.295 While in traditional 
international law, the establishment of individual criminal responsibility was very rare, the 
conceptual dissociation of the two regimes of responsibility after the Second World War led to 
the evolution of a general principle of individual criminal responsibility for breaches of 
international obligations, whether committed by private individuals or by State organs.296 Thus, 
from this perspective, individual criminal responsibility is inevitably distinct from state 
responsibility.297 The proponents of this view assume that international crimes of an individual 
stand on their own and are not necessarily attributable to a State in a manner which would 
implicate the law on state responsibility.298 Accordingly, the dissociation approach implies 
separate responsibility at the international level, meaning that the two regimes of responsibility 
are separate and mutually independent.299 In particular, these regimes differ with respect to the 
subject, which can commit international crimes, the contents of the responsibility implied by the 
commission of international crimes and the enforcement mechanism, which should guarantee 
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compliance with primary rules.300 Accordingly, the two regimes serve parallel functions within 
their respective spheres of application and can therefore develop each their own respective rules 
in perfect independence from each other.301  
As will be illustrated in Part I and Part III, such an extreme approach is not reflected in 
international practice, which is more complex and pays more attention to the points of contact 
between the two responsibility regimes.302 On the one hand, international practice shows a 
certain tendency to keep state responsibility separate from individual criminal responsibility.303 
These regimes may well share a common origin, i.e. the breach of obligations owed to the entire 
international community, nonetheless, they remain two different legal regimes of international 
responsibility aiming at governing the consequences of distinct types of conduct. In particular, 
international criminal law only concerns individual conduct, not State conduct. The principle of 
individual criminal responsibility applies to all individuals, those forming part of State organs as 
well as private individuals. International case law has made it plain that no state policy need be 
demonstrated as a condition for holding State organs accountable when they commit 
international crimes. To be convicted, every defendant must have had a certain mens rea, and 
this element can never be presumed, not even with respect to high ranking individuals forming 
part of State organs. On the other hand, international practice reveals that there are various points 
of contact between the two regimes which can hardly be eliminated. As will be argued in Part II, 
the manner in which international criminal tribunals establish the material element of 
international crimes is very similar to the manner in which the State act amounting to an 
internationally wrongful act is demonstrated. The general context of a violation serves a 
fundamental role in proving that material element. Furthermore, particular modes of liability 
have been elaborated to address the collective dimension of international crimes more efficiently 
(i.e. JCE, superior responsibility). The more international criminal law focuses on and develops 
tools to deal with collective criminality, the more the assessment of individuals’ crimes reveals 
traits of overlap with the assessment of States’ violations. At a minimum, it deals with the same 
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facts that are capable of invoking state responsibility.304 This dissertation argues that these 
common denominators make it hard to simply dissociate state responsibility and individual 
criminal responsibility for international crimes. 
Part I has identified the traditional dualistic approach as the prevailing doctrinal approach to the 
relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility for international crimes, which 
accepts certain overlap between both responsibility regimes, but at the same time rejects the idea 
of formalized mutual dependency. Accordingly, the prevailing dualistic approach accepts a 
connection between a system based on state responsibility and a system based on individual 
criminal responsibility and acknowledges the double attribution and complementarity as the 
main characteristics of this relationship. Recognizing there is no hierarchical relationship 
between different international jurisdictions,305 a concurrent jurisdiction over the same set of 
facts may be exercised by different international courts and tribunals. The finding of individual 
criminal responsibility before an international criminal tribunal or court is not a legally 
compelling argument for establishing state responsibility before another international tribunal. 
Nor can it relieve the State of its own autonomous responsibility under international law.306 
However, proceedings before international criminal tribunals may occasionally be used as 
evidence in inter-state proceedings. For instance, many of the allegations before the ICJ in the 
Genocide case had previously ‘been the subject of the processes and decisions of the ICTY.’307 
The Court made a careful use of such materials distinguishing their evidentiary value on the 
basis of strict criteria.308 
The dualistic approach suggests these two regimes of responsibility should not exclude each 
other, but, on the contrary, being inevitably intertwined, they appear complementary to each 
other.309 In certain cases the circle of potential perpetrators of international crimes is inevitably 
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limited to political and military leaders, as these crimes are always committed by, or on orders 
from, individuals occupying the highest decision-making positions in the political or military 
apparatus of the State. In such cases the individual criminal responsibility of the authors of 
particularly serious violations of international law must be complemented with the responsibility 
of the State. Moreover, state responsibility should not be considered as precluding individual 
criminal responsibility of the leaders or organizers of the same crimes. Crimes such as genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity can thus be considered as amounting to either “crimes 
of States”310 or individual crimes or both, depending on the circumstances of the breach.  
Attempts to introduce legal accountability in the aftermath of wars and mass atrocities reveal the 
actual difficulty of drawing clear lines of separation between individual and state 
responsibility.311 Such distinctions are especially difficult to make when they implicate the 
individual criminal responsibility of political and military leaders, whose acts are closely 
identified with State policies. Part II and Part III aim to demonstrate that in cases of complicity 
by way of provision of military aid a clear separation of the acts of political and military leaders 
from the policies of the respective States is but artificial. While distinctions between individual 
and state responsibility continue to be drawn in these cases (international criminal courts only 
have jurisdiction over individuals, whereas inter-state courts may only adjudicate state 
responsibility cases) their legal and moral interconnectedness militates in favour of adopting a 
more holistic approach towards responsibility management. The succeeding analysis will show 
that in the "foreign assistance cases" individual criminal responsibility of a political or military 
leader can not be established in isolation from state responsibility, and accordingly, a 
determination of individual criminal responsibility necessarily triggers state responsibility.  
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PART II – THE PROVISION OF MILITARY AID AS COMPLICITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
4. Introduction 
For the past several years, the US government – alongside other States – has provided assistance, 
including military aid, military training, and arms, to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and other 
rebel groups engaged in conflict with both the Syrian government and, more recently, with 
extremist rebel groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).312 During this same 
period, the world has watched in horror as forces affiliated with the Syrian government have 
committed widespread atrocities, including torture, extrajudicial killings, attacks on civilians, 
and the deployment of chemical weapons.313 The crimes of ISIS, moreover, have been headline 
news for the past two years.314 The US officials involved in providing this assistance were aware 
that some of the aid—however well intended—will unavoidably find itself directed toward 
criminal activity. Part II will address the question whether such knowledge is sufficient to hold 
such officials criminally responsible for aiding and abetting the crimes facilitated by their 
assistance. 
Accordingly, Part II examines individual criminal responsibility for complicity in international 
crimes on the basis of a two-step analysis. First, a systematic analysis of jurisprudence of 
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international criminal tribunals and some particularly problematic aspects of the individual 
complicity will outline a general legal framework of individual criminal responsibility for 
complicity. Second, this normative framework will be applied on the landmark case of individual 
complicity by way of provision of military aid, i.e. the Perišić case. The examined case study 
will argue that the provision of military aid does not ipso facto render the political and military 
leaders of the assisting States individually criminally responsible for aiding and abetting the 
crimes committed during such armed conflicts, simply because they provided such aid. 
Furthermore, it will demonstrate that the ad hoc tribunals have employed the wrong 
methodology to identify the putative customary international law of complicity in cases of 
provision of military aid. Part II argues that for the determination of individual criminal 
responsibility for complicity it must be shown that one has aided and abetted the commission of 
specific crime(s) during an armed conflict, an act which is distinct, and apart, from the mere 
provision of military aid. By holding military leaders external to a conflict criminally responsible 
for aiding and abetting crimes committed by another State’s army or a non-state actor operating 
in another State, new boundaries are drawn in the international criminal law. Part II proposes the 
normative boundaries to individual criminal responsibility for complicity that ensure adequate 
protections against over-criminalization and offers the kind of normative analysis that 
international tribunals have declined to explicitly undertake. 
The question of individual criminal responsibility for extraterritorial provision of military aid has 
proven particularly challenging in cases of prosecutions of senior political and military officials 
external to a conflict and thereby remote from the actual perpetration of offences (i.e. the 
“foreign assistance cases”). This is particularly so in the context of international crimes 
physically carried out by individuals or groups that are not subordinate to an accused but rather 
belong to another, independent and separate army of another State to which some form of 
military aid has been provided. Despite almost twenty years of concerted judicial application of 
the rules regarding individual criminal responsibility for international crimes, recent decisions by 
the ad hoc tribunals have created uncertainty regarding the law on complicity. This jurisprudence 
has been fractured in relation to the requirements for individual criminal responsibility in cases 
of aid or assistance, whereby the “specific direction” element of aiding and abetting as a mode of 
criminal responsibility proved particularly controversial. 
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Different international courts have effectively addressed an issue whether military or political 
leaders may be convicted for knowingly facilitating crimes by foreign armed forces not under 
their direct control or by armed groups operating in another State. Both the ICTY and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (hereinafter: SCSL) examined this question in the cases of prominent 
defendants accused of aiding and abetting international crimes – Momčilo Perišić, the former 
Head of the Yugoslav Army315, and Charles Taylor, the former Liberian President.316 
Accordingly, Part II explores the appropriate legal standard to convict a political or military 
leader who aids or abets international crimes committed by a foreign army or an armed group 
operating in another State.  
These two cases are among the most significant cases in the history of international criminal law 
not only because they raised novel legal issues, concerned mass atrocities and involved high-
profile defendants; these two cases also stand out because both international courts impliedly, 
and at times overtly, weighted how international relations could be affected by a precedent under 
which a top State official is convicted for providing military assistance to a foreign armed group 
responsible for international crimes. Yet, the courts reached vastly different conclusions.317 
Moreover, the Perišić and Taylor trials were landmark cases not only because of the positions 
held by the respective accused, but because of the circumstances in which their alleged criminal 
conduct took place. They each were convicted of crimes outside the borders of their own State, 
perpetrated by armed groups who were not from their own State and whom they did not 
command. At the appellate level, the Perišić and Taylor cases came to very different final 
resolutions; namely, Perišić was acquitted on all charges whereas Taylor’s conviction was 
upheld. The contrasting results were due to the very divergent interpretations of the parameters 
of aiding and abetting liability applied in these judgments.  
In Perišić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber deemed that a facilitator’s knowledge that the recipients 
of military aid are perpetrating crimes is essentially irrelevant, absent proof that the facilitator’s 
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89 
actions were ‘specifically directed’ to assist crimes318 – a requirement tantamount to proof that 
the facilitator knew his acts facilitate the commission of (the) crimes. The aftermath of Perišić 
reflects continued disagreement on the process by which courts should determine the content of 
individual criminal responsibility for complicity in “foreign assistance cases”, with the standards 
of accomplice liability depending very much on which tribunal – and which particular judge – 
happens to decide the case. Namely, the SCSL held that the controversial Perišić precedent did 
not comport with customary international law, and therefore affirmed the conviction of Taylor 
for knowingly assisting atrocities by rebel forces during the Sierra Leone civil war. The SCSL 
explicitly refused to follow the precedent set by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Perišić by 
emphasizing that proof of “specific direction” is not required under customary international law, 
as it is sufficient that the facilitator provided substantial assistance with the general knowledge 
that the recipient armed forces were committing crimes.319 Accordingly, the SCSL affirmed the 
conviction of Taylor, who had been convicted at trial of aiding and abetting crimes by rebel 
forces in Sierra Leone’s civil war, which coerced child soldiers and murdered, raped, mutilated, 
and amputated civilians on a vast scale.320 
Moreover, since Perišić, two differently composed ICTY Appeals Chambers have twice 
repudiated the specific direction standard.321 Specifically, less than a year later the decision in the 
Prosecutor v. Šainović at al. (known as the Milutinović case) held that the Perišić Appellate 
judgment deviated from both ICTY jurisprudence and customary international law. The Šainović 
panel announced that it “unequivocally reject[ed]” the Perišić standard since “specific direction” 
is not a requisite element of aiding and abetting,322 thereby siding with the SCSL’s holding in 
Taylor.323 Most recently in December 2015, a divided panel reversed the Trial Chamber 
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Judgment in Stanišić that had applied Perišić to acquit two Serbian security officers accused of 
aiding and abetting crimes committed in Bosnia and Croatia by paramilitary units that the 
defendants had established, financed, trained, and otherwise supported.324 With no formal 
mechanism – such as en banc review – for resolving the split, these judgments have left the 
ICTY with a conflicted jurisprudence.325 The ICC Statute includes a complicity provision (as of 
yet untested) that appears to enforce a stricter, purpose-based version of complicity that arguably 
resembles the Perišić approach.326 
Part II argues in favour of setting a relatively high legal standard to convict a top State official 
for facilitating atrocities from a remote location, as adjudicated by the appellate decision in 
Perišić. Accordingly, Part II explores the impact that Perišić might have on international 
relations if other courts opted to follow this precedent, such as by considering the political 
repercussions of their decisions.327 It shall be examined whether requiring additional proof that a 
defendant’s actions were “specifically directed” to assist crimes would be reasonable under these 
circumstances or would it create an unprecedented hurdle for convicting leaders who enable 
atrocities by a foreign army.328 While an apparent solid majority of experts disagree with the 
requirement of “specific direction”329, certain experts have defended it.330 
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Implications for International Criminal Justice Mechanisms, Hague Institute of Global Justice, 2014, 
http://www.thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/PB13-Gotovina-Perisic-Sainovic-
Appeal-Judgments.pdf. 
326 See Article 25 (3)(c) of the Rome Statute. 
327 See infra Chapters 6.3 and 6.4. 
328 See infra Chapter 6.4. 
329 Critics of the Judgment have worried that its strict approach provides a manual for officials on how to support 
atrocities without fear of criminal responsibility. As Marko Milanović has argued, for example, the acquittal 
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any political or military leader external to a conflict who is assisting one of the parties even while knowing they are 
engaging in mass atrocities, so long as the leader is remote from the actual operations and is not so thoroughly stupid 
to leave a smoking gun behind him.« See Milanović. M., The Limits of Aiding and Abetting Liability: The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber Acquits Momčilo Perišić, EJIL: TALK! (11 March 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-limits-of-
aiding-and-abetting-liability-the-icty-appeals-chamber-acquits-momcilo-perisic/; see also Roth, K., Opinion, A 
Tribunal's Legal Stumble, New York Times, 9 July 2013, www.nytimes. com/2013/07/10/opinion/global/a-
tribunals-legal-stumble.html.  
330 See, e.g., Ambos, K., and Njikam, O., Charles Taylor's Criminal Responsibility, 11 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 2013, 789, 804-08 (expressing support for the »specific direction« standard), Heller, K. J., Why the 
ICTY's »Specifically Directed« Requirement is Justified, Opinion Juris (June 2, 2013) 
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Like Perišić, who was essentially accused of supporting the army of the Bosnian Serb Republic 
(a non-state actor operating within the boundaries of a foreign State)331, Taylor was accused of 
supporting rebel forces in Sierra Leone’s civil war.332 The issues in these two cases were so 
closely related that many experts considered Perišić the death knell of criminal responsibility for 
the likes of Taylor.333 Had the SCSL not explicitly declined to follow the legal standard set in 
Perišić, Taylor would plausibly have been acquitted on appeal. 
4.1. Determination of the Appropriate Mode of Responsibility 
Determination of an appropriate mode of participation for prosecuting the provision of military 
aid to direct perpetrators of international crimes is a challenging task. International criminal 
tribunals have used aiding and abetting as a form of responsibility to hold individuals responsible 
in a wide range of factual contexts, targeting accused that ranged from high-ranking political and 
military leaders to low-level detention-facility officers. These cases have covered a variety of 
ways in which the accused assisted the crimes, from those financing a group, supplying weapons 
or other equipment, to what are described as willing or enthusiastic onlookers to crimes. Aiding 
and abetting has played and will continue to play a critical role in international criminal justice, 
and will likely often be the most appropriate mode of responsibility for the highest level accused 
responsible for fuelling atrocity campaigns from a distance as seen in the recent disparate 
judgments in Perišić and Taylor. 
The post-war trials had provided precedents, but in the context of codifying the laws of war, the 
focus was mainly on setting down the primary rules, rather than clarifying in any great detail 
secondary rules concerning individual criminal responsibility. In the World War II era, a variety 
of tribunals prosecuted individuals as accomplices to war crimes under international law. Among 
other notable cases, a British military tribunal convicted two executives of a company that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/06/02/why-the-ictys-specifically-directed-requirement-is-justified/ (»As long as aiding 
and abetting's mens rea requires no more than knowledge, the specific direction requirement is a necessary and 
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331 See infra Chapter 6.1. In 1992 the Bosnian Serbs declared an independent Repubic of Srpska (RS). While the RS 
had not been recognized by the UN, one could argue that at the relevant period the RS indeed met the requirements 
of statehood under international law: territorial sovereignty, population and political leadership as the three 
governing criteria for statehood. 
332 Taylor Appeals Judgment, paras. 260, 280, 518-21.  
333 Jouet, M., supra note 317, p. 1096. 
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supplied the poison gas used by the Schutzstaffel (SS) in the Auschwitz gas chambers,334 and a 
US military tribunal convicted two German industrialists for making large donations to a fund 
that financed the SS.335 
The grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for example, refer only to those 
persons “committing or ordering to be committed” serious violations of those treaties.336 At the 
1949 Diplomatic Conference in Geneva, it was explained that modes of criminal liability and 
related matters were not the concern of the delegates: 
These should be left to the judges who would apply the national laws. The Diplomatic Conference is 
not here to work out international penal law. Bodies far more competent than we are have tried to do it 
for years.337 
 
Amongst the treaties of IHL, the Additional Protocol I stands as something of an exception in 
that it specifically includes superior responsibility as a distinct form of individual criminal 
responsibility for war crimes.338 When the UN Security Council established a number of 
international criminal tribunals beginning in the early 1990s, superior responsibility was included 
alongside various other modes of liability, thus casting a wide net for criminal responsibility. The 
statutes of the ad hoc tribunals provide that those persons who “planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime” 
are liable to prosecution.339 In contrast, the Rome Statute provides a more detailed treatment of 
the various forms of individual criminal responsibility in Articles 25 and 28.340 
                                                          
334 Case No. 9, The Zyklon B Case, Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others, in 1 UN War Crimes Commission, Law 
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Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Art. 50. 
337 Fourth report drawn up by the Special Committee of the Joint Committee, Final Record of the Diplomatic 
Conference of Geneva of 1949, Vol. 2, Federal Political Department, Berne, 12 July 1949, Section B, p. 115. 
338 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) (AP I), Art. 86. 
339 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, UN Doc. 
S/RES/827, 25 May 1993 (hereinafter: ICTY Statute), Art. 7(1); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
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Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between January 1, 1994 and December 31 1994, UN 
Doc. S/RES/955, 8 November 1994 (hereinafter: ICTR Statute), Art. 6 (1). See also Statute of the Special Court for 
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In determining the scope of individual criminal responsibility, the ad hoc international tribunals 
have interpreted their own constitutive documents with reference to customary international law. 
This has often served as a euphemism for drawing on the limited practice of the post-Second 
World War trials, as exemplified in the ICTY’s jurisprudence on joint criminal enterprise 
liability.341 Customary international law has also featured in the recent jurisprudence concerning 
aiding and abetting, although it was not mentioned in the first brief discussion of this mode of 
liability in obiter dictum of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the seminal Tadić case. The Appeals 
Chamber explained that aiding and abetting involves the carrying out of “acts specifically 
directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime 
[…] and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime”.342 Assistance 
may be logistical (e.g. delivery of weaponry or military equipment, provision of fuel, payment 
for military supplies, unauthorized donations), technical or personnel assistance (e.g. provision 
of personnel, training of personnel, payment of salaries, deployment of troops). According to 
Tadić, an aider and abettor must know that his or her acts assist the commission of a specific 
crime.343 Similarly, the provision of military aid by a State in breach of its obligation under 
customary international law has been defined by the ICJ in terms of "recruiting, training, arming, 
equipping, financing, supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing 
military and paramilitary actions in another State".344  
It is argued that accomplice liability is of particular relevance to persons who supply the means 
to commit international crimes, or who contribute in other ways to such commission. While joint 
criminal enterprise and superior responsibility have attracted considerable judicial and scholarly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002, 2178 UNTS 138 (entered into force 12 April 2002), UN Doc. S/2002/246 
(hereinafter: SCSL Statute), Appendix II, Art. 6(1). 
340 See also Zgaga, S., Posredno storilstvo in sostorilstvo mednarodnih hudodelstev, Zbornik znanstvenih razprav, 
70 (2010), p. 333 (Noting that international judicial practice sometimes prefers one form of participation in 
wrongdoing while at times favours others. Once the court decides for one model of participation, the tendency is to 
continue preferring the selective form. Doing so, it attenuates the elements for selected form of participation in order 
to justify its selection even though the facts of the case might prefer the use of another form of participation. In any 
event, none of the existing forms of participation is flawless. It is worth mentioning that the ICC distanced itself 
from the use of JCE and instead favours traditional forms of participation in a criminal offence.) 
341 Tadić Appeals Judgment, paras. 172–233. 
342 Ibidem, para. 229. 
343 Ibidem. 
344 Nicaragua case, para. 228. 
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attention, and a certain degree of infamy,345 aiding and abetting proved to be relatively 
uncontroversial at the ad hoc tribunals. This form of liability was cast into the spotlight, 
however, when it featured to varying degrees in a series of ICTY judgments that saw the 
acquittals of several high-ranking accused individuals, most notably Momčilo Perišić, the former 
chief of the general staff of the Yugoslav Army.346 The spotlight’s glare became even more 
intense when the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, in an unprecedented turn of events, 
“unequivocally” rejected the aiding and abetting standard that it had previously endorsed and 
applied in Perišić.347 
Complicity is a particular way of contributing to a wrongdoing – a way of participating in a 
wrong committed by another actor. In accounting for complicity in law, there are principled 
reasons for holding accomplices responsible for their own contribution to the principal's wrong, 
rather than for the wrong itself.348 In criminal law, the central means of achieving this end is 
through a differentiated mode of participation in a wrongdoing, distinguishing principals from 
other participants in the wrong.349 The denomination of a mode of participation as a form of 
accessory liability suggests that a person’s act had a substantial effect on the commission of a 
crime by someone else, while in the case of commission as a principal, the crime is ascribed to 
one’s own conduct. Distinguishing principal perpetrators and accomplices carries an implied 
suggestion that the latter are less blameworthy than the former. When the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber introduced joint criminal enterprise in Tadić, it stated that treating as aiders and 
abettors those that “in some way made it possible for the perpetrator physically to carry out that 
criminal act … might understate the degree of their criminal responsibility”.350  
                                                          
345 See, e.g., Shahabuddeen, M., Judicial Creativity and Joint Criminal Enterprise, in Darcy, S. and Powderly, J. 
(eds), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 184–203; 
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While criminal law might treat the facilitator more leniently than the physical perpetrator, the 
former’s role should not be neglected in the context of core international crimes. Aiding and 
abetting is aimed at those who knowingly provide assistance, which has a substantial effect on 
the commission of crimes. As will be argued below the relevant mens rea requirement according 
to jurisprudence of ad hoc tribunals is a double knowledge standard, whereas Article 30 of the 
Rome Statute lays down “intent and knowledge” as the general standard – although with respect 
to superior responsibility, for example, military commanders can be criminally responsible for 
subordinate’s crime of which they “should have known”.351 This form of liability (i.e., superior 
responsibility), however, is “predicated upon the power of the superior to control or influence the 
acts of subordinates”,352 whereas for aiding and abetting, it is not necessary to show that an 
accomplice “had any power to control those who committed offences”.353 The emphasis is 
instead on the significant influence that the assistance has on the commission of crimes.  
Similarly, joint criminal enterprise (hereinafter: JCE) as a form of liability is predicated upon 
showing that the accused shared the principal’s intent, whereas for aiding and abetting the 
requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed assist the commission of a specific 
crime by the principal.354 The Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Kvočka held that as soon as an 
accomplice shared the intent of the perpetrator, he would become a perpetrator himself.355 While 
it remains difficult to draw a clear distinction between joint liability and complicit liability, the 
need for the latter alongside joint liability is obvious. Considering the law of state responsibility, 
many acts falling short of rendering a State a co-principal involve it in activity that substantially 
contributes to the wrongful act of another State, such that an international legal prohibition is 
needed. State practice has found liability in many such instances. Where a State’s role is 
ancillary, it should be deemed complicit only, regardless of the seriousness of the act of the 
principal.356  
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While the ILC in its Articles on State Responsibility prohibits States from inter alia, assisting in 
the maintenance of a situation involving serious breaches of peremptory norms, the rules do not 
require the assisting State to share the principal’s intent, and this, as well as the fact that the 
responsibility it entails is clearly apart from that of the principal, sets it apart from co-
perpetration.357 Nevertheless, Article 16 ARSIWA, prohibiting States from aiding and assisting 
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by another State, requires intent on the part 
of the facilitating State. This does not mean that the assisting State needs to share the principal’s 
intent; rather, it must intend by its assistance to facilitate the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act.358 
Both areas of law distinguish between those who ‘commit’ an act and those who assist in its 
commission. Whereas the former bear full responsibility for the act itself, the latter’s 
responsibility is derivative in nature, and often involves lesser consequences. The relevant 
provisions are Article 25 (c) ICC Statute (‘aids, abets or otherwise assists’) and Article 16 and 41 
ARSIWA (‘aid and assistance’), reflecting relatively new trends in international law. ‘Aiding and 
abetting’ as opposed to ‘commission’ was first explored in-depth in the 1990s, before the ad hoc 
tribunals.359 Both, the ICC Statute and the law of state responsibility rely on the notion of 
control360 to distinguish those that carry full responsibility from those whose responsibility is 
derivative.361 
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It remains difficult to draw a sharp distinction between joint liability and complicit liability. The 
ILC made it clear that Draft Article 27 (now Article 16) does not address co-perpetration.362 
Brownlie addressed the problem: 
[M]any strong cases of ‘aid or assistance’ will be primarily classifiable as instances of joint 
responsibility and it is only in the more marginal cases that a separate category of delict is called for. 
No doubt the law is undeveloped in this context but the distinction which is to be sought is sufficiently 
clear.363 
Brownlie suggests examples of distinction between complicity and joint liability fall into the two 
categories: 
Thus, the supply of weapons, military aircraft, radar equipment, and so forth, would in certain 
situations amount to ‘aid and assistance’ in the commission of an act of aggression but would not give 
rise to joint responsibility. However, the supply of combat units, vehicles, equipment, and personnel, 
for the specific purpose of assisting an aggressor, would constitute a joint responsibility.364 
Brownlie’s interpretation, however, does not correspond to the one advocated by the ICJ.365  
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber in Tadić sought to construe broadly the portion of the Statute 
concerning derivative liability, which makes no distinction between conspiracy and aiding and 
abetting. Recognizing that “the Tribunal’s Statute does not specify nor expressly nor by 
implication the objective and subjective elements of this category of collective criminality,” the 
Appeals Chamber proceeded to identify them.366 The Tadić Appeals Chamber decided not only 
to clarify the doctrine of conspiracy but to contrast it with aiding and abetting liability, 
announcing in dictum: 
In the case of aiding and abetting…the principal may not even know about the accomplice’s 
contribution. The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend 
moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, 
wanton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and its support has a substantial effect upon the 
perpetration of the crime. By contrast, in the case of acting in pursuance of a common purpose or 
design, it is sufficient for the participant to perform acts that in some way are directed to furthering the 
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common plan or purpose. In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge 
that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specific crime by the 
principal. By contrast, in the case of common purpose or design more is required ([for example], 
either intent to perpetrate the crime or intent to pursue the common criminal design plus foresight that 
those crimes…were likely to be committed).367 
Whereas an accomplice’s acts must be specifically directed to assist a perpetrator and have a 
substantial effect, a conspirator’s need only be “in some way directed” to furthering the 
conspiracy. The language of Tadić judgment suggests that, if a given act has a plausible, non-
criminal explanation, it would be insulated as a basis for accomplice liability, regardless of the 
substantiality of its effect on the commission of a war crime.  
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5. The Law on Complicity in International Criminal Law 
5.1. The Authorities 
The word ‘complicity’ itself is not used in the statutes of the various international criminal 
tribunals, as the preferred nomenclature includes such terms as ‘planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a 
crime’,368 ‘[o]rders, solicits or induces the commission of a crime’369, ‘aids, abets or otherwise 
assists, including providing the means for [a crime’s] commission’370 and ‘committed, 
participated as accomplice, organized or directed others’.371 
The principle of complicity lacks definition. Neither the law of state responsibility nor 
international criminal law attaches a fixed meaning to the word ‘complicity’. The term was 
explicitly rejected for use in the ILC’s project on codification and development of general rules 
on state responsibility as it invited inappropriate associations with domestic criminal law 
concept.372 The Genocide and Torture Convention both contain a single reference to ‘complicity’ 
as a form of banned participation. The only international criminal law Statute to use the term is 
that of the ICTR, and its inclusion there is commonly explained with reference to poor drafting 
practices.373  
The responsibility of accomplices was recognized in the Statute of the International Military 
Tribunal only in a general way: ‘[l]eaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating 
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing 
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.’374 Many 
of those convicted at Nüremberg were held responsible as accomplices rather than as 
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principals.375 The ILC’s Nüremberg Principles, stating certain core principles of liability, deal 
with accomplice liability. Namely, the seventh and final principle states: “Complicity in the 
commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity…is a crime 
under international law,” but says nothing about the forms and elements of complicity.376 The 
concept of complicity is also recognized in the Genocide Convention,377 the Torture 
Convention,378 and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid.379 The Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals contain a general provision on 
complicity, applicable to all of the offences over which the tribunals have subject matter 
jurisdiction. They establish criminal responsibility for persons who have ‘planned, instigated, 
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a 
crime’ within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.380 The ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes, while failing to 
identify the elements of complicity, nevertheless declared that individual criminal responsibility 
would be incurred, in the case of crimes against humanity and war crimes, by a person who 
‘knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of such 
a crime, including providing the means for its commission’.381 The Rome Statute of the ICC 
imposes criminal responsibility upon an individual who ‘[f]or the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission’.382 
According to the Rwanda Tribunal, aiding means giving assistance to someone, while abetting 
involves facilitating the commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto.383 The two terms are 
disjunctive, and according to the Tribunal it is sufficient to prove one or the other form of 
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participation.384 War crimes case law provides many examples of prosecution of accomplices.385 
The accused who is not physically present when the crime takes place may still be accomplice. 
As the ICTY observed, ‘direct contribution does not necessarily require the participation in the 
physical commission of the illegal act. That participation in the commission of the crime does 
not require an actual physical presence of physical assistance appears to have been well accepted 
at the Nüremberg war crimes trials’.386 Sometimes, complicity is established because the accused 
is employed in a criminal enterprise or belongs to some civilian or military unit. But complicity 
should never be equated with collective guilt, by which members of a regime or of its armed 
forces are deemed, by that fact alone, to share criminal responsibility.387 
As the ICTY Trial Chamber has declared in the Čelebići case, “that individuals may be held 
criminally responsible for their participation in the commission of offences in any of several 
capacities is in clear conformity with general principles of criminal law.”388 Another Trial 
Chamber has identified a customary law basis for the criminalization of accessories or 
participants.389 The boundaries of different forms of participation may shift. Moreover, the line 
between principalship and accomplice liability drawn by the control theory390 remains a matter 
of discussion in international criminal law practice and scholarship.391 Wherever that line is 
drawn, doctrines of complicity sit around principalship, inculpating those who help the principal 
to commit the wrong or influence his decision to do so.392  
5.2. Aiding and Abetting in the Ambit of the ad hoc Tribunals 
As has traditionally been the case with international criminal tribunals, the ICTY Statute 
prohibits aiding and abetting without specifying the elements required to establish this form of 
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Sliedregt, O. and Weigend, Assessing the Control Theory; Weigend, T., Problems of Attribution in International 
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102 
culpability.393 Accordingly, the ICTY has instead purported to apply rules of accomplice liability 
derived from uncodified customary international law and discovered primarily through 
consulting the case law of international criminal tribunals. 
5.2.1. The actus reus Elements (The Conduct Elements/ The Objective Elements) 
The first ICTY Appeals judgment setting out the parameters of aiding and abetting was the Tadić 
Appeals Judgment, rendered in 1999, which described the actus reus of criminal responsibility 
for aiding and abetting as follows: 
“The aider and abettor carried out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support 
to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction 
of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the 
crime”.394 
Accordingly, at the ad hoc tribunals, the conduct element of aiding and abetting liability consists 
of acts or omissions directed at providing practical assistance, encouragement or moral support 
to the perpetration of a certain specific crime, which have a substantial effect on the perpetration 
of the crime.395 It is important to emphasize that this work concerns complicity by way of 
                                                          
393 The ICTY’s Statute merely provides as follows: “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or 
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in . . . the present 
Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.”; ICTR Statute (same); Article 6(1), SCSL Statute (same); 
Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes 
Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (2001), as amended by NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 
2004), Article 29 (hereinafter: ECCC Statute) (“Any Suspect who planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or 
committed the crimes referred to in article 3 new, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this law shall be individually responsible for the 
crime.”); S.C. Res. 1757, annex, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 2(b)(1)(a) (Mar. 29, 2006) 
(hereinafter: STL Statute) (“A person shall be individually responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Special Tribunal if that person . . . [c]ommitted, participated as accomplice, organized or directed others to commit 
the crime set forth in article 2 of this Statute . . . .”); London Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, 
Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (hereinafter: London Charter) (“Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices 
participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes 
are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”); Control Council Law No. 10: 
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity art. II(2), Dec. 20, 1945, 
3 Official Gazette Control Council For Germany 50–55 (1946) (hereinafter Control Council Law No. 10) (“Any 
person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed to have committed a crime as 
defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the commission of any 
such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was connected with plans or 
enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of any organization or group connected with the 
commission of any such crime or (f) with reference to paragraph 1 (a) if he held a high political, civil or military 
(including General Staff) position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents or satellites or held high 
position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any such country.”). 
394 Tadić Appeals Judgment, para. 229.  
395 Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeals Judgment, para. 81; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Simić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 
28 November 2006, para.85; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 25 February 2004, para. 
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provision of military aid and does not focus on encouragement or moral support. Assistance, 
often termed as “practical” assistance by the tribunals,396 is in many cases relatively 
straightforward, and encompasses the range of conduct aimed at helping the principal to commit 
crime.397 Examples are provision of weapons, transport, or information concerning location of 
potential victims to the principal perpetrator.398 While the ad hoc tribunals have proposed that 
“aiding and abetting include all acts of assistance in either physical form or in the form of moral 
support”399, the ICTY already in its first judgment on aiding and abetting called for a minimum 
actus reus requirement400. Consequently, two additional, unwritten actus reus elements for 
aiding and abetting have been introduced, and both have been held to reflect customary 
international law. Some Chambers have held that the contribution must have had a substantial 
effect on the commission of the crime, whereas others have cumulatively put forward a direct 
effect requirement.  
5.2.1.1. The Substantial Effect Requirement (the Nexus Requirement) 
Different causation standards exist in international criminal law (i.e., conditio sine qua non link, 
substantial effect/contribution requirement). No causation requirement forms part of ‘aiding and 
abetting’ provision of the Statutes of ad hoc tribunals. Rather this element has developed in case 
law.401 In respect of complicity, there is not much support for a condition sine qua non link in 
neither national nor international criminal law. Rather, the substantial contribution requirement 
adopted in tribunal jurisprudence is suited to limiting aiding and abetting to the extent that it 
provides for an appropriate standard of culpable assistance to crime.402 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
45 (hereinafter: Vasiljević Appeals Judgment); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 19 April 
2004, para. 238 (hereinafter: Krstić Appeals Judgment); ICTY, Krnojelac Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 17 
September 2003, para. 51 (hereinafter: Krnojelac Appeals Judgment); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment, 29 July 2004, para. 48; Tadić Appeals Judgment, para. 229. 
396 Blaškić Appeals Judgment, para. 46. 
397 Kadish, S. H., Complicity Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 California Law 
Review, 1985, 323, p. 345.  
398 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR-96-10-A & ICTR-96-17-A Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment, 13 December 2004, paras. 530, 532.  
399 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Rutaganca, Case No. ICTR-96-3, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 6 December 1999, para. 43, 
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 27 January 2000, para. 126. 
400 Compare infra Part III, Section 9.3.1. 
401 Furundžija Trial Judgment, para. 231. 
402 See, e.g. Van Sliedregt, E., Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law, Oxford University Press, 
2012, pp. 127-128.  
104 
The substantial effect requirement was introduced by the Tadić Trial Chamber as an actus reus 
threshold to give aiding and abetting quantifiable limits. Bound to apply only customary 
international law, in both Tadić and Furunđija the respective Trial Chamber has worked towards 
giving substantial effect a customary basis. In order to determine what “amount of assistance”403 
an aider and abettor must have provided in order to be held responsible under customary 
international law, the Tadić Trial Chamber examined post-World War II cases. Holding that 
from these examples no general rule as to the required extent of participation had yet 
crystallized, the Trial Chamber rather simplistically concluded that “aiding and abetting includes 
all acts of assistance by words or acts that lend encouragement or support”.404 
The ICTY has specified that criminal participation must have a direct and substantial effect on 
the commission of the offence.405 It has endorsed the approach of the ILC requiring that 
assistance be ‘substantial’, noting that while the latter provided no definition of ‘substantially’, 
the post-World War II cases it had reviewed required ‘a contribution that in fact has an effect on 
the commission of the crime’.406 The ICTY has left open to what degree the effect of the 
accused’s acts must be “substantial.”407 The question of whether an act constitutes “substantial 
assistance” to a crime is a fact-based inquiry.408 The contribution must have had a substantial 
effect on the commission of a crime.409 In other words, there must be a nexus between the 
alleged acts of the accused and the commission of the crime. 
While the ICTY indicated that participation is substantial if ‘the criminal act most probably 
would not have occurred in the same way had not someone acted in the role that the accused in 
                                                          
403 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 7 May 1997, para. 681 (hereinafter: 
Tadić Trail Judgment). 
404 Tadić Trial Judgment, para. 688.  
405 Delalić Trial Judgment, para 326; Prosecutor v Furundžija (Case no. IT-95- 17/1-T), Judgment, 10 December 
1998 (hereinafter: Furundžija Trial Judgment), paras. 223, 234; Prosecutor v Aleksovski (Case No. IT-95-14/1-T) 
Judgment, 25 June 1999 (hereinafter: Aleksovski Trial Judgment), para 61. 
406 The ILC required that accomplices participate ‘directly and substantially’ in the commission of the crime. In 
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408 Blagojević Appeals Judgment, para. 134; Mrkšić Appeals Judgment, para.200. 
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fact assumed’410, assistance need not constitute an indispensable element, that is, a conditio sine 
qua non for the acts of the principal.411 Similarly, the Rome Statute does not provide any 
indication as to whether there is some quantitative degree of aiding and abetting required to 
constitute the actus reus of complicity. The absence of words like ‘substantially’ in the ICC 
Statute, and the failure to follow the ILC draft is offset by its mens rea requirement.412  
Notably, the actus reus threshold goes back to the works of the ILC, which was also unable to 
substantiate it in a more elaborate way than to determine that a “significant” facilitation was 
needed.413 The Tadić Trial Chamber relied on the works of the ILC, namely, the 1996 ILC Draft 
article 2(3)(d), which stipulates that the aider and abettor must contribute “directly and 
substantially” to the commission of the crime.414 The ILC commented that the assistance 
“facilitates the commission of a crime in some significant way,”415 marking the contrast to its 
previous drafts, such as the 1991 Draft Code, which remained silent on any quantitative 
threshold.416 
Finally, the Tadić Trial Chamber held that any contribution that has an effect on the commission 
of the crime is a substantial contribution – such deprived the word “substantial” of its 
quantitative connotation.417 Following Tadić, the Trial Chamber in Furundžija also attempted to 
base the substantial effect requirement on customary international law. Methodologically it took 
a similar path as in Tadić, and also failed to pin down the quantitative actus reus threshold. In 
addition to the 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes, the Furundžija Trial Chamber relied on both 
Einsatzgruppen and Zyklon B when dealing with the required extent of participation for aiding 
and abetting. It found that substantial effect meant that “[h]aving a role in a system without 
influence would not be enough to attract criminal responsibility.”418 The two cases share the 
subject matter of State-sponsored mass exterminations – either in institutions or by roaming 
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412 See infra Section 5.3. 
413 Noto, F., Secondary Liability in International Criminal Law, A Study on Aiding and Abetting or otherwise 
Assisting the Commission of International Crimes. Dike, Zurich 2013, p. 79.  
414 Report of the ILC work of its forty-eight session, UN doc. A/51/10, 1998, Volume two: The Treaties, Part II, 
Oxford 2004. p. 18 (hereinafter: Report of the ILC work of its forty-eight session). 
415 Ibidem, p. 1693. 
416 Weigend, T., Article 3, in: Bassiouni, M. C., (ed.): Commentaries on the International Law Commission's 1991 
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Toulouse 1993, pp. 113-118. 
417 Eser, A., supra note 349, p. 800. 
418 Furundžija Trial Judgment, para. 233. 
106 
death squads. However, in Zyklon B the defendants were businessmen providing dual use goods 
for institutionalized exterminations, whereas in Einsatzgruppen the accused were formal 
members of a Nazi sub-organization with the sole purpose of managing death squads. Thus, to 
put both subject matters on the same heading may stretch the point when it comes to 
authoritatively establish the actus reus of accessories under customary international law.  
Even though both Tadić and Furundžija remained unsatisfactorily vague, substantial effect has 
become firmly entrenched in the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals. No Chamber 
concerned with this subject matter has ever questioned this prerequisite for aiding and abetting or 
proposed a different approach to tackle the marginal assistance to international crimes.419  
The ad hoc tribunals have given different answers to the question as to “what amount of 
assistance”420 an aider or abettor must lend to the commission of the crime. The following 
categorization of the tests applied will show they have done so on the basis of a fact-based 
inquiry. Regrettably, no clear pattern is evident and the various tests applied shed little light on a 
substantive definition of substantial effect.  
a. The encouragement by mere presence test in Tadić 
Tadić was fund guilty as an aider and abettor to the mistreatments of inmates at Omarska 
concentration camp because he had been encouragingly present when the crimes were committed 
and had insulted and helped to carry off brutalised victims.421 Thus, he was held responsible for 
both physical and psychological assistance. The Trial Chamber found that with both forms of 
assistance he had substantially changed the course of events at Omarska, for it deemed that “the 
criminal act most probably would not have occurred in the same way had not someone acted in 
the role that the accused in fact assumed”.422 It is noteworthy that Tadić was not invested with 
any authority in the camp; even so, the Trial Chamber found him responsible for having been 
                                                          
419 The Trial Chamber in Kvočka case further determined that a significant assistance made a criminal undertaking 
more efficient: “By significant, the Trial Chamber means an act or omission that makes an enterprise efficient or 
effective; e.g., a participation that enables the system to run more smoothly or without disruption. Physical or direct 
perpetration of a serious crime that advances the goal of the criminal enterprise would constitute a significant 
contribution.” See Kvočka Trial Judgment, para. 309; Equally, the Orić Trial Chamber stated that the aider and 
abettor’s contribution had to be “substantial and efficient enough to make the performance of the crime possible or 
at least easier”. See Orić Trial Judgment, para. 282. 
420 Tadić Trial Judgment, para. 681. 
421 Ibidem paras. 277-280, 726, 730. 
422 Ibidem, para. 688. 
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present passively, thereby paving the way for convictions for abetting by mere presence without 
authority. The Trial Chamber ruled that due to his encouraging presence in those instances in 
which he was not himself the perpetrator, Tadić “intentionally assisted directly and substantially 
in the common purpose of [the group] inflicting physical suffering upon [the victims] and 
thereby aided and abetted in the commission of the crimes”.423 
b. The encouragement by authority test in Akayesu, Aleksovski and Furundžija 
Akayesu was found guilty by the ICTR for aiding and abetting for having spoken out words of 
acquiescence.424 Akayesu was a mayor of the Taba commune in Rwanda; a well known and a 
popular leader whose de facto authority over the community largely exceeded his de jure powers 
as a mayor.425 The fact that Akayesu had possessed de facto authority over the principals 
committing crimes in front of his office mattered greatly in as much as he had encouraged the 
crimes merely by tacit signs of tolerance. The Trial Chamber held that he had sent a signal of 
official tolerance for the killings and acts of sexual violence committed around his office 
“without which these acts would not have taken place”.426 
Thus, in a number of cases the aid rendered was found to be substantial because the aider and 
abettor had, to a certain extent, authority over the principal. To convict for aiding and abetting, 
the ad hoc tribunals have repeatedly relied on the notion that authority plus silence could amount 
to moral support. This substantial encouragement by authority design also led to individual 
criminal responsibility for Aleksovski, the de facto commander of the Kaonik military prison in 
central Bosnia in 1993.427 The Trial Chamber held that although he had neither ordered the 
mistreatments nor explicitly approved them, by being present and not objecting when the 
mistreatments were committed, Aleksovski had shown signs of support and encouragement to 
the perpetrating prison guards.428 According to the Trial Chamber, the fact that he did not oppose 
or repress the recurring brutality occurring in the vicinity of his office was a sign of his approval. 
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Accordingly, the Trial Chamber convicted him as an aider and abettor even for the abuses taking 
place in his absence.429 
Moreover, in Furundžija, the Trial Chamber explained the rationale for establishing substantial 
effect through the contributor’s authority or position. According to Furundžija Trial Chamber, 
the substantial encouragement formula focused on the aider and abettor’s influence on the 
commission of the crime according to his ability to prevent the crimes, or, when he could have 
done to prevent or mitigate the crimes. Accordingly, substantial effect presupposed having a role 
in a system with influence, as it was one’s influential position that determined whether lack of 
objection against the unlawful actions of others could lead to individual criminal 
responsibility.430 Lack of objection had to make some difference to the commission of the 
crimes.431 If, by contrast, objection was futile due to the low rank, no responsibility would ensue. 
As to the futility of protest, the Trial Chamber would not only consider the formal rank or 
position, and also the feasibility or reasonableness to protest may play a role.432 
c. The efficiency test in Kvočka and Orlić 
The Trial Chamber in Kvočka was seized with crimes committed in the Omarska camp and 
determined that it had functioned as a systemic form of a joint criminal enterprise.433 The Trial 
Chamber held that the accused contributed “to the commission of the crimes by playing a role 
that allows the system or enterprise to continue its functioning.”434 Furthermore, it determined 
that a significant assistance made a criminal undertaking more efficient: 
“By significant, the Trial Chamber means an act or omission that makes an enterprise efficient or 
effective; e.g., a participation that enables the system to run more smoothly or without disruption. 
Physical or direct perpetration of a serious crime that advances the goal of the criminal enterprise 
would constitute a significant contribution.”435 
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The Trial Chamber underlined that the camp significantly gained efficiency by “the considerable 
role” defendant Kvočka played in maintaining its functioning.436 Also, the Appeals Chamber 
adopted the test when acquitting defendant Žigić for lack of efficiency gained; his acts had 
formed “only mosaic stones in the general picture of violence and oppression”.437 Equally, the 
Orić Trial Chamber stated that the aider and abettor’s contribution had to be “substantial and 
efficient enough to make the performance of the crime possible or at least easier”, a requirement 
that was ultimately found to be lacking because the accused had been unable to prevent wanton 
destruction of Bosnian Serb property by civilians and fighters in the region.438 If the efficiency 
test had been applied in the Perišić case, the Chamber would have to determine whether Perišić 
was able to prevent the crimes committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. However, such a 
determination would arguably place Perišić in a position of a commander vis-à-vis the principal 
perpetrator(s) and his criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute (i.e. the 
command responsibility) would be a more appropriate mode of liability to pursue.  
d. The quantitative test in Perišić, Krstić and Blagojević and Jokić 
In a number of cases concerning the notorious events in and around Srebrenica, the substantiality 
of an aider and abettor’s support has been determined by the sheer amount of material support, 
and, thus, has been understood quantitatively. In Krstić, the Appeals Chamber found that only 
the high number of vehicles, personnel and equipment lent by the accused to the VRS Main Staff 
were found to have enable the Main Staff “to carry out its plan to execute the Bosnian Muslim of 
Srebrenica”.439 The Appeals Chamber explicitly held that the accused’s contribution to the 
Srebrenica genocide by providing Drina Corps resources under his command to the Main Staff 
was substantial because “without the use of Drina Corps resources, the Main Staff would not 
have been able to implement its genocidal plan”.440 The same test was used by the Appeals 
Chamber in Blagojević and Jokić for inquiry as to whether the accused’s acts amounting to 
permitting resources and personnel to the Bratunac Brigade Military Police to logistically 
support the murder and persecution of the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica constituted 
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substantial support.441 Finally, in providing that the accused had substantially contributed to 
various crimes committed in Srebrenica, the Prosecution in the Perišić case chiefly relied on the 
quantity of the Yugoslav personnel and material that the accused had let as reinforcement to the 
VRS.442  
e.  The conclusion on the variety of the tests applied 
In Tadić, the test related to substantial encouragement was relied on because the role of the 
accused in the commission of the principal crime had remained unclear – which violates 
fundamental principles of criminal law in terms of procedural right of the accused.443 The second 
problem is that the tests applied in the examined case law said nothing about why the 
encouraging assistance was a substantial one. The point to be addressed should be the extent of 
encouragement, but the reasoning is circular in that a contribution is said to be substantial 
because it has encouraged the principal. As a result, encouragement simply becomes 
synonymous for substantial encouragement.444  
The second issue, lack of significance, also appears to impede the efficiency test applied in both 
Kvočka and Orić, which focused on whether the accused had made the commission of the crime 
easier in terms of an efficiency gain. Again, the test says little about whether the aider and 
abettor facilitated the crime substantially or not; rather, it seems that the efficiency test merely 
replaces one formula that needs to be substantiated with another that equally needs to be given 
meaning. In none of the cases under this category it was required that the risk of the commission 
of the crime had been augmented to such an extent that it was dependent on the aider and 
abettor’s act or omission; rather, the test seemed to require that the accused had noticeably 
augmented the chances of the crime being committed. This is where the problem lies with the 
way the Chambers have applied this test; they have simulated quantitative precision ex ante, 
whereas in reality they had to operate with ex post probabilities and a retrospective, normative 
assessment of the facts.  
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A number of cases related to Srebrenica concerned the quantity of material support. The extent 
of logistic support to the forcible transfer and killing of the Bosnian Muslims was indeed so 
extensive that without the facilitation by Krstić’s Drina Corps and Blagojević’s Bratunac brigade 
“Operation Krivaja 95” to eliminate the enclave would have been much harder to accomplish or 
may have failed.445 Thus, Krstić’s and Blagojević’s assistance undoubtedly had a substantial 
effect on the crimes. The quantity of material support may also play an important role in 
establishing an aider and abettor’s mens rea, particularly with respect to dual use of goods, 
which, depending on the circumstances, either serve an illicit or legal purpose. 
In sum, neither category of tests applied by the ad hoc tribunals to determine whether the 
assistance had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime is truly convincing. The tests 
are either tantamount to circular reasoning or are inherently vague and therefore undesirable.446 
For instance, in the drafting process of the U.S. Model Penal Code447, a substantial effect 
requirement was “rejected on the grounds of inacceptable uncertainty”.448 What can be deduced 
from the above is that first, the term substantial needs to be given meaning, and second, in giving 
it meaning a normative choice has to be made as to what should constitute substantial aid.449 The 
obvious implication of such normative choice is that a juror is compelled to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether particular assistance should be regarded as criminal. Regrettably, the cases 
offer no explanation as to the methodology of selection of tests to corroborate substantial effect. 
Thus, the question as to which test has been applied for what reason is left open. 
The substantial effect presupposes that the contribution has a certain impact on the commission 
of the crime: in Orić, the Trial Chamber called this a “nexus” between the contribution and the 
crime committed by the principal, a link that establishes a substantial effect on the commission 
of the crime.450 Accordingly, substantial effect equals the required nexus between the 
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contribution and the crime committed. According to the ICTY, substantial effect is an elevated 
nexus requirement calling for a qualified link between the aider and abettor’s conduct and the 
commission of the crime. In that sense, the substantial effect requirement can also be explained 
in terms of a causal nexus, because substantial effect and causality go hand in hand. As Smith 
explains, “[t]o claim that anything suffices is tantamount to accepting that causality has no role” 
as far as aiding and abetting is concerned.451 To view the substantial effect requirement form the 
perspective of causality serves for the purpose of attribution of responsibility; as the Trial 
Chamber has put it, to participate in a crime is “to have made a causal contribution to the 
impairment of the protected interest”.452 
The ad hoc tribunals have strictly followed a non-causal approach to aiding and abetting. Even 
though the ICTY has repeatedly underlined the “central place assumed by the principle of 
causation in criminal law”,453 it has consistently rejected any causality requirement whatsoever 
with respect to aiding and abetting. The ICTY’s non-causal approach stems from the fact that the 
vast majority has rejected causality because it has understood causality as a condition sine que 
non to the success of the crime, namely, a but-for condition without which the crime would not 
have happened.454 Accordingly, a causal nexus was never required as long as the assistance had a 
substantial effect on the commission of the crime. As shown above, the test applied by various 
chambers of the ad hoc tribunals have only modestly substantiated the requirement. In fact, the 
flexibility with which the ad hoc tribunals seem to have applied the tests reveals a rather 
pragmatic choice of a suitable test after the blameworthiness of the aider and abettor’s conduct 
has been decided on.455  
5.2.1.2. The Direct Effect Requirement 
In addition to the substantial effect requirement, the Tadić Trial Chamber rather boldly 
determined that under customary international law, aiding and abetting presupposed a “direct 
contribution” to the commission of the crime.456 By stipulating this requirement, the Trial 
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Chamber must have had recourse to the 1996 ILC Draft Article 2(3)(d) again; however, probably 
due to the fact that the ILC offered no explanation as to this threshold whatsoever, the Trial 
Chamber chose to support the customary nature of direct effect through post-WWII case law 
alone. It held that in the Justice case457, the judges required a “deliberate act if an accused is to 
be held criminally culpable and this deliberate act must directly affect the commission of the 
crime itself”.458 The Trial Chamber gave no interpretation and reasoning, thus one can only 
speculate about the Trial Chamber’s reading of that case. In its effort to further outline the direct 
effect requirement, the Tadić Trial Chamber drew a very interesting conclusion from the Zyklon 
B case. It asserted that the British military judges “necessarily must have made the determination 
that without the supply of gas the exterminations would not have occurred in that manner, and 
therefore that the actions of the accused directly assisted in the commission of the illegal act of 
mass extermination”.459 Trial Chamber offered no further explanation as to its interpretation of 
the Zyklon B case, which remains only remotely supported by the records. Moreover, the Trial 
Chamber ultimately did not subsume any evidence under direct effect. Nevertheless, its 
reasoning indicates that a direct contribution was meant to reflect the requirement that, without 
the accessory’s assistance, the crime would not have occurred in the manner it did. As was the 
case with respect to the substantial effect requirement, the Trial Chamber followed a non-causal 
approach with respect to direct effect; unlike the defence, which called for a “significant causal 
relation” between the commission of the crime and the aider and abettor’s contribution, the Trial 
Chamber did not mention causality anywhere.460  
Thus, it remains speculative how the Tadić Trial Chamber itself distinguished between the direct 
and substantial effect requirement: in fact, it defined both elements identically by holding that, 
without the contribution of the aider and abettor, the criminal act “would not have occurred in 
that manner” or, respectively, “would not have occurred in the same way”.461 Direct effect 
requirement from Tadić has only been reaffirmed in three judgments – Akayesu, Strugar and 
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Čelebići.462 In two appeals judgments the Appeals Chamber confirmed the Tadić Trial 
Chamber’s actus reus elements of aiding and abetting but omitted the direct effect requirement 
without explaining why.463 In other cases, the ICTY either explicitly rejected464 or simply did not 
mention465 Tadić’s direct effect requirement when assessing the actus reus requirements of 
aiding and abetting. Even in the three mentioned judgments it is neither apparent what the 
requirement exactly called for nor whether the conduct of the accused had met the requirement. 
Firstly, in Akayesu direct effect was deemed a prerequisite but ultimately not applied to the facts 
of the case. Secondly, in Strugar the Trial Chamber arguably mismatched direct effect. It held 
that direct effect meant that the aider and abettor carried out acts “specifically directed” to 
support the perpetration of the crime.466 This wording is borrowed from Tadić where the Appeals 
Chamber ex proprio motu explained the distinction between a joint criminal enterprise and 
aiding and abetting in an obiter dictum.467 Furthermore, it is contested whether a “specific 
direction to assist” forms part of actus reus or mens rea of aiding and abetting. The Appeals 
Chamber held that this was an actus reus element, but, peculiarly, not an essential one.468 In 
Čelebići, the Trial Chamber followed Tadić in merging direct and substantial effect into one 
single actus reus element.469 
Yet, in Orić, the Trial Chamber rejected the requirement of a direct contribution “if it was to 
express more than the necessary ‘proximity’ (in terms of a link) between the assistance and the 
principal act”.470 It could thus be argued that direct effect was intended to reflect the necessary 
causal chain between the assistance lent and the commission of the crime. A similar position was 
put forth by the Appeals Chamber in Mrkšić: although it nowhere confirmed the direct effect 
requirement, the Appeals Chamber mentioned direct effect when addressing the necessary link 
between the murders of the 200 prisoners of war held at Ovčara and the withdrawal of the 
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military police stationed there; it held that the withdrawal “had an immediate and direct effect” 
on the crimes committed.471 
The function of direct effect in terms of a causal chain between the assistance lent and the 
commission of the crime is reflected in some findings in the trial against the Dutch businessman 
Frans van Anraat, charged in 2004 with aiding and abetting genocide and war crimes for having 
supplied the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein with Thiodiglycol (TDG), knowing that this raw 
material would be used in the production of mustard gas eventually employed in the attacks on 
several towns in Kurdistan in 1987 and 1988. 
Even though it was held that according to both Dutch and international criminal law, the aider 
and abettor’s contribution was not required to have a causal effect on the crime, but needed to 
advance the crime or facilitate its commission,472 both the District Court and Court of Appeal 
required a connection between the deliveries and the production as well as between the 
production and the use of mustard gas. The Court of Appeal indicated that “mathematical proof” 
for the occurrence of TDC contributed by van Anraat on the battlefield was not necessary,473 but 
established that van Anraat’s TDG very likely ended up in ammunition used for the attacks in 
question.474 In other words, the Court underlined that a causal chain had to be established 
between van Anraat’s deliveries and the crimes committed. Since he provided raw materials, this 
necessarily translated into a two step test; as a consequence, the latter was reflected in the 
assessment of the accused’s mens rea: the Court of Appeals backed the Court of first instance475 
when observing that the accused was aware that the TDG would be used for the production of 
mustard gas and that he knew that the mustard gas was going to be used for a war crime.476 
Furthermore, the quality of the assistance provided does matter: the provision of goods 
specifically designed to kill, such as Zyklon B, Judge Scheindlin argued, bore “a closer causal 
connection to the principal crime than […] the provision of loans”.477 Accordingly, when 
assessing the claims relating to IBM’s sales of computer hardware and software to the South 
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African Government, she upheld them with respect to the crime of apartheid, because 
“customized computerized systems were indispensable” for the implementation of apartheid “in 
a nation of million”; whereas she dismissed them as regards the crime of torture and other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, because “computers were not an essential element […] or the 
means by which it was carried out”.478 
Some authors consider the direct effect requirement as a limitation to the number of links in the 
causal chain between the contribution and the commission of the crime.479 Certainly, it can be 
argued that the supply of poison gas to an extermination camp contributes more directly to the 
principal crime committed than a financial contribution that is ultimately used to buy poison gas 
for the same purpose. As was the case with van Anraat’s supply of raw materials, the financial 
contribution first needs to be swapped for the instruments to commit the crime. Unlike the direct 
provision of the instrument, which raises the question whether the latter has been used for the 
killings, the contribution of loans or raw materials necessitates a two step test with respect to 
causality. Accordingly, the question in van Anraat was not merely whether the raw materials 
provided for were used for the production of mustard gas, but also whether the mustard gas 
ended up on the battlefield.480 It is also for this reason that the required nexus between an aider 
and abettor’s financial contribution and the modalities of the crime is difficult to establish. When 
Flick’s defence argued that his payments to Himmler’s account stood in no casual connection 
with the crimes committed by the SS481 the Tribunal simply concurred with the Prosecution in 
that it saw no need to establish that the funds were “directly used for specified criminal 
activities”.482 
As the District Court in van Anraat put it, causality is not to be confused with the excuse that the 
crimes would also have occurred without the aider and abettor’s contributions “because someone 
else would certainly have made the contribution”.483 For the purpose of accessory liability, it 
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should matter little how many steps need to be taken in the causal chain to link the assistance to 
the crime, as long as all steps are covered by the required mens rea.  
5.2.1.3. The Specific Direction Requirement  
The following Section presents the analysis of jurisprudence on specific direction and offers a 
critique of the legal analysis and practical problems underpinning this requirement. 
While the Wold War II-era precedents do not provide much guidance on the divisive question of 
specific direction, the ILC’s 1996 Draft Code does specify that the aider or abettor must “directly 
and substantially” assist the principal’s crime, but it does not elucidate what is meant by the 
word “directly.”484 The ICTY Appeals Chamber has repeatedly defined the actus reus for aiding 
and abetting as acts “specifically directed” to assist, encourage, or lend moral support to the 
perpetration of a crime, which have a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.485 The 
“specific direction” saga started to unfold when Perišić Appeals Chamber held that “no 
conviction for aiding and abetting may be entered if the element of specific direction is not 
established beyond reasonable doubt, either explicitly or implicitly.”486 The Perišić Appeals 
Chamber asserted that “previous appeals judgments had not conducted extensive analyses of 
specific direction because prior convictions for aiding and abetting entered or affirmed by the 
Appeals Chamber involved relevant acts geographically or otherwise proximate to, and thus not 
remote from, the crimes of principal perpetrators.”487 Where such proximity is present, specific 
direction may be demonstrated implicitly through discussion of other elements of aiding and 
abetting liability, such as substantial contribution.488 In such case, the existence of specific 
direction, which demonstrates the culpable link between the individual’s assistance and the 
crimes of principal perpetrators, will be self-evident. However, not all cases of aiding and 
abetting will involve proximity of an individual’s relevant acts to crimes committed. Where an 
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individual is remote from relevant crimes, evidence proving other elements of aiding and 
abetting may not be sufficient to prove specific direction. In such circumstances, explicit 
consideration of specific direction may be required.489  
Relying on Tadić and Perišić, the Trial Chamber in Stanišić and Simatović490 acquitted the 
defendants of aiding and abetting war crimes on the grounds that “the accused’s assistance was 
not specifically directed towards the commission of the crimes.”491 Contrary to the Appeals 
Chamber in Perišić, the SCSL Appeals Chamber in Taylor concluded that the specific direction 
is not a requisite element of actus reus of aiding and abetting. Moreover, a different panel of 
judges on the ICTY Appeals Chamber subsequently reversed the legal standard set in Perišić less 
than a year earlier. Namely, in Prosecutor v. Šainović et al. the appellant Lazarević had been 
convicted for having provided various forms of support and assistance to soldiers of the 
Yugoslav Army involved in forcible displacement in Kosovo.492 The Šainović Appeals Chamber 
held that the Perišić had been wrongly decided493 as it deviated from both ICTY jurisprudence 
and customary international law. The Šainović panel announced that it “unequivocally 
reject[ed]” the Perišić standard since “specific direction” is not a requisite element of aiding and 
abetting,494 thereby siding with the SCSL’s holding in Taylor.495  
Having reached that conclusion, the Šainović judgment evidenced no attempt to consider 
whether principles of justice might require a specific direction requirement in the kinds of 
“foreign assistance cases” exemplified by Perišić. Indeed, the judgments rejecting the specific 
direction standard correctly observe that none of the early (World War II-era) cases mention 
specific direction as an element of aiding and abetting496, however, the vast majority of these 
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cases do not raise the problem encountered in Perišić, namely of generalized or so-called 
“neutral” assistance provided to a recipient who uses it for both legitimate and illegitimate 
purposes. However, Zyklon B and Flick appear to be exceptions. In the former case, the accused 
argued that they had supplied insecticide to the SS for the legitimate purpose of delousing 
buildings.497 The Judge Advocate instructed that the Tribunal could convict based on a finding 
“that the accused knew that the gas was to be used for the purpose of killing human beings.”498 
Even here, the instructions do not distinguish between a scenario in which the accused knew that 
all of the gas was to be used for killing human beings, and one in which the accused knew that 
only some or much of it was to be so used. Nevertheless, it is to be emphasized that the law does 
not demand an exclusively criminal purpose. Indeed, as pointed out by Perišić, in Zyklon B it 
was evidenced “that defendants arranged for S.S. units to be trained in using this gas to kill 
humans in confined spaces.”499 
In the Flick case, one of the Nüremberg Military Tribunal cases, the Tribunal convicted two of 
the accused on charges of having contributed funds used to support the SS. The Tribunal noted 
that “[o]ne who knowingly by his influence and money contributes to the support [of an 
organization which on a large scale is responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity] 
must, under settled legal princples, be deemed to be, if not a principal, certainly an accessory to 
such crimes.500 In the Flick case, moreover, the Tribunal did acknowledge the probability that 
not all the accused’s financial donations to the personal use of SS commander Heinrich Himmler 
went to illegitimate ends. The judgment finds it “reasonably clear” that a portion of the funds 
“were used purely for cultural purposes,” but nevertheless justifies the conviction of Flick and 
Steinbrinck on the grounds that they could not “reasonably believe” that their contributions were 
used “solely for cultural purposes.”501 The Tribunal further expressed “no doubt” that “some of 
this money” was used in support of criminal activity.502 Given this broad reading, this language 
conveys a breathtakingly broad view of criminal responsibility according to which a donor is 
criminally responsible for a mere negligent failure to realize that some portion of a financial 
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contribution will be directed by the recipient toward criminal ends. However, other passages 
caution against such a broad reading, indicating that perhaps what the judgment really means to 
say is that defendants must have known, and hence did know, of the uses to which their 
contributions were put. Moreover, the IMT also took the position that any use of the accused’s 
contributions for legitimate cultural activities was likely insignificant during the wartime 
period.503 
These cases, however, are potentially distinguishable on the grounds that they involve aiding and 
abetting of a criminal enterprise: the defendants were convicted of providing assistance to the SS, 
which the Nüremberg Military Tribunal had already determined to be a criminal organization.504 
The distinction between generalized and particular assistance can depend on the context, 
including the anticipated use of assistance. General monetary aid to an armed group becomes 
easier to characterize as substantial assistance to crime when the donor realizes that the recipient 
is a criminal enterprise or that most or all the funds will be directed by the recipient toward 
criminal ends. Thus, the Zyklon B and Flick cases are noteworthy on the account of the fact that 
they deal with assistance to the SS, an entity that the IMT had determined to be a criminal 
organization. This fact played a central role in the reasoning of Flick, as the IMT determined it to 
be “clear from the evidence that [Flick and Steinbrinck] gave to Himmler, the Reich Leader SS, a 
blank check. His criminal organization was maintained and we have no doubt that some of this 
money went to its maintenance. It seems to be immaterial whether it was spent on salaries or for 
lethal gas.”505 In the Zyklon B case, the accused directly supplied the SS with insecticide.506  
Fot this reason, Heller has argued that Zyklon B is compatible with Perišić. In particular, he notes 
that “the SS was not an organization that was engaged in lawful and unlawful activities” as the 
VRS undoubtedly was. “On the contrary, all of the SS’s activities were unlawful, which is 
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precisely why the IMT specifically deemed it a criminal organization”.507 This argument 
suggests a way to read both the Zyklon B and Flick cases that is broadly consistent with Perišić’s 
specific direction requirement. The outcome of Zyklon B does not offend specific direction, as 
any support for a criminal enterprise such as the SS was necessarily illegitimate, whereas the 
narrow reading of Flick supports, at best, a de minimis exception to the specific direction 
requirement in cases where an insignificant portion of assistance is directed toward legitimate 
ends. 
Schabas has suggested that while there is no reference to specific direction in the Article 25(3)(c) 
of the Rome Statute, the formulation of aiding and abetting does seem to require that the accused 
acted purposively, perhaps requiring a specific intent rather than mere knowledge.508 According 
to Schabas, this might be deduced from the acts of the accused,509 and it would likely be satisfied 
where assistance was specifically directed towards criminal acts, although such specific direction 
may not be essential. As regards specific direction at the ICC, the jurisprudence to date has 
simply not addressed this matter in any great detail.510 
It should be emphasized that Perišić and other ICTY acquittals gave rise to considerable political 
and scholarly criticism.511 Specific direction itself was seen as a conscious raising of 
responsibility standards that could render accountability for international crimes more 
difficult.512 While the concept first appeared in the Tadić appellate judgment, the single reference 
to “specific direction” lacked explanatory analysis.513 Only passing references to the concept of 
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“specific direction” were previously made in the bulk of the ICTY’s aiding and abetting 
jurisprudence. The concept remained obscure until the Appeals Chamber's decision in Perišić. 
Judge Liu’s dissent from Perišić Appeals Judgment observed that most cases cited by the 
Majority “simply restate[d] language from the Tadić Appeals Judgment without expressly 
applying the specific direction requirement.”514 Judge Ramaroson concurred that most prior 
cases reiterated the Tadić language “verbatim” and “never” applied “specific direction” to the 
facts of these cases.515 As underlined by Judge Liu in his dissenting opinion, “specific direction 
has not been applied in past cases with any rigor.”516 The Appeals Chamber’s opinion itself 
acknowledges that “previous appeals judgments have not conducted extensive analyses of 
specific direction.”517 
An air of uncertainty thus surrounds the law on aiding and abetting at the ICTY.518 The Taylor 
and Šainović Appeals Judgments, together with a subsequent Trial Chamber Judgment from the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,519 may possess sufficient force to dissuade 
any further divergence.520 It is noteworthy that a slightly differently constituted Appeals 
Chamber denied a prosecution motion in Perišić to overturn his acquittal in light of Šainović, 
considering that there were no cogent reasons for it to depart from its earlier jurisprudence 
regarding reconsideration of final judgments.521 It is quite rare for an Appeals Chamber to depart 
from its own earlier jurisprudence, especially in an apparent climate of acrimony, or for other 
tribunals to reject precedent so forcefully. In the modern era there has been a notable degree of 
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consistency in the case law regarding IHL within and across the various international judicial 
bodies.522 
 Prosecutor v. Tadić523 
The first ICTY Appeals judgment setting out the parameters of aiding and abetting was the Tadić 
Appeals Judgment, rendered in 1999, which described the actus reus of individual criminal 
responsibility for aiding and abetting as follows: 
The aider and abettor carried out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support 
to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction 
of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the 
crime.524 
In defining the elements of aiding and abetting liability, the Tadić Appeals Judgment contrasted 
aiding and abetting with JCE, distinguishing the modes of liability on the basis of specific 
direction. The Appeals Chamber underscored that, while actus reus of JCE requires only ‘acts 
that in some way are directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose’ the actus reus of 
aiding and abetting requires a closer link between the assistance provided and particular criminal 
activities: assistance must be ‘specifically’ – rather than ‘in some way’ – directed towards 
relevant crimes.525 Many subsequent ICTY and ICTR appeals judgments explicitly referred to 
‘specific direction’ in enumerating the elements of aiding and abetting, often repeating verbatim 
the Tadić Appeals Judgment’s relevant holding.526 
 Prosecutor v. Blagojević527 
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Blagojević was the commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, convicted of aiding and abetting 
genocide and crimes against humanity. His role in the events surrounding Srebrenica massacre 
was one of oversight and instruction; he supervised the forced transfer of refugees by members 
of his brigade and coordinated such efforts against the Bosnian Muslims.528 Finding that 
Blagojević rendered substantial assistance to the primary perpetrators, the Trial Chamber 
convicted him of aiding and abetting genocide, despite the Prosecutor’s failure to establish that 
he had knowledge of the executions at Srebrenica when rendering the assistance.529 However, 
because he undoubtedly had knowledge of his inferiors’ “cruel and inhumane” acts towards and 
torture of the refugees and because his assistance was “practical”, the Trial Chamber concluded 
that genocidal intent could be inferred from evidence of other culpable acts systematically 
targeting the same group.530 However, the Appeals Chamber took the view that no trier of fact 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that, without knowledge of the mass killings, Blagojević’s 
awareness of the other facts relating to the forcible transfer operation satisfied the mens rea for 
complicity in genocide.531 The fact of his command responsibility did not override the necessity 
of proving his particular mens rea (knowledge) concerning the acts themselves. The Appeals 
Court addressed the confusion Tadić had engendered: 
[W]hile the Tadić definition has not been explicitly departed from, specific direction has not always 
been included as an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting. This may be explained by the fact 
that such a finding will often be implicit where the accused has provided practical assistance to the 
principal perpetrator which had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime…[T]he fact that 
his or her participation amounted to no more than his or her “routine duties” will not exculpate the 
accused.532 
Thus, the Appeals Chamber held that specific direction ought not constitute the focus, because it 
had effectively served as a proxy for practical assistance having a substantial effect on 
commission of the crime. In the subsequent decision, namely the Prosecutor v. Brdjanin533 
specific direction played no part in upholding convictions for aiding and abetting detention camp 
killings. The Appeals Chamber in Brdjanin held that “Brdjanin’s inactivity and openly laissez-
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faire attitude towards the camps and detention facilities, coupled with his failure to “take a 
stand” against the events in the camps, had a substantial effect on the commission of torture, and, 
as a result, encouraged and supported the perpetrators of the crime.”534 Inactivity and an 
indifferent attitude could hardly be “specifically directed” toward facilitating the commission of 
detention camp killings (inactivity is just as suggestive of innocence as guilt). Therein lay the 
problem to which Brdjanin court was responding – that of conditioning the actus reus of 
complicity on some observable character of the assistance itself.  
 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić535 
While the Appeals Chamber has not expressly defined “specific direction” the Appeals Chamber 
in Kupreškić provided an informative analysis when determining whether the conduct at issue 
amounted to acts specifically directed to the commission of the underlying crime. Namely, the 
Appeals Chamber found that evidence that Vlatko Kupreškić was seen unloading weapons from 
his car was not sufficient for finding that his acts were specifically directed towards assisting the 
crime of persecution.536 Kupreškić Appeals Judgment importantly noted that the six-month 
length of time between when Vlatko Kupreškić was observed unloading the weapons and when 
the attack on Ahmici actually occurred “diminishes the likelihood that the weapons were 
intended to be used for attacking the Muslim population.”537 Kupreškić Appeals Judgment 
further found that the accused’s mere presence outside the building where the plan for the attack 
on Ahmici was discussed, one day before the attack occurred, could not amount to an act 
specifically directed towards the commission of the underlying crime.538 
Thus, the Kupreškic Appeals Judgment clearly demonstrates that not any act of assistance 
provided to the commission of a crime constitutes aiding and abetting. Only acts that are 
specifically directed towards assisting a crime are sufficient.  
 Prosecutor v. Mrkšić and Šljivančanin539 
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The Šljivančanin Appeals Chamber explicitly held that “specific direction is not an essential 
ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.540 
Importantly, “specific direction” had been explicitly included as an element of the actus reus for 
aiding and abetting in two recent ICTR appeals judgments rendered after Mrkšić Appeals 
Judgment. Kalimanzira Appeals Judgment referred to acts “specifically directed” to assist the 
perpetration of a crime.541 Likewise, Rukundo Appeals Judgment applied a variation of the 
“specific direction” notion, namely that the acts must be “specifically aimed” at assisting the 
perpetration of a crime.542  
The jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR prior to the Perišić case, therefore, demonstrates 
that “specific direction”, albeit as either an explicit or an implicit element, had continued to form 
an integral part of the actus reus for aiding and abetting. The Mrkšić Appeals Judgment was thus 
(until Perišić) strikingly inconsistent with the ICTY jurisprudence. Similarly, the SCSL, in two 
trial judgments, had held that specific direction is a requisite element of the actus reus for aiding 
and abetting.543 
Prosecutor v. Perišić 
In finding that specific direction is not a required element of the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting, the Perišić Trial Chamber relied on the Appeals Chambers’ judgments in Mrkšić and 
Blagojević.544 It is proposed that such reliance seems misplaced as Blagojević Appeals Judgment 
accepted that specific direction forms a part of the actus reus, stating “such a finding [of specific 
direction] will often be implicit in the finding that the accused has provided practical assistance 
to the principal perpetrator which had a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.”545 
Moreover, Blagojević Appeals Judgment expressly noted, “the Tadič definition [of the actus reus 
for aiding and abetting] has not been explicitly departed from.”546  
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It is imperative to note that Mrkšić Appeals Judgment relied solely on Blagojević Appeals 
Judgment for the proposition that the Appeals Chamber has “confirmed that ‘specific direction’ 
is not an essential ingredient of the actus reus of aiding and abetting.”547 This was not the case. 
Contrary to Mrkšić Appeals Judgment’s assertion, Blagojević Appeals Judgment actually 
accepted the continued applicability of specific direction, finding the notion to be “often […] 
implicit.”548 Therefore, Mrkšić Appeals Judgment, standing alone, is misguided in this instance 
and cannot overshadow the Appeals Chamber’s previously repeated adoption of the concept of 
“specific direction” in defining the actus reus for aiding and abetting (prior to Perišić).549 Had 
Blagojević Appeals Judgment wished to reject this notion, it would have expressly done so.  
Perišić Appeals Chamber held that “no conviction for aiding and abetting may be entered if the 
element of specific direction is not established beyond reasonable doubt, either explicitly or 
implicitly.”550 In Blagojević, an implicit finding of specific direction was held to inhere 
whenever the accused accomplice provided to the principal practical assistance having a 
substantial effect on commission of the crime. By the same reasoning, an explicit finding of 
specific direction might be necessary only if assistance did not have a substantial effect. The 
Trial Chamber found that Perišić’s assistance did have a substantial effect on the commission of 
war crimes, and as such, it completely refrained from engaging in a specific direction inquiry.551 
Arguing that precedent demanded independent proof of specific direction, the Appeals Chamber 
posited two potential aiding and abetting scenarios. First, where acts of assistance were 
geographically proximate to the principal’s acts, proximity itself satisfies specific direction. 
Second, in the case of Perišić, where assistance was not geographically proximate, the 
Prosecution sufficiently proves specific direction only “if the VRS was an organization whose 
sole and exclusive purpose was the commission of crimes”, or if Perišić “endorsed a policy of 
assisting their crimes.”552  
After Tadić, Blagojević and Perišić, the ICTY complicity jurisprudence assumed the following 
form: if aid of assistance was “geographically or otherwise proximate to” the crimes of the 
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principal(s) (proximate assistance), the assistance has a substantial effect on the perpetration of 
the principal’s crime, and specific direction is satisfied implicitly, whereas specific direction 
must be satisfied explicitly by a finding that the aid rendered is not merely a “general assistance 
which could be used for both lawful and unlawful activities,” but is rather of a type that almost 
always attends the commission of punishable crimes, or where aid could be “general assistance 
for lawful means,”, by finding that (i) the sole purpose of the assisted organization is the 
commission of crimes or (ii) the accused “endorsed a policy of assisting the organization’s 
crimes.” 
Appeals judgments have subsequently been issued in the Šainović et al., the Popović et al. and 
Stanišić cases, departing from the approach adopted in the Perišić case.553 
Prosecution v. Šainović et al.554 
The Šainović Appeals Judgment, issued subsequent to Perišić clarified that specific direction is not an 
element of aiding and abetting liability.555 After reviewing the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the ICTR in 
this regard556 and re-examining the elements of aiding and abetting liability under customary international 
law557 the Appeals Chamber observed that, neither in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and the ICTR nor 
under customary international law, had specific direction been considered to be an element of aiding and 
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abetting liability.558 As a result, it rejected the approach adopted in the Perišić and held that this approach 
was “in direct and material conflict with the prevailing jurisprudence on the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting liability and with customary international law”.559 The Appeals Chamber re-affirmed that, “under 
customary international law, the actus reus of aiding and abetting consists of practical assistance, 
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime”.560 The Šainović case should, however, be differentiated from Perišić as it did not 
concern the question of “remote assistance”. It may be correct, as Judge Tuzmukhamedov held in 
his dissent, that the Perišić specific direction requirement arguably did not apply because in 
Šainović the assistance provided was not “remote” in the same way as in Perišić case, meaning 
that the Appeals Chamber’s decision to reject the analysis in Perišić “unequivocally”561 may not 
have been strictly necessary.562  
Moreover, a detailed reading of the analysis conducted by the Šainović Appeals Chamber, far 
from demonstrating that specific direction is not a requirement, rather goes to prove that a degree 
of flexibility exists at the national level as to whether specific direction is required or not.  But 
further analysis of the approach to aiding and abetting in some of the national legal systems 
mentioned in the Šainović shows that such flexibility indeed exists even within domestic 
jurisdiction itself.563 As a common basis, for aiding and abetting liability to arise, national 
legislation and the jurisprudence of domestic courts require the provision of assistance or support 
which facilitates the commission of a crime. However, national jurisdictions conceptualise the 
link between the acts of assistance and the crime in the context of actus reus and the required 
degree of mens rea in various different ways in accordance with principles in their respective 
legal systems.564 
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Subsequently, in the Popović et al. Appeals Judgment, the Appeals Chamber re-affirmed that 
“‘specific direction’ is not an element of aiding and abetting liability under customary 
international law.”565 
 Prosecution v. Stanišić 
Invoking Tadić and Perišić, the Trial Chamber in Stanišić acquitted the defendants of aiding and 
abetting war crimes on the grounds that “the accused’s assistance was not specifically directed 
towards the commission of the crimes of murder, deportation, forcible transfer, or 
persecution.”566 In its actus reus inquiry, the court, in assessing whether defendants’ assistance 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The Penal Code further explains that “[w]hoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does 
anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof, is said to aid 
the doing of that act” (Indian Penal Code, Section 107, Explanation 2). Therefore, in order to constitute abetment by 
aiding within the meaning of Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code, the abettor must be shown to have intentionally 
aided the commission of the offence (Ratanlal Ranchhoddas and Dhirajlal Keshavlal Thakore, The Indian Penal 
Code: Act XLV of 1860: with exhaustive notes, comments, case-law references, State Amendments along with 
Schedule of Classification of Offences and Forms as prescribed under Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, 28th 
Edition (New Delhi: Wadhwa and Company, 1997), p. 136). The Penal Codes of Singapore and Malaysia contain 
provisions mirroring Section 107 of the Indian Penal Code (see Singaporean Penal Code, Section 107; Malaysian 
Penal Code, Section 107). Article 29 of the Criminal Code of Cambodia defines an accomplice as “the person who 
intentionally facilitates the attempt or the realization of a felony or a misdemeanour by providing his/her help or 
assistance”. According to Article 56 of the Penal Code of Indonesia, an accomplice is a person who either 
deliberately aids the commission of the crime or deliberately provides opportunity, means or information for its 
commission. Article 20 of the Penal Code of Vietnam identifies “helpers” as those “who create spiritual or material 
conditions for the commission of crimes.” Article 17 of the Penal Code of Laos recognizes “accomplices” as those 
“who have intentionally assisted in the offence, or who have previously agreed to hide the offender, to hide 
instruments and tools of the offence, to efface traces of the offence or to conceal any proceeds from the offence.” 
The High Court of Hong Kong has confirmed that: “the fact that a person was voluntarily and purposely present 
witnessing the commission of a crime, and offered no opposition to it, though he might reasonably be expected to 
prevent and had the power so to do, or at least to express his dissent, might, under some circumstances, afford 
cogent evidence upon which a jury would be justified in finding that he wilfully encouraged and so aided and 
abetted. To find a person guilty as an aider and abettor it is not only necessary to prove that he was present while the 
offence is committed, that he knew an offence was being committed and that his presence, in fact, gave 
encouragement to the perpetrators but it must be proved that he intended to give that encouragement, that he wilfully 
encouraged.” (R. v. Lam Kit [1988] 1 HKC 679, pp. 2-3 (emphasis in the original)). Article 66(1)(b) of the Crimes 
Act 1961 of New Zealand provides that a person is a party to and guilty of an offence if that person “does or omits 
an act for the purpose of aiding any person to commit the offence”. The Supreme Court of New Zealand has held  
that aiding and abetting requires that “the secondary party intentionally helped or encouraged the principal offender 
with knowledge of the essential matters constituting the offence, including the principal’s mens rea” (Mahana 
Makarini Edmonds v. R [2011] NZSC 159, para. 22). In South Africa, accomplice liability requires that the person 
has “intentionally furthered or assisted in the commission of the crime”. In this regard, dolus eventualis would 
suffice. In addition, “the accused must also know or foresee the possibility that his or her conduct is unlawful” 
(Jonathan Burchell and John Milton, Principles of Criminal Law, 3rd Edition (Juta and Company Ltd., 2005), pp. 
604-605. In Tladi v. S, the Free State High Court has held that the accomplice’s “assistance may be of a negligible 
nature but what is required is that it must be proven that there was adequate assistance” (Tladi v. S [2005] ZAFSHC 
143, p. 3).  
565 Popović et al. Appeals Judgment, para. 1758, quoting Šainović et al. Appeals Judgment, para. 1649. See also 
Popović et al. Appeals Judgment, paras. 1764, 1783.  
566 Stanišić Trial Judgment, para. 2360. 
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had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crimes looked to specific direction, and found 
lack of specific intent to dictate a finding of no substantial effect. Thus, aiding and abetting 
liability could not be attached to the defendants’ acts of assistance because they were not 
geographically proximate to the principals’ crimes, nor were they specifically directed, because 
evidence of defendants’ intent did not support a finding of substantial effect (nor, presumably, 
endorsement of the VRS crimes), and the military objectives of the VRS were not solely and 
exclusively the commission of crimes punishable under the ICTY Statute.567  
The Stanišić Appeals Judgment took the position that the Stanišić Trial Chamber erred in its 
position that “specific direction” is an element of aiding and abetting.568 Nevertheless, Judge 
Koffi Kumelio A. Afanđe’s view underscored in his dissent: 
I have some sympathy for the approach taken by the Majority, if one is seeking answers to the 
question of whether “specific direction” is an element of aiding and abetting, however in my view the 
question itself is wrong. The more meaningful question in my view, which has been evaded or ignored 
throughout this longstanding discussion and jurisprudential battle, is a very simple one: “Whether, 
without making a finding on ‘specific direction’, a trier of fact can find beyond reasonable doubt that 
the contribution, supposed to be substantial (actus reus), and/or the intent (mens rea) of the alleged 
aider and/or abettor (accessory) was set to aid and abet the crimes committed by another 
(principal)?”569  
 
As demonstrated above, the question of specific direction requirement is preliminarily semantic 
and linguistic by nature, before becoming a legal issue at the second level. Primarily there must 
be a link of causality or nexus, in the sense that “what is provided” shall aim at “achieving an 
end” or “achieving a purpose”. Brought into the legal domain at the second level, this means that 
“what is provided” by the accomplice shall aim at achieving the resulting “end” (namely, the 
crimes committed by the principal). Therefore, Judge Afanđe argues that “it should be clearly 
demonstrated that the resulting crimes have occurred specifically because the aider or abettor has 
provided such objective element and/or such subjective element. This means that without such 
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objective and subjective elements on the part of the aider and/or abettor, being specifically 
directed to achieve the resulting crimes, these could not have been committed.”570  
Greenawalt also concurs that the debate on specific direction may have more to do with 
semantics than substance. He argues that the idea of specific direction may be something already 
implicit in the idea of aiding and abetting; for example, there is a difference between actually 
assisting criminal behaviour, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, engaging in more general 
activities that somewhere along the line will have the effect of remotely assisting an offender’s 
culpable conduct.571 The evidence from the seminal Tadić Appeals Judgment – which introduced 
the language of specific direction into the international criminal jurisprudence – suggests a 
distinction along these lines.572 The language makes its appearance in a passage distinguishing 
the culpability involved in aiding and abetting from that resulting from participation in a JCE, 
where individual criminal responsibility can be established based on general contributions to the 
shared criminal enterprise rather than by proof of contributions to particular crimes committed 
by the enterprise. Whatever the precise meaning of the words “specifically directed,” it is argued 
that criminal prohibitions against aiding and abetting are generally concerned with behaviour that 
has both a more specific and a more direct relationship to crime than the JCE approach 
contemplates. 
This dissertation proposes that it is irrelevant to argue whether specific direction constitutes a 
part of the actus reus or the mens rea of aiding and abetting liability. Rather, “specific direction” 
is a methodological threshold for the test of certainty about the nexus between an accused’s 
contribution and the resulting crime. Accordingly, it is meant to prevent errors in assessing 
whether contribution was meant for criminal purposes.573 As a result of a flexible approach in 
domestic legal systems, it appears that it is paramount that the “specific direction” be specifically 
looked for, in any case where there is no direct evidence establishing the objective and/or 
subjective link between the contribution of the accused and the crimes charged. According to 
Judge Koffi Kumelio A. Afanđe 's view:  
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571 Greenawalt, A.K.A., Foreign Assistance Complicity, 54 Colombia Journal of Transnational Law, 2016, p. 577. 
572 Tadić Appeals Judgment, para. 229.  
573 Ibidem, para 25. 
133 
“[S]pecific direction could be assessed in either the actus reus or the mens rea, but it is not required to 
be found in both before entering a conviction. This assessment is fact-based and can vary from one 
case or situation to another. Indeed, in the situations in which the “specific direction” is obvious and 
easily inferable from the actus reus or the mens rea, as established based on the evidence, there would 
be no need to further or specifically search for it. However, in situations where “specific direction” is 
not obvious and easily inferable, then there would be a need to further or specifically search for it. 
This approach allows trial chambers, who are best placed to assess the entirety of the evidence, a level 
of flexibility that allows them to tailor the requirements on a case-by-case basis.574  
5.2.2. The mens rea Elements – The Fault Element  
With a broad conduct element and underdeveloped nexus element for aiding and abetting, much 
of the burden in delimiting individual criminal responsibility is shifted to the fault required of the 
accomplice. The purposive approach to aiding and abetting seeks to prevent the overextension of 
criminal responsibility through a narrow mens rea requirement. In the United States, for 
example, the influential Model Penal Code provides, “A person is an accomplice of another 
person in the commission of an offense if…with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the 
commission of the offense, he…aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or 
committing it.”575 The codes and case law of several other common law jurisdictions include 
similar language,576 as does the Rome Statute.577  
However, at the ad hoc tribunals, the fault requirement has been formulated in different terms.578 
The classic formulation is that the aider and abettor must know that his conduct assists in the 
commission of the crime of the principal perpetrator and be aware of the essential element of the 
crime ultimately committed.579 A common formulation is that of the Trial Chamber in Kunarac, 
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namely the aider and abettor must ‘take the conscious decision to act in the knowledge that he 
thereby supports the commission of the crime’.580 
The requisite mental element (mens rea) of aiding and abetting under the case law of the ad hoc 
tribunals is knowledge that the assistance aids the commission of the specific crime of the 
principal perpetrator along with awareness of the essential elements of these crimes.581 Many 
scholars agree that standard reflects customary international law.582 In contrast, the Rome Statute 
explicitly adopted a “purpose” mens rea for most crimes of complicity.583  
5.2.2.1. A Knowledge-based mens rea Threshold 
In Tadić, the Trial Chamber held that the “clear pattern” emerging from relevant cases required 
that the aider and abettor knew of the crime committed by the perpetrator and, despite his or her 
knowledge, took a “conscious decision to participate” in the crime by supporting it.584 
Interestingly, the Trial Chamber neither explained what a “conscious decision to participate” 
meant nor mentioned this mental element again in the remainder of the judgment, not even in a 
subsequent paragraph in which it summarised the mens rea elements for aiding and abetting.585 
As the Trial Chamber in Aleskovski has interpreted the term, “conscious decision to participate” 
meant that aider and abettor had participated in the act of the perpetrator “in full knowledge of 
what he was doing”.586 Other Chambers have consistently applied the knowledge standard:587 in 
both Aleskovski and Kvočka, the applied knowledge plus intent standard comprised a cognitive 
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element of knowledge and a volitional element of intent.588 The Trial Chamber in Orić also 
confirmed Tadić with what it called a “double intent” standard.589 It held: 
“[The aider and abettor’s mens rea] must contain a cognitive element of knowledge and a 
volitional element of acceptance, whereby the aider and abettor may be considered as 
accepting the criminal result of his conduct if he is aware that in consequence of his 
contribution, the commission of the crime is more likely than not.”590 
Discomforted by the very use of the term intent with respect to the mens rea of aiding and 
abetting, in Furunđija the cognitive-volitional approach was rejected as misleading. Although 
the Trial Chamber explicitly endorsed the mens rea definition in Tadić in principle,591 it held that 
the accurate threshold was “knowledge, rather than intent”.592 The Appeals Chamber in Blaškić 
held that Furunđija was correct to find that the applicate mental element was knowledge of the 
act of assistance alone.593 As the Trial Chamber in Orić explained, it was “undisputed that the 
aider and abettor had to deliberately support the commission of the crime by the perpetrator.594  
In the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals there has been no fundamental disagreement as to a 
knowledge-based standard for aiding and abetting. Some Chambers’ insistence on a “knowledge 
alone standard” should be seen not as a rejection of the volitional element but as a mere 
clarification that intent with respect to the act of contributing to a crime must not be 
misunderstood as implying a purpose standard with respect to aiding and abetting.595 
5.2.2.2. A Double Knowledge Standard 
The aider and abettor’s knowledge need not only cover the elements of the crime committed but 
also the aider and abettor’s own conduct. In accordance with the maxim that the subjective 
elements must cover all objective elements, in Kvočka it was correctly pointed out that the aider 
and abettor not only had to be aware that his conduct furthered the crime by the principal, but 
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that it did so to a substantial degree.596 Hence, the ad hoc tribunals’ more recent formula to 
require knowledge that his conduct supports the perpetrator’s crime, coupled with awareness of 
substantial effect, is as essential an element of the aider and abettor’s mens rea as knowledge of 
the crime itself. Thus, it can be argued that a double knowledge standard most accurately reflects 
the shapes given to the mens rea; this has been recognized by the Appeals Chamber in Orić and 
Mrkšić, namely it required the aider and abettor to be aware of both the crime committed and 
that his conduct supported the commission of the crime.597 
5.2.2.3. A Purpose-based mens rea Standard 
With respect to special intent crimes such as persecution or genocide, the question whether the 
aider and abettor has to share the perpetrator’s mens rea has been discussed controversially. The 
ad hoc tribunals are in strong favour of a knowledge standard, since the ad hoc tribunals have 
consistently held that the aider and abettor’s knowledge of the crime included the principal’s 
state of mind.598 Accordingly, it is unsurprising that in Kvočka, the leading case on that matter, 
the Trial Chamber held that the aider or abettor had to “be aware that the crimes being assisted or 
supported are committed with a discriminatory intent”.599 Moreover, the Kvočka standard has 
been consistently conformed by the Appeals Chamber.600 
The fact that the ad hoc tribunals have put forward no shared intent requirement for aiding and 
abetting, neither for specific intent crimes nor any other types of offences, simply reflects that 
shared intent had already marked a primary function in the system of participation. Various 
modes of liability have their own actus reus and mens rea requirements, irrespective of which 
crime they are applied to. As Judhe Shahabuddeen put it: 
“Intent must always be proved, but the intent of the perpetrator of genocide is not the same as the 
intent of the aider and abettor. The perpetrator’s intent is to commit genocide. The intent of the aider 
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and abettor is not to commit genocide; his intent is to provide the means by which the perpetrator, if 
he wishes, can realise his own intent to commit genocide.”601 
The Appeals Chamber explained that sharing the direct perpetrator’s intent was one of the 
distinguishing factors between aiding and abetting and participation in a JCE: 
“In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is knowledge that the acts performed 
by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specific crime by the principal. By contrast, in the 
case of common purpose or design more is required (i.e., either intent to perpetrate the crime or intent 
to [participate in and further the criminal activity or purpose of a group]) […]”602 
Kvočka Trial Chamber held that as soon as an accomplice shared the intent of the perpetrator, he 
would become a perpetrator himself.603 
5.3. Aiding and Abetting under the Rome Statute 
5.3.1. The Actus Reus Standard 
According to Article 25(3) (c) of the Rome Statute, “a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment of a crime […] if that person, for the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted 
commission, including providing the means for its commission”. Due to the limited 
jurisprudence having emanated from the ICC so far, authors have often drawn analogies to the 
case law of the ad hoc tribunals when determining the scope of aiding and abetting within 
subparagraph (c) of the Rome Statute. 
It follows from the term “aids, abets or otherwise assists” that both aiding and abetting are forms 
of providing assistance to the perpetrator. As the word “including” suggests, providing the means 
for the commission of a crime is but an illustrative example of such assistance.604 It is equally 
clear that, in accordance with the case law of the ad hoc tribunals, both practical and moral 
contributions are covered by Article 25(3)(c),605 notwithstanding a note by the ILC Special 
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Rapporteur on the Draft code of Crimes, who, while clearly distinguishing between physical and 
moral acts of assistance, stated that aiding and abetting were “specific physical acts”.606 
The actus reus must evidently at least reach the stage of an attempt, otherwise the aider cannot 
be held criminally responsible for his assistance.607 This means that the drafters conceived aiding 
and abetting as a form of derivative liability,608 a view shared by the Lubanga Trial Chamber.609 
The provision remains silent on aiding ex post facto, i.e. whether assistance can also be given 
after the commission of the crime. The ILC adopted the view that aiding ex post facto only falls 
into the ambit of Article 25 if such assistance has both “a causal connection with the final 
accomplishment of the crime” and has been agreed upon prior to the perpetration of the crime.610  
5.3.2. A Substantial Effect Requirement in Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute 
To acknowledge that both practical and mental acts of assistance are covered by Article 25(3)(c) 
inevitably leads to the question whether the wording covers ancillary acts of assistance or 
whether there are objective minimum requirements for accessory liability. Such a threshold can 
be introduced not only by an elevated mens rea but, alternatively or cumulatively, by a 
heightened actus reus requirement such as a substantial effect requirement.  
Considering a substantial effect requirement in Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, the ICC in 
Lubanga sided with the case law of the ad hoc tribunals and interpreted Article 25(3)(c) as 
requiring substantial effect. Yet, as it did so in an obiter dictum when discussing the accused’s 
responsibility as a co-perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a),611 this subject may still be open to 
debate.612 For policy reasons a substantial effect requirement may be persuasive as it may be 
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unjustified to attribute too minor a contribution to an accessory.613 Also, the gravity threshold in 
Article 17(1)(d) Rome Statute in itself is in effect similar to a substantial effect requirement.614 
Even so, the Trial Chamber’s inclusion of a substantial effect requirement stretches the wording 
of Article 25(3)(c), which rather tends towards a qualified mens rea than a restrictive actus reus. 
The Rome Statute itself does not provide for the latter, neither do the travaux preparatoires. 
Most notably, the drafters did not incorporate the rule set out in the 1996 Draft Article 2(3)(d), 
according to which the aider must contribute “directly and substantially” to the commission of 
the crime.615 Accordingly, some writers claim that the drafters of the Rome Statute have 
implicitly rejected the substantial effect requirement advocated by the ad hoc tribunals.616 
Should the ICC reconfirm a substantial effect requirement in the Article 25(3)(c), it is doubtful 
whether the Court will be able to come up with a satisfactory substantive definition of what a 
substantial contribution is; the rather unsuccessful attempts of the ad hoc tribunals render the 
prospect of a meaningful test for cases of marginal assistance rather unlikely.617 
5.3.3. Specific Direction Under the Rome Statute 
An obvious question is whether specific direction will feature in the aiding and abetting standard 
at the ICC. At first glance, the ICC judges may not need to take sides on this clearly divisive 
issue, given the greater level of detail in the Rome Statute and related instruments when 
compared to the statues of the ad hoc tribunals. With regard to aiding and abetting, the Rome 
Statute makes no reference to specific direction, although the formulation of Article 25(3)(c) 
does seem to require that the accused acted purposively, perhaps requiring a specific intent rather 
than mere knowledge.618 The ICC jurisprudence to date has simply not addressed this matter in 
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any great detail. Nevertheless, specific direction might arise in the context of Article 25(3)(d) of 
the Rome Statute, which foresees criminal responsibility of an individual who intentionally 
contributes to the commission of a crime by a group acting with a common purpose. The 
contribution must have been made “with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal 
purpose of the group” or “in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime”.619 
In Katanga, the accused was convicted under this provision, and Judge Van den Wyngaert 
commented on the relevant ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence on specific direction: 
“I do consider that, when assessing the significance of someone’s contribution, there are good reasons 
for analysing whether someone’s assistance is specifically directed to the criminal or non-criminal part 
of a group’s activities. Indeed, this may be particularly useful to determine whether particular generic 
contributions – i.e. contributions that, by their nature, could equally have contributed to a legitimate 
purpose – are criminal or not.”620  
This was especially relevant, she felt, given the “extremely low” mens rea and actus reus 
thresholds under Article 25(3)(d). Furthermore, Judge Van den Wyngaert noted that without a 
specific direction requirement, there might otherwise “be almost no criminal culpability to speak 
of in cases when someone makes a generic contribution with simple knowledge of the existence 
of a group acting with a common purpose”.621 The Trial Chamber convicted Katanga for having 
knowingly provided weapons to a group with a policy of targeting civilians, without seemingly 
having insisted that such provision be specifically directed to such crimes.622 Emphasis was, 
however, placed on the need for the contribution to be substantial and have a “significant 
influence on the commission of those crimes”.623 This reflects the fact that aiding and abetting 
jurisprudence from the ad hoc tribunals has always underscored that the assistance provided 
must have had a substantial effect on the commission of crimes.  
5.3.4. Subjective Element Under Article 25(3)(c) - An Elevated mens rea Standard 
As it has been shown in Section 5.2.2, the ad hoc tribunals have applied a knowledge standard 
for aiding and abetting; a shared intent requirement has not crystallised in the ac hoc tribunal’s 
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case law. Meanwhile, the knowledge standard has also been applied in van Anraat case before 
Dutch courts, where all three instances clearly applied a knowledge standard when assessing 
complicity in war crimes.624 For many scholars, that standard reflects customary international 
law.625 However, Article 25(3) (c) of the Rome Statute does not seem to incorporate a mens rea 
for aiding and abetting that would correspond to the threshold put forth by the ad hoc tribunals. 
Rather, Article 30 of the Rome Statute defines the general mens rea as cumulatively composing 
both knowledge and intent. The commentators agree that the conjunctive formula ultimately 
chosen in Article 30 of the Rome Statute largely reflects the dissection of mens rea into a 
cognitive component of knowledge and a volitional component of intent.626 This means that in 
the ambit of Article 30, the term intent is not synonymous with purpose, in the sense that the 
aider and abettor must share the mens rea of the principal.627 Besides, Article 25(3)(c) 
specifically requires the aider and abettor to act with the purpose of facilitating the commission 
of the crime, which appears to exceed the ICTY’s knowledge only standard. Moreover, most 
scholars interpret Article 25(3)(c) as requiring dolus directus in the first degree. On the ground 
that the Rome Statute does not explicitly set forth a substantial effect requirement, most authors 
claim that the purposive motivation balances the low objective threshold in terms of an elevated 
mens rea threshold.628 According to this view, it is not sufficient that the aider and abettor acts 
with knowledge; his intent must cover the consequence of the conduct of the perpetrator in that 
he desires the commission of the crime, the latter being the principal scope of his contribution.629 
To require purpose is to exclude knowing assistance. The distinction between mere knowledge 
on the one hand and an intentional or purposive assistance on the other has thoroughly been 
discussed in both common and civil law literature. For instance, various legal scholars exclude 
individual criminal responsibility if the aider and abettor is utterly indifferent about the criminal 
result brought about by the principal;630 the aider and abettor must act “due to”631 or “in order to 
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assist”632 the crime committed by the principal. Other scholars instead derive a dolus directus in 
the first degree interpretation from their reading of Article 25(3)(c).633  
The term purpose has been left undefined in the Rome Statute and may therefore be open to 
interpretation.634 Time will tell what reading of the notion of purpose the ICC will give to Article 
25(3)(c). 
5.4. The Appropriate mens rea Standard 
This Section proposes that the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting under international law 
requires proof of purpose and not just knowledge. As the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals do not 
provide for a mens rea standard for aiding and abetting, the applicable standard must derive from 
customary international law.635 The ICJ has held “[i]t is, of course, axiomatic that the material of 
customary international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of 
States.”636  
5.4.1. Is the ad hoc Tribunal’s Jurisprudence Concerning mens rea Standard under 
Customary International Law Flawed?  
While the ICTY Appeals Chamber has held that knowledge is sufficient for aiding and abetting 
liability, it has not thoroughly addressed whether this standard is supported by customary 
international law. The ICTY’s application of the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting has in 
fact been inconsistent, with various definitions cited for this standard throughout the relevant 
jurisprudence.637 For example, in several cases before the ICTY and the ICTR the Chambers 
have referred to a requisite intention to facilitate or assist the crime, which implies purpose, 
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while at the same time finding that mere knowledge is sufficient.638 Additionally, it is proposed 
that the Furundžija Trial Chamber, one of the ICTY’s first judgments to adopt a mere knowledge 
standard, is flawed.639 In view of the international community’s endorsement of a purpose 
standard which requires proof the aider acted with the purpose of facilitating the charged crimes, 
the soundness of the standard articulated in the Furundžija Trial Chamber is increasingly 
doubtful. Namely, Furundžija Trial Chamber incorrectly relied on Article 30 of the Rome Statute 
in holding that the applicable mens rea standard for aiding and abetting is mere knowledge.640 
The mens rea for aiding and abetting is in fact clearly stated in Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome 
Statute, lex specialis to Article 30.641  
Furundžija Trial Chamber further erred by holding that post-World War II jurisprudence, such as 
the Einsatzgruppen,642 Zyklon B,643 and Schonfeld644 cases, established that mere knowledge is 
sufficient to find the requisite mens rea for aiding and abetting.645 The Einsatzgruppen case was 
conducted under Control Council Law No. 10 (“CCL-10”), which did not define the mens rea for 
aiding and abetting. Hence, the tribunals created by this law relied heavily on their own national 
legal standards in defining aiding and abetting, not international standards. This is precisely why 
the High Court of Australia has noted concern over accepting the opinions of these tribunals as 
reflecting authoritative statements of customary international law.646 The Zyklon B and Schonfeld 
cases were tried before British military courts. The jurisdiction of these courts was based on the 
Royal Warrant of 14 June 1945 and these courts applied only domestic law, unless otherwise 
provided.647 In fact, the Furundžija Trial Chamber conceded that the judgments from these 
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courts are “less helpful in establishing rules of international law.”648 Neither of the military 
courts in these cases specified that they applied anything other than domestic British law.649 
In sum, Furundžija’s findings on the elements sufficient to establish the mens rea for aiding and 
abetting are based on a misreading and/or incorrect interpretation of customary international law 
standards. 
5.4.2. Post-World Warr II Jurisprudence on mens rea Standard  
There was no consensus in customary international law that mere knowledge was the correct 
standard when Furundžija was decided upon. Contrary to the passages in the Einsatzgruppen 
case cited by the Furundžija Trial Chamber,650 the Judge Advocate in Einsatzgruppen stated that, 
“more than mere knowledge of illegality or crime is required.”651 Similarly, the Furundžija Trial 
Chamber’s reliance on the Schonfeld case as cause to adopt a mere knowledge standard is wholly 
misplaced.652 The Schonfeld court described the mens rea for aiding and abetting as “the 
intention of giving assistance”,653 and requiring that the accused’s assistance must have been 
“calculated to give additional confidence to his companions.”654 Additionally, other CCL-10 
cases, such as the Hechingen Deportation case involving complicity liability, adopted a 
“purpose” test requiring that the accomplice must have acted with the same mens rea as the 
principal perpetrator.655 The Ministries case declined to impose criminal responsibility on a bank 
officer who made a loan with the knowledge, but not the purpose, that the borrower would use 
the funds to finance the commission of crimes.656  
The Tadić Trial Chamber, which also discussed post-WWII cases with respect to the mens rea 
for aiding and abetting, noted “the [post-WWII] judgments generally failed to discuss in detail 
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for an actus reus analysis. 
655 Furundžija Trial Judgment, paras.240, 248. 
656 U.S. v. von Weizaecker (The Ministries Case), in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nüremberg Military 
Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. XIV, pp.621-622. 
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the criteria upon which guilt was determined.”657 The only “clear pattern” that the Tadić Trial 
Chamber found within this jurisprudence concerning the mens rea standard was “a requirement 
of intent, which involves awareness of the act of participation coupled with a conscious decision 
to participate by [. . .] aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime.”658 This standard 
provides for a higher mens rea than mere knowledge. The Tadić Appeals Judgment states that 
the requisite mens rea is knowledge without providing any authority or analysis supporting this 
standard.659 To the extent that the Trial Chamber in Tadić and Furundžija also relied on the ILC 
Draft Code of Crimes,660 the Draft Code does not accurately reflect the existing customary 
international law.661   
5.4.3. Mens rea in The Rome Statute 
As outlined above, the Rome Statute clearly articulates the requisite mens rea for aiding and 
abetting. It requires that for a person to be held criminally responsible for aiding and abetting, he 
or she must have acted “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission of [. . .] a crime.”662 
Unlike the Model Penal Code, however, the Rome Statute does not define the word “purpose,” 
nor does it specify how much of the underlying offence must fall within the accomplice’s 
purpose. Importantly, the knowledge standard of the ICTY was considered when adopting the 
Rome Statute. This standard was expressly rejected in favour of the more appropriate purpose 
standard.663  
The Rome Statute reflects the international community’s consensus on the applicable mens rea 
standard for aiding and abetting. It has been signed and ratified by 139 and 120 States, 
respectively.664 Article 25(3)(c) establishes that the international community has promulgated a 
standard that requires purpose as part of the mens rea and rejected a standard of mere knowledge 
                                                          
657 Tadić Trial Judgment, para. 674. 
658 Ibidem, para. 674 [emphasis added]. 
659 Ibidem, para. 229. See e.g. (citing Tadić Appeals Judgment) Blagojević Appeals Judgment, para.221 & fn.581; 
Kvočka Appeals Judgment, para.89 & fn.202; Krstič Appeals Judgment, para.140 & fn.235; Aleksovski Appeals 
Judgment, para. 163. 
660 Tadić Trial Judgment, para. 688; Furundžija Trial Judgment, para. 242. 
661 See Giustiniani, Z., supra note 646, pp. 444-445. 
662 Rome Statute, Article 25(3)(c ). 
663 Giustiniani, Z., supra note 646, pp.442-443. As one member of the German delegation to the Rome Conference 
and former ad litem judge of the Tribunal has observed, “the aider and abettor must act with ‘purpose’. . . [which] 
means more than mere knowledge” (Eser, A., supra note 349, p. 801). 
664 International Criminal Court, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/; Coalition for the International 
Criminal Court, http://www.iccnow.org. 
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alone for imposing aiding and abetting liability. The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC recently 
clarified this point by explaining that “unlike the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, article 
25(3)(c) of the [Rome] Statute requires that the person acts with the purpose to facilitate the 
crime; knowledge is not enough for responsibility under this article.”665   
Since the seminal case of Tadić, the Appeals Chamber has expressly noted, “[the Rome Statute] 
was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the States attending the Rome Diplomatic 
Conference and was substantially endorsed by the Sixth Committee of the United Nations 
General Assembly.”666 The ICTY Appeals Chamber also recognized that the “[Rome Statute] is 
supported by a great number of States and may be taken to express opinio juris of those 
States”667 and emphasised the “significant legal value” of the Rome Statute.668 The Tribunal has 
accordingly looked to the Rome Statute for guidance when considering the substance of 
customary international law.669 
Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute embodies the development of customary international law. 
Since its adoption in 1998 there has been a growing trend of general acceptance that mere 
knowledge that crimes may be committed is insufficient to establish individual criminal 
responsibility as an aider and abettor.670  
5.4.4. Mens rea Under U.S. Courts of Appeals 
The applicable mens rea standard for aiding and abetting under international law has recently 
been addressed by a number of U.S. Courts of Appeals. A majority of them have held that the 
applicable mens rea for aiding and abetting liability under international law is the “purpose” 
                                                          
665 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, para.274 (internal citations 
omitted). Furthermore, the knowledge standard provided under Article 30 does not alter the purpose standard in 
Article 25(3)(c), as this standard falls within the “[u]nless otherwise provided” clause of Article 30.  
666 Tadić Appeals Judgment, para. 223. See also Furundžija Trial Judgment, para.227. 
667 Ibidem (stating that the Rome Statute “by and large may be taken as constituting an authoritative expression of 
the legal views of a great number of States”). 
668 Ibidem, para.223. 
669 See e.g. Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, paras.221-222; Kunarac Appeals Judgment, para.118 & fn.147; Tadić 
Appeals Judgment, paras.222-223. See also Boškoski Trial Judgment, para.186; Krstić Trial Judgment, para. 541; 
Furundžija Trial Judgment, paras.227-235; Čelebići Trial Judgment, paras.342-343 & fn.33. 
670 In 2000, for example, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor adopted the same purpose 
mens rea standard provided in Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute (United Nations Transitional Administration in 
East Timor, Regulation Number 2000/15 On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious 
Criminal Offences, Section 14.3(c), 6 June 2000).  
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standard provided in Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute.671 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Second and Fourth Circuits, applying customary international law, also rejected a mere 
knowledge standard.672 While the claims in these cases involved civil liability of corporations 
under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”),673 the courts applied international law as required by the 
ATS. These decisions are particularly important given that the U.S. is not a party to the Rome 
Statute, and the Second and Fourth Circuits nonetheless found that the Rome Statute represents 
an authoritative international expression on the proper mens rea standard for aiding and 
abetting.674  
5.4.5. Conclusion on the Appropriate mens rea Standard 
Pursuant to its mandate, the ICTY has historically applied customary international law and found 
it to be a cornerstone for its decisions.675 In light of evolving customary international law on the 
elements of aiding and abetting, it is proposed that the ICTY should find that an accused cannot 
be convicted as an aider and abettor unless there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt he acted 
with the purpose of facilitating the crimes charged. Mere knowledge is an insufficient basis upon 
which to impose accomplice liability. While the Krstič Appeals Chamber did attempt to explain 
its reasoning for adopting the mere knowledge standard for aiding and abetting, its analysis is 
lacking. Namely, it relied on seven domestic jurisdictions in support of the knowledge 
standard.676 However, several of these jurisdictions either do not follow this standard or have not 
done so consistently.677 If the international criminal courts continue to apply the mere knowledge 
standard without clearly determining whether this standard is supported by customary 
                                                          
671 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, p. 259 (2d Cir. 2009); Aziz v. Alcolac, 
Inc., 658 F.3d 388, p.401 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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675 See e.g. Tadić Appeals Judgment, paras.194, 220, 226-227, 251, 255-270, 275, 287-292; Furundžija Appeals 
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Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbesch Health Authority, 1986, 1 AC 112, requiring a “guilty mind” for aiding and 
abetting).   
148 
international law, they will simply perpetuate the initial underlying errors in Furundžija. The 
Rome Statute articulates a mens rea standard which requires more than mere knowledge. Cases 
discussed herein also require proof the aider and abettor acted “for the purpose of facilitating” 
the crimes charged. As the ICTY has recognized, it “should follow its previous decisions, but 
should be free to depart from them for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.”678  
                                                          
678 Aleksovski Appeals Judgment, para.107. 
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6. Application of the Law on Complicity by Way of Provision of Military Aid:  
6.1. Case Study – The Case of Prosecutor v. Momčilo Perišić  
In one of the most significant cases in the history of international criminal law, the ICTY 
effectively addressed an issue whether a military or political leader may be convicted for 
knowingly facilitating crimes by another State’s army. The Perišić Appeals Chamber answered 
this question in the negative – knowledge that the recipients of military assistance are 
perpetrating crimes is essentially irrelevant absent evidence that the facilitator of military aid 
specifically intended that such assistance facilitates the commission of the specific crime(s). It is 
noteworthy that, notwithstanding numerous opportunities to do so, prior to Perišić, no political 
or military leader had been charged before the international tribunals with aiding and abetting 
international crimes of another State or a non-state actor merely for the reason that he supplied 
them with arms or personnel.  
In August 1993 Perišić was appointed Chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Army (hereinafter: 
VJ), the most senior VJ officer in the FRY. Between 1993 and 1995, the VJ provided military 
and logistical assistance to the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) in BiH. Given that the FRY 
President, Slobodan Milošević died in 2006 while facing trial, General Perišić’s case came 
closest to determining the responsibility of the FRY leadership for international crimes 
committed during the armed conflict in BiH. Unlike all other defendants in other ICTY aiding 
and abetting cases, General Perišić almost exclusively acted from the FRY, not only distant 
location from the crime scene, but also from another country, occupying the highest military post 
of a neighbouring army. 
The Prosecution charged Momčilo Perišić with aiding and abetting the planning, preparation or 
execution of the crimes pursuant to Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. Perišić was indicted for his 
acts in relation to the crimes perpetrated in Sarajevo, namely, for murder, a crime against 
humanity, murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, as recognized by Common Article 3 
(1) (a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, inhumane acts (injuring and wounding civilians), a 
crime against humanity, an attack on civilians, a violation of the laws or customs of war as 
recognized by Article 51 (2) of Additional Protocol I and Article 13 (2) of Additional Protocol II 
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to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 pursuant to Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. In relation to 
the crimes involving forcible transfers and killings perpetrated in Srebrenica, Perišić was charged 
with murder, a crime against humanity, murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war, 
inhumane acts, a crime against humanity, persecution on political, racial or religious grounds, a 
crime against humanity, including murder, cruel and inhumane treatment and forcible transfer, 
and extermination, a crime against humanity.679  
In September 2011, the ICTY Trial Chamber convicted General Perišić for aiding and abetting 
crimes committed by the VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica during 1993 and 1995.680 An 
ambitious expansion of the law on complicity by way of provision of military aid was proposed 
by the ICTY Trial Chamber. Accordingly, the Trial Chamber held Perišić responsible for his role 
in facilitating the provision of substantial military and logistical assistance to the VRS,681 an 
independent army with separate chain of command. Thus, Perišić’s conviction marked the first 
ICTY judgment against an official of the former VJ for the crimes committed in another 
internationally recognized State (i.e. BiH) by principal perpetrators being members of (belonging 
to) another army (i.e. VRS).682 As the top military officer in the VJ, headquartered in Belgrade, 
FRY, the accused had used his position to provide critical support to Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) 
which had engaged in “systematic and widespread sniping and shelling of civilians” in Sarajevo 
and killings of thousands in Srebrenica in 1995. The Trial Chamber judgment emphasized the 
many ways in which Perišić had “repeatedly exercised his authority to provide logistic and 
personnel assistance that made it possible for the VRS to wage a war that he knew encompassed 
systematic crimes against Muslim civilians.”683 These efforts included the “provision of weapons 
and ammunition, technical experts, training, medical support, fuel and operational support,”684 
the payment of VRS salaries, and the transfer of over 7,000 Yugoslav Army officers to the 
VRS.685  
                                                          
679 See Perišić Indictment. 
680 Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-T, Trial Judgment, 6 September 2011 (hereinafter: Perišić Trial 
Judgment). 
681 Perišić Trial Judgment, para. 1627. 
682 Ibidem. 
683 Ibidem, para. 1621. 
684 Ibidem, para. 1594. 
685 Ibidem, paras. 1607-19. 
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On 28 February 2013, the ICTY Appeals Chamber overruled the 2011 convictions of General 
Perišić on the grounds that the necessary link (nexus) was missing.686 The Appeals Chamber held 
that “specific direction” is an essential element of responsibility for the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting the crimes of murder, extermination, inhumane acts, attacks on civilians, and 
persecution as crimes against humanity and/or violations of the laws or customs of war. The 
record suggests the concern by certain judges that convicting individuals like Perišić could 
potentially disrupt international relations by casting too wide a net for convicting leaders whose 
provision of military aid facilitates crimes by a foreign army or non-state actors operating in 
another State.687 
6.2. Application of actus reus Element of Aiding and Abetting in Perišić Case 
6.2.1. Perišić’s Role in the Provision of Military Aid  
The Trial Chamber convicted Perišić for the role he had played in the provision of logistical and 
other type of assistance to the VRS. The Trial Chamber classified the assistance provided by the 
VJ to the VRS in two broad categories: first, secondment of personnel,688 and second, provision 
of military equipment, logistical support, and military training.689  
With respect to the secondment of VJ soldiers to the VRS, the Trial Chamber found that Perišić 
had persuaded the Supreme Defence Council (hereinafter: SDC) to create the 30th Personnel 
Centre (hereinafter: 30th PC or PC), a unit of the VJ that served as the administrative home of VJ 
soldiers and officers seconded to the VRS and was used to increase and institutionalise the 
support already provided to seconded VJ soldiers and officers.690 However, the trial record 
contains no evidence suggesting that the benefits provided to seconded soldiers and officers – 
including VJ-level salaries, housing, and educational and medical benefits691 – were tailored to 
facilitate the commission of the VRS crimes.692 According to the Appeals Chamber, the evidence 
does not suggest that VJ soldiers and officers were seconded in order to specifically assist the 
                                                          
686 Perišić Appeals Judgment. 
687 Jouet, M., supra note 317, p. 1091. 
688 Perišić Trial Judgment, paras. 761-940. 
689 Ibidem, paras.1010-1154, 1232-1237. 
690 Ibidem, paras. 763-766, 1607-1611, 793, 795. 
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692 Perišić Appeals Judgment, para. 63. 
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VRS criminal acts.693 In sum, the evidence provided a basis for the conclusion that Perišić’s 
facilitation of secondments was directed to assist the VRS war effort, rather than VRS’s 
crimes.694 
With respect to the second category of assistance, namely, the provision of military equipment, 
logistical support, and military training, the Trial Chamber found that the VJ had supplied the 
VRS with “comprehensive” logistical aid,695 often not requiring payment for such assistance.696 
The Trial Chamber concluded that the VJ had provided the VRS with military equipment and 
supplies on a large scale, including semi-automatic rifles, machine guns, pieces for machine-gun 
barrels, cannons, bullets, grenades, rocket launchers, mortar ammunition, mines, rockets, anti-
aircraft ammunition, and mortar shells.697 Furthermore, the VJ offered military training to VRS 
troops and assisted with military communications.698 
6.2.2. Provision of Personnel Assistance to the VRS 
The Prosecution alleged that the “VJ, under the command of Perišić, continued the policy of the 
SDC and its individual members to provide and finance the majority of officers comprising the 
officers corps of the VRS.” Furthermore, the Indictment alleged that by providing the majority of 
senior officers in the VRS 699 by sending them to serve in the VRS, regulating their service, 
paying their salaries and benefits, and verifying promotions, Perišić aided and abetted the 
commission of crimes.700 According to the Prosecution the VRS was not capable of survival 
without substantial manpower from the VJ.701 Thus, through his acts and conduct Perišić had 
influence on the structure of those officer corps, either in terms of quantity or quality. Further, 
that the purpose of forming the PC was to conceal the provision of those officers. Granting 
certain status related rights such as salaries, and benefits attached to rank members of an army 
had influence on the composition, character, and activities of the VRS.702 
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The Prosecution claimed that the purpose of the PC was to covertly supply assistance in violation 
of international instruments in support of the crimes charged. However, the evidence presented at 
the trial showed that the majority of the officers serving in the armies of the VRS were in place 
well before Perišić’s assignment to the post of the VJ CGS in the fall of 1993. By that time, the 
structures of those armies was independent and well defined.703 
The trial record does not establish that the specific officers requested by the VRS and dispatched 
from the VJ to the VRS during Perišić’s tenure contributed to or were part of the commission of 
the charged crimes. Moreover, the evidence failed to establish that Perišić was responsible for 
paying the salaries of the VRS officers whose status was regulated by the 30th PC. Rather, 
payment of salaries fell under the authority of the FRY Ministry of Defence (MOD).  
6.2.2.1. The Personnel Centre 
The Prosecution alleged that in November 1993 Perišić personally established special purpose 
personnel centre within the General Staff of the VJ to disguise the provision and payment of 
those officers who comprised the majority of officer corps of the VRS.704  
While the order establishing the 30th PC was issued by FRY President Lilić,705 in accordance 
with an SDC Decision,706 the Trail Chamber nevertheless found that Perišić had a decisive role 
in the creation of the PC and that he conceived and subsequently carefully implemented the idea 
to create such centre to regulate the status of all former JNA and VJ military personnel who 
remained in BiH and to legalise the deployment of VJ military personnel to the VRS. In doing 
so, Perišić intended to meet the requests for military personnel by the VRS Main Staff. 
According to the Trial Chamber, the evidence conclusively established that Perišić designed the 
formation of the PC. His role in this process was confirmed by Perišić himself, who at the SDC 
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Law of SVK, Article 281. 
704 Perišić Indictment, paras.10, 11. 
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Session of 30 August 1995 reminded the SDC members that he was the one who “advocated” for 
the idea of sending all those military personnel who originated from BiH to serve in the VRS.707 
According to the Prosecution, by creating the PC, Perišić substantially contributed to the crimes. 
The evidence in the trial showed that the main purpose of the PC was to effectively enable the 
transfer and assignment of VJ officers to the VRS708 and, if necessary, their subsequent 
deployment to the VJ.709 When VJ officers were formally transferred to the PC in Belgrade, they 
were, in fact, relocated to positions within the VRS.710 As a measure to maintain the secrecy of 
the VJ involvement in the transfer of VJ officers to the VRS from the local and international 
public, the deployment orders delivered to these officers would refer to deployment to the PC in 
Belgrade, but would not mention the RS.711 
The Prosecution asserted that the purpose of the PC was to hide the involvement of the VJ and 
the FRY Government in the provision and payment of the officers who served in, and were 
transferred to, the VRS712 and thus the PC served as a legal cover to hide the fact that the VJ was 
ordering its personnel to serve in BiH.713 However, it was accepted by the Prosecution that 
salaries and vested status-related rights were already exercised by the officers before the PC was 
formed.714 
During the SDC Session held on 21 July 1994, Perišić reported:  
As for the VRS […], about 6,800 officers there are taking care of the system, people and organization, 
and fighting successfully. To date, at their request, we have sent a total of 3,795 more on permanent 
transfer and 187 on rotational basis.715 
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Trial Chamber found the main function of the PC was to regulate the status of all those former 
JNA/VJ officers who remained to serve in the VRS [in BiH] after the withdrawal of the JNA 
[from BiH] and to allow the VJ to secretly transfer VJ military personnel to the VRS, ensuring 
that they all continued to enjoy and exercise their rights in the VJ and FRY while serving in 
VRS. All SDC members, as well as Perišić, intended to keep this function and the VJ 
involvement in the conflicts secret in order to avoid criticism or risking further sanctions from 
the international community. Additionally, under the cover of a formal appointment to the PC, 
the VJ personnel were transferred directly to the VRS. The need and intention to keep this 
function secret was clearly expressed at the SDC session of 11 October 1993 while discussing 
the order on the establishment of the PC. At the session, Perišić admitted that the establishment 
of the PC had been devised in order to “avoid having anyone criticize us” for the number of 
former JNA and VJ personnel serving in the VRS.716 Momir Bulatović [the president of 
Montenegro] instead expressed his concern that, should the document fall into anybody’s hands, 
the FRY would face sanctions “for ten years”.717 
The orders of appointment or transfer of VJ officers to the VRS were issued by the Chief of the 
Personnel Administration of the VJ General Staff or by Perišić himself to meet pressing requests 
from the VRS. The Trial Chamber found that while the VJ appointed VJ personnel to the PC, the 
appointment to specific posts within the VRS was done by the VRS itself.718 Furthermore, there 
were instances in which VJ soldiers were appointed to the VRS on a temporary basis through the 
PC. Assignments would last one year, and upon termination the officers were to return to the VJ 
unit from which they were transferred.719 
The Trial Chamber found that although many VJ officers volunteered or readily accepted to be 
transferred to the VRS, those who refused or were reticent to go were pressured or coerced to do 
so by threats of early retirement or termination of service. The Trial Chamber further found that 
Perišić intended the deployment of VJ officers to the VRS to be obligatory under threat of 
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termination of service, but decided not to include any such clause in writing in order to avoid 
litigation that would expose the involvement of the VJ in the conflict in BiH.720  
Several witnesses testified that officers who served in the VRS through the PC received their 
salaries and other benefits from the VJ.721 Stamenko Nikolić, Head of VJ General Staff 
Personnel Administration estimated that between 4,000 and 4,700 military personnel in the VRS 
were entitled to a salary from the VJ.722 With particular emphasis on 1995, he testified that in 
that period 2,421 officers and contract soldiers received their salaries through the PC.723  
Salaries presented the largest expenditure within the VJ budget724 and thus included the 
necessary funds to pay members of the PC. Illustratively, at the SDC session of 7 June 1994, 
Perišić specified that: 
In RS we support and pay for 4,173 persons, or 7.42% from the VJ…we allot around 14 million 
[dinars]…each year and we need the same amount for next year, and that’s just for the salaries. That’s 
a great help to them.725 
Those salaries were eventually paid by the FRY Ministry of Defence with funds allocated to the 
VJ in the national defence budget.726 Former JNA military personnel who remained in BiH to 
serve in the VRS received salaries as if they continued to serve with the JNA.727 The Trial 
Chamber concluded that Perišić was directly involved in determining the funds needed for the 
payment of salaries for military personnel, including members of the PC.728  
Further, members of the PC continued to be part of the VJ retirement plan, although they had 
served in the VRS.729 The VJ retirement plan was financed partly by contributions made by the 
VJ military personnel, including members of the 30th PC, during their service, and partly by 
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funds allocated for this purpose within the annual defence budget.730 About 60 – 65 % of the VJ 
military budget was allocated to pensions and salaries. 
The Trial Chamber found that members of the PC and their families were entitled to and 
benefited from medical assistance in the VJ and the FRY. Like other VJ officers, members of the 
PC also enjoyed various benefits, such as compensation for service under difficult conditions, 
health insurance and housing benefits.731 
6.2.2.2. The importance of the Personnel Centre according to the Trial 
Chamber 
The Trial Chamber concluded that Perišić sustained the very lifeline of the VRS by creating the 
PC.732 Furthermore, it found that Perišić provided practical assistance to the VRS by creating the 
conditions that enabled members of the 30th PC to continue serving in the VRS without 
impediments while enjoying the rights conferred to VJ members.733 According to the Trial 
Chamber, Perišić created such conditions by forming the PC, composed of key VRS officers, 
through which they legally acquired their status as VJ members with all the corresponding 
benefits.734 The Trial Chamber further found that Perišić sent other VJ military personnel to the 
VRS on an ongoing basis, which enabled the flow and rotation of personnel to continue without 
interruption.735 
The Trial Chamber found Perišić’s practical assistance in creating the 30th PC and subsequently 
providing personnel to the VRS, regulating the status of its members, his role in the payment of 
salaries for 30th PC members, and the role in the verification of promotions process facilitated or 
contributed to the commission of crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. Furthermore, the Trial 
Chamber concluded that Perišić’s acts in the creation of the 30th PC, payment of salaries, and 
verification of promotions had a substantial effect on the crimes committed by the VRS in 
Sarajevo and Srebrenica.736 With respect to the effect of the practical assistance, which the 
                                                          
730 Ibidem, para 882. 
731 Testimony of Witness Stojan Malčič, T. 11229-11232, Testimony of Witness Mile Novaković, T. 13051-13052, 
13324-13326. 
732 Perišić Trial Judgment, para. 1623. 
733 Ibidem, para. 1608, 1609, 1623. 
734 Ibidem, para. 1609. 
735 Ibidem, para. 1610.  
736 Ibidem, paras. 1603-1619, 1627. 
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Chamber attributed to Perišić, it found that such assistance “was vital to help the VRS to 
function”737 and that it “created conditions for the VRS to wage a war that encompassed 
systematic criminal activities”738 through which “he facilitated the commission of the crimes in 
Sarajevo and Srebrenica.”739 
According to the Trial Chamber, by promoting and paying the salaries of members of the 30th PC, 
Perišić contributed to the commission of the crimes by the VRS,740 as such salaries and other 
benefits were “vital to the functioning of the very core of the VRS.”741 
6.2.2.3. Provision of Officers and its Substantial Effect on the Commission 
of Crimes  
According to the Prosecution, Perišić continued the policy of the SDC to provide the majority of 
officers comprising the officer corps of the VRS.742 The question that the Chamber had to 
resolve was whether acts of Perišić as the Chief of General Staff of the VJ substantially 
contributed to the commission of specific crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica and whether Perišić 
had control over the creation, manning, or maintenance of the officer corps of the VRS, whose 
members were the direct perpetrators of the crimes.  
According to the combat readiness report that identifies the strength of VRS units at the 
formation of VRS on 1 March 1993 and later on,743 out of a total of 182,689 VRS members, the 
officer corps totalled 17,046 and comprised of 6,135 officers and 10,911 non-commissioned 
officers. Only 2,894 of those were receiving salaries from the FRY in the relevant period.744 
Prior to Perišić’s appointment to the position of the CGS, 2,894 active servicemen from the VRS 
were receiving their salaries from the FRY Ministry of Defence.745 In October 1993,746 after 
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738 Ibidem. 
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743 Exhibit P149: VRS Main Staff situation report to RS President, VJ Chief of General Staff and commands of the 
1KK, 2KK, SRK, IBK, HK, DK, and Airforce and Air defence (RS). (no. 02/3-137), p.79, table 25. 
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746 Exhibit P1872: Documents regarding the regulation of the status of the VJ active military personnel (born on the 
teritory of RH and RBiH) temporarily serving in the SVK and the VRS, with a tabular overview of the number of 
the said in the armies of the SVK and the VRS. No. 840-1. 
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Perišić's appointment, and within the timeframe of discussions at the SDC on the need for some 
kind of regulatory system, the number of active servicemen who were reassigned to the VRS was 
2,593,747 a decrease since July 1993. At that point, there were 2,630 officers, whereas in May 
1995 there were 2,276 officers in the VRS.  
Whereas the Prosecution further asserted that the key positions of VRS commanding core were 
held by individuals whose status was regulated in the FRY,748 the trial record revealed that all the 
officers occupying the highest positions in the VRS, in the Main Staff as well as the highest 
command functions, were in service in the VRS prior to Perišić’s appointment as the VJ CGS in 
August 1993.749  
Thus, the Defence asserted that the connection between Perišić’s acts and conduct and the 
assignment of any officer to any high military duties within the VRS had not been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority of those officers had been assigned to their respective 
duties in the VRS in the period before Perišić became the VJ CGS. Additionally, the trial record 
established that assignments to different posts /duties in the VRS were conducted by the VRS 
itself. There is no evidence that Perišić played any role in the assignments on duties in the VRS. 
The Trial Chamber itself recognized that Perišić had no involvement or participation in 
personnel policy of appointing of certain officers to highest and most responsible positions in the 
VRS. 
All of the main officer corps, both in number and in position, were established prior to Perišić's 
appointment to position of VJ CGS. After Perišić's appointment, the number of personnel whose 
status rights were recognized in FRY was in constant decline. The creation and functioning of 
the 30th PC did not change this situation in terms of increasing the number or quality of officer 
personnel. Thus, it is submitted that it was not established at trial that the assistance given to 
VRS during Perišić’s tenure in relation to the provision of the officer core of the VRS had a 
substantial effect on the commission of the crimes charged. 
                                                          
747 Testimony of Witness Stamenko Nikolić, T.10534. 
748 Prosecution Opening Statement, Transcript from Perišić’s Trial p. 371 – 372 (available at http://www. 
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749 Testimony of Witness Stojan Malčić, T.11207-T.11210. 
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6.2.2.4. Substantial Effect of Salaries on the Commission of Crimes 
The financing and remuneration of the officer corps of the VRS, and the payment of their 
benefits formed one of the forms of assistance by the VJ. The Prosecution had to prove the 
salaries had a substantial effect on the commission of crimes. While the Trial Chamber found 
that the salaries enjoyed by members of the 30th PC were instrumental in assisting the VRS in 
pursuing its military operations,750 Judge Moloto in his Dissent held that “[i]t cannot be said that 
the only reasonable inference is that the payment of salaries had a substantial effect on the 
commission of such crimes.”751  
The evidence established that during the sanctions imposed by the FRY on the RS from August 
1994 until February 1995, the payment of salaries provided to members of the 30th PC was 
completely suspended.752 Numerous witnesses testified that their salary was of little or no 
significance to them, and the evidence also showed that even during times of complete cessations 
in payment of salaries, no officers left the army and the VRS continued to function. The Trial 
Chamber recognized that during this period of suspension none of the 30th PC members left their 
positions in the VRS.753 Thus, if the suspension of their salaries did not cause high ranking VRS 
officials and other perpetrators of the crimes committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica to leave their 
positions within the VRS, it cannot be claimed that salaries were instrumental for VRS in 
pursuing its military operations.  
Further, the Trial Chamber concluded that members of the 30th PC did not leave their posts in the 
VRS due to the VRS denial of requests for transfer back to the VJ.754 This fact demonstrates that 
the VRS itself had a mechanism for sustaining its personnel independent from Perišić. The 
operative requirement of authorisation for leaving the VRS was consent by the VRS Commander. 
The Trial Chamber held that it has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that personnel 
                                                          
750 Perišić Trial Judgment, para. 1623. 
751 Perišić Trial Judgment, Judge Justice Moloto Dissenting Opinion, para. 23. 
752 Perišić Trial Judgment, para. 867. 
753 Ibidem, para. 1618. It should also be noted that 30th PC members were invited by the FRY leadership to cancel 
their obedience to the RS leadership and to return to FRY and VJ (25th SDC Session).  
754 Ibidem, para. 1618. 
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serving in the VRS through the 30th PCs could be redeployed to VJ without approval from the 
VRS.755 Furthermore, General Milovanović, Chief of Staff of VRS, said: 
This is what happened, for six months we lived without salaries. We did not desert, as many 
people were hoping we would, we stayed behind and we would have stayed even if they never 
paid back what they did, and even that was short of the fighting allowance, short of all those 
things which go with a salary, but we are satisfied with how much we get, and we must be 
satisfied. I now can tell you that we must and should be satisfied because with a clear eye and a 
high forehead I stand before my soldiers. At the Bihać front, one says to me, general, I don't 
have a salary; son, I don't have one either; so he asks how do your wife and children live? Same 
as yours; but do not take this to mean that the officers should have their salaries abolished.756 
Additionally, salaries were not paid for all the VRS members. The number of those that actually 
received the benefits actually constituted a small portion of the total number of persons serving 
in the VRS.757 Namely, the VRS had 200,000 to 250,000 troops including military personnel.758 
Various witnesses testified that the salaries of the majority of the VRS members were paid by the 
RS Ministry of Defence.759 
In August 1994, the Federal Government of the FRY decided to cut political and economic ties 
with the RS,760 and the SDC made a decision to stop all payments to the VRS due to RS 
leadership’s rejection of the Contact Group Plan.761 Payment of the VRS officers was interrupted 
for five months, from August 1994 to February 1995 in order to pressure the RS leadership into 
accepting the peace plan.762 While a dispatch from Mladić to VRS corps of 4 November 1994 
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756 Exhibit P312: Tape recording of the 50th Session of the BiH SDS Assembly, pp.191-192.  
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758 Ibidem, T.10552. 
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Witness S. Nikolić, T.10558. 
762 Ibidem. 
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indicates the difficulties faced by the VRS when the payment of salaries was stopped,763 very 
few officers went back to the FRY during this period, even though conclusion of the SDC 
minutes states that officers in the VRS who disagreed with the RS leadership would be 
welcomed back to the FRY.764 Defence witness Petrović also confirmed that, while he himself 
was indignant about losing his salary, nobody left the ranks of the VRS for that reason.765 Nor 
were there any disruptions in the activities of the VRS, and particularly not in those of the Main 
Staff.766  
In addition to periods of non-payment of salaries having no effect on the operations of the VRS, 
numerous witnesses confirm that during periods of hyperinflation, salaries had almost no worth 
at all.767 In spite of these conditions, none of these officers left the ranks of the VRS during these 
times. In light of this evidence, the premise that the payment of salaries substantially contributed 
to the commission of crimes by the VRS is not supported. The trial record fails to establish any 
connection between the commission of crimes and the payment of salaries to members of the 
VRS. 
6.2.2.5. Decision to Pay Salaries taken at the Political Level  
The evidence at trial established that the decision to pay salaries was made by the FRY 
government and that the power to suspend and reinstate payments of salaries was within the 
exclusive purview of the SDC. Specifically, the actual payment of salaries was within the remit 
of the FRY Ministry of Defence.  
                                                          
763 Exhibit P2817: Dispatch no.23/20-993 sent by the VRS Main Staff Sector for Organization, Mobilization and 
Personnel dated 4 November 1994; Testimony of Witness Simić, T.10392-10393. 
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The payment of salaries to those VRS officers who were formerly JNA officers was initially 
made pursuant to decisions of the SFRY Presidency768 and later on by the FRY SDC.769 After the 
disintegration of the SFRY and the withdrawal of the JNA from the former republics, and prior 
to the establishment of the PC on 10 November 1993, the highest authorities of the FRY were 
looking for solutions to the status-related problems of the army. While organs of the VJ General 
Staff submitted various proposals on the resolution of these problems to the SDC,770 the ultimate 
decision on how to regulate these matters was made by the FRY SDC.771 In practical terms, the 
officers continued to receive their salaries as during the days of the JNA, “the cycle was never 
broken;” those officers had been receiving their salaries even before the establishment of the 
PC.772   
Compensation for salaries was granted to active duty servicemen, contract servicemen and 
civilians who had served with the JNA and remained with the VRS, and professional servicemen 
and civilians serving in the VJ who were born in BiH and went to serve in the VRS.773 They 
continued to receive their salaries through the post savings banks as they did before the PC was 
established.774 By mid 1993, prior to Perišić’s appointment as CGS of the VJ, status issues of 
former JNA members serving in the VRS remained unresolved. A VJ Budget Report from 
August 1993 contains a breakdown of the numbers of “officers”, “non-commissioned officers”, 
“contract soldiers” and “civilians” in the VJ and the VRS that are being paid by the FRY MOD 
in 1993.775 In July 1993 there were 64,994 persons financed from the budget of the VJ, out of 
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774 Testimony of Witness Malcic, T.11329. 
775 Testimony of Witness Starčević, T.6865-6866. 
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which 4,121 were VRS members.776 On 10 November 1993, the FRY President Lilić issued an 
order, based on conclusions reached by the SDC, which led to the establishment of the 30th PC, 
and authorised the continuation of the payment of salaries to persons serving in the VRS.777 
Specifically, Lilić’s order sets out that “individuals shall retain all rights pertaining to their rank 
and qualification and retain the salary they had in the post before the current assignment, or they 
shall receive the salary envisaged for the new post, whichever is more favourable to the 
individual.”778 
 
While Perišić could make proposals to the SDC, the power to suspend and reinstate payments 
was one that was within the exclusive purview of the SDC. The SDC’s sole authority to initiate, 
suspend, and reinstate payments was illustrated by the first suspension of the payment of salaries 
in 1993. On 2 June 1993, the SDC on its 9th Session decided to stop payments from the military 
budget to personnel serving in the VRS, as a result of the RS leadership’s refusal to accept the 
Vance-Stoltenberg plan.779 A conclusion was adopted that the VJ CGS, General Panić (Perišić’s 
predecessor) should issue an order invalidating the decision under which the status of those 
persons was regulated at the time.780 Panić did as directed by the SDC.781 On 23 August 1993, 
the SDC decided to reinstate the payment of salaries to individuals serving in VRS after 
reviewing a proposal of General Panić.782 During Perišić’s tenure as the Chief of General Staff of 
the VJ, a similar situation arose in 1994 when SDC decided to stop all salaries and payments to 
the VRS due to a political leadership difference of opinion between the FRY leadership and the 
RS leadership. The FRY leadership endorsed the Contact Group Plan, while the RS leadership 
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rejected it.783 Salaries were eventually reinstated after five months, and while Perišić advocated 
for the reinstatement of payments due to the hardship endured by the families of those officers 
affected,784 the decision ultimately rested with the SDC.785  
6.2.2.6. Federal Control over the Defence Budget and the Salaries 
Included in the salary components of the military budget were funds sufficient to pay the salaries 
of those persons who were administered through the 30th PC. These were paid through the 
accounting centre of the MoD, as approved in the federal budget.786 The General Staff identified 
the number of officers to be paid by category and calculated a total sum required to pay all 
officers and servicemen in the VJ. The ‘final calculation of the final sum’ was done by the 
Ministry of Defence.787 The federal government was responsible for determining the rate of the 
salaries of military personnel and civilians serving in the army.788 From 1993 onwards, salaries 
made up 60-65% of the total defence budget.789 
The trial record established that salaries were not paid by the VJ. Prior to 1992, in the SFRY, the 
JNA was a sector of the Secretariat for National Defence (SSNO) and the federal Ministry for 
National Defence was superior to the General Staff of the JNA.790 During the SFRY, the 
accounting centre was under the SSNO. They would issue the allocated salaries for the JNA, the 
Territorial Defence (TO) and for retired military personnel. 791 From 1992 onwards the 
organizational structures of the VJ and the Federal Ministry of Defence (MOD) were separated. 
With these changes came a separation between command and administrative functions, and the 
MOD retained control over planning the budget and financing of the VJ.792 The Minister for 
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Defence was responsible for the execution of the defence budget and decided on the resources to 
be allocated to the VJ.793  
It was within the competencies of the MOD to deal with status-related issues of the military 
personnel.794795 The MOD administration for System and Status Issues was responsible for 
regulations governing salaries, and other remuneration in the army, in accordance with the Law 
on the VJ. This administration would complete the preparatory work for the regulations and the 
federal government would pass regulations as to the amount of salaries to be paid out, the salary 
scales, the titles of various allowances, and all other manner of remuneration paid in the army. 
The Minister for Defence was also entitled to issue more detailed rules governing allowances, 
reimbursements of expenses and other income in the army.796 The Finance and Budget 
administration of the MOD was responsible for drafting and implementing the defence budget, 
which was supposed to meet the needs of the ministry as a federal organ and the needs of the 
VJ.797  
With the formation of the MOD as a separate organ of the federal government, the MOD Finance 
and Budget Administration formed an accounting centre which took over the responsibilities of 
the JNA accounting centre.798 The accounting centre was an independent administration directly 
responsible to the MOD, and controlled by the Finance and Budget Administration.799 This 
centre collected all the data on all professional members of the army, calculated the salaries 
according to specific regulations, and issued those salaries. The final calculation of salaries at the 
MOD accounting centre was done by the material, financial and market inspection, a 
professional organ that oversaw the entire financial and material operations of all organizational 
units of the MOD and the VJ. 800 The processing and payment of salaries was done by the MOD 
accounting centre alone.801 
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Under the Law on Finances of FRY, the Chief of General Staff of the VJ is not entitled to 
manage federal assets; rather he is entitled only to dispense the assets conferred to him by the 
Minister of Defence.802 Article 337 and Article 87 of the FRY Law on Finances demonstrate that 
the Chief of the General Staff is not involved in either the budget allocations, which are the 
responsibility of the MOD, or the salary determinations, which are the responsibility of the 
federal government.  
FRY MOD control over salaries is further corroborated by a number of pronouncements made at 
SDC sessions. The conclusions adopted at the 25th SDC Session held on 30 August 1994 state:  
In order to maintain the requisite level of combat readiness of the Army of Yugoslavia, it is essential 
within the limitations of the funds approved by the federal budget, to secure a more regular and steady 
flow on funds for the army and an additional 35.5 million dinars. The salaries of members of the 
Yugoslav Army shall be regularly harmonized with those in other sectors of the society. […] The 
federal ministry of defence shall regularly inform the Supreme Defence Council at its sessions about 
the implementation of this task.803 
It is clear that the FRY MOD was responsible for providing money for the salaries.804 The 
following conclusion adopted at the 36th SDC Session held on 7 June 1995 clearly shows that the 
FRY government was the only authorized body to secure the necessary funds for the payment of 
salaries of the VJ:805 
"Secure a regular inflow of funds. The Federal Government shall take care of this matter not later than 
in the course of next week. As a part of this, secure funds for the payment of salaries to members of 
the Army of Yugoslavia."806  
6.2.2.7. Payment of Salaries does not Equate to Control 
The Prosecution contended that personnel administered through the 30th PC was subordinated to 
Perišić. Based on the evidence presented in trial, the Trial Chamber concluded that the members 
of the 30th PC remained de jure members of the VJ while serving in the VRS as they retained all 
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the rights of the VJ personnel, specifically salaries, pensions, verification of promotion in the 
service, compensation for unused annual leave, and other benefits.807  
According to the Trial Chamber the payment of some VRS officers by the FRY, both legally and 
factually, did not equate to subordination of those officers to Perišić, or the VJ. The Prosecution 
failed to prove that the payment of salaries (as well as the provision of any other status-related 
rights) translated into an actual ability on the part of Perišić nor FRY to effectively control, or 
even influence, the conduct and behaviour of members of the VRS receiving such compensation 
from the FRY. Instead, the evidence indicated that their salary was of little or no significance to 
them, such that even during periods of non-payment of salaries, the activities of the VRS were 
not affected. This is further corroborated by statements made by General Manojlo Milovanović, 
Chief of the Main Staff of the VRS, at the 50th Session of the RS National Assembly in April 
1995.  
We did not regard these salaries as charity, nor did we accept them….in order to serve them. We 
received them following an agreement which the RS Presidency made with the Presidency of 
Yugoslavia. We never accused you or rather the state, why don't you pay us. We know that with your 
signatures you made sure that we should be paid by Yugoslavia. When they introduced the sanctions, I 
personally issued the warning, I do not remember what were the circumstances causing me to be the 
one to say – gentlemen they are going to abolish our salaries…This is what happened, for six months 
we lived without salaries. We did not desert as many people were hoping we would, we stayed behind 
and we would have stayed even if they never paid back what they did, and even that was short of the 
fighting allowance, short of all those things which go with a salary, but we are satisfied with how 
much we get, and we must be satisfied.808 
Thus, the evidence did not establish that that the provision of salaries translated into an actual 
ability to exercise authority over the VRS officers. The totality of the evidence shows no 
indication that provision of salaries had any effect to influence the behaviour of members of the 
VRS; it neither changed their perceptions of belonging to that army nor their allegiance to that 
army. The suggestion that these activities enabled Perišić to exert any authority or degree of 
control over them, as to make him a superior, resulted as unfounded. Rather, the trial record 
establishes that the members of the PC were re-subordinated to the VRS and therefore, acted 
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solely within its chain of command. The fact that their salaries, as well as other benefits, were 
still paid by the VJ remains fully compatible with this notion of re-subordination. Consequently, 
once the PC members were re-subordinated to the VRS, Perišić could no longer exercise control 
over them.  
 
6.2.3. Perišić’s Role in the Logistical Assistance Process  
When the provider of assistance is a collective entity, the assessment of individual 
blameworthiness must also look to the significance of the individual accused’s role within the 
organizational effort. Indeed, Perišić was the most senior military official of the FRY who played 
instrumental role in the policies at issue. The Indictment alleged that Perišić aided and abetted 
crimes by providing substantial military assistance to the VRS which he knew was used in 
significant part in the commission of crimes. The assistance claimed to have been provided 
continued the practice of supplying large quantities of weapons, ammunition and other logistical 
materials necessary for the commission of the crimes.809 The issue the Trial Chamber had to 
decide was not whether the VJ, pursuant to orders of the SDC, gave assistance to the VRS. It did 
and Perišić admitted so. Rather, the Trial Chamber had to decide whether Perišić in his position 
as CGS of the VJ aided and abetted the crimes charged.  
Perišić acknowledged that, as the Chief of the General Staff in the VJ, he provided assistance to 
the VRS pursuant to the SDC’s orders.810 The Appeals Chamber’s review of evidence 
demonstrated that, pursuant to the overall policy of the FRY, as expressed in decisions of the 
SDC, Perišić administered and facilitated the provision of large-scale military assistance to the 
VRS.811 
6.2.3.1. Logistical and Technical Assistance to the VRS 
The Prosecution alleged that the VJ provided considerable quantities of weaponry and military 
equipment, as well as training and technical assistance, to the VRS, which heavily depended on 
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this aid because of its limited reserves and resources.812 It posited that the VRS did not have to 
pay for the material it received from the VJ.813  
Perišić recognized that he and the VJ gave assistance to the VRS pursuant to the SDC’s orders. 
An official procurement procedure was devised pursuant to the agreement between the VRS 
Main Staff and the VJ General Staff. However, the review of the trial record attests that number 
of supplies were delivered by the VJ members to the VRS outside of the official procurement 
procedure devised by Perišić. In December 1993 Perišić ordered that all requests for logistical 
assistance be processed through the VJ General Staff with his approval814 and decided to institute 
disciplinary proceedings against VJ commanders who gave military supplies directly to the VRS 
without authorisation.815 Mladić ordered all VRS units to involve the VRS Main Staff in the 
official procurement of material from the VJ816 and stressed that violators would face 
disciplinary action.817 
The Trial Chamber concluded that a comprehensive logistical assistance system was in place and 
that the FRY-RS border was porous, thereby enabling logistical assistance to be regularly 
delivered without difficulty.818 The flow of military supplies from the VJ to the VRS continued 
after August 1994, notwithstanding the FRY’s decision to officially seal its border with RS 
except for medical equipment or other humanitarian supplies, as part of its sanctions on RS for 
having refused to accept a proposed peace plan.819 The FRY’s nominal prohibition on the 
delivery of military materiel to the VRS essentially lasted until the end of the armed conflict in 
BiH.820 
According to Michael Williams, who served as Director of Information for UNPROFOR form 
February 1994 until April 1995 and saw all classified reports in the UN’s possession, the overall 
military capabilities of the VRS increased in 1994 and 1995 due to FRY assistance.821 The Trial 
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Chamber was satisfied to conclude that even though the VRS’s situation was partly worsened by 
the FRY’s economic blockade on RS in 1994, the VJ largely maintained its regular delivery of 
military supplies to the VRS. In January 1995, the VRS Main Staff reported that “a great number 
of commands, units and certain numbers of the VJ have selflessly been offering us humanitarian 
aid and services which are extremely important for RS defence”.822  
The trial record further established that the VRS received ammunition from the VJ and the FRY 
special purpose industries. No evidence established that the VRS received ammunition from any 
other country than the FRY.823 To the extend that the FRY provided assistance to the VRS 
independent of the VJ,824 clearly such assistance cannot be considered in determining Perišić’s 
individual criminal responsibility. Additionally, while Perišić has acknowledged that the VJ 
provided assistance to the VRS,825 such assistance should not be considered tantamount to 
Perišić’s individual criminal responsibility merely because he was the Chief of the General Staff 
in the VJ.  
The Trial Chamber held that Perišić exercised his authority to provide a substantial amount of 
the weapons, ammunition and logistical support used by the VRS, which was used, in part, to 
perpetrate the crimes committed. 
6.2.3.2. Final Decisions on Logistical Assistance Taken by the SDC 
While the Trial Chamber recognized that the ultimate authority over the FRY defence policy 
rested with the SDC826 and that the decision to provide VJ assistance to the VRS had been 
adopted by the SDC before Perišić was appointed Chief of the VJ General Staff,827 and the SDC 
continued to support the policy of assistance during Perišić’s tenure,828 it still held Perišić liable 
for the continuing provision of military aid to the VRS.  
Logistical assistance to the VRS was regularly discussed and agreed upon at FRY SDC 
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meetings. While the SDC meetings were attended by many individuals, including Perišić, final 
decisions were taken by political leaders: Slobodan Milošević, President of Serbia, Zoran Lilić, 
President of the FRY, and Momir Bulatović, President of Montenegro.829 On 11 October 1993, 
Perišić briefed the SDC about the situation and acknowledged that the VJ’s aid to the VRS was 
affecting the VJ’s resources: 
“Our reserves of wartime material which we are now spending […] are bringing us into a situation 
where our combat capacities are declining, and we can’t even help these two republics [RS and RSK]. 
[…] Each day we are using up our reserves but we are not getting a normal inflow of funds; and, 
secondly we are helping the armies of the republics [RS and RSK].”830 
Yet, Perišić never suggested that the VJ discontinue its assistance to the VRS despite the 
problems with the VJ’s funding and resources.831 Rather, the SDC adopted measures to resolve 
problems concerning financing and securing funds for the transformation and financing of the 
VJ832 thus enabling the continuing flow of aid. On 10 January 1994, the SDC convened to 
discuss the VJ’s funding. Perišić cautioned the SDC that the financing of [RS] had not been 
taken into account at all.833 He noted: 
“If the war there were to continue, we know that they need to be given certain assistance, beginning 
with weapons and ordnance and all other materiel”.834 522 million dollars and 307 million dollars 
were respectively required for the needs of the VRSD and SVK. He pled: “We cannot abandon Ratko 
[Mladić] and others – they are asking for extremely expensive ammunition they use to fire on land 
targets. Why? Because it is very effective […]”835 
6.2.3.3. SDC Granted Perišić Authority Over the Logistical Assistance Process 
The Trial Chamber found that the evidence conclusively established that the SDC granted Perišić 
authority over the logistical assistance process.  
On February 1994, at the 18th Session of the SDC, Perišić warned the SDC that the FRY Law on 
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Property does not give the Chief of General Staff any right to misappropriate any resource, 
especially in terms of assistance to the RS. Perišić noted that the assistance should now go 
through the Ministry of Defence and the FRY Government.836 Perišić told the SDC that it should 
either give him the authority to give logistical assistance to the VRS or allow the FRY Law on 
Property to regulate the logistical assistance process.837 Perišić advised the SDC to give him that 
authority because “if the two Krajinas are not defended, we will be significantly jeopardised. 
And they certainly can’t be defended without our assistance in weapons and military 
equipment”.838 
Eleven days later, Zoran Lilić, President of the FRY issued an order, directing that “in 
accordance with a decisions of the Supreme Defence Council”, the VJ “shall supply the 30th PC 
[...] with weapons and military equipment”,839 whereby Lilić ordered that “[t]he Chief of General 
Staff of the VJ is hereby authorized to reconcile the requests of the 30th […] PC with the means 
of the VJ and specifically regulate the method and procedures for providing the supplies”.840 The 
trial record contains Defence witness Starčević’s testimony, confirming that the SDC ordered 
Perišić to provide logistical assistance to the VRS within the limits of the VJ’s available 
resources.841 
6.2.3.4. Perišić Advocated for the Continued Provision of Logistical 
Assistance to the VRS 
On 16 March 1994, the SDC again discussed the provision of weapons and military equipment to 
the VRS.842 On 7 June 1994, Perišić personally advised the SDC that logistical assistance to the 
VRS was necessary and must continue: 
“If we stop helping them in the area of education, financing or educated personnel and material 
assistance for certain combat operations, they’ll start losing territories. […] This means we have to 
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help them somehow; and we can’t leave them to their own devices”.843  
At the 19th session of the SDC held on 16 March 1994, Perišić recommended the SDC to 
approve the grant of ammunition and spare parts to the VRS.844 On 11 July 1994, Perišić and 
FRY Defence Minister Pavle Bulatović presented to the SDC the reasons for the materiel 
requests and personnel-related proposals of RS,845 whereupon the SDC decided that the delivery 
of weapons and military equipment to be used by RS shall only be conducted through the FRY 
Ministry of Defence and the VJ General Staff.846 
On 21 July 1994, Perišić equally told the SDC that it was necessary to consider “how much 
longer we can extend assistance to the VRS”.847 General Blagoje Kovačević, the Deputy Chief of 
the VJ General Staff, noted that, the VJ’s reserves were partially depleted “by giving large 
quantities of weapons, ammunitions, and explosives – 3,640 tonnes” to the VRS848. Perišić later 
specified that the VJ’s stock of infantry rifle ammunition remained at 110 % but that its stock of 
60mm and 82mm infantry shells was down to 37 %.849 Perišić did not propose discontinuing 
military assistance to the VRS and SVK, instead urging the SDC to increase the VJ’s budget:  
“It is not possible to send supplies across the Drina river out of these reserves. But that leads to the 
conclusion that a budget of additional funds for this purpose should be considered”.850  
Slobodan Milošević and Zoran Lilić agreed with Perišić that the VJ’s budget should be raised 
accordingly, and the SDC went on to reach that conclusion.851 On the SDC meeting six months 
later on 24 January 1995 Milošević observed: “We are exhausted and have no reserves”, and 
stressed the need to end the war soon by reaching a peace agreement with favourable terms.852 
Notably, Perišić urged the SDC to continue assisting the VRS in the meantime:  
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“Our backbone over there is the army and we have to give them their mainstay and support”.853 
On 7 June 1995, Perišić again encouraged the SDC to keep on authorising the VJ’s assistance to 
the VRS:  
“Allow us, as has been the case so far, to offer certain help to the [RS], primarily with spare parts and 
whatever we can give that will not have an impact on FRY’s combat readiness”.854 
On 29 July 1995, pursuant to another briefing by Perišić, the SDC decided to “[c]ontinue to 
extend certain assistance to the Army of [RS] within limits that do not jeopardise the combat 
readiness of the [VJ]”.855 The SDC agreed that it was “immediately” necessary to “continue 
extending material and expert assistance to the VRS to the extent of VJ abilities”. The SDC also 
decided that it was necessary to “emphasise [in the mass media] the legitimate right of the FRY, 
as their mother-State, to help the survival of the Serbian people west of the Drina”.856  
In sum, all the SDC records conclusively demonstrate that the SDC licensed military assistance 
to the VRS, and that it granted to Perišić and the VJ General Staff the authority to administer the 
provision of this assistance. Perišić also opted to refer certain requests to the SDC.  
The Trial Chamber found that Perišić, as the Chief of the VJ General Staff, oversaw the 
administration of logistical assistance for the military needs of the VRS. Moreover, Perišić 
convinced the SDC to give him the legal authority to do so in an effect to comply with the FRY 
Law on Property.857 The Trial Chamber found that Perišić’s role went beyond administering the 
logistical assistance process. Perišić participated in the SDC’s deliberations on logistical 
assistance to the VRS, and recurrently encouraged the SDC to maintain this assistance, thereby 
helping craft the FRY’s policy to aid the other army, the VRS. 
According to the Trial Chamber’s conclusions, Perišić’s role in coordinating the logistic process, 
his statements before the SDC, and his approval of extensive assistance to the VRS demonstrate 
that he intended on assisting the VRS. Perišić’s remarks before the VJ Collegium at the end of 
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the armed conflict are equally instructive:  
“I would have retained all material reserves here [in the VJ] to the maximum, to give as little as 
possible material reserves away […]. We gave all we had always and I am not sorry for that, as we 
defended the people as much as we could”.858 
6.3. Military Aid Provided for Furtherance of Specific Criminal Activities 
In general, decisions regarding the distribution of military support are quite particularized, 
involving judgments regarding the specific goals to be served by providing particular support to 
particular recipients. In cases where the provider knows that the recipient plans to use the 
assistance to commit international crimes, perhaps it makes sense to hold the provider to a more 
demanding standard of responsibility. However, viewing the issues in this way fails to capture 
what makes the “foreign assistance cases” so difficult. The central problem remains that in some 
situations the pursuit of legitimate and desirable goals demands the provision of assistance that 
will unavoidably contribute in some way to crime. Considerations of these cases requires a moral 
judgment that is not reducible to the simple assessment of whether or not the conduct in question 
consists of acts of practical assistance which have a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime.  
According to the Trial Chamber’s conclusions, Perišić’s role in coordinating the logistic process 
demonstrate that he intended to assist the VRS and supported the continuation of the SDC policy 
of assisting the VRS.859 Such was not contested by Perišić during the trial. During the SDC 
meetings, Perišić argued both for sustaining the aid to the VRS and for adopting related legal and 
financial measures that facilitated such aid.860 However, the Trial Chamber did not identify 
evidence demonstrating that Perišić urged the provision of VJ assistance to the VRS in 
furtherance of specific criminal activities. Rather, according to the Appeals Chamber, the Trial 
Chamber’s analysis of Perišić’s role in the SDC deliberations indicates that Perišić, while 
recurrently encouraging the SDC to maintain this assistance and thereby helping craft the FRY’s 
policy to aid the other army, nevertheless merely supported the continuation of assistance to the 
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VRS general war effort.861 As the above presentations before the SDC illustrate, Perišić 
advocated for the continuation of the provision of assistance to the VRS in order to “defend 
people over there”, “for certain [VRS] combat operations”, [or else] they’ll start losing 
territories”, for their defence since “if the two Krajinas are not defended, we [the FRY] will be 
significantly jeopardised”862 and “in order for the Serbian people to successfully defend itself 
and survive on its territory”863. 
6.3.1. Perišić Merely Implemented the FRY State policy Adopted Prior to his Tenure 
Perišić admitted that the VJ, pursuant to orders of the SDC, provided assistance to the VRS.864 It 
is suggested that while advocating for the continuation of the provision of assistance to the VRS, 
Perišić merely continued the same line of state policy on assisting the VRS as had been in place 
prior to his tenure. The Appeals Chamber recognized that by providing large-scale military 
assistance, including equipment, logistics and training, to the VRS, the VJ had put into effect the 
policy of the SDC of the FRY.865 
Review of the Perišić trial record reveals that the FRY and the VJ had been providing military 
and other type of aid to the VRS/RS prior to the appointment of Perišić as the head of the VJ.866 
Pursuant to the FRY Constitutions and Law on the Army, only the SDC had the authority to 
adopt decisions on the provision of aid and assistance to the VRS/RS. Perišić advocated for the 
continuation of the provision of aid to the VRS/RS and called for regulation of the provision of 
logistics to the VRS and regulation of status of the officers sent to the VRS. Moreover, Perišić 
implemented SDC decisions on the provision of assistance to the VRS and advocated that 
military assistance be provided solely pursuant to the SDC decisions and in accordance with the 
FRY legislation. The trial record did not establish that Perišić provided aid to the VRS outside of 
the established channels.867  
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In its analysis of the objective element of aiding and abetting, it considered Perišić’s role in 
shaping and implementing FRY’s policy of supporting the VRS and whether the FRY policy was 
specifically directed towards the commission of crimes by the VRS.868 While the Appeals 
Chamber recognized that the parameters of its inquiry were limited and focused solely on factors 
related to Perišić’s individual criminal responsibility, and not the potential responsibility of 
States over which the Tribunal has no pertinent jurisdiction,869 it was the state policy that was in 
the centre of its analysis. Particularly, the Appeals Chamber inquired whether the SDC endorsed 
a policy of assisting VRS crimes, suggesting that the VJ assistance was specifically directed 
towards the VRS crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. Furthermore, the assessment of actus reus 
by both the Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber focused on evidence indicating SDC 
approval of measures to secure financing for the VJ’s assistance to the VRS and to increase the 
effectiveness of this assistance by systematising the secondment of VJ personnel and the transfer 
of equipment and supplies.870 
 
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber’s analysis of individual criminal responsibility consisted of 
an inquiry over the state policy, i.e. the policy undertaken by the FRY SDC, particularly, whether 
the SDC had endorsed a policy of assisting VRS crimes.871 By finding that no basis existed for 
concluding that the highest State defence body pursued the policy of specifically directing aid 
towards VRS crimes,872 the Appeals Chamber reached a conclusion that Perišić’s provision of 
military and other type of aid could not quality as actus reus of aiding and abetting crimes 
committed by VRS in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. While the Appeals Chamber considered Perišić’s 
role in SDC deliberations, the nature of the assistance Perišić provided to the VRS, and the 
manner in which this aid was distributed, it is evident that the crux of its analysis of the objective 
element of aiding and abetting liability significantly depended on examination of the state policy 
on assisting the neighbouring army. 
6.3.2. Provision of Logistical Support Constituted a State Secret 
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The trial record demonstrated that the VJ General Staff continued to covertly deliver significant 
quantities of weaponry to the VRS throughout the sanctions period, although this assistance was 
a FRY “state secret”.873  
Overall, the FRY SDC continued to agree on logistical assistance to the VRS during the 
sanctions period,874 and Perišić himself urged the SDC to keep on authorizing the assistance.875 
On 25 August 1995 a meeting of the FRY and RS leadership was convened, bringing together, 
FRY and RS military and political leadership,876 whereby President Milošević indicated that the 
Drina river blockade was merely a formality and that the aid flew daily.877  
The logistical assistance system was not transparent. Namely, Slobodan Milošević admitted that 
logistical assistance “was not made public because it was a state secret, as was everything else 
that was provided for the VRS.878 The SDC’s decisions on the matter were classified as “military 
secret”, “strictly confidential” or both.879 Partly the reason behind this state secrecy lay in 
political reality where FRY’s support to the VRS was exposed to constant condemnation by the 
international community. The UN Security Council issued multiple resolutions urging a cease-
fire and a halt of all hostilities.880 It demanded that the FRY cease its involvement in the military 
conflict in Bosnia,881 condemned the FRY’s failure to do so and subjected it to sanctions.882 The 
UNSC further called upon the FRY to maintain the effective closure of the border with BiH in 
respect of all goods with exception to food, medical supplies and clothing for essential 
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humanitarian needs.883 In addition, as early as spring 1992, the UNSC discussed the sniping and 
shelling of Sarajevo civilians on a nearly daily basis884 and strongly condemned these actions.885 
FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs precluded any export of military goods to RS in due 
compliance with UN Security Council resolutions.886 The Trial Chamber found it was presented 
with extensive evidence documenting the role of the VJ General Staff, Ministry of Defence and 
other FRY authorities in supplying significant amount of weaponry to the VRS regardless of UN 
Security Council resolutions.887 
The evidence at trial unequivocally showed that Perišić sought to provide assistance to the VRS 
and SVK regardless of the UN Security Council resolutions. Perišić specifically addressed the 
matter when he met with a delegation of leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The record of 
the meeting indicates that the delegation asked Perišić about the conflict in Bosnia. In his 
responses, General Perišić said that despite the unfair sanctions imposed by the international 
community the FRY has been assisting RS in every respect (humanitarian, military, etc.) in order 
for the Serbian people to successfully defend itself [sic] and survive on its [sic] territory”.888 
“Perišić promised to do everything in his power to continue helping the Serbian people”.889 
The FRY’s provision of logistical assistance to the VRS and SVK was widely known despite its 
official state secrecy. UNPROFOR officials were aware that the VRS received significant 
military support from the FRY.890 General Branko Gajić, a senior VJ official and Defence 
witness, himself acknowledged that the FRY sent large quantities of military aid to RS and 
RSK,891 stating that the military assistance was a matter of “common knowledge [as] the public 
was aware of it, there were articles in the press about it, and as far as I can remember I think it 
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was discussed by the delegates in parliament it was well known even to military and political 
representatives accredited in Belgrade”.892 
In 2001 Slobodan Milošević admitted that the FRY had secretly provided significant military 
assistance to the VRS during the armed conflict in BiH.893 Milošević insisted that the State funds 
were used “for the survival of the country during a total embargo and war across the Drina river, 
in which we helped our people with all the resources we had at our disposal”.894 Milošević 
specifically mentioned the FRY’s logistical assistance to the VRS: 
These expenditures constituted a state secret and because of state interests could not be indicated in 
the Law of the Budget, which is a public document. The same applies to the expenditures incurred by 
providing equipment, from a needle to an anchor, for the security forces and special anti-terrorist 
forces in particular, from light weapons and equipment to helicopters and other weapons which still 
remain where they are today, and this was not made public because it was a state secret, as was 
everything else that was provided for the Army of Republika Srpska.895 
6.4. Substantial Effect Applied in Perišić  
6.4.1. The Lack of Nexus Between the Acts of the Accused and the Crimes Committed  
This section will examine the Perišić Trial Chamber’s generalised approach to substantial effect 
requirement and its reliance on the VRS’s dependence on the VJ. Throughout the Indictment and 
the trial, the Prosecution repeatedly applied “substantial” when discussing aiding and abetting. 
For example, the Prosecution alleged that Perišić exercised his authority to “provide a substantial 
amount of the weapons, ammunition and logistical support used by the VRS, which was used, in 
part, to perpetrate the crimes committed during the siege of Sarajevo.”896 A similar formulation 
is found with regard to Srebrenica.897 It is argued that the actus reus of aiding and abetting does 
not require a substantial amount of assistance, but that the assistance provided has a substantial 
effect on the perpetration of a crime. 
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The Trial Chamber held that “Perišić’s actions substantially facilitated the commission of these 
crimes because the VRS heavily depended on the VJ’s support to function as an army and 
conduct its operations, including besieging Sarajevo and taking over Srebrenica.”898 The Trial 
Chamber conceded that “the evidence does not establish that the specific weapons used in 
committing the charged crimes stemmed from the logistical assistance process overseen by 
Perišić.”899 However, the Majority, relying on the proposition that the acts of the aider and 
abettor need not be “specifically directed” to assist the crimes, found that Perišić’s support of the 
VRS served as a basis for his individual criminal responsibility under aiding and abetting.900 
It is argued that the Trial Chamber improperly rejected the need for applying the “specific 
direction” standard in analysing this case. The assistance given was neutral on its face in terms of 
whether it contributed to criminal or non-criminal military action. Moreover, the Trial Chamber 
failed to articulate how any assistance by Perišić contributed to the charged crimes, except in the 
most generalised of senses. In doing so, the Trial Chamber lowered the threshold for aiding and 
abetting to such an extent that criminal responsibility was imposed on Perišić not because his 
involvement in the crimes committed by the VRS was proved but because he provided, as a 
general matter logistical and personnel assistance to the war waged by the VRS, a war which was 
not criminal of itself.901  
In his dissent, Presiding Judge Moloto emphasized that Perišić was not charged with waging a 
war or participating in a JCE and accordingly stated: 
He is charged with aiding and abetting the crimes that were committed during the war and not 
for the war itself; therefore his conduct must be judged in relation to the commission of those 
crimes and not in relation to the waging of war or the dependence of the VRS as an army on 
the VJ. 902  
The point is crucial. Perišić’s conduct should have been judged in relation to the commission of 
the charged crimes, which requires proof that Perišić’s individual acts had a substantial effect on 
such crimes, not on the VRS’s war effort in general. The Trial Chamber agreed that “Perišić is 
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not charged with helping the VRS wage war per se, which is not a crime under the [ICTY] 
Statute.”903 However, it subsequently relied on the view that Perišić’s responsibility stemmed 
from the “dependence of the VRS as an army on the VJ” as the primary basis to find Perišić 
individually criminal responsible of aiding and abetting. 
The Trial Chamber repeatedly and erroneously cited Perišić’s role in responding to the 
dependence of and fulfilling the military needs of the VRS as proof of guilt, stating: 
The foregoing evidence conclusively demonstrates that Momčilo Perišić, as Chief of the VJ 
General Staff, oversaw the administration of logistical assistance for the military needs of the 
VRS […]. That being noted, the Trial Chamber considers that the question of greater 
relevance is [...] the actual role that Perišić played in the logistical assistance process.904  
Providing support to the VRS as a matter of policy does not give rise to individual criminal 
responsibility under the theory of aiding and abetting. Whether the VRS as an army received 
substantial assistance from the VJ cannot be the focus of the inquiry. If such were the case then 
the inquiry could end with the mere proof of the waging of war, dependence of the VRS on the 
VJ, and the commission of crimes during the armed conflict. Nonetheless, the Trial Chamber 
focused on this precise issue, reasoning for example: 
In assessing whether the VRS received substantial assistance from the VJ, it is necessary to 
consider the extent to which the VRS relied on logistics from separate sources.905 
Continuing in the same vein, the Trial Chamber stated:  
Furthermore, numerous exhibits indicate that the VRS heavily depended on supplies from the 
VJ, thereby demonstrating that the VRS’s reserves were insufficient.906 
“Dependence”, as pointed out by Judge Justice Moloto’s Dissenting Opinion, is the incorrect 
inquiry as it entirely fails to relate Perišić’s conduct to the commission of the crimes for which 
he is charged. The Trial Chamber improperly places emphasis on conduct which is neutral on its 
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face in terms of whether it contributed to criminal conduct or to non-criminal military action to 
establish that Perišić aided and abetted crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. 
In its conclusion regarding Logistical and Technical Assistance to the VRS,907 the Trial 
Chamber, rejecting the Defence assertion that the evidence produced was insufficient to 
determine the extent of assistance received by the VRS from the VJ, stated:  
The trial record, however, demonstrates that the logistical assistance that the VRS received 
from the VJ with Perišić’s approval was very important in comparison to other sources. In 
fact, the record clearly shows that the VRS depended on the VJ’s assistance regardless of its 
other sources of supply.908  
The Trial Chamber similarly found that:  
Momčilo Perišić, as Chief of VJ General Staff, oversaw a system providing comprehensive 
military assistance to the VRS, and participated in the SDC’s decision to license this aid. The 
VJ General Staff directly supplied considerable quantities of weaponry comprising a very 
large part of the VRS’s munition requirements.909  
The Trial Chamber concluded that:  
The VRS’s general state of dependence on VJ support was acknowledged by Perišić himself, 
as well as Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić.910   
In sum, it is clear that the Trial Chamber impermissibly relied upon “the general dependence of 
the VRS on the VJ”, as the cornerstone for finding Perišić individually responsible for aiding and 
abetting. As will be shown in Part III, such a general dependence test proposed by the Perišić 
Trial Chamber for determination of individual complicity results to be strikingly similar to a 
complete dependence test for attribution of acts of non-state actor to a State under the state 
responsibility regime.911  
6.4.2. The Effect of Reliance on the VRS’s Dependence on the VJ – Strict Liability 
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It is argued that for imposition of Perišić’s individual criminal responsibility the relevant 
question was not whether the VRS substantially depended upon the VJ’s support to function as 
an army, but rather, whether military support provided by Perišić had a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of crimes. Dependence of one army on a foreign army alone does not automatically 
lead to the only reasonable conclusion that such assistance was specifically directed at providing 
those officers in those units, being the principal perpetrators of the crimes, with practical support 
which had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crimes.912  
Perišić provided logistical assistance to the VRS and the commanders in the VRS gave arms and 
ammunition to their soldiers and sent them to the theatre of war. The military aid provided by the 
FRY/VJ to the VRS was distributed by the VRS itself to its subordinate units. This step, 
according to Judge Moloto's view is a novus actus interviniens that places Perišić in a remote 
position in relation to the crimes.913 While it is not necessary to establish that the logistical 
assistance provided by Perišić served as a conditio sine qua non to the commission of crimes, the 
presence of these intervening factors breaking the chain of events raises a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the logistical assistance provided by Perišić, in fact, had a substantial effect on the 
crimes committed in Srebrenica and Sarajevo. According to Moloto, the intervening factors 
present in the examined case supported an alternative inference which interrupts the natural flow 
of consequences from the provision of logistical assistance provided by Perišić to the VRS.914 It 
appears, therefore, that in cases of remoteness between the accused aider and abettor and the 
physical commission of crimes, Judge Moloto's characterisation of specific direction is a 
requirement that there be a clear chain of causation between the provision of assistance and the 
perpetration of the crimes. 
If the notion of direction is implicit in finding substantial assistance, a linkage between the 
accomplice’s acts and the crimes must exist and needs to be proved. According to Judge Moloto 
and based on the evidence in the Perišić case, there was no clear connection between the 
assistance provided and the commission of crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica. While it is clear 
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that Perišić supported the conflict as a whole, no evidence suggested that such assistance 
supported the commission of the crimes committed in Sarajevo and Srebrenica.915 
Ad hoc tribunals should not create a strict liability standard whereby any crime committed by any 
soldier would entail responsibility by top military officials due to provision of military support. 
While the Perišić Trial Chamber followed established jurisprudence by requiring proof that the 
defendant provided substantial assistance to the principal perpetrators despite knowing of their 
crimes, it overlooked was that not any assistance suffices; it is only the assistance that 
substantially contributes to the commission of the crime(s). That was the missing link in the 
Perišić Trial Judgment. The aid must have been influential; namely, the aid had to be provided 
for the commission of crimes, not for other (any) purposes.  
In analysing the effect the assistance had on the crimes committed by the VRS, the Majority 
found that the VRS’s material reserves were significantly depleted as the armed conflict 
progressed.916 The Majority further found that:  
The highest authorities in the VRS were clearly aware that their war depended on the 
assistance from the VJ. Karadžić admitted that “nothing would happen without Serbia. We do 
not have those resources and we would not be able to fight”.  Mladić too reckoned that “we 
would not be able to live” if the FRY suspended its assistance.917 
Again, the consistent thread in the Trial Chamber’s analysis focuses on the issue of dependence; 
indeed its findings are replete with references to the dependence of the VRS, e.g.:  
In conclusion, the Majority finds that the VRS depended heavily on FRY and VJ assistance in 
order to function as an army and to wage war. As shown below, this dependence was not 
limited to logistical assistance but also encompassed all other forms of assistance provided by 
the VJ including personnel. The Majority recalls that the crimes charged in the Indictment 
were an integral part of the VRS’s war strategy. Hence, the evidence leads the Majority to the 
only reasonable conclusion that by providing vital logistical and technical assistance to the 
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VRS during the war, including to the specific units that perpetrated the crimes, Perišić 
facilitated the commission of those crimes.918 
The Trial Chamber found that Perišić repeatedly exercised his authority to assist the VRS in 
waging a war that encompassed systematic criminal actions against Bosnian Muslim civilians as 
a military strategy and objective. Accordingly, Perišić’s actions substantially facilitated the 
commission of these crimes because the VRS heavily depended on the VJ’s support to function 
as an army and conduct its operations, including besieging Sarajevo and taking over 
Srebrenica.919 It is argued that whether the VRS was dependent on the VJ for its war effort in 
whole or in part, such dependence does not prove that the assistance provided by Perišić had a 
substantial effect on the commission of crimes. This is particularly true where the Trial Chamber 
found that the Prosecution had failed to prove that certain instrumentalities used in the 
commission of crimes were provided to the VRS by the VJ pursuant to the logistical assistance 
process managed by Perišić. 
6.4.3. The Trial Chamber’s Dependence Analysis Undermined by the Lack of Evidence 
This Section will address the lack of evidence that specific weaponry or logistics used in 
committing the crimes stemmed from the logistical assistance process overseen by Perišić.920 
The Trial Chamber rejected the Prosecution contention that the weaponry recovered from the 
crimes scenes stemmed from the logistical assistance overseen by Perišić, finding that the “trial 
record does not establish that the particular shells used in Sarajevo incidents were provided to the 
VRS pursuant to the logistical assistance process managed by Perišić.”921 Given the varied 
possible explanations for how this weaponry came into the possession of the VRS, this finding 
was correct under the principle of in dubio pro reo.922 
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However, alternative possibilities are improperly ignored in the Trial Chamber’s remaining 
analysis of Perišić’s responsibility for aiding and abetting crimes when similar evidence was not 
produced. The Trial Chamber properly found it could not draw an inference of guilt when 
presented with specific evidence of the instrumentalities or weaponry used. Drawing an 
inference of guilt in the absence of evidence of the specific instrumentalities or weaponry a 
fortiori had to have been based on speculation.   
The Trial Chamber came to the same conclusion, for the same reasons, regarding evidence 
recovered from the Srebrenica area923 that was manufactured by the Prvi Partizan factory in 
Užice, Serbia in 1993 and 1994. It held:  
The Trial Chamber finds that it is impossible to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
these specific bullets were provided to the VRS pursuant to the logistical assistance process 
that Perišić oversaw. Overall, this evidence presents the same problems as the aforementioned 
shells recovered from Sarajevo. The trial record does not establish whether these specific 
bullets were delivered to the VRS pursuant to Perišić’s orders, purchased directly from Prvi 
Partizan or otherwise procured through unauthorised channels.924    
Similarly, the Trial Chamber found that 378 bullet casings out of the 3,644 recovered from the 
Srebrenica killing sites were manufactured by Prvi Partizan (Užice, FRY) in 1993 and that these 
bullets raise the same problems as previously discussed:  
“Again, it is not possible to reasonably conclude that Perišić was involved in the provision of 
these specific bullets”.925  
The Chamber found that there were a number of possible objective scenarios explaining the 
provision of the weaponry in Sarajevo and the Srebrenica bullets, holding that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that Perišić aided and abetted those crimes.926 The ultimate conclusion that 
Perišić’s logistical assistance had a substantial effect on the commission of crimes was made in 
the absence of any evidence as to the origin of the ammunition actually used. It was based on the 
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generalised conclusion that providing logistical assistance to the VRS war effort automatically 
constituted aiding and abetting selected crimes committed by the VRS during the armed conflict.  
While the Majority acknowledged that there was no evidence that specific weaponry or logistics 
used in committing the charged crimes stemmed from the logistical assistance process overseen 
by Perišić,927it excused this absence of proof by relying on its finding that the acts of an aider 
and abettor need not have been “specifically directed” to assist crimes.928  
6.5. Aid Specifically Directed Towards the Commission of Crimes 
6.5.1. Specific Direction in the Perišić Case 
The normative framework adopted in Perišić does not require a purposeful contribution to 
crime.929 It allows conviction for aiding and abetting on the accomplice’s knowing contribution 
to the principal offender.930 However, it protects against over-incriminalization by demanding 
that the accomplice’s actus reus takes the form of assistance that is specifically directed toward 
the offense.931 This Section will focus on the relatively high legal standard for individual 
complicity of a top State official for facilitating atrocities from a remote location, as laid down in 
the appellate decision in Perišić. The novelty of the Perišić case in the context of the application 
of aiding and abetting should be underscored. Never before has a Commander and the Chief of 
Staff of General Staff of one army been criminally responsible as accomplice for the crimes 
committed by members of the armed forces of another State or entity.932 The Perišić case is also 
unique insofar as it is the first clear expression of a direct link between the FRY and the crimes 
committed in Srebrenica and Sarajevo. It is, however, imperative to recall a fundamental 
principle of national and international criminal law – namely that individual criminal 
responsibility is based on personal guilt, not on state responsibility.933 
The Appeals Chamber in Perišić concluded that assistance from one army to another army’s war 
efforts is insufficient in itself to trigger individual criminal responsibility for individual aid 
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providers absent of proof that the relevant assistance was specifically directed towards criminal 
activities.934 Judge Liu, dissenting, was of the opinion that the Appeals Chamber by insisting on 
specific direction had raised the threshold for aiding and abetting, and by doing so risked 
undermining its very purpose, as it was “allowing those responsible for knowingly facilitating 
the most grievous crimes to evade responsibility for their acts”.935  
The focal issue for the Trial Chamber in the Perišić case was not whether logistical assistance 
was provided, but rather whether Perišić’s acts were directed to assist, encourage, or lend moral 
support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime, and which had a substantial effect on the 
perpetration of that crime. The Appeals Chamber found that Perišić had indeed furthered the 
FRY’s policy of supporting the VRS war effort. There is, however, the question of how much the 
accomplice’s acts take the form of assistance tailored to the crime itself rather than generalized 
support. Thus, providing general assistance that could be used for lawful and unlawful activities 
did not by itself suffice to prove that the assistance was specifically directed towards the 
commission of crimes by the VRS perpetrators.936 In particular, the Appeals Chamber deemed 
that no “link” existed between Perišić’s actions and the VRS’s crimes since he had only provided 
general military assistance.937 Given the alleged absence of such a “link”, the Appeals Chamber 
implied that the Trial Chamber had adopted a strict liability standard whereby any assistance 
from one army to another would trigger individual criminal responsibility if the recipient army 
committed crimes.938 Accordingly, the Perišić Appeals Chamber underlined that the element of 
specific direction establishes a culpable link between assistance provided by the accused and the 
crimes of the principal perpetrators.939  
The Trial Chamber reasoned that a link existed between Perišić’s actions and the alleged crimes 
since the VRS heavily depended on operational support to commit its crimes. In its view, it was 
no defence for Perišić to argue that he merely provided general military assistance since warfare 
by the VRS encompassed grave crimes licensed by its leaders, including top officers on Serbia’s 
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payroll.940 However, the Trial Chamber found that the VRS was independent from the VJ941 and 
that the two armies were based in separate geographic regions.942 Furthermore, the Trial 
Chamber did not find that the VRS was de jure or de facto subordinated to the VJ.943 Rather, it 
found that the VRS had a separate command structure.944  
According to the Appeals Chamber, in circumstances where an accused was not physically 
present when relevant criminal acts were planned or committed, an explicit analysis of specific 
direction is required in order to establish the necessary link between the aid provided and the 
crimes. While specific direction may be an implicit element,945 the majority of the ICTY’s 
jurisprudence has expressly included the notion of “specific direction” as part of the actus reus 
standard for aiding and abetting.946 With this in mind, in cases where the conduct of the accused 
is remote in relation to the commission of the crimes, the requirement of specific direction as an 
explicit element of aiding and abetting is manifest. This was especially important in the Perišić 
case, as Perišić was not accused of providing assistance to the commission of crimes committed 
by the VJ. Rather, he was accused of facilitating the commission of crimes committed by the 
VRS, a separate and independent army. In cases involving such remote conduct as is evident in 
Perišić, the notion of “specific direction” should form an integral part of the actus reus for aiding 
and abetting. To hold otherwise, in a case such as Perišić, could lead to a conflation of state 
responsibility with individual criminal responsibility, which must be based on personal guilt.947 
As Judge Moloto properly noted, 
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If we are to accept the Majority’s conclusion based solely on the finding of dependence, as it 
is in casu, without requiring that such assistance be specifically directed to the assistance of 
crimes, then all military and political leaders, who on the basis of circumstantial evidence are 
found to provide logistical assistance to a foreign army dependent on such assistance, can 
meet the objective element of aiding and abetting. I respectfully hold that such an approach is 
manifestly inconsistent with the law.948  
Thus, for any military leader such as Perišić to be convicted on the basis of individual criminal 
responsibility, it has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that his acts were specifically 
directed to assisting the commission of the crimes perpetrated by the VRS as a separate army. 
This dissertation argues that the Perišić’s Trial Chamber failed to do that. 
The Appeals Chamber stressed that “the Trial Chamber did not find that all VRS activities in 
Sarajevo in Srebrenica were criminal in nature” but that “only certain actions of the VRS in the 
context of the operations in Sarajevo and Srebrenica” were criminal.949 The Appeals Chamber’s 
analysis suggested that the siege of Sarajevo and the takeover of Srebrenica were side events that 
were not central to the VRS’s war plans and the conflict as a whole. By intent or design, such 
conclusions of the Appeals Chamber had profound implications. If one establishes that the 
crimes in question were perpetrated on a small scale and were only isolated crimes perpetrated 
by rogue soldiers acting independently, it becomes far more doubtful that Perišić could be 
responsible as an aider and abettor. However, when a war plan by military leadership encompass 
attacks on civilians and when crimes of a foreign army receiving military assistance are of an 
enormous magnitude, the aider and abettor could/should be held responsible.  
The Appeals Chamber held that the type of aid provided by the VJ was not seen as being 
“incompatible with lawful military operations”, and although it may have considerably facilitated 
the commission of crimes “proving substantial contribution does not necessarily demonstrate 
specific direction”.950 The Appeals Chamber further noted that Perišić had provided “general 
assistance which could be used for both lawful and unlawful activities”951 and argued that the 
evidence against Perišić was therefore entirely “circumstantial.”952 Critics of the Perišić Appeals 
                                                          
948 Ibidem, para. 33 [emphasis added]. 
949 Perišić Appeals Judgment, para. 53. 
950 Ibidem, para. 65. 
951 Ibidem, para. 44. 
952 Ibidem para. 47. 
193 
Judgment argue that even assuming that the case was wholly circumstantial, one may conclude 
that the only reasonable inference was the Perišić’s actions had a “substantial effect” on the VRS 
crimes.953 However, it is doubtful that an individual can heavily buttress a dependent and 
struggling army without having a “substantial effect” on its operations. If attacks on civilians are 
a major part of these operations, the person who orchestrated substantial operational support 
should be convicted of aiding and abetting these crimes if he was aware of them954 provided that 
he was also aware of the fact that his acts facilitate the commission of the crimes. 
The above demonstrates that the Appeals Chamber effectively raised the legal standard to 
convict top officials of aiding and abetting atrocities by requiring proof that support was 
“specifically directed” to assist crimes, especially when the defendant provided support from a 
remote location.955  
6.5.1.1. Specific Direction as a mens rea element of aiding and abetting 
Additional ambiguity about the meaning of specific direction is palpable in the Perišić appellate 
judgment. One option is that the specific direction standard is simply another way of describing 
the purposive approach to complicity. As a linguistic matter, the Tadić Appeals Chamber’s 
reference to assistance “directed” toward atrocities connotes intentionality, and this 
understanding comports with Judge Ramaroson’s concurring opinion in Perišić, stressing that 
“specific direction” has been miscategorised under actus reus and is best understood as a mens 
rea element.956 This would be an odd result given the ICTY’s consistent finding, including 
Perišić itself, that knowledge rather than purpose is the requisite mens rea.957 However, this 
apparent contradiction may find resolution in the conduct/result distinction958: an accomplice 
who specifically directs assistance to the perpetrator’s murderous conduct may be held 
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responsible even if the accomplice does not act with the conscious object of bringing about the 
death of any human being. 
Although the Perišić plurality opinion treats specific direction as an actus reus requirement, it 
too emphasizes an important connection to mens rea by suggesting that specific direction can be 
established circumstantially by proof of a criminal purpose.959 Particularly, the Appeals Chamber 
did accept that “specific direction may involve considerations that are closely related to 
questions of mens rea”, and held that evidence relating to an accused’s state of mind could serve 
as circumstantial evidence of specific direction as an actus reus element.960 Judges Meron and 
Agius in their Joint Separate Opinion to the Perišić appellate decision asserted that “whether an 
individual commits acts directed at assisting the commission of a crime relates in certain ways to 
that individual’s state of mind”, and held that were they to set out the elements afresh, they 
would include specific direction as a mens rea element.961 Either way, they asserted, the key 
issue is “whether the link between assistance of an accused individual and actions of principal 
perpetrators is sufficient to justify holding the accused aider and abettor criminally responsible 
for relevant crimes”.962 Under this approach the accused’s criminal purpose will usually be 
sufficient, but not always necessary, to prove specific direction. In either event, to the extent that 
a purposive mens rea can establish specific direction – whether as a necessary or merely 
sufficient condition – then the interpretive questions relating to purpose will apply. 
6.5.1.2. Conflating aiding and abetting with the JCE  
This Section addresses the question whether a JCE offers a more appropriate mode of liability 
when it is established that military aid was provided to further a common plan or purpose based 
on the “strategic objectives” of the recipient armed force. It is crucial to underline that when the 
Appeals Chamber first articulated the standard for the actus reus of aiding and abetting in Tadić 
Appeals Judgment, it was done in the context of distinguishing individual criminal responsibility 
for aiding and abetting from participation in a JCE. The Tadić Appeals Judgment established that 
“the aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage, or lend moral 
support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime” and which have a substantial effect on the 
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perpetration of the crime.963 In contrast, it explained that “acts that in some way are directed to 
the furthering of the common plan or purpose” are sufficient for the requisite participation in a 
JCE.964 This important distinction between these two modes of liability provides the foundation 
for the Appeals Chambers’ continued inclusion of the concept of “specific direction” as the 
required element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting. If the Tadić Appeals Judgment had not 
intended for specific direction to constitute a requisite element for aiding and abetting liability, 
there would have been no need to make such a distinction.  
The Prosecution in the Taylor case contended that specific direction, as used in the Tadić 
Appeals Judgment, clarifies that the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability is more strict than 
the actus reus of joint criminal enterprise, since for aiding and abetting liability, it is not enough 
that you contribute to the enterprise. Rather, the accused’s acts and conduct have to contribute to 
the crime.965 It is submitted that this was the understanding expressed by the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber held in Blagojević and Jokić and Mrkšić and Šljivančanin.966 Had the Prosecution 
intended to hold Perišić accountable for his alleged assistance in furthering a common plan or 
purpose based on the “strategic objectives” of the Bosnian Serbs, it should have done so by 
charging him under the theory of JCE.967 If the Prosecution had done so, there would be no 
requirement that Perišić’s acts be specifically directed towards assisting the commission of the 
underlying crimes. However, the Prosecution chose to charge Perišić with aiding and abetting 
and thus was required to satisfy the “specific direction” element.  
In this context, it must be emphasized that in reaching its conclusion on Perišić’s individual 
criminal responsibility for aiding and abetting, the Trial Chamber took into account the strategic 
objectives of the Bosnian Serbs.968 As Judge Moloto correctly stated in his dissenting opinion, 
such objectives “have no place in an analysis under aiding and abetting.”969 Therefore, by 
focusing on these objectives, rather than on whether Perišić’s conduct itself was specifically 
directed toward the commission of the crimes, the Majority erroneously conflated aiding and 
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abetting with JCE.970 As noted above, Perišić acknowledged that, as the Chief of the General 
Staff in the VJ, he provided assistance to the VRS pursuant to the SDC’s orders.971 However, 
such assistance was not directed, let alone specifically directed, to assisting the commission of 
the crimes perpetrated by the VRS. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that the assistance given 
was made in the context of supporting the general war effort. The Trial Chamber itself found that 
“the VRS depended heavily on FRY and VJ assistance in order to function as an army and to 
wage war.”972 There was no evidence presented supporting a finding that Perišić’s acts were 
specifically directed to assisting the perpetration of the VRS’s crimes. 
There is a reason why the Trial Chamber avoided the requirement that the acts of an aider and 
abettor be specifically directed, namely the Trial Chamber recognize[d] that the evidence does 
not establish that the specific weapons used in committing the charged crimes stemmed from the 
logistical assistance process overseen by Perišić.973  
Moreover, where direct evidence of the instrumentalities used to commit crimes were provided 
to the Trial Chamber, it found that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the weaponry 
used to commit the crimes was supplied to the VRS pursuant to the logistical assistance process 
managed by Perišić.974 Similarly, as all but three individuals holding key positions within the 
VRS had held such positions prior to Perišić’s appointment as Chief of the General Staff in the 
VJ, the VJ’s overall personnel assistance, rendered through Perišić, cannot be said to have been 
specifically directed to the commission of the crimes of the VRS.975 Perišić provided the 
assistance at issue on behalf of the VJ to support the war effort alone,976 not the VRS’s 
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commission of crimes. As the Trial Chamber correctly noted, “Perišić was not charged with 
helping the VRS to wage war per se, which is not a crime under the Statute.”977 
6.5.2. Can the Requisite Link be Satisfied by the Substantial Effect Requirement? 
Even prior to Perišić, international tribunal case law had established that aiders and abettors 
must make a substantial contribution to crime.978 This dissertation argues that the best 
understanding of this substantiality requirement already includes considerations concerning the 
specificity and directionality of assistance. For those tribunals that have rejected both purpose 
and specific direction as elements of aiding and abetting, the primary protection against over-
incriminalization is the requirement of a substantial or significant contribution. Regrettably, as 
argued above, the concept of substantial contribution, remains rather vague.979 The case law has 
consistently distinguished the concept from that of causation. In Furundžija, for instance, the 
Trial Chamber rejected the proposition that “the acts of the accomplice need bear a causal 
relationship to, or be a condition sine qua non for, those of the principal.980 This view accords 
with the prominent view of aiding and abetting outlined by Stanford Kadish, according to which 
a causation requirement attaches to principals but not accomplices.981 At the international level, 
the requirement of substantial contribution fails to provide a bright-line distinction between guilt 
and innocence, and the case law has provided relatively little guidance on the application of this 
standard.982 Many judgments fail to elucidate it at all,983 whereas others have emphasized 
generally that the accomplice’s contribution must increase the likelihood or ease of the crime.984 
Thus, as Noto has observed, this approach leaves it to individual adjudicators to “decide on a 
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case-by-case basis whether in the particular circumstances the assistance should or should not 
properly be regarded as criminal.”985 
This Chapter demonstrates986 that the Perišić Trial Chamber incorrectly applied the substantial 
effect standard and its finding that “Perišić’s logistical assistance and personnel assistance 
individually and cumulatively had a substantial effect on the crimes perpetrated by the VRS in 
Sarajevo and Srebrenica.987 The Trial Chamber held that the acts of the accused must amount to 
“practical assistance […] which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”988 It 
found that Perišić’s acts ‘contributed’, ‘facilitated’, and ‘assisted’ the commission of crimes. 
Such does not support its conclusion that “Perišić’s logistical assistance and personnel 
assistance, individually and cumulatively, had a substantial effect on the crimes perpetrated by 
the VRS”.989 The question whether a given act has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the 
crime requires a fact-based inquiry.990 While it is established that there is no requirement for the 
acts of assistance to serve as a condition precedent for the commission of the crime, it is manifest 
that the contribution of the aider and abettor must have a substantial effect upon the perpetration 
of the crime.991 
Both the practical assistance provided by the aider and abettor and whether this practical 
assistance directly and substantially affects the commission of the offence must be assessed.992 
The practical assistance provided need not necessarily be substantial in itself. For example, while 
guarding detainees and helping to control access to them is not substantial in itself, such practical 
assistance might have a substantial effect on the crimes committed if it ensures the further 
detention of the detainees and allowed their murders to take place.993 As for the effect on the 
crime of the practical assistance provided, it must be substantial, which implies: “assistance 
which facilitates the commission of a crime in some significant way” 994 or acts which “make a 
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significant difference to the commission of the criminal act by the principal.”995 Consequently, 
acts which facilitate the commission of a crime fall short of the ‘substantial effect’ requirement. 
The Trial Chamber’s findings when considering the practical assistance provided by Perišić 
referred to terms such as ‘facilitate’, ‘contribute’ and ‘assist’, all of which do not support its 
conclusion that: “Perišić’s logistical assistance and personal assistance, individually and 
cumulatively, had a substantial effect on the crimes perpetrated by the VRS.”996 For example, the 
Trial Chamber’s finding that: “by providing vital logistical and technical assistance to the VRS 
during the war, including to the specific units that perpetrated the crimes, Perišić facilitated the 
commission of those crimes”997 failed to meet the substantial effect threshold.  
The Trial Chamber also found that Perišić facilitated the commission of crimes in Sarajevo and 
Srebrenica on the basis that he provided the VRS with personnel and sustained the officers 
already serving in the VRS before the establishment of the 30th PC, thereby creating the 
conditions for senior officers of the VRS to wage a war that encompassed systematic criminals 
actions without impediment.998 This finding also falls short of the substantial effect standard. 
Furthermore, addressing Perišić’s direct participation in the determination of the funds within the 
federal budget for the payment of the salaries of VJ military personnel, including 30th PC 
members, as well as his involvement in the provision of other benefits, the Trial Chamber found 
that this type of assistance contributed to the commission of the crimes.999 While the Trial 
Chamber held that Perišić’s assistance was at the very least significant,1000 this finding describes 
Perišić’s contribution in itself. It fails to address whether Perišić’s contribution had a substantial 
effect on the commission of the crimes. As argued in Section 11.3.3, the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting does not require a substantial amount of assistance, but that the assistance provided has 
a substantial effect on the perpetration of a crime. 
Notwithstanding the above findings, the Trial Chamber went on to hold that “Perišić’s actions 
substantially facilitated the commission of these crimes because the VRS heavily depended on 
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the VJ’s support to function as an army and conduct its operations” as it had limited weaponry, 
qualified personnel, and financial resources.1001 The Trial Chamber’s holding rests solely on its 
findings that: (i) “the VRS heavily depended on the VJ’s support to function as an army and 
conduct its operations, including besieging Sarajevo and taking over Srebrenica”;1002 and that (ii) 
“Perišić repeatedly exercised his authority to assist the VRS in waging a war that encompassed 
systematic criminal actions against Bosnian Muslim civilians as a military strategy and 
objectives.” The Trial Chamber’s finding of dependence1003 neither provides sufficient 
information for determining whether the support provided by the VJ had a substantial effect on 
the commission of the crimes nor makes it possible to establish the necessary link between the 
assistance given and the commission of the crimes.1004  
An example of findings made by other Trial Chambers having correctly applied the standard and 
found that the acts of the accused had a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crimes is 
demonstrated by Milutinović Trial Chamber. Namely, it found that “through his acts and 
omissions, Ojdanić provided practical assistance, […] to the VJ forces engaging in the forcible 
displacement of Kosovo Albanians in coordinated action with the MUP”;1005 and that “these 
contributions had a substantial effect on the commission of the crimes, because they provided 
assistance in terms of soldiers on the ground to carry out the acts, the VJ weaponry to assist these 
acts, and encouragement and moral support by granting authorization within the VJ chain of 
command for the VJ to continue to operate in Kosovo, despite the occurrence of these 
crimes.”1006  
Consequently, the Trial Chamber’s analysis should not had be saved by any type of broad 
interpretation of its findings of facilitation, contribution and practical assistance.  
6.6. Application of mens rea of Aiding and Abetting in the Perišić Case 
The Prosecution asserted that Perišić had actual knowledge that the personnel and logistical 
assistance he provided to the VRS was being used, in significant part, to perpetrate crimes in 
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Sarajevo and Srebrenica.1007 The requisite mental element of aiding and abetting is knowledge 
that the acts performed assist the commission of the specific crime of the principal 
perpetrator.1008 The mens rea for aiding and abetting required the Prosecution to prove, first, that 
Perišić intentionally performed an act with the knowledge that such act would lend practical 
assistance, encouragement, or moral support to the commission of a crime, and second, that 
Perišić was aware of the essential elements of the crime for which he was charged with, 
including the mental state of the physical perpetrator or intermediary perpetrator.1009 
The Prosecution alleged that Perišić provided assistance “covertly and in contraventionf UN 
Security Council Resolutions that were issued, in part, because such assistance was being used in 
the commission of crimes”1010 It is noteworthy that none of the UN Resolutions issued during 
Perišić’s tenure described criminal behaviour by members of the VRS. Earlier resolutions had 
mentioned wrongful conduct by the Bosnian Serb paramilitaries.1011 The exception was UN SC 
Resolution 859, which mentioned war crimes “by whomsoever committed, Bosnian Serbs or 
other individuals.”1012 Resolution 859, however, failed to specify what crimes are being referred 
to, where they are being committed, or what Bosnian Serbs are being referred to. Perišić was not 
charged with providing assistance to Bosnian Serb paramilitaries, but to the VRS. Perišić did not 
dispute that he periodically received situation reports from the VRS1013 or that he had direct 
communications with VRS officers, including Mladić.1014 The Prosecution failed to present any 
evidence, however, that these reports or communications contained any information about 
criminal behaviour by the VRS officers. Similarly, Perišić admitted that VRS intelligence organs 
sent intelligence reports to VJ General Staff1015 but no evidence was presented that any of these 
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reports contained information on criminal behaviour by members of the VRS in Sarajevo or 
Srebrenica.  
Furthermore, Perišić did not dispute that FRY government officials had regular contact with the 
Bosnian Serb leaders;1016 rather he disputed that any of these contacts resulted in the 
transmission of information about the commission of crimes. The Prosecution also alleged that 
the charged crimes received widespread attention from intergovernmental organizations, 
international negotiators, and non-governmental organizations but failed to present evidence of 
any international representative, negotiator, military officer, or NGO representative speaking 
directly to Perišić or at a meeting attended by Perišić of alleged criminal behaviour by the VRS 
in Sarajevo or Srebrenica.1017 The Prosecution evidence demonstrated that members of the 
international community had access to Perišić and contacted him on numerous occasions to 
resolve certain issues.1018 The same members of the international community could have 
protested to Perišić about the behaviour of the Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo and elsewhere.1019 
However, the trial record does not contain any evidence of such conversations taking place. The 
Prosecution submitted a series of reports created by the UN Commission on Human Rights on 
alleged abuses in Bosnia.1020 Witness Sacirbey stated that unnamed “FRY representatives” read 
the reports as they “were discussed in Security Council and other UN meetings” and the “FRY” 
made responses to the reports.1021 The only information presented regarding the reports being 
read or analysed was a statement by the FRY government rejecting the reports in their entirety as 
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not objective and based on unchecked information.1022 The trial record contains no evidence that 
Perišić read or had any knowledge of the reports. Comments made by “FRY representatives” or 
the “FRY” in general cannot be imputed to knowledge by Perišić.  
6.6.1. Perišić Purposefully Assisted in the Commission of Crimes 
In Perišić case, no evidence was presented that Perišić’s purpose in overseeing the 
administration of logistical assistance for the military needs of the VRS and SVK was to assist in 
the commission of crimes. To the contrary, the trial record is filled with statements and 
indications of what his purpose was, namely to keep the territory of FRY secure, pursuant to the 
political decisions of the SDC. The Trial Chamber based its determination of guilt on the 
inference that the lower standard of knowledge of the commission of crimes had been met. While 
the Trial Chamber stated the correct legal standard for the mens rea for aiding and abetting,1023 
its conclusion that Perišić possessed the applicable mens rea rests solely on its finding that 
Perišić was aware of the VRS’s propensity to commit crimes, that crimes were being committed, 
and that other similar crimes would probably be committed. The Trial Chamber did not consider 
whether Perišić knew that his acts assisted the commission of crimes. 
6.6.2. Determination by the Trial Chamber Concerning Perišić’s mens rea 
The applicable mens rea for aiding and abetting is “knowledge that the acts performed [by the 
aider and abettor] assist the commission of the specific crime of the principal [perpetrator]”.1024 
The Trial Chamber stated that “to establish the required mental element for aiding and abetting, 
it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Perišić knew that his actions provided practical 
assistance to the crimes and that he was aware of the essential elements of the crimes, including 
the mental state of the perpetrators.”1025 Thus, the mens rea for aiding and abetting comprises 
two components: the aider and abettor knew that one of a number of crimes would probably be 
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at Geneva. 
1023 Perišić Trial Judgment, paras.129-130, 1629.  
1024 Vasiljević Appeals Judgment, para. 102.   
1025 Perišić Trial Judgment, para.1629. See also, paras.129-130. 
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committed;1026 and the aider and abettor knew that his acts or conduct assist the commission of 
these present or future crimes.1027 
The Mrkšić case provides an important example of the correct application of the requisite mens 
rea standard for aiding and abetting. Mrkšić was found guilty of aiding and abetting the murder 
of prisoners of war because he issued an order to withdraw the members of the Military Police 
who were protecting prisoners from members of the Territorial Defence (“TO”) and 
paramilitaries likely to commit one of a series of crimes against these prisoners.1028 Mrkšić 
Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber did not commit an error of law concerning the 
mens rea for aiding and abetting when it concluded that “when Mrkšić ordered the withdrawal of 
the military police, he knew that this left the TOs and paramilitaries with unrestrained access to 
the prisoners of war and that by enabling this access, he was assisting in the commission of their 
murder.”1029 In doing so, Mrkšić Trial Chamber correctly applied the second element of the mens 
rea standard with respect to the determination that Mrkšić knew that his acts (i.e. issuing the 
order) assisted the commission of the crimes.  
Similarly, Nahimana Appeals Chamber upheld Ngeze’s conviction for aiding and abetting 
genocide on the basis that he “set up, manned and supervised roadblocks in Gisenyi in 1994 that 
identified targeted Tutsi civilians who were subsequently taken to and killed at the Commune 
Rouge.”1030 In light of this evidence, Nahimana Appeals Chamber concluded that “there is no 
doubt that the appellant was aware that his acts were contributing to the commission of genocide 
by others.”1031 Hence, the requisite mens rea was proved, in that Ngeze had knowledge that 
crimes were being committed and would continue to be committed at the Commune Rouge, and 
he knew that by his acts – identifying Tutsi civilians who were then killed at the Commune 
Rouge – he assisted the commission of genocide by others.  
The Ntagerura case further underscores the necessity of establishing that an alleged aider and 
abettor knew that his acts assisted the commission of the crime in finding that he possessed the 
requisite mens rea. In upholding Bagambiki’s acquittal for aiding and abetting the killing of 16 
                                                          
1026 Haradinaj Appeals Judgment, para.58. 
1027 Blagojević Appeals Judgment, para.127. 
1028 Mrkšić Trial Judgment, paras.621-622. 
1029 Mrkšić Appeals Judgment, para.333. 
1030 Nahimana Appeals Judgment, para.670, citing Nahimana Trial Judgment, para.956. 
1031 Ibidem, para.672 [emphasis added]. 
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refugees, the Ntagerura Appeals Chamber correctly considered whether the evidence supported 
“the conclusion that Bagambiki knew that his participation in the selection of the refugees would 
lead to their death”1032 and held that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that this had not 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.1033  
The required determination of whether an accused knew that his acts assisted the commission of 
a crime is especially important in a case such as Perišić, where the alleged aider and abettor is 
physically removed from the location of the crimes, let alone occupying the post of Chief of 
General Staff of a different army, in another State. Whereas a military officer present at the 
crime scene and/or directly involved in the actions which lead to the commission of a crime is 
likely to know that his conduct assists the commission of that crime, a military officer who is 
located far from the crime scene and is not involved in, nor exercising any control over the 
events which led to the crime – is less likely to know his conduct assists the commission of that 
crime. Hence, in the latter situation it is particularly important that the trier of fact fully analyses 
and explains its reasoning in finding that the alleged aider and abettor possessed the requisite 
mens rea, which includes determining whether he knew that his acts assisted the commission of 
the crime(s).  
This is precisely what the Trial Chamber in Perišić failed to do. The Trial Chamber found that 
Perišić had the required mens rea for aiding and abetting the crimes committed by the VRS in 
Sarajevo1034 and Srebrenica,1035 but it neither analysed nor explained whether Perišić knew that 
his acts assisted the perpetration of these crimes. The Trial Chamber failed to provide any 
reasoning in support of its conclusion that Perišić knew that his actions assisted the commission 
of these crimes.1036 Rather, as mentioned above, it found that Perišić possessed the requisite 
mens rea based solely on its determination that he knew of the VRS’s propensity to commit 
crimes, that the VRS had committed crimes in Sarajevo and Srebrenica and that these crimes 
would probably be followed by the commission of more crimes.1037  
                                                          
1032 Ntagerura Appeals Judgment, para.327 [emphasis added]. 
1033 Ibidem, para.327.  
1034 Perišić Trial Judgment, para. 1632.  
1035 Ibidem, para. 1637.  
1036 Ibidem, paras. 1636, 1638. 
1037 Ibidem, paras.1628-1650, 1438-1579. 
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6.6.3. Perišić’s Knowledge that his Conduct Assisted the Crimes Committed in 
Sarajevo 
The Trial Chamber held that notwithstanding Perišić’s knowledge, he continued to “provide 
significant assistance” to the VRS until the end of the siege of Sarajevo.1038 The appropriate 
standard is whether Perišić knew that any assistance provided would assist the commission of the 
specific crime of the principal perpetrator.1039 
The trail record contains no evidence demonstrating how the logistical assistance provided was 
distributed from the VRS depots to corps or from corps to individual units. The VRS was a large 
army with six corps, spread out over the entirety of BiH, and with logistical depots serving the 
entire army.1040 How and when any logistical assistance would be used was unknown. It cannot 
be presumed that Perišić knew the logistical assistance provided would be used in the 
commission of crimes. Perišić recognized that the law does not require specific perpetrators of 
crimes to be identified for responsibility to arise under aiding and abetting.1041 Greater specificity 
is required, however, than the “VRS” as a whole, to which the Trial Chamber referred.1042 While 
the specific individuals do not have to be named, more specificity is required than simply naming 
an entire army, especially under such unique circumstances where the aider and abettor is 
physically removed from the location of the crimes, and where the direct perpetrators operate in 
another State and belong to another (separate, independent) army. 
In fact, the Trial Chamber failed to make any findings that would objectively demonstrate 
Perišić’s knowledge that the military aid he provided assisted the commission of the crimes 
charged. The law does require contemporaneous actus reus and mens rea for aiding and 
abetting.1043 The Trial Chamber failed to make any findings that Perišić knew at the time he 
provided assistance that it would facilitate the commission of crimes. No correlation in this 
regard at all was made by the Trial Chamber. In the absence of any evidence regarding what 
                                                          
1038 Ibidem, para. 1632. 
1039 Ibidem, para.129; citing Seromba Appeals Judgment, para.56; Blagojević Appeals Judgment, para.127; 
Ntagerura Appeals Judgment, para.370; Simić Appeals Judgment, para.86; Blaškić Appeals Judgment, paras.45-46; 
Vasiljević- Appeals Judgment, para.102. 
1040 Exhibit P75: Transcript of interview with Dorde Djukić, p.3. 
1041 Milutinović Trial Judgment, Vol. 1, para.92; citing Brđanin Trial Judgment, para.273; Stakić Trial Judgment, 
para. 533. 
1042 Perišić Trial Judgment, para. 1632. 
1043 Blagojević Trial Judgment, para. 728; Blagojević Trial Judgment, para. 295. 
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specific assistance Perišić actually provided, there cannot be a finding that Perišić knew such 
assistance would facilitate the commission of crimes. As conceded by the Trial Chamber, there 
was no evidence that any of the bullets, shells, or mortars recovered from the crime scenes or 
specific weapons used to commit the crimes in Sarajevo originated from the “logistical 
assistance process” overseen by Perišić.1044  
6.6.4. Perišić’s Knowledge that his Conduct Assisted the Crimes Committed in 
Srebrenica 
The law requires the actus reus and mens rea of aiding and abetting to be contemporaneous.1045 
The Trial Chamber failed to specify what “substantial assistance” Perišić provided “prior to and 
during the period crimes were committed in Srebrenica.”1046 Its analysis of Srebrenica is devoid 
of a discussion of any details regarding Perišić’s assistance, the recipients of any assistance, 
when the assistance was provided or received, how the assistance was distributed, or how Perišić 
was supposed to know that any assistance would be used for crimes in Srebrenica. Its findings 
are generic to the VRS and not specific to Srebrenica.1047 This is particularly important as the 
Trial Chamber had noted that there was no evidence that any of the bullets recovered from the 
Srebrenica crime scenes came from Perišić or that any of the specific weapons used to commit 
the crimes in Srebrenica originated from the “logistical assistance process” overseen by 
Perišić.1048 It is argued that in the absence of any evidence regarding what assistance Perišić 
actually provided, there cannot be a finding that Perišić was aware that such assistance would 
facilitate the commission of crimes. Instead, the Trial Chamber made generalized finding that 
Perišić provided assistance to the VRS prior to and during the time crimes were committed in 
Srebrenica1049 without any specificity.  
6.7. Charles Taylor’s Case of Aiding and Abetting by Way of Provision of 
Military Aid 
Due to its similarities in time, docket and jurisdiction with Perišić, the Taylor case represents a 
unique and unparalleled contribution to the debate on specific direction. Seven months after the 
                                                          
1044 Perišić Trial Judgment, para. 1624.  
1045 Blagojević Trial Judgment, para.728; Blagojević Appeals Judgment, para. 295. 
1046 Perišić Trial Judgment, para.1637; see also, paras. 1638, 1648. 
1047 Ibidem, paras. 1595, 1602. 
1048 Ibidem, para.1624. 
1049 Perišić Trial Judgment, para. 1637. 
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Appeals Judgment in the Perišić case was rendered, the SCSL Appeals Chamber in the Charles 
Taylor case reached a completely contrasting decision and upheld the conviction of former 
Liberian President Charles Taylor for aiding and abetting crimes committed by the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in 
Sierra Leone.1050 In one of the most high-profile international prosecutions to date, the Appeals 
Chamber of the SCSL expressly rejected the Perišić specific direction standard. Much of the 
case against Charles Taylor rested upon finding him criminally responsible for the military 
assistance he provided, including various quantities of arms and ammunition, to the rebel groups 
fighting and committing war crimes in the civil war in Sierra Leone. Thus, the conviction rested 
on a similar theory to the prosecution’s case in Perišić – Taylor had provided critical support to 
these forces in the form of weapons, supplies, and operational support.1051 The Trial Chamber 
considered that this aid amounted to practical assistance to the commission of crimes, being 
indispensable to military offensives in certain instances, and having an overall substantial effect 
on the commission of the crimes charged.1052 The Taylor Appeals Judgment went farther than the 
ICTY case law in maintaining that, in the absence of proof that the accused had intentionally or 
knowingly assisted a crime, aiding and abetting could be established based on a form of 
recklessness.1053 
The Taylor case is another illustration of the concept of responsibility for atrocities committed by 
armed forces whom one has supported by furnishing weapons and other military assistance. In 
particularly, the indictment charged Taylor with individual criminal responsibility for aiding and 
abetting crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in Sierra Leone by the RUF and allied forces. His responsibility 
was based in part on his role in providing “financial support, military training, personnel, arms, 
ammunition and other support and encouragement” to the rebel forces.  
                                                          
1050 SCSL, Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-1-T, Trial Judgment, 26 April 2012, paras. 6912-6914 
(hereinafter: Taylor Trial Judgment). 
1051 Taylor Trial Judgment, paras. 6907-6953. 
1052 Ibidem, paras. 6912-6914. 
1053 Ibidem, para. 438 (holding dolus eventualis – the civil analogue to recklessness- satisfies the mental 
requirements for aiding and abetting). On dolus eventualis, see Dubber, M. D., supra note 634, pp. 992-993, 2007 
(noting that dolus eventualis has a “subjective aspect which requires indifference toward, or perhaps even 
acceptance of, the chance that a proscribed result might occur, and an objective aspect…which requires the creation 
of a risk not rising to the level of virtual certainty”, and concluding that “[n]o matter how one looks at dolus 
eventualis, it is clear that it is not knowledge, or dolus indirectus, even though it may not quire be recklessness 
either”). 
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With an almost identical factual basis to the one examined in the Perišić case1054, the case of 
Charles Taylor enables a direct comparison of decisions reached by two different international 
judicial institutions.1055 There is little qualitative difference between the types of assistance given 
by Taylor and by Perišić. The Trial Chamber in Taylor considered that the military aid provided 
amounted to practical assistance to the commission of crimes, being indispensable to military 
offensives in certain instances, and having an overall substantial effect on the commission of the 
crimes charged.1056 The Appeals Chamber emphasized that the essential requirement for aiding 
and abetting is that the acts of an accused have “a substantial effect on the commission of the 
crime charged”, and it agreed with the ICTY that it was not necessary to establish that an 
accused “had any power to control those who committed offences”.1057 The need for a causal link 
would ensure that persons would not be unjustly held responsible for the acts of others, even if 
they had only provided the means for those crimes.1058 Regarding the mental element of aiding 
and abetting, the Taylor Trial Chamber found that an accused must know or be aware of the 
“substantial likelihood” that his or her acts would assist the commission of crimes.1059 
Upon its review of the post-Second World War jurisprudence1060 and examination of the ILC 
Draft Code of Crimes and state practice1061 the SCSL was not convinced that specific direction 
was required under customary international law, and considered that the absence of any 
                                                          
1054 The Trial Chamber found Taylor individually criminally responsible for aiding and abetting the commission of 
crimes, committed between 30 November 1996 and 18 January 2002 in the Districts of Bombali, Kailahun, Kenema, 
Kono, Port Loko and Freetown and the Western Area. What was critical to the conviction for aiding and abetting 
were the Trial Chamber’s findings that (i) Taylor’s assistance supported, sustained and enhanced the RUF/AFRC’s 
capacity to undertake its Operational Strategy involving the commission of crimes; (ii) his assistance was critical in 
enabling the RUF/AFRC’s Operational Strategy; and that (iii) Taylor knew that his support to the RUF/AFRC 
would assist the commission of crimes in the implementation of the RUF/AFRC’s Operational Strategy. 
Furthermore, the Trial Chamber found that “without the contributions of Charles Taylor to the AFRC/RUF alliance, 
the crimes charged in the indictment would not have occurred”. See Taylor Trial Judgment, paras. 4262, 6936, 5835, 
5842, 6914, 6949. 
1055 The Appeal Chamber in Taylor emphasized that while in applying the Statute and customary international law, it 
is guided by the decisions of the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chamber, the Appeals Chamber remains the final arbiter 
of the law for this Court, and the decisions of other courts are only persuasive, not binding, authority. The Appeals 
Chamber recognizes and respects that the ICTY Appeals Chamber is the final arbiter of the law for that Court. See 
Taylor Appeals Judgment, para. 472. 
1056 Taylor Trial Judgment, paras. 6912–6914. 
1057 Taylor Appeals Judgment, paras. 368–370.  
1058 Ibidem, para. 391. 
1059 Ibidem, para. 415. 
1060 Ibidem, paras. 362-385, 413-437. Accord STL Decision on Applicable Law, paras 225-227; Čelibići Appeals 
Judgment, para. 352; Kayishema and Ruzindana Appeals Judgment, paras 186, 198; Duch Trial Judgment, paras 
478, 532-535; Tadić Trial Judgment, paras 661-692; Aleksovski Trial Judgment, paras 58-65; Čelibići Trial 
Judgment, paras 319-329. 
1061 Taylor Appeals Judgment, paras. 474, 390-392. 
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discussion of custom by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Perišić case meant that the latter was 
“only identifying and applying internally binding precedent”.1062 Whereas in applying the Statute 
and customary international law, the Appeals Chamber is guided by the decisions of the ICTY 
and ICTR Appeals Chamber1063 and looks as well to the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the 
ECCC and STL and other sources of authority,1064 the Appeals Chamber, however, is the final 
arbiter of the law, and the decisions of other courts are only persuasive, not binding, 
authority.1065 
Another fundamental question was raised by the Taylor Appeals Judgment, namely whether, as 
suggested by the Appeals Chamber, individual criminal responsibility can be established in 
isolation from state responsibility. Taylor’s Defence argued that the fact that international law 
would not recognise state responsibility for the alleged crimes pleaded for a narrow construction 
of individual criminal responsibility. It argued that the standard applied by the Trial Chamber 
(and upheld by the Appeals Chamber) was ‘so broad that it would in fact encompass actions that 
are today carried out by a great many States in relation to their assistance to rebel groups or to 
governments that are well known to be engaging in crimes of varying degrees of frequency…’. 
Such assistance, the Defense argued, ‘is going on in many other countries that are supported in 
some cases by the very sponsors of this Court’.1066 The above argument was arguably rejected by 
the Taylor Appeals Chamber, leaving it to ‘those bodies and tribunals which properly have 
authority over States to interpret the law on state responsibility.’1067 However, while the 
development of a customary principle of individual criminal responsibility is based on its own 
practice, it is suggested that the articulation of the law on aiding and abetting in Taylor is 
inconsistent with and contradicted by state practice, as it criminalizes provision of military 
assistance by political or military leader, while the same activities are considered lawful for 
States and within their sovereign rights. If States have the right to supply materiel to parties to an 
armed conflict even if there is evidence that those parties are engaged in the regular commission 
                                                          
1062 Ibidem, paras. 471–478. 
1063 SCSL Statute, Article 20(3). 
1064 SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 72bis(ii), available at http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/SCSL/Rules 
-of-proced-SCSL.pdf 
1065 Taylor Appeals Judgment, para 457.  
1066 Taylor Defence Oral Argument on Appeal, Appeal transcript, p. 49896. 
1067 Taylor Appeals Judgment, para. 436. 
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of crimes, the law as articulated in Taylor would cause inconsistency between the two 
responsibility regimes. 
6.7.1. Specific Direction Disregarded in the Charles Taylor Case  
The SCSL recently convicted Charles Taylor for aiding and abetting war crimes committed in 
Sierra Leone. The case is important to the analysis here because it both signals the SCSL’s 
understanding that it shares a space under customary international law with the ICTY, and 
underscores specific direction’s novelty and potential affront to retributive goals.1068 SCSL in 
Taylor rejected the notion that geographic proximity has any bearing on actus reus, and invoked 
Perišić merely by finding no “cogent reasons to depart from its holding that the actus reus of 
aiding and abetting liability is that the accused’s acts and conduct…had a substantial effect on 
the commission of each charged crime…”1069 Moreover, it concluded its analysis by holding 
“that specific direction is not an element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting liability under 
Article 6(1) of the Statue or customary international law.”1070  
Inconsistency with the law of peer tribunals is noteworthy and at most problematic, giving 
similarities in time, docket and jurisdiction.1071 Further irreconcilability of specific direction with 
ICTR case law is also noteworthy; ICTR cases concerning remote assistance to principal 
perpetrators are seemingly irreconcilable with the jurisprudence underlying Perišić.1072 
The Taylor Appeals Chamber expressed alarm at the ICTY’s novel formulation of aiding and 
abetting, rebutting it with the language of the Rome Statute:1073 “the actus reus of aiding and 
abetting liability under Article 6(1) and customary international law is that the accused’s acts and 
conduct of assistance, encouragement, and/or moral support had a substantial effect on the 
                                                          
1068 Note that the SCSL Statute differs somewhat form the others' in that it directs the Appeals Chamber, when not 
interpreting Sierra Leonean law, to »be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and ICTR.« 
SCSL Statute, article 20(3). This makes the Taylor court's rejection of Perišić even more notable. 
1069 Taylor Appeals Judgment, para 481. 
1070 Ibidem, para 481. 
1071 See Donovan, D. F., and Roberts, A., Comments and Notes, The Emerging Recognition of Universal 
Jurisdiction, 100 American Journal of International Law 142, 143 (2006). 
1072 Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR 99-52-T, Trial Chamber I (Dec 3, 2003) holding a radio station 
liable for inciting genocide; Musema v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, Appeals Chamber (Nov 16, 2001) 
(extending accomplice responsibility to a corporate director of a tea factory for his role in Rwandan genocide and 
attendant crimes against humanity).  
1073 Rome Statute, Article 17. 
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commission of each charged crime for which he is to be held responsible.”1074 According to the 
Appeals Chamber in Taylor, this requirement ensures that there is a sufficient causal, a 
‘culpable’,1075 link between the accused and the commission of the crime before an accused’s 
acts and conduct may be adjudged criminal.1076 The SCSL subsequently held that the 
controversial Perišić precedent did not comport with customary international law, and therefore 
affirmed the conviction of Charles Taylor for knowingly assisting atrocities by rebel forces 
during the Sierra Leone Civil War.  
While the Appeals Chamber in Perišić emphasized that its ruling “should in no way be 
interpreted as enabling military leaders to deflect criminal liability by subcontracting the 
commission of criminal acts”1077, had the Appeals Chamber in Taylor followed its specific 
direction requirement, Taylor’s convictions would most likely have been overruled. Indeed, 
under the Perišić standard, it would be very hard to convict a high-ranking military or political 
official of knowingly facilitating mass atrocities from a remote location.1078 However, the 
Appeals Chamber in Perišić emphasized that if a presumably independent military group is 
proved to be under the control of officers of another military group, the latter can still be held 
responsible for the crimes committed by their puppet forces.’1079 One could argue that the 
aforesaid Appeals Chamber’s disclaimer rings hollow in light of the fact that not even the vast 
amount of support that the FRY gave to the Bosnian Serbs was enough to establish such a level 
of control.1080 
While recognizing that there is no perfect match between the basis of individual criminal 
responsibility and the basis of state responsibility, the Taylor judgment exposes an important gap 
in this regard. Namely, the political/military leader may be individually responsible under 
international law, while the same act is not necessarily wrongful under the rules of state 
                                                          
1074 Taylor Appeals Judgment, paras. 362-385, 390-392, 481. 
1075 Contra Perišić Appeals Judgment, para. 37 (At the outset, the Appeals Chamber, Judge Liu dissenting, recalls 
that the element of specific direction establishes a culpable link between assistance provided by an accused 
individual and the crimes of principal perpetrators.), para. 38 (In such a case, the existence of specific direction, 
which demonstrates the culpable link between the accused aider and abettor’s assistance and the crimes of the 
principal perpetrators, will be self-evident.). 
1076 Taylor Appeals Judgment, paras. 390-392. 
1077 Perišić Appeals Judgment, para. 72. 
1078 Jouet, M., supra note 317, p. 1110. 
1079 Perišić Appeals Judgment, para. 72. Relevant forms of liability, in addition to aiding and abetting, could include 
JCE and superior responsibility.  
1080 See infra Part III, Chapter 14. 
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responsibility. A State then may provide military aid to other States or non-state actors who 
engage in commission of international law, without the responsibility of that State being 
engaged. Indeed, there appears to be substantial practice were such support has actually been 
given, without this having led to claims of responsibility. 
7. Conclusion 
The aiding and abetting liability has challenged and presented international criminal tribunals 
with some of the most difficult questions concerning the scope of criminal responsibility. The 
“foreign assistance cases” pose not only legal, but also moral dilemmas that have predictably 
divided the courts and commentators. Part II has argued that individual complicity by way of 
provision of military aid is characterized by a collective dimension which necessarily implies an 
involvement at the State level. The assessment of the general criminal context in the Perišić case 
largely corresponds to a finding of an international responsibility of a State for complicity in the 
comission of an internationally wrongful act by another State.1081 As the analysis showed, State 
involvement in the criminal context has been explicitly taken into account in the determination of 
Perišić’s individual criminal responsibility. This particular approach does not lead to an identity 
in the establishment of individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility (in the sense 
that it is not required to establish state responsibility first in order to ascribe thereafter individual 
criminal responsibility), however, it nonetheless marks a significant point of contact between the 
two regimes given that the same criminal context is relevant to establish both kinds of 
international responsibility.  
In essence, the Perišić Trial Chamber’s analysis was based on the following argument: the aid 
given by the FRY as a State and Perišić as an individual to the VRS was instrumental for their 
war effort, was given in full knowledge that the VRS forces were committing crimes and that the 
aid given will assist the commission of the crimes, thereby satisfying the required level of mens 
rea. Therefore, Perišić was considered an aider and abettor. By contrast, Judge Moloto found that  
the approach of the majority failed to distinguish between an aid to the commission of specific 
crimes and an aid to the war effort generally. The latter is not inherently criminal for the 
purposes of the ICTY’s Statute, particularly bearing in mind the general nature of the aid given 
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in terms of logistics and personnel and Perišić’s lack of proximity to the crimes themselves. 
Judge Moloto’s approach is the one ultimately followed by the Appeals Chamber. 
The Perišić Trial Chamber effectively concluded that providing assistance to the VRS in its war 
effort amounted to aiding and abetting the crimes committed during the armed conflict. The 
logical consequence of the standard adopted by the Trial Chamber is that a military assistance 
given to a party of a conflict with the knowledge that crimes are likely to be committed by that 
party will inevitably result in a finding of responsibility even in cases of humanitarian intent and 
irrespective of the impact of that assistance.1082 The absence of an element requiring specific 
direction, or even a lesser ‘purpose of facilitating’1083 standard, creates a threshold approaching 
that of a strict liability. Convicting the likes of Perišić could disrupt international relations by 
casting too wide of a net for aiding and abetting the crimes of another State’s army. However, 
the Perišić Appeals Chamber underlined that no “link” existed between General Perišić’s actions 
and the crimes he was accused of assisting and that “assistance from one army to another army’s 
war efforts is insufficient, in itself, to trigger individual criminal responsibility”.1084  
Regrettably, warfare is not a crime per se under international criminal law. Various scholars 
rightfully argue that to elevate an accused’s remote geographic location to an effective defence to 
a charge of aiding and abetting, without meeting a higher standard of proof, would undoubtedly 
undermine efforts to prosecute military or political leaders for knowingly facilitating mass 
atrocities.1085 However, as argued in Part II, an in-depth reading of the Appeals Chamber’s 
reasoning in Perišić coupled with a detailed examination of the totality of the factual evidence 
presented in the trial reveals that it is not due to Perišić’s remoteness (i.e. himself being situated 
in Belgrade whereas the crimes were committed in another State by another army) that the proof 
of specific direction is required. Rather, the sole evidence of military aid provided to another 
army which in the course of a legitimate warfare commits international crimes proves just that: 
the fact that the aid was provided. What is lacking is the requisite “nexus” between the acts of 
the accused and the crimes. As argued in Section 11.3., the Perišić Appeals Chamber opted for 
this standard in search of the requisite “nexus” or “link” between the acts or conduct of the 
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accused and the crimes. Even omitting the “specific direction” standard, the accomplice’s acts 
require the necessary connection to the crimes in order to satisfy the requisite element of actus 
reus of aiding and abetting. Therefore, it is argued, the Perišić Appeals Chamber’s reasoning of 
the “specific direction” element is merely the fulfilment of the indisputably requisite element of a 
substantial effect on the crime.  
Accordingly, the Perišić Appeals Chamber’s characterisation of specific direction did not 
amount to the introduction of any novel elements in the realm of the imposition of individual 
criminal responsibility. In particular, the Appeals Chamber merely asserted that for the act or 
conduct of the accused to have a substantial effect on the crime, the nexus or link is required. It 
was solely by reason of the failure on the side of the Prosecution to establish the “link” or 
“nexus”, that the Appeals Chamber felt obliged to further detail the requisite elements of actus 
reus in cases where such a link or nexus was not self-evident. The aid provided has to 
substantially affect the commission of the crimes charged. It is insufficient to simply prove the 
flow of aid on the one side and the fact that crimes were committed on the other. That was not 
even contested by the Defence during trial. The linkage was the missing element. To overlook 
that the establishment of a link (any link for that matter) between the conduct and the 
commission of the crimes is necessary for conviction of an accomplice is to overlook the 
essential element of accomplice liability. The nexus was the missing element and the missing 
criticism of the prosecutorial work in Perišić trial among all the legal scholars interpreting the 
Perišić’s judgment is striking. 
Regrettably, the Perišić Trial Chamber did not rely on specific evidence of assistance which had 
a substantial effect on the commission of crimes, but rather determined criminal responsibility on 
the basis of circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from the general dependence of the 
VRS on the VJ for its war effort and Perišić’s knowledge of the criminal objectives of the VRS. 
In short, any assistance by the VJ to the VRS in their conduct of hostilities, was to be regarded as 
aidding and abetting their criminal acts.1086 The argument is, that the standard adopted essentially 
amounts to a form of strict liability and is contrary to the established jurisprudence of ad hoc 
tribunals. Unfortunately it also ignores the practical reality of contemporary armed conflicts. 
                                                          
1086 Perišić Trial Judgment, the Majority’s approach designates the VRS as a manifestly illegal organization. 
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By analogy and considering the recent situation in Syria, where a number of foreign 
governments (such as the US and the United Kingdom) were providing various types of military 
aid to either the Syrian regime or (more likely) the opposition, knowing that both sides were 
engaged in international crimes and that the aid provided was contributing or was likely to 
contribute to the commission of these crimes, these foreign leaders are, according to the 
reasoning of the Perišić Trial Judgment, culpable as aiders and abettors. As argued above, the 
Perišić Appeals Chamber is certainly correct that there should be a difference between 
contributions to the war effort as such and to the commission of specific crimes. Admittedly, 
drawing the line between the two seems rather challenging by using a specific direction standard. 
It could be argued that Perišić had every reason to know that the aid that he was providing to the 
VRS would (also) be used in the commission of international crimes. The commission of such 
crimes was perhaps not an intrinsic feature of their war effort, yet these crimes were not being 
committed by some random soldiers, but as part of a deliberate, systematic state policy. In such 
circumstances it could be argued that it is profoundly unsatisfactory to say that Perišić was not 
guilty at all under any pertinent theory of criminal responsibility. It is submitted that had the 
Prosecution chosen another mode of liability (e.g. JCE), his role in provision of military aid 
would probably be sufficient for establishing criminal responsibility. 
Recognizing Perišić case to be factually distinct from any of the cases that have come before the 
ICTY, or any other international court for that matter, it is necessary to acknowledge the political 
implications for military generals or political leaders, if the standards as articulated in the Perišić 
Trial Judgment were to be applied in similar scenarios around the world. However, if one holds 
that the applicable actus reus standard needs to be that the aid was “specifically directed” to the 
commission of the crime, then the “specifically directed” standard is, coincidentally, almost 
identical to the standard for attribution in the Articles on State Responsibility.1087 Moreover, the 
Perišić case is noteworthy for yet another reason: the actions which were central to the charges 
against Perišić crossed State boundaries and encompassed assistance to an army of which Perišić 
was not a member. The impact of the Perišić Trial Chamber’s determination is specific to 
individuals in positions of high command in national armed forces who are frequently supplying 
logistic and personnel assistance to the armed forces of another State or a non-state actor 
                                                          
1087 See infra Part III, Chapters 13 and 14.  
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operating in another State. Unfortunately, such transactions are an unavoidable reality of 
contemporary armed conflicts.1088  
The jurisprudence of the ICTY is rich with instances of judicial creativity, which have been 
directly responsible for the progressive development of core elements of substantive 
international criminal and humanitarian law.1089 In so doing, there has been an implicit 
acknowledgement from Perišić’s Trial Chamber that the law cannot remain static and must 
respond to the challenges of contemporary armed conflict.1090 With the establishment of the 
ICTY, the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali mandated a “Golden Rule” to be followed 
in the judicial interpretation and application of the Statute, namely, fidelity to the principle of 
legality and customary international law.1091 In Perišić, the Trial Chamber has broken this rule 
on both counts. If the principle of legality is to be taken seriously with respect to aiding and 
abetting crimes, then foreseeability and interpretative certainty must attach to the understanding 
to be given to “substantial effect” which takes into account the centrality of a “specific direction” 
criterion. The Perišić Trial Chamber failed to square its interpretation of the requisite objective 
and subjective standards for aiding and abetting international crimes with any observable 
customary standard.1092 In this regard, it took no heed of the guidance to be derived from Article 
25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute which includes a “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the commission 
of such crime” element.1093 The result is not only uncertainty as to the customary standard, but 
another instance of inconsistent and divergent standards in international criminal law.  
International criminal law should, by definition, seek to prosecute those who bear the greatest 
responsibility, including those who sponsor the perpetrators of international crimes. The 
safeguards within the traditional elements of aiding and abetting liability, as reiterated by the 
                                                          
1088 See also, Perišić Trial Judgment, Judge Moloto Dissent, para. 33. “If we are to accept the Majority’s conclusion 
based solely on the finding of dependence, as it is in casu, without requiring that such assistance be specifically 
directed to the assistance of crimes, then all military and political leaders, who on the basis of circumstantial 
evidence are found to provide logistical assistance to a foreign army dependent on such assistance, can meet the 
objective element of aiding and abetting. I respectfully hold that such an approach is manifestly inconsistent with the 
law”. See also, para. 32. 
1089 See generally, Darcy, S. and Powderly, J., Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011; Shahabuddeen, M., supra note 345. 
1090 See generally, Tadić Trial Judgment.  
1091 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of UN Security Council Resolution 808 of 3 May 1993, 
U.N. Doc S/25704, para 34. 
1092 See e.g. Tadić Trial Judgment, paras. 661-692.  
1093 Rome Statute, Article 25(3)(c).  
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Appeals Chambers in Taylor, Šainović, Popović et. al and Stanišić are insufficient to ensure that 
in any “foreign assistance cases” only those who have committed culpable acts will be held 
responsible. As the Taylor Appeals Chamber importantly held, the substantial effect requirement 
should be “sufficient to ensure that the innocent are not unjustly held liable for the acts of 
others”.1094 However, a finding of substantial effect where the nexus between the acts of the 
accomplice and the crimes of the principal offender(s) is missing, is necessarily flawed. Those 
political and military leaders who provide military assistance to a conflict situation but are 
otherwise external to it, should not automatically be convicted if crimes are committed by way of 
the aid provided. Rather, only if such leaders act with the knowledge that their assistance will 
facilitate crimes and, in fact, their actions substantially assist the commission of crimes, can they 
be held accountable. 
Furthermore, the substantial contribution analysis may well identify factors that are morally 
relevant to the determination of guilt. However, there is a difference between moral relevance 
and a criminal legal standard that provides the type of notice and predictability necessary to 
safeguard the liberty of the accused in a manner consistent with the principle of legality. The 
unique challenges of international criminal law enforcement demand clarity of those rules and 
standards that seek to limit complicit liability. Definite rules of law further the principle of 
legality by constraining discretion. Highlighting this point, Flavio Noto has expressed concern 
that the substantial contribution requirement invites an arbitrary determination, one reached only 
»after the blameworthiness of [a defendant's] conduct has been decided on«.1095 While this risk 
may be most obvious in the context of substantial contribution, it also complicates the other 
competing approaches to aiding and abetting. In the foreign assistance context, there is special 
need for certainty with respect to the boundaries between legitimate and criminal efforts, given 
that a vague standard could unduly deter valuable foreign aid programs that pursue important 
foreign policy goals by reason of a concern that some of the aid would unavoidably fall into the 
wrong hands. While judicial discretion is often accepted in domestic law where the adjudication 
of criminal law standards proceeds in the context of a mature political or legal system that lends 
legitimacy to the domestic criminal proceedings, the enforcement of international criminal law 
through international courts lacks such a strong legitimizing foundation.  
                                                          
1094 Taylor Appeals Judgment, para. 480. 
1095 Noto, F., supra note 413, p. 98. 
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Some uncertainty is indeed endemic to criminal law. Thus, culpability for aiding and abetting 
will inevitably involve some indeterminacy. The more pertinent issue is whether the law can 
manage that indeterminacy in a way that renders the assignment of criminal responsibility 
sufficiently predictable whilst also maintaining a normatively meaningful distinction between 
guilt and innocence. The specific direction requirement indicates an important way of managing 
such indeterminacy: by providing that aiding and abetting requires the assistance be 
directed/aimed towards the crimes, the specific direction requirement seeks to avoid the 
imposition of criminal responsibility in close cases, reserving punishment only for situations that 
are well past the line of what could be considered reasonable. The international criminal law 
should promote the foreseeability of punishment by clearly distinguishing those actors who 
pursue legitimate policy objectives by taking affirmative precautions to prevent the use of their 
support for criminal purposes, from those who do not. Where such precautions are pursued in 
good faith, the law should not demand a risk-free environment. Accordingly, knowledge that 
some aid will inevitably, despite all reasonable precautions, find itself directed to criminal 
purposes is not the kind of knowing contribution the law should target. Thus, the resolution of 
the foreign assistance cases requires a moral judgment that is not reducible to the recitation of 
elements debated by international tribunals. The result is indeterminacy. Part II has demonstrated 
the current state of the law does not define complicity with sufficient particularity and the 
competing approaches to aiding and abetting all provide for variation of interpretation and 
application, producing the greatest indeterminacy.  
The ultimate resolution as to whether specific direction is a requirement for aiding and abetting 
liability is likely to have a huge impact not only on the determination of individual criminal 
responsibility but will influence the behaviour of States as well. Part II has examined provision 
of military aid within the framework of individual criminal responsibility. In determining actus 
reus of individual criminal responsibility for complicity, the international court analysed state 
policy on provision of military aid, rather than the conduct of an individual, thereby blurring the 
boundaries between the two separate regimes of international responsibility. This proposition is 
further examined in Part III dealing with provision of military aid within the framework of state 
responsibility. 
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Individual complicity can be applied to hold political and military leaders accountable for 
provision of military aid to a party committing international crimes. Part III explores whether 
this particular mode of liability shares some parallels with standards developed in the domain of 
state complicity for the same act (conduct) of provision of military aid. Part II has illustrated that 
the establishment of an individual case of complicity for provision of military aid provides for an 
additional point of contact between state and individual criminal responsibility in international 
crimes. By focusing on the same conduct, these two forms of international responsibility grow 
closer,  and an increasing need to guarantee consistency in the way each evolves arises. 
221 
 
PART III: STATE COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
8. Introduction 
Historically, international law failed to adequately regulate state complicity in the wrongdoing of 
other States. Only since the World War II a norm has emerged to hold a State responsible for 
aiding another State in committing an internationally wrongful act. The norm represents an 
international corollary to domestic norms that hold responsible in tort and criminal law one who 
aids another in committing a wrongful act. State complicity was not mentioned by the writers on 
state responsibility until the ILC drafted a complicity provision in the 1970s. International law 
traditionally contained no general prohibition on state complicity in the internationally wrongful 
act of another State – there was no international analogue to common domestic doctrines of 
accomplice or accessorial liability.1096 Short of joint participation, as a general rule, participants 
in another State’s commission of an internationally wrongful act were not implicated by 
international law’s assignment of responsibility. In his Hague Lectures of 1939, Ago argued that: 
[I]t appears inconceivable in international law to have any form of complicity, participation, or 
incitement to a delict. The law of nations, in its current structure, does not allow for such forms of a 
consideration shared by several subjects with respect to a single delict; these constructs are 
characteristic of the nature and development of domestic criminal law.1097  
Further, historically, international law was addressed to States, and indeed States remain the 
primary bearers of rights and obligations in international law.1098 The absence of regulation of 
the conduct of non-state actors simply denied the possibility of state complicity in relation to that 
conduct, for there was no wrong to which the State might be linked by the complicity rule. As 
international law has come to recognize conduct other than State’s conduct as internationally 
wrongful, the conceptual possibilities for complicity have expanded.1099 
Part III examines the status of the complicity norm in international law of state responsibility. It 
argues that such a norm has bacome a customary law. By examining the normative framework of 
                                                          
1096 Quigley, J., supra note 356, p. 77. 
1097 Ago, R., Le Delit International, 68 Recueil des Cours, 1939, pp. 415-554, at p. 432. 
1098 Jennings, R. and Watts, A., supra note 285, 16; Crawford, J., Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 
8th Edition, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 115.  
1099 See infra Chapter 13. 
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complicity in the international law of state responsibility, Part III argues that a particularly 
exacting standard must be met for a State to be responsible under international law for providing 
or facilitating assistance to those engaging in international crimes, notwithstanding some judicial 
disagreement as to how stringent that standard should be. International law envisages different 
standards for when a State is implicated in violations committed by an individual or a group (a 
non-state actor), compared to when those are perpetrated by another State. Part III contends that 
a State providing military aid to another State is responsible for complicity in internationally 
wrongful acts committed by the receiving State utilizing contributed resources, where the 
assisting State intends the contributed resources to be so used. It demonstrates that state practice 
supports assigning international responsibility to a State which deliberately participates in the 
internationally wrongful act of another State through the provision of aid or assistance, in 
circumstances where the obligation breached is equally opposable to the assisting State.1100 
However, a State providing military aid to a non-state actor is not responsible for complicity in 
internationally wrongful acts committed by a non-state actor if it is not proven that such groups 
were instructed, directed or controlled by the aiding State in relation to a specific conduct.  
The rule reflected in Article 16 ARSIWA should be understood to entrench a general complicity 
rule in the law of state responsibility, at least with respect to State participation in wrongdoing 
committed by other States. Article 16 prohibits general forms of complicity – aid or assistance – 
in the commission of any international wrong by the recipient State, so long as the act committed 
by the principal State would be wrongful also if committed by the accomplice State.1101 The 
general rules on complicity embodied in the ARSIWA need to be seen as part of a larger network 
of rules on complicity. Other rules may be found in primary norms which directly establish 
responsibility on complicity. With respect to the use of force in international relations, both the 
jus ad bellum and the jus in bello prescribe additional rules which provide for more demanding 
criteria that States need to respect to avoid responsibility for complicity. Where there exist 
special rules on complicity in international law, Article 16 ARSIWA continues to provide a 
                                                          
1100 For example, in 1984 Iran protested against the supply of financial and military aid to Iraq by the UK, which 
allegedly included chemical weapons used in attacks against Iranian troops, on the ground that the assistance was 
facilitating acts of aggression by Iraq. The British government denied both the allegation that it had chemical 
weapons and that is had supplied them to Iraq. See New York Times, 6 March 1984, p.A1, col. 1; In 1998, a similar 
allegation surfaced that Sudan had assisted Iraq to manufacture chemical weapons by allowing Sudanese 
installations to be used by Iraq technicians for steps in production of nerve gas. The allegation was denied by Iraq’s 
representative to the United Nations. See New York Times, 26 August 1998, p. A8, col. 3. 
1101 Article 16 ARSIWA. 
223 
matrix for interpretation thereof. These special rules allow for an attribution of responsibility in 
situations where States are supporting other violations of international law under different 
conditions as would be the case of responsibility for complicity under Article 16.  
Part III demonstrates that the provisions on complicity pertaining to States find scarce 
application in practice. This is by reason of States being bound by a variety of primary rules of 
conduct that serve to limit or prevent them from contributing to international wrongs.1102  
Finally, Part III illustrates that the general standard for a State to be responsible under 
international law for providing or facilitating assistance to those engaging in international crimes 
has some similarities to that applied to individuals under international criminal law, even though 
States themselves are not criminally liable or subject to criminal sanctions under international 
law.1103 
8.1. The Notion of State Complicity 
The category of military aid is broad. Granting military support to another State or a non-state 
actor may comprise different levels of State involvement. It can consist of security assistance in 
the sense that a State has decided to furnish military supplies or services to another State free of 
charge. It can also involve the furnishing of supplies in exchange for other goods or money. 
Finally, mention has to be made of private arms sales and supplies of military goods and 
services, which, in vast majority of States, need to be licensed by the home State’s government. 
Moreover, through permitting the use of its territory by another State to carry out an armed 
attack against a third State an assisting State may also breach the obligation not to use force. 
Further, a State may incur responsibility if it assists another State to circumvent sanctions 
imposed by the UN Security Council or provides material aid to a State that uses the aid to 
commit violations of international law.1104 In this respect, the UN General Assembly has called 
on Member States in a number of cases to refrain from supplying arms and other military 
assistance to States found to be committing serious human right violations.1105 Supplying 
military aid to another State or a non-state actor which uses it to violate international law could 
                                                          
1102 See infra Chapters 11 and 15. 
1103 See infra Chapter 9. See generally Blum, G., The Crime and Punishment of States, Yale Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 38, 2013, pp. 57–122; Jørgensen, N. H. B., supra note 20; Spinedi, M., supra note 26. 
1104 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, para. 9. 
1105 Report of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the Third Committee of the General Assembly, Draft 
Resolution XVII, 14 December 1982, A/37/745, p. 50. 
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potentially lead to responsibility of the complicit State in whichever form this support takes. 
These different degrees of State involvement would arguably play a role in an ultimate 
determination as to whether or not a given State incurs responsibility for complicity. From many 
forms of complicity, this dissertation focuses merely on military aid provided by States to other 
States or non-state actors in armed conflicts.  
Complicity is not a term of art in international law1106 although it is frequently employed to 
describe situations in which one State furnishes aid or assistance to another State’s wrongful 
conduct.1107 It was once used by the ILC in its deliberations on supportive States,1108 but was 
discharged in favour of the more neutral sounding concept of ‘aid and assistance’ which now 
appears in Article 16 of the ARSIWA.1109 In public international law the term ‘complicity’ is 
mostly used as a reference to Articles 16 and 41 of the ARSIWA on ‘aid and assistance’ and 
assistance in serious breaches of peremptory norms, and the paragraphs on ‘complicity’ in the 
Genocide Convention and the Torture Convention.1110 According to the Articles on State 
Responsibility, complicity liability arises where a State facilitates the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by another State.1111 An internationally wrongful act is one that 
violates an international obligation of a State.1112 The ILC has stated that a State is liable as an 
accessory ‘whether the principal wrongful act is committed against a State or a particular group 
of States, a subject of international law other than a State, or international community as a 
whole’.1113  
Complicity is a particular way of contributing to a wrongdoing. Accomplices are held 
responsible for their own contribution to the principal’s wrong. The wrong of the principal 
should not be imputed or attributed to the accomplice.1114 This is how the rule in Article 16 
                                                          
1106 Genocide case, para. 419. 
1107 See, e.g. Lowe, V., International Law, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 121. 
1108 Ago, R., Seventh Report on State Responsibility of the Special Rapporteur, at 30th session of the ILC (1978), pp. 
108-20, UN Doc. A/CN.4/307 and Add.1-2, YBILC 1978, Volume II, Part One, p. 31, at p. 60, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add. I (pt. I) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/30/30sess.htm> (8. 5. 1978) (hereinafter: Seventh 
report on State Responsibility), pp. 31, 58-60. 
1109 UN GA Res 56/83 (12 December 2001). 
1110 Article III (e) of the Genocide Convention; Article 4(1) of the Torture Convention.  
1111 ILC Report on State Responsibility, p. 99. 
1112 ARSIWA, Article 3 (b). The act must actually be committed; ILC Report on State Responsibility, pp. 255-6. 
1113 ILC Report on State Responsibility, p. 105. 
1114 Jackson, M., supra note 348, p. 167. 
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ARSIWA is structured. Although at some point complicity crosses over into joint 
commission,1115 the position under Article 16 is made clear in the Commentary: 
In accordance with Article 16, the assisting State is responsible for its own act in deliberately assisting 
another State to breach an international obligation by which they are both bound. It is not responsible, 
as such, for the act of the assisted State.1116 
8.2. Interaction Between Primary and Secondary Rules in Prohibiting State 
Complicity  
International law prohibits state complicity by providing for different layers of responsibility. 
The issue of state complicity involves a complex interplay between primary (substantive) and 
secondary (framework) rules of international law. The responsibility of complicit States based on 
primary rules can be engaged in two ways: either a complicit State is responsible for the 
violation of a primary rule to which it is bound itself, or it incurs derivative responsibility for its 
assistance to the internationally wrongful act of another State. Furthermore, complicity may also 
be discussed is in the context of secondary rules of international law, attributing the grave wrong 
itself to the State (i.e. the attribution rules). 
8.2.1. Primary rules 
Primary rules are independent obligations of conduct, which do not lead to the attribution of the 
grave wrong itself to the State. When pertaining to complicit conduct, responsibility under a 
primary rule can take two shapes: responsibility under the norm that covers the grave wrong and 
that of responsibility under a norm different from that of the grave wrong. The first form results 
when provisions on the commission of acts are interpreted as inherently containing duties not to 
assist in that commission. Provisions such as Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions or the ‘complicity’ clause in the Genocide Convention create responsibility under a 
norm different from the grave wrong to which its complicit conduct pertains.1117 Complicity 
rules of a primary nature exist both in customary and in treaty law.  
8.2.1.1. Primary rules of Complicity in Customary International Law 
                                                          
1115 Crawford, J., State Responsibility: The General Part, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 325-61; Lowe, V., 
Responsibility for the Conduct of Other States, 101 Japanese Journal of International Law 1, 2007, p. 4.  
1116 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16 (10). 
1117 Nicaragua case, para. 192; Genocide case, para. 419. 
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The ICJ held that a State may be responsible under customary international law for the rendering 
of unlawful ‘aid and assistance’.1118 The ILC sought to codify such responsibility through its 
Articles 16 and 41, which do not lead to the attribution of the grave wrong itself to the assisting 
State. In the words of the relevant Commentary: 
The situation of aid or assistance must be distinguished from that of co-perpetrators or co-participants 
in an internationally wrongful act. Under Article 16, aid or assistance by the assisting State is not to be 
confused with the responsibility of the acting State.1119 
Accordingly, Article 16 established derivative state responsibility for violation of a negative 
obligation. One way in which the term complicity might be used is in determining derivative 
state responsibility; that is, when one State is derivatively responsible for assisting another State 
in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. This type of complicity is analytically 
distinct to attribution as the rules of attribution concern the attribution of conduct to a subject of 
international law (i.e. a State); they are distinct from the question of responsibility. Rules of 
derivative responsibility focus on the relationship between a principal and an accomplice. Thus, 
derivative responsibility is generally predicated on the internationally wrongful act of a principal 
State. As such, it is distinct from the question of attributing the conduct of the agents of one State 
to another State, which, in itself, says nothing about whether an internationally wrongful act has 
been committed or whether any State’s international responsibility arises. 
This form of responsibility is derivative of the principal State’s responsibility. As such, where 
the principal is not violating a particular obligation, the assisting State cannot bear derivative 
responsibility for the violation of that obligation. For example, if the assisting State is a party to 
the European Convention on Human Rights, but the principal State is not, then the assisting State 
cannot be said to bear derivative responsibility for violating the European Convention.1120 
                                                          
1118 Genocide case, para. 420. 
1119 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, para. 1. See also Commentary on Article 41, 
para 11. 
1120 The issue of extraterritoriality may also be relevant here. If the principal state is not bound by certain of its 
human rights obligations while acting outside of its territory, its responsibility cannot arise under those obligations 
in these circumstances. Thus, ironically, the assisting, territorial state could not bear derivative responsibility, 
notwithstanding the fact that the human rights violations are occurring on its territory. However, if the conduct of 
the perpetrators is attributable to the assisting, territorial state, its responsibility would arise if the relevant human 
rights norms entailed positive obligations.  
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Derivative state responsibility arising from complicit conduct is governed by the rule set forth in 
Article 16 of ARSIWA.1121 That Article, titled “Aid or assistance in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act”, provides: 
“A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by 
the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:  
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and  
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”1122  
 
Thus, Article 16 prohibits general form of complicity – aid or assistance – in the commission of 
any international wrong by the recipient State, so long as the act committed by the principal State 
would be wrongful if committed by the accomplice State.1123 As further argued in Chapter 15, 
the rule reflected in Article 16 has been accepted as one of customary international law.1124  
As derivative responsibility is a lesser form of responsibility, it seems that the legal threshold for 
derivative responsibility could not be the same as that for state responsibility (it should be 
somewhat lower than that for principal responsibility). Thus, it would be absurd to have the same 
level of involvement that gives rise to derivative responsibility also make the conduct of the 
perpetrators attributable to the assisting State. In the light of the Commentary to the Articles, as 
well as state practice, it is clear that derivative responsibility requires more than 
acquiescence.1125 Thus, the standard for attribution must necessarily be higher. 
8.2.1.2. Primary rules of Complicity in Treaty Law 
Treaties that aim to prevent the commission of grave wrongs employ the following types of 
provisions: duties of prevention (e.g. prevention to cooperate with other States, implement 
legislation of exercise due care), duties not to specifically assist, and duties to prevent and punish 
commission by individuals, when that duty is read as inherently banning State participation. One 
of the examples where ideas of complicity and its related forms of responsibility played a role is 
                                                          
1121 Aust, H. P., Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 102.  
1122 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16 (1), p. 65. 
1123 Article 16 ARSIWA. 
1124 Considering Serbia’s potential complicity in the genocide in Srebrenica under Article III (e) of the Genocide 
Convention, the ICJ declared that Article 16 reflects a rule of customary international law. See Genocide case, para 
420. 
1125 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, p. 66-67. 
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the law of neutrality.1126 Neutrality regulates the relationship between neutral States and 
belligerents through the core principles of non-participation and non-discrimination.1127 The 
principle of non-participation gives rise to a number of duties that are related to forms of 
complicity.1128 Particularly, Article 6 of the Hague Convention concerning the Rights and Duties 
of Neutral Powers in Naval War provides that ‘[t]he supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, 
by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of war-ships, ammunition, or war material of any kind 
whatever, is forbidden’.1129 The law of neutrality was inevitably affected by the rise of the 
Charter system of collective security and the prohibition on the use of force in international 
law.1130 Interestingly, the Charter system sets out a rule much closer in rationale to that of a 
prohibition on complicity. Article 2(5) of the Charter requires that ‘[A]ll Members…refrain from 
giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or 
enforcement action’.1131 The decision of the Security Council to take preventive or enforcement 
action triggers Member States’ obligations of non-assistance.1132  
In common Article I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Article 2, paragraph 5, of the UN 
Charter the State parties have agreed that they will not render aid that might facilitate certain 
wrongful acts of other States. In common Article I they agree to do nothing, whether by material 
aid or political act or otherwise, to promote violations of the humanitarian rules by other States 
parties. In these instances the prohibition against complicity is assumed as a treaty obligation. 
These anti-complicity provisions contribute to the body of state practice, especially since breach 
of the treaty obligation may also be a breach of an obligation under general international law.  
A prohibition on participation may also be construed from general principles of international 
law, such as the principle that a State cannot do through another what it cannot do itself.1133 A 
ban on aid and assistance in grave wrongs may originate from the concept of obligation erga 
                                                          
1126 Aust, H. P., supra note 1121, p. 15-23. 
1127 Dinstein, Y., War, Aggression and Self-Defence, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 25. 
1128 Lowe, V., supra note 1115, p. 13. 
1129 Article 6 of the Convention concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, adopted on 18 
October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910, 36 Stat 2415. 
1130 Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996, ICJ Reports 226 (89); Dinstein, 
Y., supra note 1127, p. 176-80. 
1131 Article 2(5) Charter of the United Nations, adopted on 26 June 1945, entered into force on 25 October 1945, 1 
UNTS XVI. 
1132 Dinstein, Y., supra note 1127, p. 176; Aust, H.P., supra note 1121, pp. 158-62 for discussion of UN resolutions 
relating to non-assistance.  
1133 See ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16 ARSIWA, para. 6. 
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omnes, as suggested by the ICJ in its Wall case.1134 Judges Burgenthal, Kooijmans and Higgins 
disapproved such a suggestion and founded the ban on the argument that once the ICJ or the 
Security Council determines a situation of unlawful activity exists, States are under a duty not to 
assist that activity. The legal basis for that duty is found in Article 241135 and 251136 of the UN 
Charter or the Court’s role as the UN’s principal judicial organ, depending on the organ that 
made the determination.1137  
The complicity rules that find the most application in practice are those derived from treaties 
such as the Genocide Convention and human rights conventions, as well as ad hoc obligations 
imposed by the Security Council. Most potentially complicit conduct will be barred by domestic 
law1138 and rules related to the use of force, friendly relations, neutrality and non-intervention. 
However, these are not international rules seeking to ban influence over an internationally 
wrongful act; accordingly, they do not establish complicity. Similarly, European law bans the 
export of weapons that could endanger the receiving State’s compliance with IHL, human rights 
and international stability.1139 
                                                          
1134 The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion in the Wall case determined that erga omnes character of certain obligations 
violated by Israel triggers the obligation for all States not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation 
created by such construction. See Advisory Opinion in the Wall case, p. 6. 
1135 Article 24 of the UN Charter determines the Functions and Powers of the Security Council (in order to ensure 
effective action by the UN, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
1136 Article 25 of the UN Charter states that the Members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of 
the Security Council. 
1137 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins in the Wall case, para. 38.  
1138 US law prohibits its government from selling arms or otherwise providing aid to state that are involved in gross 
human rights abuses. The Arms Export Control Act limits the use of U.S. weapons given or sold to a foreign country 
to 'internal security' and 'legitimate self-defense' and prevents their use against civilians (22 U.S.C. para. 2754). The 
Foreign Assistance Act states that 'No assistance may be provided under this part of the government of any country 
which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights' (22 U.S.C. para. 
2151n(a)). The Constitution of the Netherlands entails an obligation to 'promote the international legal order', whilst 
that of Germany imposes a duty to penalize acts capable disturbing the peaceful coexistence between peoples'. 
Articles 91 and 26, respectively. The Leahy Law in the United States prohibits funding to governments and foreign 
military units if they are engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights or have committed a gross violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have been taken. 
(Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations, 2001, Section 563 of Pub.L. No. 
106–429, 114 Stat. 1900A-17, (2000); Department of Defence Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub.L. No. 106–259, para. 
8092, 114 Stat. 656, 2000.) The European Union Common Position on Exports of Military Technology and 
Equipment provides that Member States shall deny an export licence if there is a clear risk that the military 
technology or equipment to be exported might be used in the commission of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. See EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules 
governing control of exports of military technology and equipment, art. 2(2)(c).] 
1139 Common Position 944/2008, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri= OJ:l:2008:355:00990103: 
NL:PDF. 
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International law furthermore contains rules prohibiting a State from rendering any aid to rebel 
groups who conduct an illegal war or when neutrality has been declared. All aid that is not purely 
humanitarian will be illegal under these rules, even when it is not or only remotely connected to 
the commission of grave wrongs. This is illustrated, inter alia, by the ICJ’s judgment in the 
Nicaragua case, where the grave breaches complained of were not attributed to the assisting 
State and taken only as evidence of damage caused by violations of the principle of the non-use 
of force, non-intervention and humanity. Similarly, duties imposed by the Security Council when 
it pursues international stability may de facto mitigate the risk that grave wrongs occur. 
The possibility for an external organ to impose ad hoc measures guarding against complicity 
supplements the above body of permanent primary and secondary rules. For example, recent 
events in Libya led the Security Council to impose an arms embargo to minimize the likelihood 
of violence against the domestic population.1140 Acting under Chapter VII and taking measures 
under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo and 
indicated that all Member States should ‘prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to 
[Libya]…of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military 
vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment’ and other items.1141 It is clear from the 
resolution that this action was taken based on concerns that Libya would use these items to 
engage in violent acts against civilians and civilian objects within its sovereign territory.1142 
Thus, the Security Council directed Member States to abstain from the shipment of weapons and 
related military aid to Libya in order to prevent them from engaging in complicity.  
8.2.1.3. State Responsibility for failure to fulfil a positive obligation 
Another way in which the concept of complicity is employed is in the context of a failure to fulfil 
a positive obligation; e.g., where a State has a duty to prevent certain conduct. Complicity, even 
by mere acquiescence, by State officials in the carrying out of such conduct would constitute a 
violation of that State’s positive obligation. 
                                                          
1140 UN Security Council Resolution 1970 [on peace and security in Africa] of 26 February 2011, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1970 (2011), adopted by the SC at its 6491st Meeting, on 26 February 2011.  
1141 Ibidem, para. 9.  
1142 Ibidem, para. 2(a). 
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It is well-established that an omission can constitute an internationally wrongful act giving rise to 
state responsibility whenever a State is under a duty to act.1143 The scope of positive obligations 
– obligations imposing a duty to act – is determined by primary rules. The primary rules set forth 
in each of the principal human rights treaties entail positive obligations.1144 
While the scope of positive obligation varies in accordance with the primary rules,1145 the 
primary rules of the principal “bill of rights” type treaties1146 were formulated in similar terms, 
and have been interpreted by their respective judicial and quasi-judicial institutions to impose 
comparable obligations. These institutions, drawing upon the Law of State Responsibility for 
Injury to Aliens, have generally settled upon a standard of “due diligence”, while recognizing 
that the level of conduct actually required by this standard will vary depending upon the right in 
question, as well as the circumstances of the particular case.1147 
Knowledge that violations are being perpetrated – once the State is on notice of human rights 
violations being committed on its territory, the conduct required of States is certainly increased – 
the State must do more; the obligation remains formally the same, but what is required to satisfy 
the obligation increases.  
The standard for failure to fulfil a positive obligation must be lower than that for attribution of 
the conduct of the perpetrators to the State, and presumably also lower than for derivative 
responsibility for violation of a negative obligation.1148 
As demonstrated above, different legal issues to which complicity may be applied introduce a 
degree of incoherence into the law of state responsibility. The term complicity may be 
understood to encompass a broad spectrum of conduct, with varying degrees of participation in 
the principal violation. These different degrees of participation may engage different modes of 
                                                          
1143 Cerone, J., Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The Application of International Human Rights Law During 
Armed Conflict, Occupation, and Peace Operations, 39 Vand. Journal of Transnational Law, 1447, 1464 (2006). 
1144 Ahmed, T, and Butler, I. J., Human Rights: An International Law Perspective, 17 European Journal of 
International Law, 4, 2006, pp. 771-801, at p. 783. 
1145 For example, the scope of positive obligations under the ICCPR is different from the scope of positive 
obligations under the Convention Against Torture. See ICCPR and the Torture Convention. 
1146 See, e.g., ICCPR, European Convention, American Convention on Human rights, November 22, 1969, and 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981. 
1147 See, e.g., Velasquez-Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-American Court of human Rights, No. 4,. at 153 (July 29, 
1988), see also Genocide case, para 430. 
1148 Cerone, J., Re-examining international responsibility: »Complicity« in the context of human rights violations, 14 
ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 525, 2008, p. 533. 
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responsibility, both direct responsibility (of a principal) and derivative responsibility (of an 
accomplice). 
8.2.2. Secondary rules – The Attribution rules 
Complicity may also be discussed in the context of attribution. The issue of attribution arises in 
the context of the so-called secondary or “framework” rules of international law, as reflected in 
the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility.1149 Secondary rules attribute the grave wrong itself to 
the State. Examples of these are found in Articles 8, 17 and 18 ARSIWA, covering direction, 
control and coercion. The application leads to the State becoming responsible for the grave 
wrong itself, requiring that it take steps to terminate that wrong, and obligates it to remedy its 
circumstances.1150 This sets the Articles apart from primary rules discussed above. The concept 
of attribution is an important component in the determination of an internationally wrongful act. 
Since States can only act through individuals, there needs to be a way to connect the conduct1151 
of actors to States. This is achieved by examining the relationship between a State and the 
individual perpetrators of a given act to see if there is a strong enough link to attribute the 
perpetrators’ conduct to that State.  
Where the link between perpetrators and the assisting State is strong enough to attribute the 
conduct of the perpetrators to the assisting State, the assisting State becomes a perpetrating State, 
giving rise to its international responsibility as such. This participating State bears independent 
or joint responsibility for breaching the negative obligation to refrain from violating human 
rights.  
The standards for attribution are set forth in Part I, Chapter 2 of the Articles on State 
responsibility.1152 In situations where the actor is, or can be assimilated to, an organ of the State, 
the conduct of de jure organs, lent organs, or de facto organs is attributable to the State. These 
                                                          
1149 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Part One, Chapter II, Articles 4-11. 
1150 ARSIWA, Articles 2, 3, 28, 30, 31, 34-9. 
1151 Although the term »conduct« can refer to both acts and omissions, in the case of omissions the issue of 
attribution does not directly arise. »As omission is a lack of action, an actor is not requires. Hence, the state is 
essentially in a constant default of state of omission. However, in order for an omission to constitute a basis of 
responsibility, there must be a duty to act. The question of establishing a duty to act will turn on the content of the 
relevant primary rule. Thus, in these circumstances, the issue of attribution collapses into the content of the primary 
rule.« See Cerone, J., supra note 1143, pp. 1447, 1464 (2006). 
1152 ILC Report on State Responsibility, pp. 38-54. 
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would apply only if the perpetrators were under the exclusive control1153 or in a situation of 
complete dependence1154 upon, the assisting State, which clearly would be more than an assisting 
State if this were the case. 
The next set of attribution rules apply in situations where the actor is not an organ of the State, 
but is in fact acting on behalf of the State in particular circumstances. These rules focus on the 
particular conduct of the actor in the particular circumstances to determine whether the actor 
was, in fact, acting on behalf of the State during the relevant period. The conduct of this type of 
actor (referred to as a “non-state actor”) may be attributed to a State when the actor “is in fact 
acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, a State in carrying out the 
conduct.”1155 In the absence of specific instructions, a fairly high degree of control has been 
required to attribute the conduct to the State. According to the Commentary on the Articles: 
“such conduct will be attributable to the State only if it directed or controlled the specific operation 
and the conduct complained of formed an integral part of that operation. The principle does not extent 
to conduct which was only incidentally or peripherally associated with an operation and which 
escaped from the State's direction or control”.1156  
In the absence of direction or control, the conduct of a non-state actor may be attributed to a 
State when the actor is “exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or 
default of the official authorities”;1157 when the conduct is subsequently adopted by a State;1158 or 
when the conduct is that “of an insurrectional movement that becomes the new government of a 
State.”1159 
These standards establish a fairly high threshold of State involvement or, alternatively, de facto 
State action by non-state actors accompanied by State authorization or disengagement. Instances 
of lesser participation by State organs in the conduct of a non-state actors are not sufficient to 
                                                          
1153 Ibidem, pp. 43-44. 
1154 Genocide case, para. 393. 
1155 ILC Report on State Responsibility, p. 47.  
1156 Ibidem, p. 47. 
1157 Ibidem, p. 49. 
1158 Ibidem, p. 53.  
1159 Ibidem, p. 50.  
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render such conduct attributable to the State under the traditional rules of attribution.1160 
Chapters 13 and 14 further analyse the role of state complicity in international crimes committed 
by non-state actors.  
While the term complicity could be used to describe situations encompassed by the above rules, 
the term usually connotes a lesser degree of involvement. The common sense understanding of 
complicity is that the complicit party is merely assisting and is not the directly responsible party, 
as it would be pursuant to a finding of attribution. However, the regional human rights 
institutions have gone further, stating that lesser degree of involvement, even mere acquiescence, 
would be sufficient to find the perpetrator’s conduct attributable to the complicit State. The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires State parties to “respect” and to 
“ensure” the rights contained therein, reflecting both negative and positive obligations.1161 The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in contrast, employs only 
the phrase to “secure” rights, perhaps encouraging a conflation (combination) of positive and 
negative obligations.1162 However, the European Court of Human Rights has expressly 
delineated the positive and negative dimensions of the obligation to “secure” rights. Indeed, there 
are cases in which the respective human rights bodies make clear that they are analysing 
complicity under the rubric of attribution and not the failure to fulfil a positive obligation.1163 
The ICJ has resisted this trend toward a lower threshold for attribution.1164 Chapter 14 provides 
for a further analysis on this issue.  
9. State Complicity in State Wrongdoing 
9.1. ILC’s Definition of State Complicity 
The ILC has included a provision on complicity in its Articles on State Responsibility.1165 
Chapter IV of the Articles regulates ‘Responsibility of a state in connection with the act of 
                                                          
1160 See, e.g. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 66 (June 27) (holding that 
provision of training, resources and logistical support was insufficient for the conduct of the contras to be 
attributable to the United States). 
1161 ICCPR, Article 2. 
1162 ECHR, Article 1. 
1163 Cerone, J., supra note 1148. 
1164 See Genocide case, paras. 402-406 where the ICJ rejects the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY’s lower standard for 
attribution.  
1165 For Draft Articles 1-27, see ILC Report on State Responsibility, pp. 187-96 (1978 Yearbook of the ILC, pp. 78-
80). Though it commenced its work on state responsibility in 1953, the ILC initially focused almost exclusively on 
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another state’, namely Article 16 deals with cases where one State provides aid or assistance to 
another State with a view to assist in the commission of a wrongful act by the latter. Such 
situations arise where a State voluntarily assists or aids another State in carrying out conduct, 
which violates the international obligations of the latter, for example, by knowingly providing an 
essential facility or financing the activity in question. Other examples include providing means 
for the closing of an international waterway, facilitating the abduction of persons on foreign soil, 
or assisting in the destruction of property belonging to nationals of a third country. The State 
primarily responsible in each case is the acting State, while the assisting State has only a 
supporting role. Hence the use of the term “by the latter” in the chapeau to Article 16, which 
distinguishes the situation of aid or assistance from that of co-perpetrators or co-participants in 
an internationally wrongful act.1166 The assisting State will only be responsible to the extent that 
its own conduct has caused or contributed to the internationally wrongful act. Thus in cases 
where that internationally wrongful act would clearly have occurred in any event, the 
responsibility of the assisting State will not extend to compensating for the act itself.1167  
In its Commentary, the ILC has held that ‘State practice supports assigning international 
responsibility to a state which deliberately participates in the internationally wrongful conduct of 
another through the provision of aid or assistance.’1168 States are entitled to assert complicity in 
the wrongful conduct of another State.1169  
9.2. The Evolution of the Article on Complicity in the ILC 
The provision which eventually turned into Article 16 ARSIWA underwent a number of changes 
over the twenty-five years of its gestation. It is therefore necessary briefly to present its various 
emanations as the comments of States on this provision necessarily relate to a specific version of 
the provision.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the issue of state responsibility for harm to the person or property of aliens. Beginning in 1963, the ILC changed 
direction, focusing on all situations in which one State is responsible for breach of an international obligation. This 
new orientation led the ILC to deal with situations like armed aggression, where aid by one State to another in 
perpetrating the wrong is possible.  
1166 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, para. 1. 
1167 Ibidem. 
1168 Ibidem, para. 7. 
1169 Ibidem, para. 11. 
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The first draft of the provision was presented by the Special Rapporteur Roberto Ago in his 
Seventh Report on State Responsibility in 1978. It read:  
“Article 25- Complicity of a State in the internationally wrongful act of another State:  
The fact that a State renders assistance to another State by its conduct in order to enable or help that 
State to commit an international offence against a third State constitutes an internationally wrongful 
act of a State, which thus becomes an accessory to the commission of the offence and incurs 
international responsibility thereby, even if the conduct in question would not otherwise be 
internationally wrongful.”1170 
In the ILC’s 1978 draft, the terms ‘complicity’ and ‘accessory’ are omitted.1171 Following the 
discussion in the Commission, the Drafting Committee made a number of changes. Under the 
chairmanship of Stephen M. Schwebel, the Committee proposed the following title and text of 
what would turn into Draft Article 27:  
“Aid or assistance by a State to another State for the commission of an internationally wrongful act: 
Aid or assistance by a State to another State, if it is established that it is rendered for the commission 
of an internationally wrongful act carried out by the latter, itself constitutes an internationally 
wrongful act, even if, taken alone, such aid or assistance would not constitute the breach of an 
international obligation.”1172 
The ILC apparently intended responsibility to be found only where the ‘principal’ State actually 
carries out the wrongful act. Brazilian ILC member Jose Sette Camara found such a requirement 
in the phrase ‘carried out by the latter’.1173 
Schwebel explained that it had been the aim of the Drafting Committee to retain the ‘essence of 
the original text in terms as simple and balanced as possible, while removing any source of 
                                                          
1170 Ago, R., Seventh Report on State Responsibility p. 60 (hereinafter: Seventh report on State Responsibility). 
1171 The terms ‘complicity’ and ‘accessory’ were apparently dropped because the article does not prohibit certain 
acts commonly included as complicity in domestic law, namely, moral aid and incitement. Referring to the cases 
covered by Draft Article 27, the ILC stated: ‘Cases such as this can be defined as instances of “complicity”, but 
obviously in the particular sense this term may possess in international aw, where it is far from having the same 
meaning as is attributed to it in the different internal legal orders of States’: ILC Report on State Responsibility, at p. 
250 (1978 Yearbook of the ILC p. 102). In the Sixth Committee the Nigerian delegation 'endorsed the Commission's 
decision to discard the concepts of »complicity« and »accessory« as concepts pertaining to the field of municipal 
law: General Assembly Official Records, 33rd Session, Sixth Committee, 42nd meeting, at p. 12, para. 41, UN Doc. 
A/C.6/33/SR.42 (1978) (hereinafter: GAOR 33rd Session). 
1172 ILC Report on State Responsibility, YBILC 1978, Vol. I, p. 269, para. 2.  
1173 GAOR 33rd Session, 27th meeting, at pp. 20-1, para 66, UN DOC. A/C.6/33/SR.27 (1978). 
237 
ambiguity or misunderstanding.’1174 To achieve this, the Commission had discarded terms such 
as ‘complicity’, ‘accessory’ and ‘international offence’ as well as the criticized reference to a 
third State against whom the internationally wrongful act would have been committed.1175 The 
Chairman of the Committee also made it clear that it was the opinion of its members that the 
crucial element of intent should be brought out more clearly in the provision. This was 
accordingly meant to be secured through the wording ‘if it is established that it is rendered for 
the commission’.1176 As there was no disapproval voiced among the members of the 
Commission, the title and text were therefore agreed upon by the Commission.1177 This was the 
provision as it stood for almost twenty years, and which formed part of the Draft Articles 
adopted on First Reading in 1996. When Special Rapporteur James Crawford reviewed the 
Articles in the course of the Second Reading, he made several changes to the referred Article, in 
particular to accommodate the provision to criticism, which was voiced by the states in the Sixth 
Committee of the UN General Assembly and directed at the ILC. The Draft Article then read:  
“Article 27 Assistance or direction to another State to commit an internationally wrongful act:  
A state which aids or assists, or direct or controls, another State in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act is internationally responsible for doing so if:  
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and  
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”1178 
The major change reflected in the new Article was paragraph (b). This requirement was included 
to ensure that States would only incur responsibility for aid and assistance when they were also 
bound by the obligation the main actor was violating. Another change in the Article was the 
inclusion of the element of direction or control. The Commission finally adopted the following 
provision:  
“Article 16 Aid or Assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act:  
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the 
latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:  
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and  
                                                          
1174 Schwebel, S. M., Statement at the 1524th Meeting of the ILC, YBILC 1978, Vol. I, p. 269, para. 3. 
1175 Ibidem. 
1176 Ibidem. 
1177 Ibidem, para. 6. 
1178 Crawford, J., Second Report on State Responsibility, 1999, UN Doc A/CN.4/498/Add.1 (1999) II (1) YILC 3, p. 
21.  
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(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.”1179  
Thus, there were only minor changes from Draft Article 27 to Article 16. The ‘direction or 
control’ element was removed and inserted into Article 17.1180 In addition, it was set out more 
clearly that it would need to have been an internationally wrongful act of the assisted State to 
which the support was rendered and that is was the support for which responsibility would thus 
be incurred.  
In spite of its inclusion in the ARSIWA, Article 16 embodies a primary rule of international 
law.1181 It is the rule that defines the scope of acceptable conduct for States. It defines the 
boundaries of acceptable State conduct in respect of all other primary rules.1182 This follows 
from the ARSIWA’s internal logic. Article 2 ARSIWA provides: 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: 
(a) is attributable to the State under international law; and 
(b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.1183  
Considering any matter between States in which Article 16 forms the basis of the claim, 
attribution – part (a) – will be assessed in the ordinary matter, while part (b) will be founded on 
Article 16. Thus, Article 16 is the specified international obligation of the State. On this basis, 
Article 16 is clearly a primary rule.1184  
                                                          
1179 Aust, H.P., supra note 1121, p. 102. 
1180 Article 17 ARSIWA: Direction and control exercised over the commission of an internationally wrongful act; A 
State which directs and controls another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the latter is 
internationally responsible for that act if: 
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 
1181 Graefrath, B., Complicity in the Law of International Responsibility, 372; Nollkaemper, A., Internationally 
Wrongful Acts in Domestic Courts, 101 American Journal of International Law (2007) 760, 100. 
1182 Lanovoy, V., Responsibility for Complicity in an Internationally Wrongful Act: Revisiting a Structural Norm, 
SHARES Conference – Foundations of Shared Responsibility in International Law, Amsterdam, 17-18 November 
2011, 1. 
1183 Article 2 ARSIWA. 
1184 Nollkaemper, A. and Jacobs, D., supra note 2, p. 409.  
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9.3. The Elements of State Complicity 
9.3.1. The Objective Element (The Conduct Element): The Scope of Aid and 
Assistance 
The conduct element of complicity under Article 16 is broad. Article 16 prohibits States from 
giving aid and assistance that facilitates another State’s commission of internationally wrongful 
act.  
The ILC has not explicitly defined what constitutes relevant “aid and assistance”. It is 
theoretically conceivable that “aid or assistance” comprises every act (or omission) which 
facilitates the commission of an internationally wrongful act by another State.1185 However, it is 
implausible that Article 16 should cover ‘aid or assistance’ which is only remotely or ‘indirectly’ 
related to an internationally wrongful act.1186 There should rather be some special nexus between 
the aid and the wrongful act.  
A first approach in determining what constitutes aid or assistance within the meaning of Article 
16 ARSIWA is to look at instances of international practice. Granting of over-flight and landing 
rights for the unlawful use of force or for the commission of human rights violations, allowing 
the use of territory by another State which assembles its troops and then conducts its attack from 
the first State’s territory, furnishing logistic support to the unlawful conduct of another State, 
provision of valuable intelligence, furnishing weapons, military technology or other kinds of 
military assistance to oppressive regimes; support which allows a State to circumvent the 
requirements of binding UN Security Council resolutions – all these could qualify as aid or 
assistance.1187 The compiling of a list of typical forms of aid or assistance will, however, not lead 
to satisfactory results. The nature of Article 16 ARSIWA as a general rule speaks against the 
authoritativeness of a list thus assembled. 
In the ILC’s conception, the rule reflected in Article 16 comprises different forms of physical 
assistance. As examples of actions that fulfil the conduct element of the test, the Commentary 
lists financing, the provision of an essential facility, the provision of means for the closing of an 
                                                          
1185 Omissions are particularly difficult to deal with. The ICJ has now ruled out the possibility of complicity by 
omission in its Genocide case, para 432.  
1186 Chinkin, C., Third Parties in International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993; 297; Lowe, V., supra note 
1115, p. 5.  
1187 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16. 
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international waterway, facilitating the abduction of persons on foreign soil, and assisting in the 
destruction of property belonging to third State nationals.1188 In light of this, it is necessary to 
determine whether Article 16 is contingent on the provision of a certain kind of aid.1189 It is 
argued that all kinds of aid and assistance fall within the rule.1190 Moreover, the ILC has made it 
clear that no particular kind of aid or assistance is necessary in order for this responsibility to 
arise.1191 Lowe argues that it may include technical or financial assistance, the non-application of 
mandatory sanctions, and even the provision by States of credit or investment guarantees that 
facilitate investments by their companies in other States.1192 This is certainly correct. There is no 
principled reason for limiting the kind of aid or assistance that might implicate Article 16. The 
Commentary does not do so. 
Lowe has maintained that States should normally be entitles to presume that other States will act 
lawfully1193 and that to attribute the same risk of unlawfulness to the main actor and to the helper 
would mean to treat the assisting State as if it were acting jointly with the main actor.1194 Some 
scholars argue that while such a strict rule on the responsibility for ‘aid and assistance’ appears 
to be beneficial for the international rule of law (as it would claim to force States to be their 
‘brother’s keeper’ and to steer far away from the risk of being implied in illegal activity) it would 
at the same time discourage may typical and usually beneficial forms of international co-
operation.1195  
Assuming that most States prefer an interpretation of the rule on the responsibility for ‘aid and 
assistance’ which leaves room for such typical forms of cooperation as long as the implication in 
illegal activity is not sufficiently clear. International law provides a confirmation for this 
                                                          
1188 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, para. 1, p. 66.  
1189 Lowe, V., supra note 1115, p. 5. 
1190 Crawford, J., supra note 1115, p. 402.  
1191 Talmon, S., A Plurality of Responsible Actors? in Shiner, P. and Williams, A. (eds), The Iraq War and 
International Law, p. 218, available at  <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1018172> (3. 10. 
2007). 
1192 Lowe, V., supra note 1115, pp. 5-6.  
1193 Ibidem, p. 10. 
1194 Ibidem. 
1195 Nolte, G., and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, p. 12. 
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conclusion in a somewhat related context: It does not hold a State responsible for ‘instigating’ 
another State to commit an internationally wrongful act.1196 
In fact, this interpretation of Article 16 is indirectly corroborated by the initial thoughts of 
Roberto Ago on complicity in the ILC. When Ago presented his Seventh Report on State 
Responsibility in 1978, the situations falling under the envisaged provision on complicity were 
described by him as follows: 
(There)…are the cases in which the existence of an internationally wrongful act unquestionably 
committed by a State, attributable to it as such and without the slightest doubt involving its 
international responsibility, is accompanied by the existence of participation by another State (…).1197 
There are two outstanding issues concerning the forms of complicity prohibited by the rule in 
Article 16. First, the commentary on Article 16 focuses on the provision of assistance as the sole 
mode of complicity – the various ways that a State may help another State in its commission of 
an internationally wrongful act.1198 Also, in its consideration of Article 16 in the Genocide case, 
the ICJ referred specifically to the ‘provision of means to enable or facilitate the commission of 
the crime…’.1199 These statements reflect the long-standing assumption in international law that 
excludes classic forms of complicity based on influencing the principal – inducing, instigation, 
abetting – from state responsibility for complicity in the wrongs of other States.1200 As a result, in 
the absence of a specific treaty regime, forms of complicity that are clearly established in 
international criminal law – such as instigating and abetting – probably do not apply to States.1201 
State complicity does not include moral encouragement or incitement by a State to another State 
to engage in an internationally wrongful act, although both acts would constitute complicity in 
domestic law.1202 Neither moral encouragement nor incitement renders a State liable for the 
                                                          
1196 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Introduction to Part One, Chapter IV, para 9; Nolte, G., and Aust, H.P., 
supra note 357, p. 13: In this situation, it is the factual uncertainty whether the instigated state will eventually act 
upon the instigation (as well as the normative assumption that states typically carefully weight their options and are 
not easily 'instigated' by other states), which justifies the attribution of responsibility solely to the acting state (See 
Ago, R., Seventh Report on State Responsibility, p. 30, para 55. 
1197 Ago, R., Seventh Report on State Responsibility, para 52. 
1198 Kadish, S. H., supra note 397, p. 342. 
1199 Genocide case, para. 419. 
1200 See ILC Report on State Responsibility, General Commentary on Chapter IV (9); Crawford, J., supra note 1178. 
1201 See ILC Report on State Responsibility, General Commentary on Chapter IV (9). 
1202 ILC Report on State Responsibility, pp. 244-6 (1978 Yearbook of the ILC, pp. 100-1). Incitement may, however, 
be prohibited by treaty. See, e.g. a duty to prevent encouragement of apartheid in Article 4(a) of the International 
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wrongful act of the State encouraged or incited.1203 The ILC notes that protests have been filed 
charging incitement but reports no such claim at juridical level.1204 Complicity does not include 
coercion by one State of another to commit an internationally wrongful act. Here both the 
coercing State and perhaps also the coerced State (if it did not object to the coercion) are liable as 
principals.1205 Further, a State is not responsible for the acts of another State committed within or 
from the territory of the former, in the absence of fault on the part of the host State.1206 
The second issue regarding the forms of complicity prohibited by Article 16 concerns omissions. 
In the Genocide case, in interpreting the primary rule prohibiting complicity in genocide, the ICJ 
held that ‘complicity always requires that some positive action has been taken to furnish aid or 
assistance to the perpetrators…’.1207 Crawford argues that the exclusion of complicit omissions 
from complicity in genocide applies, in the ICJ’s own understanding, to the rule in Article 16.1208 
This position is supported by the prior holding of the Court that it ‘sees no reason to make any 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 30 November 1973, GAOR, 28th 
Session, Supplement 30, p. 75. See also the General Assembly Resolution on war propaganda, which condemns 
‘propaganda…designed…to provoke aggressions’, in effect a prohibition against incitement to aggression: GS Res. 
110 (II), 8 November 1947; The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Article III (c), United 
Nation Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ construed common Article I of the four 1949 
Geneva conventions (requiring State parties to ‘ensure respect’ for these conventions) to impose an obligation ‘not 
to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of Article 3 
common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions’: ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 104. It found the US liable to Nicaragua on 
this basis: ibidem, p. 139. But it stated that this obligation prohibits incitement of ‘persons or groups’ only, not of a 
State, and suggested that incitement is nor an act that entails State responsibility: ‘The question here does not of 
course relate to the definition of the circumstances in which one State may be regarded as responsible for acts 
carried out by another State, which probably do not include the possibility of incitement’: ibidem at p. 120. 
1203 ILC Report on State Responsibility, pp. 244-6 (1978 Yearbook of the ILC, pp. 100-1). The only authors who 
assert that conspiracy and incitement are acts entailing international legal responsibility of a State are Graefrath, 
Oeser and Steiniger. They write: ‘If a State, either through another or together with it, causes, whether directly or 
indirectly, the violation of an international legal obligation, the former in this way brings on its own sovereign fault 
and international legal responsibility. In this sense is Ago in agreement when he states that ‘any form of conspiracy, 
or complicity, or of incitement” to a violation of an international legal obligation is incompatible with international 
law’ (citing Ago, R., Le Delit international, Recueil des cours, 68 (1939-II), pp. 416, 523). The authors give no State 
practice or other evidence to back their assertion that conspiracy and incitement entail state responsibility. 
Moreover, their reference to Ago is inaccurate, since in the quoted 1939 Article Ago states that conspiracy, 
complicity and incitement do not entail international legal responsibility. The full sentence from which the quoted 
Ago sentence is taken reads: ‘What appears inconceivable in international law is any form of conspiracy, or 
complicity, or of incitement in a wrong’. The authors have quoted Ago out of context and make it appear he reached 
the opposite conclusion. 
1204 ILC Report on State Responsibility, pp. 245 (1978 Yearbook of the ILC, pp. 100). 
1205 ILC Report on State Responsibility, pp. 248-9 (1978 Yearbook of the ILC, pp. 101-2) 
1206 Summary Records of the 1312th meeting, Yearbook of the ILC, 1975, VOL. I, P. 42, Article 12, paras. 1, 4, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1975. Para I provides: 'The conduct of an organ of another State or of an international 
organization acting in that capacity in the territory of a State, shall not be considered as an act of that State under 
international law.' 
1207 Genocide case, para. 432. 
1208 Crawford, J., supra note 1115, pp. 403-5. 
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distinction of substance between “complicity in genocide”…and the “aid and assistance” of a 
State in the commission of a wrongful act by another State…’.1209 Following the Genocide case, 
this appears to be the prevailing position in international law.1210  
9.3.2. The Nexus Element  
The second element of any complicity rule concerns the relationship between the aid provided 
and the wrongful act committed. Given the range of actions that might satisfy the conduct 
element of complicity, a substantiality criterion should apply. On first glance, this is the 
approach of the ILC in respect of Article 16. The ILC has explained in its Commentary that no 
particular kind or level of assistance is needed as long as the aid or assistance materially 
facilitates or contributes significantly to the performance of the wrongful act.1211 Thus, there is 
no requirement that the aid or assistance should have been essential to the performance of the 
wrongful act; it is sufficient if it contributed significantly to that act”.1212 This standard excludes 
assistance that is indirectly or remotely related to that act.1213 However, in discussing the nature 
of responsibility under Article 16, the commentary appears to assume that assistance that ‘may 
have been only an incidental factor in the commission of the primary act’ might fall within its 
scope.1214 This clearly suggests a different standard from one of significant contribution or 
material facilitation. 
The standard of material facilitation appears within the paragraphs of the Commentary defining 
the scope of the test. As a matter of textual interpretation, therefore, material facilitation seems to 
be the standards preferred by the ILC.1215 Additionally, the instances in which States have 
condemned other States’ complicity inevitably involve something more than incidental 
contributions. Finally, as to an evaluation of the requisite standard, the potential breadth of the 
rule of Article 16 should be noted. As a primary rule of international law, Article 16 defines the 
acceptable scope of State conduct in cooperating with other States. Given than no limitation is 
imposed on the kinds of aid included within the firs limb of the test, it serves the interests of 
international cooperation to require a nexus beyond incidental contribution to give rise to 
                                                          
1209 Genocide case, para. 420. 
1210 Crawford, J., supra note 1115, p. 403. 
1211 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, para.5.  
1212 Ibidem. 
1213 Nolte, G., and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, p. 10.  
1214 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, para. 10. 
1215 Crawford, J., supra note 1115, pp. 402-3.  
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international responsibility.1216 Incidental contribution sweeps too widely. Material facilitation is 
a standard that catches conduct with a sufficient link to another State’s wrongdoing while 
excluding the incidental relationships that arise from virtually every State interaction.1217 It is 
noteworthy that this standard of significant contribution is similar to that imposed by 
international criminal law – the accomplice’s assistance must have a substantial effect on the 
commission of the crime.1218  
The standard of “material facilitation” implies a notion of causality which is examined below. It 
can be noted that a close nexus between the support and the eventual wrongful act of the main 
actor is required. This is owing to comparative analysis of special rules on complicity which do 
not allow one to speak of assistance in the case of mere association.1219 In other words, more 
than cooperation alone is required in order to bring about responsibility for complicity. Although 
the ILC requires some form of causality between the support rendered and the commission of the 
wrongful act, caution needs to be applied in this regard. Notions of causality are not easily 
applicable with respect to complicity as too demanding criteria in this regard would effectively 
mean treating joint main actors as accomplices. Nevertheless, as noted above, a substantial effect 
of the aid or assistance upon the commission of the wrongful act is required. This can be 
understood to mean that the aid or assistance must have made a difference for the main actor, 
rendering it materially easier to commit the wrongful act.  
Furthermore, the Commentary makes it plain that on the one hand some form of causality is 
required, as the assisting State will only be held responsible to the extent that its assistance 
caused and/or contributed to the internationally wrongful act.1220 On the other hand, the 
Commission is also quite clear that the support need not have been an essential contribution to 
the commission of the wrongful act. Rather, it would be enough for the aid or assistance to 
                                                          
1216 Lowe, V, supra note 1115, p. 5; Nolte, G., and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, pp. 1, 12. 
1217 According to Becker, the ILC Commentary makes it plain that on the one hand some form of causality is 
required, as the assisting State will only be held responsible to the extent that its assistance caused and/or 
contributed to the internationally wrongful act. On the other hand, the Commission is also quite clear that the 
support need not have been an essential contribution to the commission of the wrongful act. Rather, it would be 
enough for the aid or assistance to contribute significantly to it. See Becker, T., Terrorism and the State: Rethinking 
the Rules of State Responsibility, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2006, p. 326. 
1218 See, e.g. Simić Appeals Judgment, para. 85; Vasiljević Appeals Judgment, para. 45; Krstić Appeals Judgment, 
para. 238; Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, para. 51; Blaškić Appeals Judgment, para. 48; Tadić Appeals Judgment, 
para. 229. 
1219 Aust, H. P., supra note 1121, p. 419. 
1220 Becker, T., supra note 1217, p. 326. 
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contribute significantly to it. This approach suggests that the ILC finds itself in line with 
considerations of general legal theory, namely, that, in the case of assistance to a wrongful act, 
the participant would neither cause the principal to act nor would the latter act in consequence of 
this assistance.1221 It is thus clear that the relationship between complicity and causality cannot 
be found in any form of ‘but for’ test or of a conditio sine qua non test.1222 Both tests assume 
that, in the absence of a cause, the result of the action would not have been a conceivable 
outcome. It is apparent that this would be too strict of a test for complicity.1223 
In considering the causal impact of the complicit State’s action, one necessarily has to take into 
account the legal evaluation of the position of the main actor: requiring too much causal impact 
of the complicit State might eventually absolve the main actor from part of its responsibility. If 
the support was a sine qua non for the commission of the wrongful act, there might not be 
conceivable to hold the main actor responsible for its conduct. The sine que non test generally 
lacks the potential to distinguish between significant and less significant causes.1224 Given the 
scarcity of available international practice on the issue of causality with respect to complicit 
States, it is to be expected that a highly casuistic approach will be resorted to if a court or 
tribunal is to deal with the matter. It is apparent that only very few if any legal systems and legal 
theorists are willing to entirely discard the requirements of some form of causality when 
considering the issues of complicity.1225 The somewhat unclear and unsatisfying state of the law 
with respect to the requirement of causality in Article 16 ARSIWA may thus reflect the 
intermediate state of development of the international legal system.  
Considering the significance of the aid in facilitating a wrongful act of another State, a certain 
level of assistance is necessitated by the requirement that the aid facilitate commission of the 
wrongful act. While it is difficult to define the necessary level, responsibility seems clear when a 
State provides such substantial aid that virtually any expenditure made by the recipient State 
depends on continued assistance from the providing State. In this situation, withdrawal of aid 
would constitute a substantial detriment to the recipient State, and the threat of withdrawal would 
constitute a substantial incentive to terminate a wrongful act. Lower levels of aid, however, will 
                                                          
1221 Hart, H. L. A., and Honore, A. M, Causation in the Law, Clarendon Press, 1959, p.347.  
1222 Kadish, S. H., supra note 397, p. 367. 
1223 Hart, H. L. A., and Honore, A. M., supra note 1221, p.347. 
1224 Becker, T., supra note 1217, p. 292. 
1225 Hart, H.L.A., and Honore, T., supra note 1221, p. 48; Kadish, S. H., supra note 397, p. 334. 
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suffice if it materially facilitates the allocation of resources by the recipient State towards its 
wrongful act.1226  
A State that gives aid to another ‘for the commission’ of a wrongful act should be responsible, 
even if the recipient State could have carried out the wrongful act without the aid. It is sufficient 
that the aid increased the possibility that the illegal conduct would be accomplished. 
Responsibility is not negated where the principal could have completed the crime without the 
assistance of the alleged accomplice, or where the principal could have obtained the assistance 
from somewhere else.1227  
9.3.3. The Subjective Element 
The question of intent is closely linked to the previous one concerning the material element. 
Although there is disagreement over its precise scope and content, there is near unanimity in the 
literature that responsibility under Article 16 ARSIWA requires some subjective relationship 
between the assisting State and the commission of the wrongful act by the main actor.1228 It is a 
longstanding debate in the field of state responsibility whether some form of wrongful intent or 
fault is required for a State to be responsible for a given conduct. Traditional theory (inspired by 
Hugo Grotius) was of the opinion that fault was an indispensable element of responsibility. This 
view prevailed until the 1920s.1229 Since then, one can broadly distinguish between three 
possible views on the general character of the rules of state responsibility. First, they could 
require some form of subjective element.1230 Secondly, they could rest on an objective basis.1231 
A third possibility would be a further enhanced notion of objective responsibility which is then 
labelled absolute objective responsibility. There are variants to these theories, for instance the 
view which distinguishes between internal acts of States – legislative, executive or judicial – for 
which the standard of responsibility is objective and external acts of States where there is 
supposed to exist a due diligence obligation which is in this case conceived of as being 
                                                          
1226 Quigley, J., supra note 356. 
1227 Ibidem, p. 122. 
1228 For the various position in the literature, see Quigley, J., supra note 356, p. 109; Nolte, G., and Aust, H.P., supra 
note 357, p. 13; Hakimi, M., State Bystander Responsibility, The European Journal of International Law Vol. 21 no. 
2, 2010, pp. 341-385, at p. 365. 
1229 See Weil, P., Le droit international en quete de son identite, Cours general de droit international public, pp. 9-
370, at p. 347. 
1230 Cheng, B., General principles of law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, pp. 218 et seq. 
1231 Brownlie, I., supra note 90, p. 38.  
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subjective in character.1232 Over the course of time, most authors seem to have adopted the 
position that responsibility is generally objective with possible exceptions.1233 
The ILC has opted for a pragmatic conception of international responsibility.1234 It has not 
excluded the issue of fault from the Articles altogether. Rather, it has emphasized that different 
primary rules of international law impose different standards ranging from due diligence to strict 
liability. This will also be the case of Article 16 ARSIWA: due to its generality it covers aid or 
assistance furnished to violations of the most divers kind of rules. It can therefore not be 
expected that a clear-cut general rule on ‘the’ intent standard with respect to complicity in 
international law will be inferred.  
The Commentary details that the relevant State organ providing aid or assistance must be aware 
of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State internationally wrongful.1235 A 
State providing material or financial assistance or aid to another State does not normally assume 
the risk that its aid or assistance may be used to carry out an internationally wrongful act. If the 
assisting State is unaware of the circumstances in which its aid or assistance is intended to be 
used by the other State, it bears no international responsibility.1236  
The standard of fault1237 required by Article 16 was a controversial issue during the drafting 
process.1238 Strict liability was never an option.1239 This builds on the general principle that 
States may presume that recipient States will use their aid lawfully.1240 The final set of comments 
from governments on the draft text reveals the United States and United Kingdom’s concern that 
the fault standard be construed narrowly. The US’s position was that the ‘assisting State must be 
both aware that its assistance will be used for an unlawful purpose and so intend its assistance to 
be used’.1241 The UK suggested that it ‘be made clear that the “assisting” State must be aware 
                                                          
1232 Sorensen, M., Principes de droit international public, Recueil des Cours 212 (1960-III), pp. 5-254, pp. 228-9. 
1233 Aust, H.P., supra note 1121, p. 231. 
1234 Crawford, J., supra note 58, pp. 12 et seq. 
1235 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, para.4. 
1236 Ibidem. 
1237 The Commentary of Article 2 ARSIWA, in considering the necessary elements of an internationally wrongful 
act of a State, uses the term “fault”. The same terminology is used in literature on the respective subject. 
1238 Quigley, J., supra note 356, pp. 108-20. 
1239 Ago, R., Seventh Report on State Responsibility, pp. 108-20. 
1240 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16 (4), p. 66; Lowe, V., supra note 1115, p. 10. 
1241 International Law Commission, State Responsibility – Comments and Observations Received From 
Governments' (2001) UN DOc A./CN.4/515 52. 
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that the act in question is planned and must further intend to facilitate the commission of that act 
by its assistance’.1242 
The standard of fault for the specific primary rule prohibiting state complicity is not clear. The 
text of Article 16 uses the term ‘awareness of the circumstances’, a threshold substantially raised 
by the Commentary’s assertion that this involves an ‘intention, by the aid or assistance given, to 
facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct’.1243 This is consistent with the Commentary to 
the 1978 draft Article: The very idea of “aid and assistance” to another State for the commission 
of an internationally wrongful act necessarily presupposes an intent to collaborate in the 
execution of an act of this kind and hence, in the case considered, knowledge of the specific 
purpose for which the State receiving certain supplies intends to use them.1244 Thus, some 
scholars argue that the textual knowledge standard is subsumed by one of wrongful intent.1245 
Accordingly, no responsibility arises unless the relevant State organ intended, by the aid or 
assistance given, to facilitate the occurrence of the wrongful conduct.’1246  
The Commentary narrows the textual meaning of Article 16 and goes against the general thrust 
of the ILC Articles which, in general, presuppose no distinct or separate requirement of fault or 
wrongful intent for an internationally wrongful act.1247 However, a requirement of fault or 
wrongful intent may be found in specific articles of the Draft or may be derived from primary 
norms which impose different standards of responsibility.1248 Accordingly, it appears that the 
ILC intended Article 16 to be interpreted narrowly so that the “knowledge” element turns into a 
requirement of wrongful intent.1249 Likewise, the ICJ has, mutatis mutandis, adopted this 
                                                          
1242 Ibidem. 
1243 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, para. 5, p. 66. 
1244 1978 YILC Vol II (Part Two), at 103, para 14. Complicity under the Genocide Convention requires ‘full 
knowledge’ of the relevant facts (including the physical perpetrator’s dolus specialis to commit genocide); See 
Genocide case, para 421 and 423.  
1245 Jackson, M., supra note 348, p. 159; Nolte, G., and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, p. 14.  
1246 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, p. 66 
1247 On the issue of fault in the law of State responsibility see Gattini, A., Smoking/No-Smoking: Some Remarks on 
the Current Place of Fault in the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility (1999) 10 EJIL 397. 
1248 Crawford, J., The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, Cambridge University Press, 
2002, Article 16, para 12. 
1249 Nolte, G., and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, p. 14; Similarly, Boivin, A., Complicity and Beyond: International 
law and the transfer of small arms and light weapons, 87 International Review of the Red Cross, 2005, 859, p. 471. 
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approach in the Genocide case.1250 Inquiring whether FRY was responsible for complicity in 
genocide, the Court pointed out that: 
“[T]here is not doubt that the conduct of an organ or a person furnishing aid or assistance to a 
perpetrator of the crime of genocide cannot be treated as complicity in genocide unless at the least that 
organ or person acted knowingly, that is to say, in particular, was aware of the specific intent (dolus 
specialis) of the principal perpetrator.”1251 
 
If the analogy to Article 16 is supposed to be meaningful, this entails that knowledge of the 
circumstances of the wrongful act is required at the least (as the Court has put it) also with 
respect to Article 16. The words “at the least” suggest that, as a general rule, more than mere 
knowledge is required.  
It is argued that in most situations where a State provides assistance to another State with the 
actual knowledge that the aid will be used to commit a wrongful act, the State’s intent that its aid 
facilitates that act may be inferred.1252 As Lowe argues, as ‘a matter of general legal principle 
States must be supposed to intend the foreseeable consequences of their acts’.1253 
Even if a standard of knowledge does become entrenched in international practice, much will 
still turn on how the requirement is interpreted.1254 In the final round of comments from 
governments on the Draft Article, the Netherlands proposed that Article 16 be changed to read: 
‘That State does so when it knows or should have known the circumstances of the internationally 
wrongful act.’1255 The ILC did not take up this proposal.  
In practice, the standard of knowing participation means awareness with something approaching 
practical certainty as to the circumstances of the principal wrongful act.1256 Dilution from that 
standard – the slide into reckless assistance – starts to become inconsistent with the essential 
derivative nature of complicity and may indeed undermine valuable international cooperation.1257 
                                                          
1250 Genocide case, paras. 420-424. 
1251 Ibidem, para. 421. 
1252 Talmon, S., supra note 1191, pp. 218-19; Crawford, J., supra note 1115, p. 408.  
1253 Lowe, V., supra note 1115, p. 8. 
1254 Jackson, M., supra note 348, p. 161. 
1255 Tange, P. C., Netherlands State Practice for the Parliamentary Year 2000-2001 (2002), 33 Netherlands Yearbook 
of International Law 191, p. 237 (emphasis added). 
1256 Jackson, M., supra note 348, p. 161. 
1257 Aust, H. P., supra note 1121, 240. 
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Somewhere around the line between knowing and reckless participation is the idea of wilful 
blindness. Lowe argues that an international tribunal would not allow a State to evade 
responsibility by deliberately failing to inquire into the circumstances of an assisted act where 
there are clear indications that its assistance would be employed unlawfully.1258 This is true as a 
matter of law and in principle – wilful blindness, narrowly interpreted, is a justified extension to 
the category of legal knowledge.1259 Beyond that, international law does not yet recognize a 
general due diligence obligation conditioning the provision of aid and assistance to another 
State.1260 
Several governments have wondered about the meaning of the knowledge element of Article 
16.1261 Ultimately, the same reasons which point in favour of a requirement of certainty for what 
should be considered relevant ‘aid or assistance’ also speak in favour of a narrow interpretation 
of the knowledge element of Article 16 in the sense of ‘wrongful intent’.1262 Nevertheless, the 
requirement of wrongful intent should not allow States to deny their responsibility for complicity 
in situations where internationally wrongful acts are manifestly being committed. In a situation 
where it is obvious that a recipient State is systematically violating human rights with the help of 
the received material, the assisting State should not be allowed to hide behind the position that it 
did not wish to support the commission of such wrongful acts. One can think of a due diligence 
obligation of supporting States to assure that their support is not used for wrongful ends.1263 Such 
an approach is supported by state practice and could be based on an analogy with obligation of 
neutral States to control the export of weapons to belligerents. A number of States have passed 
legislation on the international sale of weapons according to which these weapons may 
                                                          
1258 Lowe, V., supra note 1115, p. 10. 
1259 Jackson, M., supra note 348, see Section 2.5.4.4. 
1260 Talmon, S., supra note 1191, 218-19; Lowe, V., supra note 1115, p. 10. 
1261 See the comments of the governments of Denmark (also on behalf of Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden), 
Republic of Korea and the US, UN Doc. A/CN.4/515, 27.  
1262 It has been questioned whether the intent requirement is hindering the effective application of the complicity 
provision, see Graefrath, B., supra note 1181, p. 375; Nahapetian, K., Confronting State Complicity in International 
Law, (2002) 7 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, 106, Quigley, J., supra note 356, p. 109: 
since it would be difficult to prove the intent of a State to assist the internationally wrongful act of another state. 
However, the criteria for establishing responsibility and the standards of evidence are two different issues. The 
possibility of inferring intent and/or knowledge on the side of the complicit state from factual circumstances is not to 
be underestimated. See Nolte, G. and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, p. 15.  
1263 Talmon, S., supra note 1191, p. 32. – holds the view that such a standard might develop in the future, 
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subsequently only be used for purposes in accordance with international law.1264 In some cases 
therefore, a lack of intent can be offset by sufficient knowledge. 
As previously argued, neither the ILC formulation in its 1978 Draft Article 27 that the aid be 
given ‘for the commission of an internationally wrongful act’ nor the accompanying commentary 
makes clear precisely what state of mind is required.1265 If the assisting State desires that a 
recipient State carry out unlawful acts using resources contributed by the assisting State, then the 
assisting State is complicit in those unlawful acts under the ILC formulation. Considerable 
attention was given by ILC to the issue whether the assisting State is complicit as well where it 
does not wish the unlawful acts to occur but contributes resources aware that the contribution 
will facilitate the unlawful acts.  
Furthermore, a formulation that did not make precisely what state of mind was meant appeared 
in a General Assembly resolution on the Middle East that called upon all States ‘to put an end to 
the flow to Israel of any military, economic and financial aid…aimed at encouraging it to pursue 
its aggressive policies against the Arab countries and the Palestinian people’. 1266 
Drawing from the evolution of Article 16, it is interesting to note that Article 25 of the 1977 ILC 
Draft required the aid to be given ‘in order to enable or help the recipient State to commit an 
international offence against a third State’.1267 Article 27 of the 1978 draft requires that the aid be 
‘rendered for the commission of an internationally wrongful act’. Neither draft requires the 
assisting State to intend that the violation be committed. A State can provide aid ‘in order to 
enable or help’ even when it does not desire the particular end, but knowing it will be used to 
that end. Similarly, a State can give aid ‘for the commission’ of an act without desiring the 
act.1268  
                                                          
1264 Nolte, G., and Aust, H.P., supra note 357. 
1265 Objecting to Draft Article 27’s imprecision on the intent issue, the Australian delegate to the Sixth Committee 
said: ‘…article 27 was much too sweeping, and the issue of intent would have to be taken into consideration. As 
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p. 2, para 3, UN Doc. A/C.6/33/SR.37 (1978). 
1266 See GA Res. 39/146 A, 101st plenary meeting, 14 December 1984, adopted 100-16-28. 
1267 The statement that the offence must be 'against a third State' is incorrect, as the ILC clearly intends that the 
offense by the assisted State may involve violation of any internationally protected right. In ILC Report on State 
Responsibility, p. 257 (1978 Yearbook of the ILC, p. 105). 
1268 Quigley, J., supra note 356, p. 110. 
252 
The purpose of Article 16 could be defeated if too stringent fault requirement is imposed. This is 
so for two reasons. Firstly, it is often difficult to determine the state of mind of a State. The 
assisting State may not advertise its purpose in giving aid, particularly if it is concerned about 
international repercussions over the use of its aid for a particular wrongful purpose. Additionally, 
it can be difficult to determine a State’s state of mind because the State is represented by a 
variety of officials who may make conflicting statements about the purpose of the aid.1269 
Secondly, in most situations when a recipient State commits an international violation, the 
assisting State does not in fact desire the illegal result. The assisting State typically acts out of 
some other motivation.1270  
Ago’s view on the intent issue should be read in light of these considerations. He writes: 
To supply another State, for example, with raw materials, means of transportation and even arms, 
where this is not prohibited by a specific international obligation, is not in itself internationally 
wrongful in any way. What concerns us, however, in the present context, is not to know whether the 
conduct as such does or does not constitute a breach of an international obligation but whether or not 
the conduct adopted by the State was intended to enable another State to commit an international 
offence or to make it easier for it to do so. The very idea of ‘complicity’ in the internationally 
wrongful act of another necessarily presupposes intent to collaborate in the commission of an act of 
this kind, and hence, in the cases considered, knowledge of the specific purpose for which the State 
receiving certain supplies intends to use them. Without this condition, there can be no question of 
complicity.1271 
Ago does not require a desire for the unlawful act on the part of the assisting State. By requiring 
an ‘intent to collaborate’ he means either a desire for the wrongful act or knowledge of it. In the 
latter sense Germany intended to collaborate in the sending of US airplanes to Lebanon (even 
though it may not have desired intervention in Lebanon), as it gave assistance knowing that US 
intervention in Lebanon would result.  
                                                          
1269 Ibidem, p. 111. 
1270 An example is provided by the ILC: Germany’s provision of air bases to the US in 1958 to send US airplanes to 
Lebanon for military intervention there. The Rapporteur, Judge Ago, considered this situation to fall within the 
complicity rule, yet it is unlikely that Germany desired US intervention in Lebanon. Germany probably rendered this 
assistance to the US because of the close relationship between the two States. Ago noted that the responsibility of 
the State [Germany] was ‘based on passive conduct or toleration on the part of their organs’ in Summary Records of 
the 1313th meeting, Yearbook of the ILC, 1975, vol. I, p. 42, para 4, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1975. 
1271 Ago, R., Seventh report on State Responsibility, p. 58.  
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In the 1978 Draft, The ILC explained the culpability requirement of Article 27 as follows: 
As the Article states, the aid and assistance in question must be rendered ‘for the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act’, i.e. with the specific object of facilitating the commission of the 
principal internationally wrongful act in question. Accordingly, it is not sufficient for it to be possible 
for aid or assistance provided without such intention to be used by the recipient State for unlawful 
purposes, or for the State providing aid or assistance to be aware of the eventual possibility of such 
use. The aid or assistance must in fact be rendered with a view to its use in committing the principal 
internationally wrongful act.1272 
By stating that the aid must be given ‘with the specific object of facilitating’ the wrongful act, 
the ILC at first appears to require a purpose on the part of the assisting State to bring about the 
wrongful act of the assisted State. But then it states that ‘it is not sufficient…for the State 
providing aid or assistance to be aware of the eventual possibility of such use’. The latter 
statement implies that the assisting State is liable if it is aware that it is certain or practically 
certain that the aid will be put to a wrongful use, even in the absence of a purpose that it be so 
used. Such interpretation is strengthened by the final sentence, which indicates that the aid must 
be rendered ‘with a view to its use’ in a wrongful act. A State providing aid with knowledge of 
intended wrongful use would be rendering the aid ‘with a view to its use’ in a wrongful act.1273 
The UK delegate to the Sixth Committee feared that Article 27’s formulation ‘for the 
commission’ might be construed to permit too low a culpability standard: 
The granting State must know that the aid or assistance being given was being used or would be used 
by the receiving State to commit an internationally wrongful act, and the granting State must intend to 
facilitate that act by giving the aid or assistance. Although the Commission apparently acknowledged 
the need for those two key elements, the wording of Article 27 did not seem to his delegation to give 
enough emphasis to them. The phase ‘rendered for the commission of an internationally wrongful act’ 
was too imprecise and could lend itself to varying interpretations in concrete cases. Accordingly his 
delegation believed that Article 27 was too sweeping in its formulation.1274 
                                                          
1272 ILC Report on State Responsibility, p. 255 (1978 Yearbook of the ILC, p. 104).  
1273 Graefrath and Oeser in their discussion of the culpability standard in Draft Article 27 describe it only as 'intent' 
and do not distinguish between purpose and knowledge: Graefrath, B., Oeser, E., and Steiniger, P.A.B., 
Teilnahmeformen bei der volkerrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit, Staat und Recht, 29 (1980), pp. 446-8.  
1274 GAOR, 33rd Session, Sixth Committee, 37th meeting at p. 7, para 18, UN Doc. A/C.6/33/SR.37 (1978). 
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While the ILC explanation is not entirely clear, it seems to conclude that a State rendering aid 
with knowledge of intended unlawful use is liable for complicity.1275  
An example from an ongoing aid programme is US aid to Israel and Israel’s construction of 
civilian settlements in occupied Arab territory. The US was not only aware of an eventual 
possibility that its aid to Israel will facilitate construction of settlement. Given that Israel has 
declared plans to build settlements and has done so in the past, the US gives the money aware of 
the practical certainty that Israel will expend funds on settlements. A knowledge standard is 
found in the 1980 UN Security Council resolution on aid to Israel. The Council called on States 
‘not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements 
in the occupied territories’.1276 That language prohibits not only the giving of aid out of desire 
that it be used for settlements, but as well giving of aid that is to be used for settlements. It would 
certainly encompass the giving of aid with knowledge it would be so used and might go a step 
further to include the giving of aid without regard for whether it might be so used (recklessness 
or negligence). 
The UN Charter Article 2 (5) does not impose strict liability standard for aiding aggression; 
rather, it contains no culpability standard. It requires States members to ‘refrain from giving 
assistance to any State against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement 
action’. The absence of a culpability standard here does not mean that responsibility is imposed 
on a State that provides assistance without awareness that the assistance would be used to oppose 
the UN or at least awareness that there was a possibility that it might be so used. That much is 
implied by the wording of Article 2 paragraph 5. The phrasing suggests that the provider of the 
aid is aware of the recipient’s intent to use the assistance to oppose the UN action. It would be 
counterproductive to impose an impossible burden on assisting State of bearing responsibility 
where it has no reason to anticipate the wrongful use of contributed resources.  
It is therefore submitted that with respect to the subjective requirement in Article 16, intent on 
the part of the complicit State is required. This follows both from the analysis of international 
practice as well as from considerations concerning the construction of Article 16. The intent need 
                                                          
1275 That was the view stated by the Special Rapporteur. That approach is consistent with imposition of 
responsibility in the examples given by Ago and by the ILC as a whole as instances of State practice on complicity.  
1276 UN Security Council Resolution 465 of 1 March 1980, U.N. Doc. S/RES/465, adopted on 2203rd meeting of 
SC, at p. 405. 
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not be focused on the eventual effect of the wrongful act of the main actor, but on the 
contribution of the complicit State to the commission of the wrongful act. This does not require 
the complicit State to actually wish for the outcome of the wrongful act.1277 
9.3.4. A Double Obligation Requirement 
In addition to the elements set out above, Article 16 demands that the act committed by the 
principal State would also be internationally wrongful if committed by the complicit State. 
Where the rule is one of customary international law, both parties will most likely be bound by 
the obligation. However, with respect to treaty law, this element may limit the scope of the rule.  
10. State Complicity in Customary International Law 
While the debates in the ILC have left unresolved the question of whether Article 16 actually 
reflects a rule of customary international law,1278 the ICJ, considering Serbia’s potential 
complicity in the genocide at Srebrenica, has held that the rule reflected in Article 16 has been 
accepted as one of customary international law.1279 
Arguing in favour of the customary status of such a rule, both Special Rapporteurs Roberto Ago 
and James Crawford relied on ambiguous state practice.1280 This practice consists of protests 
against the supply of financial and military aid to a belligerent,1281 the permission of the use of a 
State’s territory by another State to carry out an armed attack against a third State,1282 the 
circumvention of sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council,1283 and calls by the United 
Nations General Assembly to UN Member States to refrain from supplying arms and other 
assistance to countries with questionable human rights records.1284 Almost all of these examples 
can be interpreted as relating to primary rules rather than to a distinct secondary rule: for 
example, the supply of financial and military aid to a belligerent may be a violation of the laws 
of neutrality. In addition, the use of a State’s territory by another State to carry out an armed 
attack is a violation of the primary obligation of a State not to knowingly allow its territory to be 
                                                          
1277 Aust, H.P., supra note 1121, p. 420.  
1278 Nolte, G. and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, p. 7.  
1279 Genocide case, para. 420. 
1280 Ago, R., Seventh Reports on State Responsibility, p. 52 et seq and Crawford, J., Second Report of State 
Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN/498/Add. I respectively.  
1281 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary to Article 16, para 7.  
1282 Ibidem, Article 16, para 8. 
1283 Ibidem, Article 16, para 9. 
1284 Ibidem. 
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used to the detriment of other States. It is true that the ILC has also made reference to specific 
primary rules which prohibit States to provide assistance for the commission of wrongful acts by 
other States in certain areas,1285 but this argument only raises the question of whether the norms 
referred to are exceptions to or whether they are expressive of a general rule. In other words, it is 
doubtful whether a secondary rule can be derived from a combination of mostly primary 
obligations. It is questionable whether a strict distinction between primary and secondary rules 
can always be drawn.1286 
Whether the practice quoted by the ILC is sufficient to prove the existence of a customary rule 
cannot be answered here. Governmental comments expressed during the ILC drafting process 
seem to lend more support to the existence of a customary1287 rule than not.1288 The Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe has referred to Article 16 when determining the 
international legal obligations of the Council of Europe Member States in respect of secret 
detention facilities and inter-state transport of prisoners.1289 The presence of French military 
advisors in Rwanda prior to the genocide in 1994 prompted the Rwandan government to 
establish an investigatory commission in order to show that France was complicit in the 
genocide.1290 The US State Department held an investigation into the possible Israeli use of US-
made cluster bombs in the 2006 Lebanon conflict which may have violated an agreement 
between the US and Israel prohibiting the unlawful use of such weapons.1291 Article 16 was also 
considered and applied by the German Federal Constitutional Court1292 and the German Federal 
Administrative Court.1293 The array of statements and state practice listed below suggest that 
there does indeed exist a primary rule prohibiting aid or assistance to internationally wrongful 
                                                          
1285 Ibidem, Article 16, para 2.  
1286 Sceptical in this regard Orakhelashvili, A., Peremptory norms in International Law, Oxford University Press, 
2006, 80; Aust, H. P., Through the Prism of Diversity – The Articles on State Responsibility in the Light of the ILC 
Fragmentation Report (2006) 49 GYIL, 165, pp. 175-177. 
1287 Support was, among others, expressed by Finland, UN Doc. A/C.6/33/SR.39, para 4; Mali, YBILC 1980, Vol. II 
Pt. One, 101; Mexico, the Netherlands, Japan, the United Kingdom, the USA, UN Doc. A/CN.4/488, 75 et seq.  
1288 These governments include Germany and Switzerland, See UN Doc. A/CN.4/488, at 75 et seq.  
1289 Venice Commission of the Council of Europe: Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of 
Europe Member States in respect of secret detention facilities and inter-state transport of prisoners, para 45, 
reprinted in 2006, 27 HRLJ 122. 
1290 Dallaire, R., Manocha, K., Degnarain, N., The Major Powers on Trial, 3 JICJ 861, 2005, pp. 861–78. 
1291 See Israel May Have Violated Arms Pact, U.S. Officials Says, New York Times (28 January 2007, Section 1, 
Column 1, 3). 
1292 Extradition of a Person Lured out of its Home Country, see on this judgment Hartwig, M., Case Note, ILDC 10 
DE, 2003, <http://www.oxfordlawreports.com> accessed 20 September 2013. 
1293 Judgment of 21 June 2005, available at <http://www.bundesverwaltungsgericht.de> accessed 20 September 
2013. 
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conduct, although its exact scope remains unclear. It remains to be determined how far Article 16 
is the proper articulation of this norm.  
While the vast majority of authors hold that Article 16 ARSIWA represents customary 
international law, others discuss this issue, while some are sceptical in this regard.1294 In the 
meantime, the ICJ has stated that Article 16 ARSIWA represents customary international law.1295 
As the Court only posited the customary character of Article 16 and assessed neither state 
practice nor the underlying opinion juris, it is not possible to infer from the judgment what the 
Court had in mind as the exact content of the rule. Therefore, it is worthwhile attempting to shed 
more light on Article 16 as an expression of customary international law. An overview of the 
relevant international practice on state complicity is presented below.1296 
10.1. Status of Complicity as a Customary Norm 
There is as yet no treaty on the law of state responsibility. Thus, if complicity is prohibited, it 
must be by a customary norm. Customary norms are developed by state practice.1297 The ILC has 
concluded that state practice on complicity is sufficient to warrant a conclusion that complicity is 
accepted by States as customary law.1298 Until the ILC drafted a complicity provision in the 
1970s, writers on state responsibility did not mention it.1299 But the post-War world produced 
enough state practice to enable the ILC to conclude that such responsibility had been accepted as 
customary law.1300  
10.1.1. Complicity by Way of Provision of Military Aid in State Practice  
State practice reveals that States have formed the conviction that they are forbidden by 
international law to provide material aid to other States for the commission of internationally 
                                                          
1294 Aust, H. P., supra note 1121. 
1295 Genocide case, para. 420. 
1296 The most complete surveys of international practice so far has been conducted by Quigley, J, supra note 356, p. 
77 et seq. 
1297 See, generally, D’Amato, A., The concept of Custom in International Law, Cornell University Press, 1971; 
Wolfke, K., Custom in present International Law, 1964, quoted in Harris, D. J., Cases and Materials on 
Internaitonal Law, p. 54. 
1298 Ago, R., Seventh report on State Responsibility, p. 59. 
1299 See, e.g., Eagleton, C., The Responsibility of States in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 1928, pp. 
35-40. 
1300 ILC Report on State Responsibility, pp. 252-3 (1978 Yearbook of the ILC, pp. 103). 
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wrongful acts.1301 Acts constituting complicity may involve a direct violation of international 
law. The Organization of American States (OAS) characterized as illegal the provision of 
material assistance by the US to the UK during the Malvinas-Falklands conflict in 1982. 
Charging the UK with ‘acts of war against the Argentine Republic’, the OAS resolved ‘to urge 
the Government of the United States of America…to refrain from providing material assistance 
to the United Kingdom, in observance of the principle of hemispheric solidarity recognized in 
the Inter-American treaty of Reciprocal Assistance’.1302 
The rule prohibiting the placing of territory at the disposal of an aggressor State addresses a 
narrow and specific form of complicity. There exists a state practice denoting a wider rule in 
respect of both aggression and the prohibition on the use of force. The strongest evidence may be 
found in the provision of military aid that is used to commit aggression, though some practice is 
more general both at the level of aid provided and in respect of the wrong assisted.1303 As a 
general principle, the provision of aid, military or otherwise, is lawful in international law, 
setting a basic presumption allowing free intercourse among nations.1304 This basic presumption 
is confined by allegations of complicity. 
For example, in 1951, the UN General Assembly condemned the People’s Republic of China’s 
participation in North Korea’s acts of aggression during the Korean Crisis, stating that … ‘by 
giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already engaged in committing aggression 
…has itself engaged in aggression in Korea.’1305 In 1982, after declaring that Israel’s occupation 
of the Golan Heights constituted an act of aggression, the General Assembly called on Member 
States to refrain from supplying aid or assistance to Israel.1306 The ILC, citing practice in support 
of the general rule in Article 16, notes that in 1984 the Islamic Republic of Iran protested the 
                                                          
1301 ‘The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of opinion 
juris sive necessitates. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal 
obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough’: North Sea Continental 
Shelf, ICJ Reports, 1969, p. 44. 
1302 Twentieth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Res. I, Serious situation in the South 
Atlantic, OEA/Ser.F/II.20, doc. 80/82, rev. 2, at p. 3 (29 May 1982), reprinted in International Legal Materials, 21 
(1982), p. 672, at p. 674.  
1303 See Quigley, J., supra note 356, 87-95; Aust, H.P., supra note 1121, 129-45, Ago, R., Seventh Report on State 
Responsibility, p. 71.  
1304 See Lowe, V., supra note 1115, p. 6, discussing the requirement of knowledge for state responsibility to arise: 
'There is, for example, nothing wrong in principle, with supplying vehicles to another State.'  
1305 UN General Assembly Resolution 498 (V) 1 February 1951 UN Doc. A/RES/498 [1], Aust, H.P., supra note 
1121, p. 109.  
1306 UN General Assembly Resolution 37/123 of 16 December 1982, UN Doc. A/RES/37/123. 
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United Kingdom’s supply of financial and military aid to Iraq in the Iran-Iraq armed conflict, aid 
which allegedly included chemical weapons used in attacks against Iranian troops, on the ground 
that the assistance facilitated Iraq’s aggression.1307 This allegation was denied by the United 
Kingdom. In 1998, a similar allegation surfaced that the Sudan had assisted Iraq to manufacture 
chemical weapons by allowing Sudanese installations to be used by Iraqi technicians for steps in 
the production of nerve gas. The allegation was denied by Iraq’s representative to the United 
Nations.1308  
10.1.1.1. Military Aid Used for Aggression 
In recent years state practice on complicity has been most substantial in provision of material aid. 
Aid has been asserted to be unlawful where it has been used for committing aggression, for 
violating rules of warfare, and for violating human rights. Brownie writes that ‘the objective of 
aid must be lawful’, that provision of material aid is unlawful if ‘intended to further preparation 
for unlawful resort to force’,1309 and that supply that may entail responsibility includes ‘weapons, 
military aircraft, radar equipment’ used for aggression.1310 As complicity in aggression Ago cited 
the supply of another State with weapons to attack a third State.1311 The Thai ILC member stated 
that Article 27 ARSIWA (now Article 16) would apply to sale of arms or military equipment for 
use by the recipient State to commit an internationally wrongful act.1312 
The issue of arms supplies was discussed in a 1958 statement of the British Secretary of State. 
The underlying scenario involved ‘substantial shipments of arms from the Soviet bloc … to the 
Yemen and some of this equipment, including mortars and heavy machine guns, has been used 
on the frontier’ to (then British) Aden.1313 The Secretary of State, when asked in parliament 
whether it would protest to alleged suppliers of arms to Yemen, when Yemen was allegedly 
using those arms for aggressive purposes, replied that ‘the policy of Her Majesty’s Government 
has always been to urge restraint in arms deliveries to the Middle East but arms deliveries do not 
                                                          
1307 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, para. 7. 
1308 Ibidem. 
1309 Brownlie, I., supra note 294, pp. 259-60. 
1310 Ibidem, p. 1919. 
1311 Ago, R., Seventh report on State Responsibility, p. 58. 
1312 GAOR, 33rd Session, Sixth Committee, 38th meeting, at p. 5, para. 14 (statement of Sompong Sucharitkul), UN 
Doc. A/C.6/33/SR.38 (1978). 
1313 Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 5th series, vol. 589, col, 891 (1958), reprinted in Lauterpacht, E., The 
Contemporary Practice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International Law – Survey and Comment, VI, 
January I – June 30, 1958, ICLQ, 7 (1958), pp. 514, 551. 
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in themselves constitute grounds for protest.’1314 Commenting on the aforementioned 
Government statement, Lauterpacht wrote: 
There is…nothing in the Answer to support the view that a State which knowingly supplies arms to 
another for the purpose of assisting the latter to act in a manner inconsistent with its international 
obligations can thereby escape responsibility for complicity in such illegal conduct.1315 
The concept that States must refrain from facilitating aggressive acts by other States appears in 
the UN Charter. Article 2, paragraph 5, requires Member States to ‘refrain from giving assistance 
to any State against which the UN is taking preventing or enforcement action’. The rationale is 
that the target State is acting unlawfully. The UN Charter requires States to avoid assisting that 
illegality.  
The US has invoked complicity in aggression in charging the Soviet Union with supplying other 
States financially and militarily. One US official charged: 
Soviet arms are the life’s blood of Soviet aggression by proxy. In recent years, the Soviets and their 
proxies have repeatedly used force or the threat of force to expand their influence and frustrate 
peaceful change. With Soviet arms and support, Vietnamese troops occupy Kampuchea and threaten 
Thailand; Libya threatens Chad, Tunisia, the Sudan, Egypt and Morocco; Afghani planes and 
armoured units raid Pakistan; and Cuban troops stationed in Angola and Ethiopia threaten regional 
stability.1316 
In 1964 and again in 1967, the US threatened to terminate aid to Turkey to forestall possible 
Turkish aggression against Cyprus.1317 The US Congress cut military aid to Turkey after it 
invaded Cyprus in 1974.1318 Furthermore, the US cut-off military aid to Indonesia for six months 
in 1975-6, as a response to Indonesia’s military intervention in East Timor.1319 In 1981, Israel 
destroyed the nuclear site of Osirak in Iraq in what was widely considered to be a violation of 
                                                          
1314 Ibidem. 
1315 Ibidem. The UK delegate to the UN General Assembly’s Sixth (Legal) Committee has also expressed the view 
that a State that renders aid for commission of an internationally wrongful act violates international law: GAOR, 
33rd Session, Sixth Committee, 37th meeting, at p. 7, para. 18, UN Doc. A/C.6/33/SR.37 (1978). 
1316 Buckley, J. L., Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. Statement before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 5 February 1982, Department of State Bulletin, April 1982, at p. 84.  
1317 At the time, the US was the primary supplier of military equipment and military grants to Turkey. See Selden, A. 
Z., Economic Sanctions as Instruments of American Foreign Policy, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999, p. 128. 
1318 Ibidem. 
1319 Quigley, J., supra note 356, p. 90. 
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Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.1320 In this context, the Movement of Non-Aligned States urged 
States not to render aid or assistance to Israel in the context and aftermath of the Osirak crisis. 
The non-aligned countries called upon all States, and especially the United States of America, to 
refrain from giving Israel any assistance, whether military, political or economic, that might 
encourage it to pursue its aggressive policies against the Arab countries and the Palestinian 
people.1321 Subsequently, the UN General Assembly also condemned the attack and reiterated 
‘its call to all States to cease forthwith any provision to Israel of arms and related material of all 
types which enable it to commit acts of aggression against other States’.1322 
Moreover, Article 16 ARSIWA was invoked by Iran in 1992 in the Oil Platforms case1323 against 
the United States where certain aspects of the so-called ‘tanker war’ in the Persian Gulf were at 
issue.1324 In particular, Iran accused the United States of having violated its duties as a neutral 
State by actively supporting Iraq in a political, economic, diplomatic and military way. In a 
response to the United States’ Counter Claims issued in September 2001, Iran expressly relied on 
Article 16 ARSIWA to attribute responsibility to the United States. It called Article 16 a ‘general 
principle of law that participation in a violation of the law committed by a different actor itself 
constitutes a violation’.1325 The memorial then cited Article 16. It further explained that: 
[t]he activities of the United States described above were not only violations of the law of neutrality; 
they also constituted unlawful assistance to an aggression, i.e., a violation of the prohibition of the use 
of force. This violation engages the international responsibility of the United States. This means that 
the United States is liable to make compensation for any damage sustained by the victim of that 
aggression. At the very least, as already explained above, the existence of this legal duty must be a bar 
to any claim for compensation raised by the United States in this case.1326 
10.1.1.2. Military Aid Used to Violate Rules of Warfare 
                                                          
1320 UN Doc. S/RES/487 (1981), para. 1: The Security Council ‘[ s ]trongly condemns the military attack by Israel in 
clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct’. 
1321 See Note Verbale dated 16 June 1981 from the Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to 
the President of the Security Council, presented on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, UN Doc. S/14544. 
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1323 ICJ, Oil Platforms Case (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment of 6 November 2003 
(hereinafter: Oil Platforms Case). 
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International Customary Law, Ocean Development and International Law 19, 1988, pp. 381–99. 
1325 Oil Platforms Case, Further Response to the United States of America Counter-Claim submitted by the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 24 September 2001, para. 7.50. 
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States have recognized a duty not to facilitate violation of the humanitarian law of war by other 
States. Provision of material used by another State to violate rules of warfare has provoked 
protest by States. Assisting States have cut-off supply of such materials upon learning of its 
unlawful use. Iran in 1984 lodged a protest based upon the premise of complicity against the UK 
for violation of the rules of warfare. It charged the UK with supplying chemical weapons to Iraq, 
which Iraq allegedly had used against Iranian troops.1327 Iran characterized the UK’s alleged 
provision of the weapons as a ‘criminal act’. The UK denied the charge.1328 Following 
publication of a UN inspection team report that Iraq had so used chemical weapons, the US and 
several European States cut-off sales to Iraq of chemicals that could be employed to make such 
weapons.1329 
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions oblige States parties to ensure that other States parties abide 
by these conventions. Article I, common to the four conventions, requires States to ‘ensure 
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances’.1330 This obligation prohibits assisting an 
unlawful act but requires States, in addition, to endeavour to bring an offending State into 
compliance. According to the Red Cross commentary, common Article I requires that in the 
event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, the other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or 
enemy) may, and should, endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the 
Convention.1331 The proper working of the system of protection provided by the Convention 
demands in fact that the Contracting Parties should not be content merely to apply its provisions 
themselves, but should do everything in their power to ensure that the humanitarian principles 
underlying the Conventions are applied universally.1332 
                                                          
1327 New York Times, 6 March 1984, at p. A6, col. 3. 
1328 The Times, 5 March 1984, at p. I, col. 6. 
1329 On the UN report, see New York Times, 27 March 1984, at p. A5, col. I. On the US cut-off, see New York 
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1330 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 12 
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1331 Pictet, J. S., Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 
1952 (reprinted in 1994), p. 26; See also Nicaragua case, para. 220, and ICRC Study on Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 2005, Rule 144. 
1332 Pictet, J. S., Commentary: IV Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1958 (reprinted in 1994), p. 16.  
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Beginning in 1978, various UN organs called on Member States not to assist Israel in the illegal 
occupation of the West Bank. In 1978, the UN Commission on Human Rights cited Article I in 
calling on States not to aid Israel in annexing and colonizing Arab territories under its military 
occupation. States were asked not to aid in violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
by Israel in the occupied Arab territories. After asserting that Israel had violated the Convention 
by annexing and colonizing such areas, the Commission  
reiterate[d] its call to all states, in particular the States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, in accordance with Article I of that Convention, … to 
avoid … extending any aid which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies of annexation 
and colonization or any other policies and practices referred to in the present resolution.1333 
In 1980, the Security Council utilized the concept of complicity by means of aid in a resolution 
on Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territory. After stating that the settlements violated 
international law, the Council unanimously called upon all States not to provide Israel with any 
assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories.1334 
Similarly, the General Assembly repeatedly called on States not to assist Israel in its occupation 
and annexation of the occupied Palestinian territory.1335 In one of these resolutions, the General 
Assembly expressly mentioned ‘the international responsibility of any parties that supply Israel 
with arms or economic aid that augment its war potential’.1336  
Thus, one may conclude that the common Article I represents state practice of all State parties to 
the four Geneva Conventions to the effect that facilitating a violation of humanitarian norms is 
itself a violation of norms of state responsibility.  
10.1.1.3. Military Aid Used to Violate Human Rights 
Foreign aid in general may also contribute to violations of international law. As Antonio Cassese 
has remarked: 
                                                          
1333 UN Human Rights Commission Res. 1984/I, para. 12, 20 February 1984. 
1334 SC Res. 465, 1 March 1980, SCOR, 35th Session, 2203rd meeting, at p. 405, para 7, UN Doc. S/INF/36 (1980). 
1335 UN Doc. A/ES-7/4 (1982), para. 9b; A/RES/38/180 (1983), paras. A9, A13, A14, D11, E2, E3; A/RES/39/146 
(1984), paras. A11, B9, B13–14; A/RES/40/168 (1985), paras. A11, B9, B13–14; A/RES/41/162 (1986), paras. A11, 
B9, B13–14. 
1336 UN General Assembly Resolution, UN Doc. A/RES/38/180 of 28 April 1983, para. E1. 
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The question whether foreign economic assistance to states grossly disregarding human rights has an 
impact on the enjoyment of civil and political rights in those states is undoubtedly very complex. The 
nexus between economic assistance and human rights is often indirect and subtle.1337 
Although it may thus in practice be difficult to find state responsibility for complicity through 
the provision of foreign aid, it may nonetheless be possible to shed further light on States’ 
attitudes to the granting of foreign aid to other States violating international law. 
The complicity concept has been invoked against giving aid to a State that commits gross 
violations of human rights. In the Seventh Report on State Responsibility Roberto Ago wrote: 
Complicity may, for example, also take the form of provision of weapons or other supplies to assist 
another State to commit genocide, to support a regime of apartheid, or to maintain colonial domination 
by force, etc.1338 
In 1984, Iran protested against the United Kingdom and France over the alleged supply of 
chemical weapons to Iraq which were subsequently used against Iranian troops in the First Gulf 
War. Both the United Kingdom1339 and France1340 denied having furnished such weapons to Iraq. 
There have been official protests by Angola, Cuba and the Soviet Union in March 1986 against 
the United States allegedly granting military and financial support to South Africa in its 
aggression against and partial occupation of the territory of Angola.1341  
In 2006, Rwanda broke off diplomatic relations with France and set up a commission to 
investigate the role of France in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi and Hutu moderates. France 
was a traditional supporter of the Rwandan government at the time, delivered arms and other 
military supplies and also had military advisers in the country about whom opinion is divided as 
to whether they were in any way involved in the planning of military operations which had an 
impact on the genocide.1342 Credible sources testify that the delivery of ammunition and 
                                                          
1337 Cassese, A., Foreign Economic Assistance and Respect for Civil and Political Rights: Chile – A Case Study, 14 
Texas International Law Journal, 1979, pp. 251–63, p. 251. 
1338 Ago, R., Seventh Report on State Responsibility, p. 59. 
1339 New York Times , 5 March 1984, p. A3. 
1340 Neue Zürcher Zeitung , 9 March 1984, p. 4 (Fernausgabe). 
1341 These protests are referred to – without further references – in Arangio-Ruiz, G., supra note 273, p. 54, para. 
246. 
1342 On the role of France and other external powers, see Dallaire, R., Manocha, K., Degnarain, N., supra note 1290, 
at pp. 863 et seq.; Wallis, A., Silent Accomplice – The Untold Story of France’s Role in Rwandan Genocide, 
London: I. B. Tauris, 2006, pp. 102 et seq . 
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communication technology for the military continued while the genocide was already 
progressing.1343 Rwanda has announced its intention to bring a case before the ICJ if the 
Commission’s results were to show that France was complicit in the genocide.1344 In 2007, 
Rwanda has reiterated this position.1345 In 2008, it finally published the Commission’s report 
which held, inter alia , that ‘[a]t all times during the genocide, France diplomatically and 
militarily assisted the interim government which planned and implemented the genocide’.1346 
The French government has denied all of the charges presented by the Rwandan government and 
held them to contain ‘unacceptable accusations’.1347 At the end of 2009, the two countries re-
established diplomatic relations and there is no longer talk of judicial action against France.1348 
In 2008, Russia protested against alleged arms deliveries by Ukraine to Georgia during the 
summer conflict of 2008. Russia considered Georgia’s use of military force in the breakaway 
province of South Ossetia as a violation of international law. In the context of a meeting 
concerning bulk gas supplies in October 2008, Prime Minister Putin told his Ukrainian 
counterpart, Yulia Tymoshenko, that ‘a more serious crime than arms deliveries in a conflict 
cannot be imagined’.1349 Russian President Dmitri A. Medvedev remarked in this regard that 
‘[u]nfortunately, several countries close to us participated in this’, meaning the Georgian conduct 
in the summer of 2008.1350 The Ukrainian response to this allegation is evasive. Ukrainian 
President Yushchenko has affirmed that ‘Ukraine has every right to sell weapons to any country, 
including Georgia, that is not under international sanctions’.1351 Furthermore, in the 2008 war 
                                                          
1343 Dallaire, R., Manocha, K., Degnarain, N., supra note 1290, pp. 865–6; see also Grünfeld, F., and Huijboom, A., 
The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders, Leiden: Nijhoff, 2007, pp. 233 et seq . 
1344 Le Monde, 2 November 2006, p. 6; Neue Zürcher Zeitung , 27 November 2006, p. 5. 
1345 Libération, 19 April 2007, p. 9. 
1346 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Justice: Report of the Independent National Commission responsible for 
collection of evidence indicating the role of the French State in the genocide against the Tutsi that was perpetrated 
in Rwanda in 1994; the report was available at www.gov.rw/government /Rapport%20France_Genocide/ 
RAPPORT%20COMPLET%20Version%20defi nitive%2015-11-07.pdf (last visited 8 June2009). 
1347 Point de presse du porte-parole du Ministčre des affaires étrangčres du 06.08.2008’, available at 
https://pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/editorial/actual/ael2/print_pp.asp?liste=20080806.html (last visited 1 November 
2010). 
1348 See Rwanda and France Restore Diplomatic Relations, BBC World News, 30 November 2009, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8385887.stm (last visited 1 November 2010). 
1349 See Pipe Down, The Economist, 10 January 2009, p. 26. 
1350 See Claims of Secret Arms Sales Rattle Ukraine’s Leaders, New York Times, 30 November 2008, p. A24. 
1351 Ibidem. 
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between Russia and Georgia, Russia accused the US of flying 2,000 Georgian soldiers from Iraq 
to the theatre of conflict in Georgia.1352 
In the 2009 conflict in Sri Lanka, India was accused of assisting Sri Lanka’s alleged violations of 
international humanitarian law.1353 
The following state practice shows that assisting States themselves have terminated their aid to 
States violating human rights. For example, in the case of Chile after the military coup in 1973 a 
number of States terminated aid to Chile, citing human rights violations.1354 The States 
terminating aid to Chile stated that they were doing so because of Chile’s human rights 
violations, they did not expressly state they considered themselves to be under an obligation to 
terminate aid. Yet that is the implication of their action.1355 A number of exemplary statements 
on this issue were made in the context of an examination by a UN Sub-Committee of ECOSOC. 
The Sub-Committee questioned States on their conduct towards the military government in 
Chile. Belgium stated that, ‘since the coup d’état of 11 September 1973, Belgium has refrained 
from supplying military or financial aid to Chile’, and ‘that the position of the Belgian 
Department of Foreign Affairs will remain unchanged until the rule of law is restored and human 
rights are fully re-established in Chile’.1356 The United Kingdom asserted that it had ‘taken a 
series of measures aimed at exerting pressure on the military regime in Chile over human rights’, 
including ‘a ban on all arms supplies’, ‘suspension of British aid’ and ‘denial of debt re-
scheduling facilities’.1357 The Federal Republic of Germany stated that it had not provided Chile 
with any more development aid and had also discontinued supplies of weapons and other 
                                                          
1352 See Russians March into Georgia, The Guardian, 11 August 2008, p. 1. 
1353 See India Accused of Complicity in Deaths of Sri Lankan Tamils, The Times, 1 June 2009, available at 
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6401557.ece (last visited 1 November 2010). 
1354 The vast majority of the States which have commented on their behaviour towards Chile in the filed of economic 
relations after 11 September 1973, have pointed out that they have either refused or substantially decreasing their 
economic assistance to Chile, as a direct consequences of the suppression of civil and political rights in that country 
carried out by the present authorities. Thus, the introduction of a repressive system in Chile has resulted in a vast 
segment of the international community denying economic aid to Chile, with a view to bringing pressure to bear on 
the present Chilean authorities for a restoration of human rights in that country. In Study of the Impact of Foreign 
Economic Aid and Assistance on Respect for Human Rights in Chile, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities , vol. 31, p. 89, para 419, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/412 (1978). On the 
1973 Chile aid cut-offs, see generally Cassese, A., supra note 1337, pp. 251-63. 
1355 Quigley, J., supra note 356, p. 95.  
1356 Study of the Impact of Foreign Economic Aid and Assistance on Respect for Human Rights in Chile, Sub-
Committee on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/412 
(1978), para. 414. 
1357 See Report of the Economic and Social Council: Protection of Human Rights in Chile, Report of the Secretary 
General, UN Doc. A/32/234 (1977), pp. 17–18. 
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military equipment.1358 Italy stated that it had ‘suspended the privileges enjoyed by Chile under 
the Insurance and Export Credit Law’ and that ‘official aid by Italy to the Chilean government is 
virtually non-existent’.1359 The Netherlands1360 and Norway1361 also stated that they had 
suspended their aid to Chile. 
After the occupation of the Falkland Islands in 1982, the Federal Republic of Germany refused to 
allow further exports of weapons and war materials to Argentina. The German Federal 
Government posited in a statement that it would prevent the delivery of arms to a State 
responsible for a violent act contrary to international law and in non-compliance with UN 
Security Council resolutions.1362 
The Netherlands stopped financial support for the maintenance of the Surinam military after a 
new military government was blamed for massive human rights violations in 1982. Under 
agreements concluded in 1975, the Netherlands had agreed to deliver economic subsidies and 
financial assistance for the maintenance of the Surinam military. In 1982, the Dutch government 
suspended the 1975 treaties and protested against the human rights violations.1363 Although the 
Netherlands government did not motivate its move entirely on the basis of considerations of 
complicity but primarily on the basis of the clausula rebus sic stantibus, it is noteworthy that in a 
diplomatic note of 14 December 1982 presented to Surinam it made reference to its position that 
the granting of development assistance shall not entail co-responsibility for serious human rights 
violations.1364 In this perspective, considerations of complicity could constitute the very change 
of circumstances which prompts a State to terminate its treaty relationship with another State 
engaged in violations of international law.1365 
                                                          
1358 Ibidem, p. 9. 
1359 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/412 (1978), para. 407. 
1360 UN Doc. A/32/234 (1977), pp. 12–13. 
1361 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/412 (1978), para. 410. 
1362 Documented in Lindemann, H. H., Völkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahre 1982, 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 44 ( 1984 ), pp. 495–584, at p. 557. 
1363 This is reported in Tams, C. J., Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International law, Cambridge Studies in 
International and Comparative Law, 2010, p. 227. 
1364 A translation of the note into German is provided by Hans-Heinrich Lindemann, ‘Die Auswirkungen der 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Surinam auf die Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen den Niederlanden und Surinam’, 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 44 ( 1984 ), pp. 64–93, at pp. 67–8, note 17. 
1365 See generally Hoffmeister, F., Menschenrechts- und Demokratieklauseln in den vertraglichen 
Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Berlin, Springer, 1998, p. 205. 
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In 1995, the German Federal Government stated that it was in close contact with the Turkish 
government to survey whether the limitations attached to German arms deliveries to Turkey were 
respected. These limitations provided that the arms delivered could only be used in a situation in 
which Article 5 of the NATO Treaty1366 would be applicable (self-defence against an armed 
attack). The Federal Government would constantly monitor Turkey’s compliance with this 
requirement.1367 
In 2004 the United Kingdom posited that due to accusations of gross violations of human rights 
by the Colombian armed forces no military assistance would be granted ‘to individuals or units 
known, or suspected to have been, implicated in human rights abuses or in collusion with 
paramilitary forces’.1368 This statement is, however, ambiguous as to whether it also has delivery 
of weapons to States in mind, as the Under Parliamentary Secretary of State for the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office spoke of ‘individuals or units’ and not of States. However, one could 
assume that the same rationale should apply to States which engage in human rights abuses. 
Support for this interpretation can be derived from the fact that, in March 2009, the UK 
government ‘quietly ended nearly a decade of military aid to Colombia’s armed forces’.1369 It has 
been mentioned that accusations of gross violations of human rights have been the motive for 
this decision. In a previous statement to the parliament, the Foreign Secretary had announced that 
the UK government ‘shares the concern … that there are officers and soldiers of the Colombian 
armed forces who have been involved in, or allowed, abuses’.1370 The actual termination of the 
military aid was not commented on by the UK government sources. The Colombian deputy 
defence minister acknowledged, however, the termination, and said his government was 
‘extremely surprised’.1371 
                                                          
1366 North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, entered into force on 24 August 1949, 34 UNTS 243. 
1367 Reported in Grote, R., Völkerrechtspraxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahre 1995, Zeitschrift für 
ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 57, 1997, pp. 923–1164, at p. 1128. 
1368 See the statement reprinted in British Year Book of International Law 75 (2004), p. 706. 
1369 See UK Ends Bilateral Military Aid to Colombia, The Guardian, 29 April 2009, available at 
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1370 Statement of Foreign Secretary David Miliband of 31 March 2009, available at 
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In 2004, the Commission on Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Bundesrat appealed to the Swiss 
government to stop arms deliveries to Israel as long as Israel did not comply with its obligation 
under international law, most notably its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.1372 
Another source of international practice which is frequently mentioned in studies on complicity 
in the law of state responsibility is United Nations practice.1373 This is not surprising, as every 
UN Security Council imposed sanctions regime has included an arms embargo against the 
targeted State except the Resolution 1054 sanctions regime against Sudan1374 and the measures 
adopted in the context of the Hariri murder in Lebanon in 2005.1375 Just as with domestic 
legislation banning the export of arms and weapons, the UN Security Council resolutions 
banning the granting of military support could be considered as having been adopted with a view 
to prevent support for unlawful activities. Hence, they could be considered as forming part of 
international practice for a rule against state complicity.1376 
In this regard, the sanctions against the racist regime of Southern Rhodesia were based on 
considerations of legality. The minority rule of the regime under Ian Smith was considered to be 
in violation of the right to self-determination of the majority of Rhodesians.1377 In Resolution 
217, the Council called upon States to undertake a range of voluntary measures against the 
minority regime. These measures included not recognizing the illegal regime’s claim to power or 
entertaining diplomatic relations with it, refraining from providing arms to the illegal regime, 
and breaking all economic relations with the illegal regime.1378 These obligations were further 
strengthened in successive resolutions which called on all States not to provide financial or 
                                                          
1372 Reported in Egli, P., Rechtliche Schranken des Handel smit Kriegsmaterial, 15 Schweizerische Zeitschriftfur 
Internationales und Europaisches Recht, 2005, p. 666. 
1373 Quigley, J., supra note 356, pp. 92–3. 
1374 UN Doc. S/RES/1054 (1996). 
1375 UN Doc. S/RES/1636 (2005); 277 Farrall, J.M., United Nations Sanctions, p. 110, names seven sanctions 
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1377 UN Doc. S/RES/217 (1965). 
1378 Ibidem. 
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economic aid to the racist regime1379 and ‘to refrain from recognizing the illegal regime or 
rendering any assistance to it’.1380 The rational behind that provision was that the government of 
Southern Rhodesia was committing an internationally wrongful act by maintaining a racial-
minority administration and that economic aid would facilitate illegality.1381 Nearly all UN 
Member States complied with the boycott.1382 In contrast to other sanctions regimes, this 
connection between the determination that the regime in Southern Rhodesia was ‘illegal’ and the 
adoption of sanctions may warrant the assumption that the idea of complicity had some role to 
play in the considerations leading up to this sanctions regime. 
In 1982, the General Assembly invoked complicity in relation to aid to Guatemala, urging 
governments ‘to refrain from supplying arms and other military assistance as long as serious 
human rights violations in Guatemala continue to be reported’.1383 The Assembly also called on 
States ‘to refrain from the supply of arms and other military assistance to El Salvador’ because of 
what it found to be serious human rights violations.1384 
Considerations of illegality and the attitude of third States towards it also played a role in the 
way UN organs dealt with South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia. Formerly under a 
South African mandate granted by the League of Nations, it was at issue after the Second World 
War and the founding of the United Nations whether the territory of Namibia was to be 
introduced into the United Nations’ trusteeship system or whether, as was claimed by South 
Africa, it was to form part of the latter’s territory. After protracted institutional developments, 
the mandate of the League of Nations was terminated by the UN General Assembly.1385 In 
Resolution 276 (1970), the Security Council recognized this termination and further defined the 
                                                          
1379 SC Res. 232, 16 December 1966, SCOR, 21st Session, 1340th meeting, at p. 7, UN Doc. S/INF/21/Rev. I 
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legal status of Namibia and the ensuing obligations of South Africa and other UN Member 
States. In paragraph 2 of the resolution, it declared ‘that the continued presence of the South 
African authorities in Namibia is illegal and that consequently all acts taken by the Government 
of South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are 
illegal and invalid’.1386 Furthermore, it called upon ‘all States, particularly those which have 
economic and other interests in Namibia, to refrain from any dealings with the Government of 
South Africa which are inconsistent with paragraph 2 of the present resolution’.1387 To further 
clarify the situation, an advisory opinion was secured by the UN General Assembly from the 
ICJ.1388 In both situations, concerning Southern Rhodesia and South Africa’s continued presence 
in Namibia, the crucial question was on which legal basis the obligation of non-assistance rested 
and whether the UN Security Council had a general concept of complicity in mind or did it only 
impose an obligation of non-assistance in order to provide for an effective application of the 
sanctions. In this respect, the Court held in its advisory opinion on Namibia that ‘[a] binding 
declaration made by a competent organ of the United Nations to the effect that a situation is 
illegal cannot remain without consequence’.1389 As to the immediate effects for third States, the 
Court held that: 
The Member States of the United Nations are … under an obligation to recognize the illegality and 
invalidity of South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia. They are also under an obligation to refrain 
from lending any support or any form of assistance to South Africa with reference to its occupation of 
Namibia...1390 
The above examples taken from state practice show that the idea of participation in the 
internationally wrongful act of another State by providing aid or assistance, and thus, in this 
sense, of ‘complicity’, has become accepted in international law.1391 That conclusion represents 
the view of many highly qualified publicists.1392  
                                                          
1386 UN SC Resolution 276 [the Situation in Namibia], U.N. Doc. S/RES/276 (1970) adopted by the SC at its 1529th 
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1389 Ibidem, para. 117. 
1390 Ibidem, para. 119.  
1391 ILC Report on State Responsibility, p. 252 (1978 Yearbook of the ILC, p. 103). Boyle suggested that complicity 
might even be considered to constitute one of the 'general principles of law' referred to in Article 38 (1) of the 
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10.1.2. Opinio Juris 
In order to generate customary international law, the existence of practice alone is not sufficient. 
Rather, it needs to be supplemented by the accompanying opinion juris, the belief that the form 
of conduct represented by the practice is required by law. Opinion juris with respect to 
complicity is indicated by the protests and other charges made by States and responses to them, 
by the decisions and resolutions of UN organs, by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case and the 
Genocide case, by the practice of States refraining from aiding wrongful acts of other States and 
by statements of representatives of States in the General Assembly’s Sixth Committee.1393  
The protests made by States charging complicity have manifested a conviction of the protesting 
State that the allegedly complicit State has violated a legal obligation. UK protested to Yemen 
for having permitted Egyptian aircraft to use Yemeni territory for allegedly aggressive attacks 
against British territory: its protest was based on the ground that it was impermissible for Yemen 
to permit its territory to be so used. Iran, in charging the UK with providing Iraq with ingredients 
for chemical weapons, described the UK role as a ‘criminal act’. The US has stated that the 
USSR ‘cannot escape responsibility for the violence’ allegedly perpetrated by Cuba with Soviet 
material support. The USSR described the US and an ‘accomplice’ in alleged aggression by 
Israel in Lebanon in 1982. The USSR accused Israel of being a ‘direct accomplice’ in aggression 
allegedly perpetrated by the US and UK against Jordan in 1958.1394 The allegedly complicit 
States have never questioned the protesting State’s assertion that the conduct alleged to have 
aided the principal State would be wrongful.1395  
Opinio juris on complicity is further reflected in the work of the UN Security Council and the 
General Assembly. Resolutions and decisions embodying complicity manifest the view of the 
States supporting those resolutions and decisions that the allegedly complicit conduct is 
wrongful. The Human Rights Commission, in opposing provision to Israel of aid that would be 
used for annexation or colonization in the Arab territories occupied by Israel, manifested a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Statute of the ICJ. See Boyle, F., Destructive Engagement in Southern Africa, International Practitioner's Notebook, 
1985, p. 34. An international tribunal might well conclude that complicity is such a 'general principle' though State 
practice seems to have established complicity as a customary norm.  
1392 ICJ Statute, Article 38, para. I (d) 
1393 Quigley, J., supra note 356, p. 97. 
1394 Ibidem. 
1395 Ibidem, p. 98. 
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conviction that State providing such aid would be acting wrongfully. That conclusion is 
reinforced by the fact that the resolution refers to the obligation of States Parties to the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to ensure compliance 
with the Convention by other State Parties, Israel being a State Party.1396 
The General Assembly, in calling on States ‘to renounce…providing Israel with military, 
economic and political assistance’, asserted that such withholding of aid would ‘discourage 
Israel from continuing its aggression, occupation and disregard of its obligations under the 
Charter’, thus implying that an aid-giving State would be acting wrongfully since it would be 
promoting wrongful acts by Israel.1397 The same implication is found in the UN Security Council 
resolution against aid to Israel ‘to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the 
occupied territories’.1398 The premise is that it is wrongful to aid the allegedly illegal acts.  
In its 1971 Namibia case, the ICJ found that States are obliged to refrain from engaging with 
South Africa in dealings that imply recognition of its occupation of Namibia, thereby suggesting 
that acts that promote the illegal act of another State are themselves wrongful.1399 The Court 
based its finding on two premises. First, it found States to be under such an obligation because 
the Security Council had ordered them not to engage in such dealings, and Article 25 of the UN 
Charter requires Member States to carry out the Security Council decisions. Secondly, the Court 
based its finding on the ‘general international law’.1400 It thus found in customary law a principle 
that States are obliged to refrain from aiding the indicated illegal acts of other States.  
While the practice alone warrants an inference of opinion juris regarding complicity, there is 
abundant indication of express recognition by States that complicity is forbidden by customary 
law. The complicity norm has been invoked by the UN General Assembly, the UN Security 
Council, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the ICJ. A number of multilateral treaties 
have invoked it as well. On the other side, there is no body of practice that rejects the complicity 
norm.  
                                                          
1396 UN Human Rights Commission Res. 1984/I, para 12, 20 February 1984. 
1397 GA Res. 38/180, para I (102nd plenary meeting), 19 December 1983. In a 1982 resolution on acts by Israel in 
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967 the Assembly 'urge[d] all Governments which have not yet done 
so:…to renounce the policy of providing Israel with military, economic and political assistance…'.  
1398 SC Res. 465, 1 March 1980, SCOR, 35th Session, 2203rd meeting, at p. 405, para 7, UN Doc. S/INF/36 (1980). 
1399 ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1971, para. 108. 
1400 Brownlie, I., supra note 294, pp. 259-60. 
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11.  Special Rules on Complicity  
The rules of the law of state responsibility constitute only the basic framework of international 
law in that regard.1401 They are supplemented by subject-specific provisions which may establish 
the responsibility of complicit States in situation in which it would be impossible to do so under 
the general rules which are Articles 16 and 41(2) ARSIWA.1402 That specialised rules on 
complicity may go further than the general ones is plausible as States have agreed to these 
constraints in specific international agreements.1403 If we survey the field of international law, 
three areas are especially relevant as they include special rules on complicit State behaviour. 
These are the rules on the use of force and the system of collective security, international 
humanitarian law and human rights law. 
11.1. The Use of Force and Collective Security 
In the case of the unlawful use of force, it is warranted to speak of a ‘network’ of rules on state 
complicity, which mutually complement and reinforce each other. 
Under a just war theory, restrictions were placed upon third States not to assist the party to a 
conflict which was waging an unjust war. In contrast, the international law of the classic, 
positivist period in the nineteenth century reaffirmed the law of neutrality as an option of choice, 
a third State having the right to remain aloof from a conflict and to keep an equal distance from 
the belligerents.1404 With emergence of the mechanisms of collective security (the League of 
Nations, the UN), these questions had to be embedded in the interpretation of the UN Charter.  
When attempting to assemble the pertinent rules on the role of third States with respect to the use 
of force, the following layer of rules are relevant. First, the general rule on aid or assistance to 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act as reflected in Article 16 ARSIWA. Secondly, 
Article 41(2) ARSIWA, supplementing Article 16 and providing that, after the commission of a 
serious breach of the international prohibition against aggression, States are under a special 
obligation not to render aid or assistance to the maintenance of the situation brought about by the 
serious breach. This rule will be further analysed in Chapter 17 below. Thirdly, Article 3(f) of 
                                                          
1401 See Article 55 ARSIWA on the principle of lex specialis. 
1402 Cerone, J., supra note 1148, p. 533.  
1403 Nolte, G. and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, p. 17.  
1404 For a concise overview of the historical developments, see Neff, S. C., War and the Law of Nations: A General 
History, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 59 and 191 et seq.  
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the Definition of Aggression of 1974 provides that States shall not allow their territory, which 
they have placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that State for the perpetration of 
an act of aggression against a third State.1405 Responsibility under this provision is potentially 
more compelling than Article 16 as it does not require a special form of intent or knowledge on 
the part of the assisting State.1406 Fourthly, this strict and objective form of responsibility for the 
permission to make use of territory for the commission of an unlawful use of force is further 
supplemented by the general obligation on States to control their own territory.1407 Sovereignty 
over territory presupposes the effective exercise thereof which includes an obligation not to 
allow for unlawful conduct harming other States to take place on one’s own territory.1408 This 
obligation thus requires the exercise of due diligence on the part of States over the uses to which 
their territory is put.1409 Fifthly, further obligations not to become complicit in the unlawful use 
of force may be triggered once the Security Council has taken preventive or enforcement action 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In addition to concrete obligation of non-assistance which 
may be provided for in the operative parts of individual resolutions, Article 2(5) of the UN 
Charter provides that States are under an obligation to ‘refrain from giving any assistance to any 
State against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action’. Enhanced duties of 
isolation apply once the Security Council has taken a position on who is responsible for the 
bringing about of a situation which threatens international peace or security or may even 
constitute a breach of the peace or an act of aggression.  
Finally, a sixth layer of obligations may apply for third States through the application of the 
traditional laws of neutrality.1410 Most authorities are willing to accord States the privilege to 
adopt a neutral position and not to side with one party to an ongoing armed conflict.1411 Once 
applicable, the laws of neutrality trigger a special form of rules against complicity which aim to 
prevent the neutral State from rendering support to both sides of the conflict and to receive, in 
return, the benefit of remaining unaffected by the conflict.1412 In order to uphold this status, 
                                                          
1405 Declaration on the Definition of Aggression, UN Doc. A/RES/3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.  
1406 See further Nolte, G. and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, p. 6.  
1407 See Orakhelashvili, A., Overlap and Convergence: The Interaction Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 12 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 1997, pp. 157-96, at p. 193. 
1408 Island of Palmas Case, RIAA II, 839. 
1409 On the due diligence as a standard for complicit states, see generally Talmon, S., supra note 1191, p. 219. 
1410 See Lowe, V., supra note 1115, p. 13; Nolte, G. and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, p. 6.  
1411 Brownlie, I., supra note 252, p. 404, Dinstein, Y., supra note 1127, p. 164. 
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neutral States are required to refrain from supporting any of the parties to a conflict in an 
unequivocal manner and are subject to losing the status of a neutral State if they consistently 
violate their obligations of neutrality.1413 
Of these six layers of obligations of States potentially complicit with violations of Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter, Article 16 is only the most basic one.1414 It is suggested that its strict criteria will 
mean that, in most cases concerning the unlawful use of force, it will not be the crucial rule upon 
which determination of responsibility for complicit States will depend.  
11.2. International Humanitarian Law 
In the field of international humanitarian law, no direct provision on complicity in violations of 
the rules of this body of law exists.1415 However, Common Article I of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions I-IV is frequently interpreted as giving rise to an obligation of non-assistance with 
respect to the content of the Conventions.1416 The Article provides: ‘The High Contracting 
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances.’ It has been referred to as the ‘nucleus for a system of collective 
responsibility’.1417 Hotly contested, and the relevant issue is the question whether the wording ‘to 
ensure respect’ is supposed to establish an obligation on States and what its precise scope would 
be. Some authors have held the view that it merely provides for a faculty of States to insist upon 
the application of the relevant rules of the Geneva Conventions in armed conflicts to which they 
are not a direct party.1418 The ICJ has interpreted the obligation ‘to ensure respect’ as having its 
roots in customary international law and as requiring States not to encourage violations of 
international humanitarian law by others.1419 The Court was even more explicit in its Wall 
opinion, where it held that Common Article I provides that ‘every state party to that Convention, 
whether or not it is a party to the specific conflict, is under an obligation to ensure that the 
                                                          
1413 Dinstein, Y., supra note 1127, p. 25. 
1414 Corten, O., Le droit contre la guerre, 1 Journal on the Use of Force in International Law 2, 2014, p. 268.  
1415 See generally Schabas, W. A., supra note 612 (Enforcing), pp. 439-59. 
1416 Azzam, F., The Duty of Third States to Implement and Enforce International Humanitarian Law, Nordic Journal 
of International Law 66, 1997, pp. 55-75, p. 70; Kessler, B., The Duty to Ensure Respect under Common Article 1 of 
the Geneva Conventions: Its Implication on International and Non-International Armed Conflicts, German 
Yearbook of International Law 44, 2001, pp. 489-516, at p. 503; Saddoli, M., State Responsibility for Violations of 
International Humanitarian law, International Review of the Red Cross 84 (2002), No. 846, pp. 401-34, p. 413. 
1417 Boisson de Chazournes, L., Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective 
Interests, International Review of the Red Cross 82 (2000), No. 837, pp. 67-87, p. 68.  
1418 Kalshoven, F., Respect and Ensure, 2 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 1999, pp. 3-61, at p. 60. 
1419 Nicaragua case, paras. 220, 255. 
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requirements of the instruments in question are complied with’.1420 Finally, reference can be 
made to the study on customary international law conducted by the ICRC.1421 Rule 144 provides: 
States may not encourage violations of international humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict. 
They must exert their influence, to the degree possible to stop violations of international humanitarian 
law.1422 
The Commentary to this rule expressly points to Article 16 ARSIWA which would support the 
customary status of Rule 144.1423  
The concrete content of Common Article I could be understood as at least requiring States not to 
render aid or assistance to violations of the Geneva Conventions.1424 In this respect, there is an 
ongoing debate whether Article 16 could imply the general principle which is underlying this 
interpretation of Common Article I.1425 A problematic feature of this debate is the conflation of 
encouragement with complicity, which occurs frequently. In the general law on state 
responsibility, incitement or encouragement do not render a state responsible.1426 In the context 
of international humanitarian law, the ICJ has, however, deduced the prohibition to encourage 
violations of the law from Common Article I.1427 Accordingly, responsibility of third parties 
under Common Article I may commence at a lower threshold than is the case with Article 16 
ARSIWA.1428 However, for those cases in which assistance to violations of international 
humanitarian law is at stake, it is very possible to construe Article 16 as the lex generalis and 
Common Article I as lex specialis.1429 The strict criteria embodied in Article 16, especially with 
                                                          
1420 The Wall case, para. 158. 
1421 Henckaerts, J. M., and Doswald-Beck, L., Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol I, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, pp. 509 et seq. 
1422 Ibidem, p. 510. 
1423 Ibidem, p. 511. 
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respect to the requisite degree of intent, may then be attenuated once complicity enters the scope 
of Common Article I.1430 
Assistance to violations of international humanitarian law can thus be seen as an example where 
more demanding standards change the interpretation of Article 16 ARSIWA. The obligation to 
ensure respect for the observance of international humanitarian law thus impacts upon the 
required vigilance of the complicit State. Sassoli has described this with respect to the transfer of 
weapons in a situation in which systematic violations of international humanitarian law would 
occur in the State to which the weapons are transferred.1431 Under the strict rules of Article 16, it 
would need to be established with certainty that the weapons were used for the concrete 
violations and the aiding State could possibly maintain that it rendered the support not for the 
violation of the international humanitarian law. However, such a narrow understanding of the 
obligations incumbent upon the assisting State would no longer be possible under the heightened 
standard imposed by Common Article I: ensuring respect for international humanitarian law 
would thus demand more of the complicit State than the general rule which is Article 16 
ARSIWA. 1432 However, one should also note the scepticism with respect to the practical impact 
of Common Article I, a provision which would only rarely be used. At least in theory, Common 
Article I is, however, a valuable addition to the rules on complicity. It may thus contribute to 
further ‘encircle’ complicit State action with normative barriers.  
11.3. Human Rights Law 
The field of human rights law is too diverse to point to a single mechanism by which the problem 
of complicit States is established beyond the general state of the law as embodied in the 
ARSIWA. However, three different mechanisms can be identified by which, in special areas of 
the law, more far-reaching responsibility for complicit States is established. These comprise 
special rules on complicity, obligations which cover different forms of State conduct which is, 
however, similar to complicity and the existence of positive obligations in several human rights 
treaties. Furthermore, complicity may have a role to play in determinations whether a given 
violation of the law took place within the jurisdiction of a particular State. 
                                                          
1430 Brehm, M., supra note 1429, p. 386. 
1431 Sassoli, M., supra note 1429. 
1432 Ibidem, p. 413, Brehm, M., supra note 1429, p. 386. 
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Article III(e) of the Genocide Convention provides that ‘complicity in genocide’ shall be 
punishable. The wording of this provision indicates that originally it was intended to require 
States to provide for the criminal prosecution of individuals who have been complicit in 
genocide. Article III (e) was not so much understood as a provision under which responsibility of 
States for complicity would be established.1433 The ICJ established why it considered the 
Genocide Convention to directly impose obligations under Articles I and III for States party to 
the Convention. With respect to Article I of the Genocide Convention, the Court held that it 
would be:  
[p]aradoxical if States were thus under an obligation to prevent, so far as within their power, 
commission of genocide by persons over whom they have a certain influence, but were not forbidden 
to commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have such firm control that 
their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under international law. In short, the obligation to 
prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide.1434 
The Court extended this finding to the acts enumerated in Article III. While the Court recognized 
the fact that: 
[t]he concepts used in paragraphs (b) to (e) of Article III, and particularly that of ‘complicity’, refer to 
well known categories of criminal law and, as such, appear particularly well adapted to the exercise of 
penal sanctions against individuals…it would not be in keeping with the object and purpose of the 
Convention to deny that the international responsibility of a State – even though quite different in 
nature from criminal responsibility – can be engaged through one of the acts, other than genocide 
itself, enumerated in Article III.1435 
Accordingly, Article III (e) of the Genocide Convention imposes upon States an additional 
obligation not to become complicit in genocide. The crucial question then is how this obligation 
differs from the general obligation not to aid or assist in the commission of a genocide under 
Article 16 ARSIWA. In this regard, the judgment sends ambiguous signals. In order to interpret 
Article III(e), the Court had recourse to Article 16 ARSIWA. It noted that, although conceptually 
distinct, Article 16 would merit consideration as there would be no apparent reason ‘to make any 
distinction of substance between “complicity in genocide”, within the meaning of Article III (e) 
                                                          
1433 Schabas, W. A., supra note 386, pp. 285 et seq.  
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1435 Ibidem, para. 167. 
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and the “aid or assistance” of a State in the commission of a wrongful act by another State within 
the meaning of…Article 16’.1436 This could be interpreted to mean that, with respect to genocide, 
no stricter standards with respect to complicity apply than the one embodied in Article 16. This 
issue will be further explored in Chapter 7.  
Article 16 may indeed be suitable as a blueprint for responsibility for complicity in genocide 
under the Genocide Convention as the rules against genocide are among those rare examples in 
international law where intent on the part of a State is required in order to trigger responsibility. 
In order to hold a State responsible for the commission of genocide, it needs to be shown that the 
requisite dolus specialis was present.1437 The ICJ has interpreted this requirement in the context 
of complicity in a way such that an accomplice must have, at the least, awareness of the special 
intent of the perpetrators of genocide. The words ‘at the least’ suggest that, normally, the 
accomplice should have more than this awareness.1438 Although the provision on complicity in 
the Genocide Convention does not establish a stricter standard for complicit States, the ICJ has 
compensated for this finding in the form of a wide interpretation of the obligation to prevent 
genocide.  
Positive obligations and obligations of prevention may also prove to be viable functional 
alternatives to Article 16 which may in some cases make it easier to establish the responsibility 
of a complicit State and may prove to be more flexible than a rigidly applied concept of 
complicity: first, determining the direct responsibility of a contracting party under a human rights 
instrument with respect to the compliance with positive obligations may absolve a court from 
having to consider the conduct of another State. Although no Monetary Gold principle1439 in the 
technical sense would arguably hinder an international human rights body from doing so, it can 
be assumed that most courts would be reluctant to engage in such an assessment.1440 Secondly, 
                                                          
1436 Ibidem, para 420.  
1437 Schabas, W. A., supra note 386, pp. 206 et seq. 
1438 Nolte, G. and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, p. 14. 
1439 Monetary Gold principle was enunciated by the ICJ in the Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 
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the criteria for a breach of a positive obligation are almost by definition vague; more so than with 
complicity. Accordingly, they allow for the consideration of policy questions.  
The analysis of three distinct areas of international law has shown that international law may 
provide for a more far-reaching rule on state complicity which cure some of the deficiencies 
attached to Article 16 ARSIWA. These rules should be mutually reinforcing. Whereas the rules 
pertaining to the use of force provide for different consequences for complicit State behaviour, 
international humanitarian law provides for a functionally similar rule, the obligation ‘to ensure 
respect’ for the 1949 Geneva Conventions which demands more of complicit States than it is the 
case with Article 16.  
12.  Complicity and Peremptory Norms of International Law 
The network of rules relating to States’ obligations arising in respect of other actors 
encompassing specific primary rules prohibiting state complicity as well as general primary rule 
prohibiting broader forms of complicity in any international wrong of another State is 
supplemented by additional obligations that States bear in respect of breaches of peremptory 
norms of international law, as reflected in Chapter III ARSIWA.1441 A peremptory norm of 
international law is one ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character’.1442 The prohibition on 
genocide, aggression, slavery and torture are commonly understood to be norms of this 
character.1443 
Article 40 ARSIWA governs the international responsibility entailed by a serious breach by a 
State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. According 
to Article 40(2) ARSIWA a breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or 
systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation. Article 41 ARSIWA sets out 
the particular consequences of serious breaches of peremptory norms. These consequences, 
                                                          
1441 Chapter III ARSIWA. 
1442 Article 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
1443 See Suy, E., Article 53 – Treaties Conflicting with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law ('jus 
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almost entirely,1444 entail obligations on non-responsible States.1445 In the first place, all States 
are under an obligation to cooperate in bringing to an end the serious breach.1446 Second, Article 
41(2) ARSIWA provides that “[n]o State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a 
serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that 
situation.”1447 
The second clause of Article 41(2) supplements the prohibition on aid and assistance in Article 
16, dealing with ‘conduct “after the fact” which assists the responsible State in maintaining’ the 
situation created by the breach.1448 In contrast to rules of complicity that respond to participation 
in a particular wrongful act, Article 41(2) defines the principal wrong more broadly as the 
situation created by the serious breach. Concerning the scope of Article 41(2) and its relationship 
with Article 16, it is argued that the rules are mutually reinforcing.1449 
An obligation of non-assistance figures among the legal consequences that the Articles on State 
Responsibility attach to the commission of a serious breach of a peremptory norm under general 
international law. It is interesting to note that none of the three recent ICJ cases that involved 
assistance in arguably serious breaches of peremptory norms (i.e., the Wall case, the Genocide 
case and the Armed Activities case explicitly refer to Article 41).  
Article 41(2) ARSIWA sets out an additional obligation of non-assistance in addition to that 
embodied in Article 16 ARSIWA. The relationship of this special provision to Article 16 is to be 
examined. The concept of non-assistance presupposes a close factual connection between the 
support rendered and the commission of a specific wrongful act.1450 The obligations of non-
assistance do not exist only with respect to serious breaches of peremptory norms, but apply with 
respect to the whole spectrum of international law. The ILC held that the obligation of non- 
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assistance in Article 41(2) ARSIWA needs to be viewed together with Article 16.1451 Article 
41(2) can be considered as lex specialis to Article 16. This entails that there should be some 
analogy between the criteria set out in Article 16 to trigger responsibility for complicity and 
those for Article 41(2), save for special considerations the ILC had in mind with respect to the 
regime of serious breaches of peremptory norms under general international law. Therefore, 
responsibility for complicity under Article 41(2) should also presuppose a certain factual and 
causal connection between the support rendered and the maintenance of the situation brought 
about by the serious breach.1452  
12.1. The Concept of Complicity in Article 16 and Article 41(2) ARSIWA 
The following section will further examined whether different criteria exist rendering a complicit 
State responsible under Article 16 and 41(2) ARSIWA. 
12.1.1. Aid or assistance ‘after the fact’  
The first notable difference between Article 16 and Article 41(2) ARS is that the latter applies 
‘after the fact’.1453 Accordingly, the concept of complicity as developed in Article 41(2) ‘extends 
beyond the commission of the serious breach, and it applies whether or not the breach itself is a 
continuing one’.1454 The issue of continuing wrongful acts would also be covered by Article 16. 
Article 14(2) ARSIWA provides that ‘[t]he breach of an international obligation by an act of a 
State having a continuing character extends over the entire period during which the act continues 
and remains not in conformity with the international obligation’. In its Commentary, the ILC 
explains that a wrongful act is not of a continuing character because its effects or consequences 
extend in time.1455 The examples the ILC gives for acts of a continuing character relate to the 
maintenance in effect of legislative provisions which are incompatible with international law, an 
unlawful detention, the unlawful occupation of territory or of premise or embassies or the 
stationing of armed forces in another State without its consent.1456 In such cases, Article 41(2) 
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ARS would apply alongside Article 16 whose applicability is not excluded by the fact that the 
aid or assistance is rendered continuously. However, the ILC has also remarked that Article 
41(2) applies regardless of whether the obligation is of a continuing character. Hence, it must be 
presumed that there are other effects of serious breaches of peremptory norms which continue to 
have an impact although they have terminated as such in their quality as wrongful acts.  
It is important to note that the ILC is apparently not very strict with the concept of assistance 
after the fact, as it considers the obligation of non-assistance in Article 41(2) ARS to be 
applicable in the case of wrongful acts of a continuing character.1457 As Article 16 also applies in 
these cases, it is indeed the case that the additional impact of Article 41(2) is rather limited in 
terms of its temporal applicability.1458 One such scenario has been analysed by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights of the UK House of Lords and House of Commons. In its report on 
‘Allegations of UK Complicity in Torture’, the Committee considered that a ‘general practice of 
passively receiving intelligence information which has or may have been obtained under torture’ 
would be ‘likely to be in breach of the UK’s international law obligation not to render aid or 
assistance to other States which are in serious breach of their obligation not to torture’.1459 This 
would be aid or assistance which would help other State to maintain the wrongful situation. The 
Committee based its reasoning expressly on Article 41(2) ARS.1460 
12.1.2. The Nexus Requirement in respect of Article 41(2)  
Some commentators have argued that the ILC has attenuated the requirement of a causal 
connection between the support rendered and the commission or maintenance of the unlawful 
act/situation.1461 This argument is deducted from the fact that the aid or assistance is to be 
rendered for the maintenance of the situation brought about by the serious breach which would 
require a less direct impact of the support rendered than is the case with Article 16.1462 The 
requisite impact of the aid or assistance cannot be measured as to its effect upon the commission 
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of the wrongful act, but with respect to its contribution to the maintenance of the situation 
brought about by the serious breach.  
12.1.3. The Attenuated Subjective Requirement of Article 41(2) ARSIWA 
A marked difference between Article 16 and Article 41(2) could lie in an attenuated subjective 
requirement of the latter provision. The ILC has stipulated that distinctions apply in this regard: 
there is no requirement of knowledge or intent set out in Article 41(2) or in the Commentary 
thereto. In this regard, the Commission expressly held that ‘it is hardly conceivable that a State 
would not have notice of the commission of a serious breach by another State’.1463 The ILC’s 
Commentary merely notes that a State is ‘presumed’ to know when a ‘situation involving serious 
breaches’ exists.1464 This explanation is unsatisfactory, as awareness of the existence of a 
situation is quite different from knowledge that the aid provided will considerably assist the 
maintenance of that situation.  
Thus, as to the knowledge requirement, it is open to debate whether the Article 41, like Article 
25 (3) (d) ICC demands that the participant acts either with the aim that the group engages in 
(any) crime, or at least in the knowledge that the group will use the assistance to commit a 
specific crime. The ILC’s reasoning is convincing insofar as serious breaches of obligations 
under peremptory norms should not go unnoticed and therefore the intent requirement postulated 
by Article 16 need not be upheld in situations of serious breaches.1465 This different treatment of 
the subjective requirement can also be justified in light of the importance of the legal values 
protected by peremptory norms. Directed against aggression, slavery, genocide, racial 
discrimination, apartheid and torture as well as comprising the most basic rules of international 
humanitarian and human rights law, jus cogens norms define the bottom line of an ordre public 
international. It is thus only proper to demand of third States a higher degree of vigilance when 
obligations triggered by jus cogens rules are at stake.1466 
However, as the ILC has remarked, ‘[i]nternationally wrongful acts usually take some time to 
happen’.1467 Accordingly, no strict distinction between complicity which occurs prior to and in 
                                                          
1463 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 41, para 11.  
1464 Ibidem, Commentary on Article 41, para 12.  
1465 Jackson, M., supra note 348, p. 341.  
1466 Crawford, J., First Report on State Responsibility, supra note 23, para. 83. 
1467 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 14, para. 2.  
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parallel to the commission of a wrongful act and assistance which is rendered thereafter will be 
possible.  
Article 41 (2) provides for a separate duty of non-assistance but, in contrast to Article 16, it does 
not require intent or knowledge. Thus, as far as serious violations of jus cogens are concerned 
there is a stronger rule against complicity.1468 It is striking that the ILC has only lowered the 
standards of attribution in the limited field of serious breaches of peremptory norms. As the ILC 
has pointed out in its Commentary, the lack of a subjective element in Article 41 (2) is motivated 
by the fact that ‘it is hardly conceivable that a State would not have noticed of the commission of 
a serious breach by another State.’1469 A contrario, this suggests that uncertainty about the 
commission of the main act is a relevant factor for the application of Article 16. 
The obligation on States to stop violations of international law, the obligation to actively 
cooperate to bring a situation involving serious breaches of peremptory norms to an end – a 
failure to take positive action has, nevertheless, never led to a judicial finding that the obligation 
to ensure respect has been breached.1470 In Nicaragua it was the positive act of encouragement 
that led the Court to find a breach of the provision. Significantly, it found a breach exclusively in 
relation to the issuance of a manual that unequivocally promoted war crimes.1471 This despite the 
fact that US aid enabled the contras to fight and commit large-scale violations and that the US 
could have exercised considerable control over them if it desired.1472 
The relationship between Article 16, the serious breaches regime and the primary rules on 
complicity can thus be conceived in the following way: Article 16 provides for the general rule 
on complicity. As such it is characterized by the most restrictive interpretation among the three. 
                                                          
1468 The scope of application of Article 41 (2) is not easy to determine. Generally it applies 'after the fact' while 
being applicable regardless if whether the internationally wrongful act is continuing or not, see ILC Report on State 
Responsibility, Commentary on Article 41, para 11.  
1469 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 41, para 11.  
1470 Tonkin, H., Common Article I: a Minimum Yardstick for Regulating Private Military and Security Companies, 
2009, 22 LJIL 779, at 782. 
1471 Kok, E., The Principle of Complicity under International Law – its Application to States and Individuals in 
Cases Involving Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, in The Diversification and Fragmentation of 
International Criminal Law, Nijhof, 2012, p. 585. 
1472 The Court at para. 109 refers to:  
[T]he potential for control inherent in the degree of the contra's dependence on aid. Yet despite the heavy 
subsidies and other support provided to them by the US, there is no clear evidence of the US having 
actually exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its 
behalf. 
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The other two regimes for responsibility of complicit States go further. The serious breaches 
regime does so because of the importance which the international community attaches to the 
values protected thereby and because of the assumption that serious violations of peremptory 
norms are clearly identifiable.1473 Some primary rules go further because States have committed 
themselves to a stricter regime. It is thus a systematic and functional relationship between three 
different regimes which suggests a restrictive interpretation of Article 16. 
13. State Participation in the Acts of Non-State Actors  
The previous Chapters considered how international law prohibits state complicity in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act by another State, analysing in particular the 
general complicity rule. However, States are not the only actors on the international plane that 
commit internationally wrongful acts; non-state actors also commit international crimes,1474 and 
often enough they carry out these acts with the support of a State. This Chapter will assess two 
developments that affect the ways in which international law regulates the participation of States 
in the wrongs caused by non-state actors. Firstly, the increased regulation by international law of 
the conduct of non-state actors has opened up the possibility of States bearing complicity 
obligations in respect of that conduct. Now that non-state actors can commit principal wrongs on 
the international plane, there is principal wrongdoing by non-state actors for a State to be 
complicit in. Secondly, in limited circumstances international law attributes the conduct of non-
state actors to the State where there is a sufficient connection between them. 
The recent conflicts in BiH, Libya, Syria and Iraq, with their multitude of parties and 
participants, serve to underline the importance of complicity responsibility for States as a means 
of addressing violations of international law committed by non-state actors. Where States 
participate in the wrongs caused by non-state actors, conceptual problems arise for complicity. 
As previously argued, complicity is essentially derivative as it requires wrongdoing by the 
principal actor.1475 Without any of such wrongdoing, there is nothing for the complicit State to be 
complicit in.1476 The historical failure of international law to regulate the conduct of non-state 
actors directly limited the possibility of state responsibility for complicity in these situations. 
                                                          
1473 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 41, para 11; De Hoogh, A., supra note 52, p. 161. 
1474 Hakimi, M., supra note 1228, p. 341. 
1475 Kadish, S. H., supra note 397, p. 12.  
1476 Weisberg, R., Reappraising Complicity, 4 Buff Criminal Law Review 217, 244, 2000-2001; Quigley, J., supra 
note 356, pp. 77, 86.  
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There was simply no international wrong for the State to be complicit in. This follows from the 
historical normative structure of the international legal system. 1477 Even if the State is no longer 
the exclusive subject of international law, it has long been its primary subject.1478 However, now 
that other legal subjects bear international obligations and non-state actors can commit principal 
wrongs on the international plane, it is possible to articulate a State’s responsibility for 
participating in violation of those obligations in terms of complicity.1479 A non-state actor may 
be responsible for international wrongdoing as a principal and the participating State may be 
linked to that wrongdoing as an accomplice. The clearest example of this development is the 
prohibition on state complicity in genocide. The prohibition of state complicity in genocide is a 
specific complicity rule. Wherever international law imposes obligations on non-state actors, so 
state complicity in violations thereof would give rise to international responsibility.1480  
Furthermore, some instances of State participation in the conduct of non-state actors will give 
rise to state responsibility under broader due diligence obligations that require States to protect 
against certain wrongs. There are number of areas where international law imposes obligations of 
non-participation in the actions of another actor, as opposed to complicity obligations. For 
instance, as elements of the principle of the non-use of force, the General Assembly’s 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter: “the Declaration 
on Friendly Relations”) adopted in 1970, provides: 
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of 
civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory 
directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the resent paragraph 
involve a threat or use of force.1481  
                                                          
1477 De Frouville takes up this point in explaining that the rejection of complicity ‘simply follows from the classical 
structure of normativity in international law which is articulated around the obligations, the only subjects of which 
are States’in de Frouville, O., Attribution of Conduct to the State: Private Individuals in Crawford et. al (eds.) The 
Law of International Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 257, 276.  
1478 Jennings, R., and Watts, A., supra note 285 – Introduction and Part 1, p. 16.  
1479 De Frouville, supra note 1477, p. 277. 
1480 Ibidem. 
1481 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, Declaration on Principles of International 
law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN 
(hereinafter: Declaration on Friendly Relations). 
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These, however, are not complicity rules stricto senso, for there is no principal wrong from 
which the state responsibility is derived.1482 These provisions reflect customary international law 
and might be seen as analogous to traditional duties of neutrality. Just as violation of the duty of 
neutrality does not give rise to a form of derivative responsibility in relation to some wrongful 
act of the belligerent State, so the participation by the State does not give rise to derivative 
responsibility in relation to some wrongful act of a non-state actor. In both cases, the 
responsibility of a State for its wrongful participation is not linked to any wrong of a principal 
actor.1483 Instead, a number of classic modes of complicity are used to constitute a direct and 
independent obligation of non-participation binding the State.1484 
13.1. State Complicity, Non-State Actors and Attribution 
The idea of complicity has penetrated the rules of attribution in international law. In customary 
international law, the requisite connection between a State and a non-state actor for attribution is 
marked by a search for an agency relationship. As will be further discussed in the next Chapter, 
complicit relationship is insufficient to attribute the conduct of non-state actors to the State.1485 
Only with a sufficient degree of dependence, direction, or control, the conduct of a non-state 
actor becomes attributable to the State.1486 Thus, in the absence of lex specialis, a complicit 
relationship is insufficient for attribution.  
It is foundational in international law that state responsibility requires the attribution of conduct 
to the State.1487 As a basic rule, States are responsible for the conduct of their own organs.1488 
The corollary of this rule is the non-attribution of conduct of non-state actors to the State.1489 
Nonetheless, international law does attribute, in limited circumstances, the conduct of non-state 
actors to the State where these is a sufficient connection between them. Traditionally, the nature 
of that connection entails an agency relationship.1490 Attribution, in this sense, may occur under 
                                                          
1482 De Frouville, supra note 1477, pp. 276-7. 
1483 Brownlie, I., International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 ICLQ 712, 1958. 
1484 In respect of state participation in terrorism, see UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 20019 UN Doc S/RES/1373; 
UNGA Res 40/61 (9 December 1985) UN Doc A/RES/40/61; UNGA Res 44/29 (4 December 1989) UN Doc.  
1485 Article 8 ARSIWA; Genocide case, paras. 398-407.  
1486 Articles 4, 8 ARSIWA. 
1487 Article 2 ARSIWA. 
1488 Article 4 ARSIWA. 
1489 ILC Report on State Responsibility, General Commentary on Chapter II (2), (3). 
1490 Chinkin, C., supra note 1186, p. 142. 
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the test of complete dependence or strict control1491 (rendering a non-state actor a de facto State 
organ1492) or the subsidiary test of direction or control of specific conduct (the effective control 
test).1493 Both of these tests constitute rules of customary international law1494 and denote the 
search for a relationship of principal to agent.1495 As will be shown below, in the law of state 
responsibility the attribution of conduct of non-state actors to the State is rooted in agency, not 
complicity.1496 
The ILC Articles envisage different standards for when a State is implicated in violations 
committed by a non-state actor, compared to when those are perpetrated by another State. Article 
17 ARSIWA addresses state responsibility for the wrongful conduct of another State: 
A State which directs and controls another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act 
by the latter is internationally responsible for that act if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if 
committed by that State.1497  
Similarly, according to the ILC, a State will be responsible for the internationally wrongful 
conduct of non-state actors (individuals or groups), absent acknowledging or adopting such 
conduct as its own, if those persons are “acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of, that State in carrying out the conduct”.1498 As determined by Article 16 ARSIWA, in 
the absence of direction and control of another State in the commission of a wrongful act, a State 
can nevertheless be responsible for knowingly providing aid or assistance to the commission of 
an international wrong by another State. However, for a State to be responsible for providing aid 
or assistance to non-state actors that commit international crimes, the Articles on State 
Responsibility require that such groups were instructed, directed or controlled by the State in 
relation to the specific conduct.1499 Thus, comparing to requirements set forth in Article 16 
                                                          
1491 Nicaragua case, para. 109; Genocide case, para. 392; Talmon, S., supra note 62, pp. 493, 499. For a more 
detailed elaboration on the test, see Sections 14.1.2, 14.1.3.  
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1494 Genocide case, para. 385 with respect to Article 4 and para. 398 with respect to Article 8. See also Armed 
Activities case, para. 160. 
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ARSIWA, the ILC imposed a higher threshold in order to invoke state responsibility in cases of 
aiding and assisting a non-state actor. 
13.2. Attribution of Conduct of Non-State Actors to a State 
Considerable judicial attention has been paid to the precise meaning of “control” required for 
international responsibility to be triggered because of State assistance to non-state actors, leading 
to a divergence between the view od the ICJ and the ICTY regarding the concept of control in 
this context. There remains a degree of uncertainty in relation to the appropriate level of control 
required. It was in the Nicaragua case that the ICJ originally found that the state responsibility 
could arise if it were proved that the State had itself directed or enforced the perpetration of the 
acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law:  
“For the conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to 
be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course 
of which the alleged violations were committed.”1500 
However, the Tadić Appeals Chamber did not follow the jurisprudence of the Nicaragua case, 
rather it sought to assert the existence of a different control requirement for attributing the 
conduct of organized armed groups for purposes of state responsibility. While considering the 
issue of control when assessing how a non-international armed conflict might become 
“internationalized”, the Tadić Appeals Chamber took the opportunity to pronounce on broader 
issues of state responsibility.1501 Namely, it was held that the appropriate criterion to imputing 
the acts committed by a non-state actor (i.e. the VRS) to the State (i.e. the FRY) under the law of 
state responsibility, was that of the “overall control” exercised over the non-state actor by the 
State.1502 The Tadić Appeals Chamber took the view that acts committed by the VRS could give 
rise to international responsibility of the FRY on the basis of the overall control exercised by the 
FRY over the RS and the VRS, without there being any need to prove that each operation during 
which acts were committed in breach of international law was carried out on the FRY’s 
instructions, or under its effective control.1503  
                                                          
1500 Nicaragua case, para. 115. 
1501 Tadić Appeals Judgment, paras. 84, 87, 88, 91, 97-104 et. seq.  
1502 Ibidem, paras. 112 et seq. (See in particular para. 131.) 
1503 Ibidem. 
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Subsequently, in the Genocide case the ICJ specifically addressed the ICTY’s overall control test 
and firmly reasserted its position regarding the appropriate standard for state responsibility for 
violations by non-state groups, stating squarely that it was “unable to subscribe to the [ICTY] 
Chamber’s view”.1504 According to the Court, it has to be proven that the perpetrators acted in 
accordance with the State’s instructions or under its effective control. It must however be shown 
that this “effective control” was exercised, or that the State’s instructions were given, in respect 
of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall 
actions taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the violations.1505 The Court 
asserted that Article 8 ARSIWA embodies customary international law and provides that a State 
is responsible for the internationally wrongful acts of persons or groups “acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct”. The 
Court’s interpretation is such that the person or group must essentially be the vehicle through 
which the crime is committed. Thus, in the Genocide case it needed to be shown that organs of 
the FRY had “originated the genocide”.1506 For the wrongful acts to be attributable to a State, 
there needed to be effective control exercised, or instructions given, “in respect of each operation 
in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken”.1507 
Although the Court found that genocide was committed at Srebrenica, it had not been proven that 
instructions were issued from organs of the FRY to commit those massacres or that the principal 
perpetrators were under its effective control.1508 
Thus, the ICJ clearly rejected the application of the Tadić “overall control test” in the context of 
attribution of acts when dealing with state responsibility for considering that “the overall control 
test has the major drawback of broadening the scope of state responsibility well beyond the 
fundamental principle governing the law of international responsibility: a State is responsible 
only for its own conduct [...] the “overall control” test is unsuitable, for it “stretches too far, 
almost to breaking point, the connection which must exist between the conduct of a State’s 
organs and its international responsibility”.1509 The Court’s vice-president, Judge Al-Khasawneh, 
on the other hand, expressed support for the ICTY approach, saying that to require both control 
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over the non-state actors and the specific operations in the context of which international crimes 
were committed is too high a threshold.1510 According to Judge Al-Khasawneh, the inherent 
danger in such an approach is that it gives States the opportunity to carry out criminal policies 
through non-state actors or surrogates without incurring direct responsibility therefore.1511 
14. State Complicity by way of Provision of Military Aid in the Genocide case 
States may be found complicit in genocide. However, if genocide was not recognized to be 
internationally wrongful without reference to the status of the principal perpetrator, it would be 
impossible to express a responsibility of a State for its participation in the conduct of non-state 
actors in terms of complicity. There would be no principal legal wrong for the State to be 
complicit in. International law’s traditional structure would impede the imposition of 
responsibility for complicity.1512 
In the Genocide case the ICJ had to adjudicate, inter alia, on the question of complicity in 
genocide, an act for which individuals may be punished under the Genocide Convention. On the 
basis of evidence produced before international criminal tribunal, the Applicant (i.e. BiH) 
contended that from 1993 onwards, around 1,800 VRS officers were “administered” by the 30th 
PC of the VJ (i.e., by the FRY); their payment, promotions and pensions were handled by the 
FRY. BiH submitted that the FRY actively supplied the VRS with arms and equipment 
throughout the armed conflict in BiH. The Applicant contended that up to 90 per cent of the 
material needs of the VRS were supplied by the FRY. According to a “consumption review” 
given by General Mladić at the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 16 April 1995, 42.2 per cent of the 
VRS supplies of infantry ammunition were inherited from the former JNA and 47 per cent of the 
VRS requirements were supplied by the VJ. The FRY generally denied that it had supplied and 
equipped the VRS but maintained that, even if that were the case, such assistance “is very 
familiar and is an aspect of numerous treaties of mutual security, both bilateral and regional”.1513  
As regards effective links between the RS Government and the FRY Government in the financial 
sphere, BiH maintained that the economies of the FRY and the RS were integrated through the 
creation of a single economic entity, thus enabling the FRY Government to finance the VRS in 
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addition to its own army (VJ). According to BiH, the RS budget had virtually no independent 
sources of income, rather the National Bank of Yugoslavia was making available funds for 
“special purposes”, namely “to avoid the adverse effects of war on the economy of the Serbian 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.1514 The FRY emphasized that any financing supplied was 
simply on the basis of credits, to be repaid, and was therefore quite normal, particularly in view 
of the economic isolation of the FRY and the RS. It also suggested that any funds received would 
have been under the sole control of the recipient, the RS.1515 Accordingly, the Court found that 
the FRY was making its considerable military and financial support available to the RS, and had 
it withdrawn that support, such would have greatly constrained the options available to the RS 
authorities at the relevant time.1516 
In the Genocide case, the Court was called upon to determine, inter alia, whether the provision 
of political, financial and military aid by the FRY to the authorities of the RS, a non-state entity 
in BiH, used in the commission of genocide by the VRS invoked state responsibility for 
complicity.1517 This was the first time complicity was discussed by the Court. Ruling on the 
responsibility of the FRY for complicity in genocide, the ICJ resorted to the criminal law notion 
of ‘aiding and abetting’. Although addressed to interactions between States and “not directly 
related” to the examined case of aid or assistance to a non-state actor, the Court nevertheless 
applied Article 16 and asked whether the FRY, or persons acting on its instructions or under its 
direction or effective control, had provided aid or assistance to the commission of the Srebrenica 
genocide.1518 Non-state actors are generally beyond the purview of the ARSIWA. The Court, 
however, examined whether the principle underlying Article 16 applied to the Genocide 
Convention’s norm establishing prohibition of complicity in genocide. The Court saw no reason 
why it could not resort to Article 16 by means of analogy.1519  
The ICJ ascertained that state parties to the Genocide Convention were obligated to refrain from 
acts constituting complicity in genocide. It does not matter if the genocide is attributable to 
                                                          
1514 Ibidem, para. 240. 
1515 Ibidem. 
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1518 Ibidem, para. 420. 
1519 Ibidem.  
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another State or committed by a non-state actor.1520 Customary international law should be seen 
to prohibit complicity in genocide. The Court located the prohibition of complicity in genocide 
within the general law of international responsibility for aid and assistance. In the first place, the 
Court held that complicity certainly “includes the provision of means to enable or facilitate the 
commission of the crime”.1521 Although “complicity” is not a notion which exists in the current 
terminology of the law of international responsibility, the Court considered complicity to be 
similar “to a category found among the customary rules constituting the law of state 
responsibility, that of the –aid or assistance– furnished by one State for the commission of a 
wrongful act by another State.”1522 Accordingly, in constructing the meaning of complicity, the 
Court turned to Article 16 ARSIWA, rather than to doctrines of complicity as developed in 
international criminal law:1523  
“The Court sees no reason to make any distinction of substance between ‘complicity in genocide’, 
within the meaning of Article III, paragraph (e), of the Convention, and the ‘aid or assistance’ of a 
State in the commission of a wrongful act by another State within the meaning of the aforementioned 
Article 16…In other words, to ascertain whether [the FRY] is responsible for ‘complicity in 
genocide’… it must examine whether organs of the FRY, or persons acting on its instructions or under 
its direction or effective control, furnished “aid or assistance” in the commission of the genocide in 
Srebrenica, in a sense not significantly different from that of those concepts in the general law of 
international responsibility.”1524 
This is the basis of the holding that the meaning of complicity in the context of genocide did not 
differ significantly from the provision of “aid and assistance” under Article 16.1525 As noted 
above, a State that provides aid or assistance to another State need not direct or control that State, 
whereas the Court here seemed to blend Article 8 ARSIWA requirements of instructions, 
direction or control with those of Article 16 requiring the knowing provision of aid or assistance. 
According to the Court, for complicity to arise the aid or assistance had to be provided 
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“knowingly”, with the person or organ being aware of the specific intent of the perpetrator to 
commit genocide.1526  
In order to determine the responsibility for complicity in genocide, the Court relied on the 
strength of political, military and financial links between the FRY and the RS.1527 For asserting 
complicity, the Court considered it necessary that the accomplice should at least have acted 
knowingly, aware of the dolus specialis of the perpetrator. The Court was not convinced by the 
evidence furnished by the Applicant that such condition was met “because it is not established 
beyond any doubt whether the authorities of the FRY supplied the VRS leaders who decided 
upon and carried out those acts of genocide with their aid and assistance, at a time when those 
authorities were clearly aware that genocide was about to take place or was under way.”1528 
Therefore, the ICJ concluded that the FRY could not be held internationally responsible for 
complicity in the commission of genocide. 
The question remains how the idea of aid or assistance under Article 16 fits with ordinary 
understanding of the scope of complicity. Drawing as it does on Article 16, the ICJ’s approach 
seems to deny the possibility of complicity by encouragement or abetment. The Court gives the 
example of the ‘provision of means to enable or facilitate the commission of the crime…’.1529 By 
looking to Article 16 rather than to international criminal law, the ICJ adopted a limited 
interpretation of complicity, seemingly ignoring that complicity ordinarily comprises both the 
provision of assistance to the principal and influence on the decision of the principal to commit 
the wrong.1530 The idea that cases of complicit State influence should not give rise to 
responsibility is generally predicated on the assumption that the principal actor in these instances 
is another State. This is evident in Ago’s own words: ‘[t]he decision of a sovereign State to adopt 
a certain course of conduct is certainly its own, even if it has received suggestions and advice 
from another State, which was at liberty not to follow.’1531 Even if it is right that international 
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law should not be concerned with cases of influence between sovereign States, it does not follow 
that a State that influences the decision of a non-state actor to commit an international wrong 
should escape responsibility for complicity.1532 As an analogy, we might look to the obligations 
of non-participation encompassed by the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of non-
intervention, both including classical modes of complicity by influence. Under non-participation 
obligation, States are obligated to refrain from ‘encouraging the organization of irregular forces 
or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State’ and 
‘instigating…acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State’.1533 Under the principle of non-
interventions, States may not ‘foment or incite…subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed 
towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State’.1534 Clearly, thus, international law 
does indicate concern for the influence of States on the conduct of non-state actors.1535 
14.1. Provision of Military aid and Attribution in the Genocide case 
The next Section will examine whether complicit relationship may serve as basis for ascertaining 
attribution. In the Genocide case the ICJ had to decide on the Applicant’s claim that the FRY 
“under the guise of protecting the Serb population of BiH, in fact conceived and shared with 
them the vision of a Greater Serbia, in pursuit of which it provided military support to those 
persons and groups responsible for the activities which allegedly constitute the genocidal acts 
complained of.”1536 
First, the Court needed to determine whether the acts of genocide could be attributed to the FRY 
under the rules of customary international law of state responsibility. This meant ascertaining 
whether the acts of genocide were committed by persons or organs whose conduct is attributable 
to the FRY under the rules of state responsibility. The inquiry over attribution of acts of genocide 
to the FRY comprised of two aspects, specifically (i) whether the acts committed at Srebrenica 
were perpetrated by organs of the FRY, namely by persons or entities whose conduct is 
necessarily attributable to it, and (ii) whether the acts in question were committed by persons 
                                                          
1532 Nollkaemper, A., The Charles Taylor Judgment – Disconnecting Responsibilities of Presidents and States, 
Research Project on Shared Responsibility in International Law, 2013, http://www.sharesproject.nl/the-charles-
taylor-judgment-disconnecting-the-responsibilities-of-presidents-and-states/ 
1533 Declaration on Friendly Relations (emphasis added); Armed Activities case, para. 162. 
1534 Declaration on Friendly Relations (emphasis added). 
1535 See also Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (12 August 1949); Nicaragua case, para. 220; 
Article III(c) Genocide Convention and Genocide case, para. 167. 
1536 Genocide case, para. 237. 
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who, while not organs of FRY, nevertheless acted on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of FRY. In ascertaining whether any attribution rules apply, the Court based its analysis 
essentially on the provision of military aid by the FRY to the RS. 
14.1.1. Attribution on the Basis of the Conduct of Its Organs  
In ascertaining whether the acts of genocide could be attributed to the FRY on the basis of the 
conduct of its organs, the Court based its inquiry on the provision of military aid by the FRY in 
the form of salaries and other benefits provided to the VRS officers. The ICJ firstly had to 
determine whether the acts of genocide committed in Srebrenica were perpetrated by “persons or 
entities” having the status of organs of the FRY under its internal law. The Applicant claimed 
that all officers in the VRS, including General Mladić, remained under military administration of 
the FRY, and that their salaries were paid from Belgrade. Accordingly, these officers “were de 
jure organs of the FRY, intended by their superiors to serve in BiH with the VRS”. On this basis 
it has been alleged by BiH that those officers, in addition to being officers of the VRS, remained 
officers of the VJ, and were thus de jure organs of the FRY. 1537  
The Court noted that no evidence has been presented that either General Mladić or any of the 
other officers whose affairs were handled by the 30th PC of the FRY were, according to the 
internal law of the FRY, officers of the VJ — a de jure organ of the FRY. Nor was it proven that 
General Mladić was one of those officers; and even if he might have been, the Court did not 
consider that he would, for that reason alone, have to be treated as the organ of the FRY for the 
purposes of the application of the rules of state responsibility. According to the Court, there was 
no doubt that the FRY had been providing substantial financial and other military support to the 
RS, including payment of salaries and other benefits to certain VRS officers. However, this did 
not automatically make them organs of the FRY. Those officers were appointed to their 
commands by the President of the RS, and were subordinated to the political leadership of the 
RS. The Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, those officers must had 
received their orders from the RS or the VRS, not from the FRY.1538  
Further, neither the RS, nor the VRS had the status of organ of the FRY under its internal law, 
and were thus not de jure organs of the FRY. The expression “State organ”, as used in customary 
                                                          
1537 Ibidem, para. 387. 
1538 Ibidem, para. 388. 
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international law and in Article 4 ARSIWA, applies to individual or collective entities which 
make up the organization of the State and act on its behalf.1539 The functions of the VRS officers, 
including General Mladić, were however to act on behalf of the Bosnian Serb authorities, in 
particular the RS, and not on behalf of the FRY. They exercised elements of public authority of 
the RS. According to the Court, the particular situation of General Mladić, or of any other VRS 
officer present at Srebrenica and “administered” by the FRY, was not such as to conclude they 
were de jure organs of the FRY. 
Subsequently, upon having rejected the possibility that the acts of genocide were perpetrated by 
de jure organs of the FRY, the Court had to ascertain whether the RS and the VRS could be 
deemed “de facto organs” of the FRY, so that their acts should be considered attributable to the 
FRY. In order to determine whether the acts of groups of individuals within the territory of a 
State could be attributed to another State the ICJ has set forward two control tests:1540 the 
complete dependence test (i.e., the “strict control test” or the “agency test”) and the effective 
control test.  
14.1.2. Attribution on the Basis of Complete Dependence1541 Test – (i.e. “strict 
control test” or “agency test”) 
According to the ICJ’s jurisprudence, persons, groups of persons or entities may, for purposes of 
international responsibility, be equated with State organs even if that status does not follow from 
internal law, provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in “complete dependence” 
on the State, of which they are ultimately merely the instrument.1542 In such a case, it is 
appropriate to look beyond legal status alone, in order to grasp the reality of the relationship 
between the person taking action, and the State to which he is so closely attached as to appear to 
be nothing more than its agent. Any other solution would allow States to escape their 
                                                          
1539 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 4, para. (1). 
1540 Talmon, S., supra note 62, p. 497: points out that “the literature and decisions of other international courts, with 
very few exceptions, refer only to one test in connection with the ICJ: the effective control test. The ICJ, however, 
has in fact applied two different tests”. 
1541 Talmon, S., supra note 62, p. 499, for a definition of complete dependence: “complete dependence means that 
the secessionist entity is “lacking any real autonomy” and is “merely an instrument” or “agent” of the outside power 
through which the latter is acting [...] Common objectives may make the secessionist entity an ally, albeit a highly 
dependent ally, of the outside power, but not necessarily its organ”. 
1542 Genocide case, para. 392. 
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international responsibility by choosing to act through persons or entities whose independence 
would be purely fictitious.1543 
14.1.2.1. Provision of Military Aid and Complete Dependence test in the 
Nicaragua Case 
Similarly as for the assessment of attribution on the basis of the conduct of its organs, the Court 
looked into the provision of substantial military aid by a State to a non-state actor when assessing 
attribution on the basis of complete dependence test. The question whether it is possible in 
principle to attribute to a State a conduct of persons who, while they do not have the legal status 
of State organs, in fact act under such strict control by the State that they must be treated as its 
organs for purposes of the attribution leading to the state responsibility for an internationally 
wrongful act was originally addressed in the Nicaragua case.1544 The ICJ has maintained its 
position in two subsequent cases which will be examined, namely in the Armed Activities case 
and the Genocide case. 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ found that from 1981 until 1984 the US was providing funds for 
military and paramilitary activities by the contras with the aim to support the opposition front 
through formation and training of action teams to collect intelligence and engage in paramilitary 
and political operations in Nicaragua. 1545 In the Court’s view it had been established that the 
support of the US authorities for the activities of the contras took various forms over the years, 
such as logistic support, the supply of information on the location and movements of the 
Sandinista troops, the use of sophisticated methods of communication, the deployment of field 
broadcasting networks, radar coverage, etc. Moreover, the Court found that a number of military 
and paramilitary operations by contras were decided and planned, if not actually by US advisers, 
then at least in close collaboration with them, and on the basis of the intelligence and logistic 
support offered by the US, particularly the supply of the aircraft provided to the contras by the 
US.1546 The ICJ concluded that despite the secrecy which surrounded it, it was established that 
the US authorities largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the contras.1547 
                                                          
1543 Ibidem, para. 392. 
1544 Nicaragua case, paras. 109-116. 
1545 Nicaragua case, para. 99. 
1546 Ibidem, para. 106. 
1547 Ibidem, para. 108. 
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Moreover, the US authorities have openly admitted the nature, volume and frequency of this 
support. 
The Court stated that it had to:  
“determine . . . whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States Government was so 
much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it would be right to equate the 
contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on behalf of 
that Government.”1548  
The Court observed that “ despite the heavy subsidies and other support provided to the contras, 
there is no clear evidence of the US having actually exercised such a degree of control in all 
fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf”,1549 and went on to conclude that 
“the evidence available to the Court … is insufficient to demonstrate [the contras’] complete 
dependence on United States aid”, so that the Court was “unable to determine that the contra 
force may be equated for legal purposes with the forces of the United States.”1550 The Court 
found that the contras constituted an independent force and that the only element of control that 
could be exercised by the US was cessation of aid. Paradoxically this assessment serves to 
underline, a contrario, the potential of control inherent in the degree of the contras’ dependence 
on aid.1551  
In sum, while the evidence before the Court indicated that the various forms of assistance 
provided to the contras by the US have been crucial to the pursuit of their activities, and that the 
contras have, at least in one period, been so dependent on the US that it could not conduct its 
crucial and most significant military and paramilitary activities without the multi-faceted support 
of the US, the Court still deemed such insufficient to demonstrate their complete dependence on 
the US aid. In the Court’s view, insufficient evidence was presented in order for it to reach a 
conclusion that the US devised the strategy and directed the tactics of the contras; such a 
conclusion, according to the Court, would depend on the extent to which the US made use of the 
potential for control inherent in that dependence.1552 Furthermore, even though political leaders 
                                                          
1548 Ibidem, para. 109. 
1549 Ibidem, para. 109. 
1550 Ibidem, pp. 62-63, para. 110. 
1551 Ibidem, para. 109. 
1552 Ibidem, para. 110. 
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of the contras had been selected, installed and paid by the US, the Court held that the question of 
selection, installation and payment thereof is merely one aspect among others of the degree of 
dependency of that force. This partial dependency on the US authorities may, according to the 
Court, certainly be inferred inter alia from the fact that the leaders were selected by the US, as 
well as from other factors, such as the organization, training and equipping of the force, the 
planning of operations, the choosing of targets and the operational support provided.1553 
Finally, the Court held that the US participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the 
financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its 
military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient 
in itself, for the purpose of attributing to the US the acts committed by the contras in the course 
of their military operations in Nicaragua. Therefore, the “strict control test” or “agency test” 
developed by the ICJ requires a relationship of dependence and control to the degree that it can 
be qualified as “complete dependence” on the State. Dependence and control can be considered 
two correlative elements:1554 the group is dependent in the extent to which it is controlled by the 
State, and that dependence and control must be “complete” 1555. The control requirement has to 
be proved at two levels: the potential for control and the actual exercise of control. Moreover, 
that actual exercise of control must extent to “all fields” of the group’s activity. 
Hence, the control test used by the ICJ to decide whether a group can be equated with a State 
organ involves complete control of the State over the group. The examination of the element of 
control involves assessing the potential for control and also the actual exertion of that capacity of 
control “in all fields” of activity of the group.1556 These requirements are very demanding and it 
is very difficult for an Applicant State to provide enough evidence to the Court to satisfy such a 
high threshold. On the other hand, this demanding threshold of evidence ensures that the 
equation of a group with an organ of a State is only carried out in cases in which there is a firm 
basis supported by enough evidence so as to attribute the State acts of private individuals, which 
must be exceptional, taking into account that the general principle is that States are only 
                                                          
1553 Ibidem, para. 112. 
1554 Talmon, S., supra note 62, p.498: he argues that “dependence and control are thus two sides of the same coin”. 
1555 Ibidem, p. 497: “control results from dependence or, looking at it from the other side, dependence creates the 
potential for control”. 
1556 Genocide case, para. 391. 
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responsible for their own conduct and that equation with a State organ involves the holding of 
responsibility also for ultra vires acts, according to Article 7 of the ILC Articles. 
The Court thus found that the assistance given by the US to the contras does not warrant the 
conclusion that these forces were subject to the US to such an extent that any acts they have 
committed are imputable to that State. The Court took the view that the US is responsible not for 
the acts of contras, but rather for its own conduct vis-à-vis Nicaragua, including conduct related 
to the acts of the contras. The lawfulness of such acts is a question different from the violations 
of international law or which the contras might have been guilty.  
It is interesting to note that a clear parallel can be drawn between Perišić Trial Chamber’s 
assessment of individual criminal responsibility of an accomplice and the complete dependence 
test (or “strict control test”) in the context of state responsibility. Namely, Perišić Trial 
Chamber’s conviction of a military commander providing military aid to a non-state actor (i.e., 
the VRS) was essentially based on its determination of complete dependence of an armed group 
responsible for the commission of international crimes on the aid provided without being 
necessary to prove the potential for control or the actual exertion of that capacity of control by 
the individual accomplice. Moreover, while the Perišić Trial Chamber acknowledged that Perišić 
did not control nor could have controlled the manner in which the VRS had put his assistance to 
use, his criminal responsibility as accomplice was nevertheless established.  
14.1.2.2. Provision of Military Aid and Complete Dependence test in the 
Genocide Case 
To equate persons or entities with State organs when they do not have that status under internal 
law must be exceptional, for it requires proof of a particularly great degree of State control over 
them, a relationship which the Court described as “complete dependence”. The Court examined 
whether the persons or entities that committed the acts of genocide at Srebrenica had such ties 
with the FRY that they could be deemed to have been completely dependent on it.  
The ICJ found that while the FRY was making its considerable military and financial support 
available to the RS, neither the RS nor the VRS could be regarded as mere instruments through 
which the FRY was acting, and thus lacking any real autonomy. The ICJ recognized that while 
the political, military and logistical relations between the FRY and the RS authorities had been 
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strong and close, they were not such that the Bosnian Serbs’ political and military organizations 
should be equated with organs of the FRY.1557 Differences over strategic options emerged at the 
time between the FRY authorities and the Bosnian Serb leaders, demonstrating that the latter 
“had some qualified, but real, margin of independence”.1558 Nor, notwithstanding the very 
important support given by the FRY to the RS, without which it could not have “conduct[ed] its 
crucial or most significant military and paramilitary activities”1559, did this signify a total 
dependence of the RS upon FRY. Therefore, the Court concluded that the RS and the VRS could 
not be deemed de facto organs of the FRY and thus the acts of genocide should not be considered 
attributable to the FRY based on complete dependence test. 
14.1.2.3. Provision of Military Aid in the Armed Activities Case  
In the Armed Activities case, Uganda has acknowledged giving training and military support to 
the Congo Liberation Movement, a rebel group led by Mr. Bemba. However, the Court held it 
had not received probative evidence that Uganda controlled or could control the manner in which 
Mr. Bemba had put such assistance to use. The ICJ rejected equating the rebel group with an 
organ of Uganda and denied the engagement of its responsibility on the basis of issuance of 
instructions or control. Accordingly, the ICJ considered that “no issue arises in the present case 
as to whether the requisite tests are met for sufficiency of control of paramilitaries”1560 and cited 
the Nicaragua case when mentioning the control tests, which would be applied in case that the 
ICJ considered that the situation was such as to call for their application in order to decide 
whether the paramilitaries could be equated with State organs or acted under the control of 
Uganda. Since the ICJ denied there was enough evidence to consider any of these scenarios, it 
did not even enter to apply the control tests to the facts. 
14.1.3. Attribution on the Basis of Instructions, Direction or Control – a Subsidiary 
Test (the Effective Control Test) 
14.1.3.1. The Effective Control Test in the Nicaragua Case 
                                                          
1557 Ibidem, para. 394. 
1558 Ibidem. 
1559 Ibidem. 
1560 Armed Activities case, para 160.  
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Upon having denied the equation of the contras with an organ of the US, the latter may still have 
been held responsible for single acts over which the US had control or had given instructions for. 
Thus, the ICJ applied the effective control test, ascertaining that  
“even the general control over a force with a high degree of dependence on it, would not in themselves 
mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of acts 
contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged [...] Such acts could well be committed by 
members of the contras without the control of the United States. For this conduct to give rise to legal 
responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective 
control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were 
committed.”1561  
Providing evidence of control over specific operations of a group involves proving the 
instructions, command or particular instances of State control over the acts in question, access to 
which is really difficult, since public demonstrations to that effect are unlikely to be done. 
Consequently, the effective control test, while more limited in scope of responsibility engaged 
and in the sense of evidence required (e.g., particular instances of control), remains a demanding 
test1562 since a general degree of control or dependence of the group is not enough but the 
Applicant State needs to provide evidence of control in relation to the specific acts at issue.1563 
14.1.3.2. The Effective Control Test in the Genocide Case 
It is the state of the customary international law, as reflected in the ARSIWA, that genocide will 
be considered as attributable to a State if and to the extent that the physical acts constitutive of 
genocide that have been committed by organs or persons other than the State’s own agents were 
carried out, wholly or in part, on the instructions or directions of the State, or under its effective 
control.  
Accordingly, after having denied the claim that the genocide was committed by organs of the 
FRY, the ICJ assessed whether genocide was committed by persons whose acts were attributable 
to the FRY on the basis of acting on the instructions or under the direction or control of the FRY. 
                                                          
1561 Nicaragua case, para. 115.  
1562 Talmon, S., supra note 62, p. 502: considers that “while the burden of proof for the –effective control– test is 
lower than that for the “strict control” test, in practice it will be extremely difficult to establish”.   
1563 Talmon, S., supra note 62, p. 503: “the object of control is no longer the secessionist entity but the activities or 
operations giving rise to the internationally wrongful act”.   
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The ICJ underlined that this is a “completely separate issue” from the question of equation with 
organs of the FRY, since it “would mean that the FRY’s international responsibility would be 
incurred owing to the conduct of those of its own organs which gave the instructions or exercised 
the control resulting in the commission of acts in breach of its international obligations.”1564 
The Court examined Article 8 ARSIWA, reproducing the relevant paragraphs of the Nicaragua 
case in which the Court put forward the effective control test over specific operations of the 
group in order to determine whether the State could be held responsible for acts committed 
during those operations. The ICJ pointed out that the effective control test differs from the strict 
control test in two regards: for the former, there is no need to show that the group who 
committed the wrongful acts was in a relation of “complete dependence” to the State but that it 
acted under its instructions or its effective control, which must be exercised in relation to the 
specific acts at stake and “not generally in respect of the overall actions taken.”1565 Moreover, the 
ICJ addressed the BiH’s claim that due to the “particular nature” of the crime of genocide, in the 
sense of being composed by a lot of specific acts that are separate but coordinated, the effective 
control test should be analysed not in relation to the specific acts but to the whole operations. 
The Court rejected this claim by asserting that “particular characteristics of genocide do not 
justify the Court in departing from the criterion elaborated [...] The rules for attributing 
internationally wrongful conduct to a State do not vary with the nature of the wrongful act in 
question in the absence of a clearly expressed lex specialis.”1566 
Accordingly, in the Genocide case the Court had to ascertain whether, in the specific 
circumstances surrounding the events at Srebrenica the perpetrators of genocide were acting on 
the FRY’s instructions, or under its direction or control. Thus, the Court had to determine 
whether FRY organs originated the genocide by issuing instructions to the perpetrators or 
exercising direction or control, and whether, as a result, the conduct of organs of the FRY, 
having been the cause of the commission of acts in breach of its international obligations, 
constituted a violation of those obligations. The applicable rule, which is one of customary law 
of international responsibility, is laid down in Article 8 ARSIWA: 
                                                          
1564 Genocide case, para. 397. 
1565 Ibidem, para. 400. 
1566 Ibidem, para. 401. 
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“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international 
law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.”1567 
The Court held it had not been proven that instructions were issued by the federal authorities in 
Belgrade, or by any other organ of the FRY, to commit the massacres, still less that any such 
instructions were given with the specific intent (dolus specialis) characterizing the crime of 
genocide. Rather, all indications were to the contrary, namely that the decision to kill the adult 
male population of the Muslim community in Srebrenica was taken by some members of the 
VRS Main Staff, but without instructions from or effective control by the FRY.1568  
14.1.4. Complicit Relationship does not Suffice for Attribution 
The above analysis has shown that the question of complicity is to be distinguished from the 
question whether the perpetrators of the acts of genocide committed in Srebrenica acted on the 
instructions of or under the direction or effective control of the organs of the FRY; if it were 
established that a genocidal act had been committed on the instructions or under the direction of 
a State, the necessary conclusion would be that the genocide was attributable to the State, which 
would be directly responsible for it and no question of complicity would arise.  
In both the Genocide case and the Nicaragua case, the ICJ emphasized that a complicit 
relationship, established by financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of an armed 
group operating in another State, is, on a traditional understanding of the rules of attribution, 
insufficient to render the conduct of the assisted party as conduct of the State.1569 Particularly, in 
the Genocide case the ICJ affirmed the need for control, thus rejecting the idea that a complicit 
relationship may be sufficient to attribute the conduct of non-state groups to the State.1570 
Similarly, in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that substantial provision of military and other 
                                                          
1567 Article 8 ARSIWA. 
1568 Genocide case, para. 413. 
1569 Nicaragua case, para. 109: The Court found that from 1981 until 1984 the US was providing funds for military 
and paramilitary activities by the contras in Nicaragua with the aim to support the opposition front in paramilitary 
and political operations in Nicaragua. The ICJ held that it was established that the US authorities largely financed, 
trained, equipped, armed and organized the contras. However, there was no clear evidence of the US having actually 
exercised such a degree of control as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf. The Court found that the 
contras “constituted an independent force” and that the only element of control that could be exercised by the US 
was cessation of aid. While various forms of assistance provided to the contras by the US have been crucial to the 
pursuit of their activities, such was insufficient to demonstrate their complete dependence on US aid.  
1570 Genocide case, paras. 369-407.  
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type of aid by the US to the contras did not warrant attributing to the US the acts committed by 
the contras in the course of their military operations in Nicaragua.1571 
As the ICJ puts it, the rules for attributing conduct to a State do not vary with the nature of the 
wrongful act, which reflects the state of customary international law.1572 The tests for attribution 
remain the same whether the non-state group is committing genocide, violation of the laws of 
war, or environmental harms.1573 However, the Court left open the possibility that clearly 
expressed lex specialis could impose a different standards, potentially of a less demanding nature 
than as reflected in the ARSIWA under which conduct of a non-state actor may be attributed to 
the State.1574 
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ had to assess the nature of the relationship between the United 
States and the contras, the armed opposition fighting against the Nicaraguan State, in order to 
determine whether the unlawful acts of contras could be attributed to the United States for 
purposes of State responsibility.1575 The judgment explained the assistance provided included:  
logistic support, the supply of information on the location and movements of the Sandinista troops, the 
use of sophisticated methods of communication, the deployment of field broadcasting networks, radar 
coverage, etc. The Court finds it clear that a number of military and paramilitary operations by the 
contras were decided and planned, if not actually by United States advisers, then at least in close 
collaboration with them, and on the basis of the intelligence and logistic support which the United 
States was able to offer, particularly the supply of aircraft provided to the contras by the United 
States.1576  
Although the United States had largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the 
armed group, this would not justify treating such an entity as having acted on its behalf.1577 For 
the internationally wrongful acts of the contras to be attributed to the United States, the Court 
                                                          
1571 Nicaragua case, para. 115: All the forms of US participation in the financing, organizing, training, supplying 
and equipping of the contras, and even the general control by the US over a force with a high degree of dependency 
on it, would not in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the US directed or enforced the perpetration of 
the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law. Such acts could well be committed by members of the 
contras without the control of the US. 
1572 Genocide case, para. 401 
1573 Ibidem. 
1574 Ibidem. See also Article 55 ARSIWA. 
1575 Nicaragua case, para. 109. 
1576 Ibidem, para. 106. 
1577 Ibidem, paras. 108–109. 
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required that it be shown that the latter exercised “effective control” over the military or 
paramilitary operations of the contras.1578 The involvement and general control exercised by the 
United States “would not in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the United States 
directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian 
law”.1579 While the United States was found to have breached the norm of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of another State by its assistance to the contras, the Court did not find it 
responsible for their unlawful acts. The Court did reprimand the United States for producing and 
disseminating a military manual to the contras which was seen to encourage violations of 
humanitarian law, and thus was contrary to the obligation to ensure respect for international 
humanitarian law.1580 
In the Armed Activities case with regard to rebel groups in Congo that had been provided training 
and support by Uganda, the ICJ did not find sufficient evidence to hold that they were acting “on 
the instructions of, or under the direction or control” of the latter.1581 Uganda has acknowledged 
that it assisted the rebel group that launched an offensive in Congo in 1998 which sought to 
overthrow its government. Particularly, Uganda conceded that it provided training and gave “just 
enough” military support to the rebel group to help Uganda achieve its objectives of driving the 
Sudanese and Chadian troops out of Congo. However, according to the Court such did not 
suffice for a conclusion that Uganda controlled, or could control, the manner in which the 
assisted rebel group put such assistance to use. In the view of the Court, the rebel group did not 
act on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of Uganda.1582 
Accordingly, it is interesting to compare the recent ICTY Appeals Chamber’s dispute concerning 
the contours of complicity1583 with the difference of opinion that emerged between the ICJ and 
the ICTY regarding the required level of State control over non-state actors for state 
responsibility to arise for violations of international law1584. While the ICTY has relied upon the 
overall control standard in its conflict classification analysis, Judge Van den Wyngaert suggested 
that the overall control test enunciated by the ICTY in Tadić requires “a new justification” in 
                                                          
1578 Ibidem, para. 115. 
1579 Ibidem. 
1580 Ibidem, paras. 109 and 220. See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel, para. 259. 
1581 Ibidem, para. 160. 
1582 Ibidem, para. 106. 
1583 See also Part II, Sections 5.2.1.3 and 6.5. 
1584 See Section 13.2 for a more detailed elaboration on the matter.  
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light of its rejection by the ICJ.1585 At the very least, it is clear that the law of state responsibility 
requires more than the mere provision of aid or assistance to non-state actors for the assisting 
State to be liable for violations of international law committed by such groups. The 
internationally wrongful acts must have been committed under the instructions or direction of the 
State, or the group must have been under the State’s control, be it “effective” or “overall”. Such 
standards do not apply in the case of knowingly providing aid or assistance to lawbreaking 
States, nor is it necessary that an individual aider and abettor issued instructions to or exercised 
control over the direct perpetrators of international crimes in order to be held criminally 
responsible. 
14.2. Substantial Contribution Applied in the Genocide Case 
As argued in Chapter 9.3.2. above, substantiality requirement ought to condition complicity 
rules. The ICJ paid little attention to the connection between the complicit State’s assistance and 
the principal’s wrong, though in its factual assessment it emphasized that “undoubtedly, the quite 
substantial aid of a political, military and financial nature provided by the FRY to the RS and the 
VRS, beginning long before the tragic events of Srebrenica, continued during those events”.1586 
The Court held that there is thus little doubt that the atrocities in Srebrenica were committed, at 
least in part, with the resources, which the perpetrators of those acts possessed as a result of the 
general policy of aid and assistance pursued towards them by the FRY.1587 Since the Court found 
that the concept of complicity in the prohibition on state complicity does not differ significantly 
from the concept of aid or assistance under the law of state responsibility,1588 it can implicitly be 
read to endorse the nexus requirement of Article 16. 
14.3. Subjective Element of Complicity Applied in the Genocide Case 
The level of fault required by the primary rule prohibiting state complicity in genocide proved 
problematic for the ICJ. Indeed, in the Genocide case the Court appeared unsure of how to 
approach the simple question whether the accomplice needs to share the specific intent of the 
                                                          
1585 ICC, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 7 March 2014, Minority 
Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, fn. 382. 
1586 Genocide case, para. 422. 
1587 Ibidem. 
1588 Ibidem, para. 420. 
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principal or if, instead, knowledge of that intent is sufficient.1589 According to the Court, for 
complicity to arise the aid or assistance had to be provided at the least “knowingly”, with the 
person or organ being aware of the specific intent of the perpetrator to commit genocide.1590 It 
was on that basis that the Bosnian claim failed.1591  
Specifically, in assessing the requisite link between the specific intent (dolus specialis) which 
characterizes the crime of genocide and the motives which inspire the actions of an accomplice, 
the Court examined whether complicity presupposes that the accomplice shares the specific 
intent (dolus specialis) of the principal perpetrator: 
There is no doubt that the conduct of an organ or a person furnishing aid or assistance to a perpetrator 
of the crime of genocide cannot be treated as complicity in genocide unless at the least that organ or 
person acted knowingly, that is to say, in particular, was aware of the specific intent (dolus specialis) 
of the principal perpetrator. If that condition is not fulfilled, that is sufficient to exclude categorization 
as complicity. 1592 
The Court found that the requirements for complicity were not met in the Genocide case, as it 
had not been shown that the FRY authorities supplied the VRS leaders with aid and assistance at 
a time when those authorities were clearly aware that genocide was about to take place or was 
under way; in other words that not only were massacres about to be carried out or already under 
way, but that their perpetrators had the specific intent characterizing genocide. Thus, the Court 
concluded it has not been conclusively established that, at the crucial time, the FRY supplied aid 
to the perpetrators of the genocide “in full awareness that the aid supplied would be used to 
commit genocide”.1593 The decision to commit genocide was taken relatively quickly by the 
relevant Bosnian Serbs, and it was not conclusively shown that the authorities in Belgrade were 
made aware of it at the time.1594  
                                                          
1589 Ibidem, para. 421. 
1590 Ibidem. 
1591 The ICJ held that the link between the specific intent (dolus specialis) which characterizes the crime of genocide 
and the motives which inspire the actions of an accomplice must be established and that complicity presupposes that 
the accomplice is aware of the specific intent (dolus specialis) of the principal perpetrator. There is no doubt that the 
conduct of an organ or a person furnishing aid or assistance to a perpetrator of the crime of genocide cannot be 
treated as complicity in genocide unless at the least that organ or person acted knowingly, that is to say, in particular, 
was aware of the specific intent (dolus specialis) of the principal perpetrator. 
1592 Genocide case, para. 421. 
1593 Ibidem, para. 424. 
1594 Ibidem, para. 423. 
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According to the Court, complicity would always require positive action. Additionally, while an 
individual accomplice must have given support in perpetrating genocide with a full knowledge of 
the facts, “a State may be found to have violated its obligation to prevent [genocide] even though 
it had no certainty, at the time when it should have acted, but failed to do so, that genocide was 
about to be committed or was under way”.1595  
The Court may have seen complicity in the context of genocide as somehow different from a 
State involvement in other breaches of international law, and thereby giving rise to responsibility 
for knowingly aiding and assisting. As the Court’s analysis did not go beyond the knowledge 
element, this remains something of an open question. One might argue that the FRY did not 
incur responsibility because of dolus specialis required for the crime of genocide. The same will 
be true only for special intent crimes (such as persecutions) but will not be true for all the rest of 
the international crimes as the awareness of a military or a political leader that such crimes were 
being committed would be easily proven. 
It is strange that the Court chose not to resolve the requisite level of culpability required for state 
complicity in genocide.1596 It remains unclear whether knowledge of the perpetrator’s specific 
intent or a shared specific intent is required. If the Court had drawn an inference of knowledge 
from the relationship and meetings between President Milošević and General Mladić, this 
question (which the Court failed to answer) would have been dispositive of Serbia’s legal 
responsibility for complicity in genocide.  
Regrettably, the Court failed to set out precisely the fault element for complicity in genocide – 
and possibly Article 16 by implication. Instead, the ICJ merely held that “at the least” complicity 
requires knowledge.1597 Some scholars have taken this holding to imply that, in general, 
complicity requires more than knowledge.1598 It is argued that the words ‘at the least’ suggest 
that, normally, the accomplice should have more than this awareness.1599 This is ultimately a 
convincing interpretation as it would not be logical to require a lesser degree of intent for the 
complicit State than of the main actor. Thus, the strict interpretation of Article III (e) appears to 
                                                          
1595 Genocide case, para. 432. 
1596 Milanović, M., State Responsibility for Genocide: A Follow-Up, 18 The European Journal of International Law 
4, 2007, p. 681. 
1597 Genocide case, para. 421. 
1598 Aust, H.P., supra note 1121, p. 236; Crawford, J., supra note 1115, p. 407.  
1599 Nolte, G. and Aust, H.P., supra note 357, p. 14. 
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be warranted. In determining the appropriate standard, there is the methodological question as to 
whether one should look to Article 16 or the requirement of fault in international criminal law. 
While there remains an ongoing debate as to whether a standard of knowledge or wrongful intent 
is required for the rule reflected in Article 16,1600 this dissertation has argued in Section 2.3.3 that 
in accordance with international practice as well as considerations concerning the construction of 
Article 16, intent on the part of the complicit State is required.  
15. Provision of Military Aid as Violation of Principles of Non-Use of Force and Non-
Intervention 
If a State provides military aid to a non-state actor due to security concerns or in support of legal 
activities of those engaged in an armed conflict, such support might constitute violation of other 
obligations arising under the principles of non-use of force and non-intervention.1601 
Accordingly, in the Armed Activities case, the Court held that even though provision of the 
training and military support by Uganda to the rebel group operating in Congo fell short of 
direction and control (and thus did not satisfy the test for attribution) it nevertheless violated 
certain obligations of international law.1602 As mentioned above, the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations provides that “[e]very State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, 
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the 
acts referred to […] involve a threat or use of force.”1603 The Declaration further provides that 
“no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed 
activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in 
civil strife in another State.”1604 
The ICJ concluded that Uganda by providing training and military support to the armed group (a 
non-state actor) operating in the territory of Congo violated the sovereignty and the territorial 
integrity of Congo. According to the Court, Uganda’s actions equally constituted an interference 
in the internal affairs of Congo. The unlawful military intervention by Uganda was of such a 
                                                          
1600 Jackson, M., supra note 348, pp. 135-174. 
1601 Armed Activities Case, para. 163. 
1602 Ibidem, para. 161. 
1603 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, Declaration on Principles of International 
law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN.  
1604 Ibidem. 
314 
magnitude and duration that the Court considered it to be a grave violation of the prohibition on 
the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter.1605 
Similarly, in the Nicaragua case, the Court made it clear that the principle of non-intervention 
prohibits a State “to intervene, directly or indirectly, with or without armed force, in support of 
an internal opposition in another State”.1606 In the Armed Activities case, the Court held that 
military support provided by Uganda amounted to military intervention. The Court further 
affirmed that acts which breach the principle of non-intervention “will also, if they directly or 
indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a breach of the principle of non-use of force in 
international relations.”1607 In the Nicaragua case, the US was held responsible for its own 
conduct in relation to the contras, namely “by training, arming, equipping, financing and 
supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and 
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, [the US] has acted, against the Republic of 
Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the 
affairs of another State.”1608 The ICJ further held that the US “by those acts of intervention [...] 
which involve the use of force, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its 
obligation under customary international law not to use force against another State.”1609 The US 
was also held responsible for its own conduct for producing a manual (“Operaciones sicológicas 
en Guerra de guerrillas”) and spreading it among the contras, what was regarded as having 
“encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian 
law”1610.  
16. Enforcement Mechanisms of State and Individual Criminal Responsibility for 
Complicity 
16.1. The International Court of Justice 
Holding States responsible before international courts and tribunals is a different issue from the 
question whether a State is responsible for the commission of an internationally wrongful act. 
                                                          
1605 Armed Activities Case, para. 165. 
1606 Nicaragua case, para. 206. 
1607 Armed Activities Case, para. 209. 
1608 Nicaragua case, para. 292. 
1609 Ibidem, para. 292. 
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The mere fact that no judicial avenue exists to hold a State responsible does not change the fact 
that there exists international responsibility. In the Genocide case, the ICJ recalled: 
The fundamental distinction between the existence and binding force of obligations arising under 
international law and the existence of a court or tribunal with jurisdiction to resolve disputes about 
compliance with these obligations. The fact that there is not such a court or tribunal does not mean that the 
obligations do not exist. They retain their validity and legal force. States are required to fulfil their 
obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, and they remain responsible 
for acts contrary to international law which are attributable to them.1611 
This is also true for the case of complicity.1612 Namely, Article 16 ARSIWA does not address the 
question of the admissibility of judicial proceedings to establish the responsibility of the aiding 
and assisting State in the absence of or without the consent of the aided or assisted State. The ICJ 
has repeatedly affirmed that it cannot decide on the international responsibility of a State if, in 
order to do so, “it would have to rule, as a prerequisite, on the lawfulness”1613 of the conduct of 
another State, in the latter’s absence and without its consent. This is the so-called Monetary Gold 
principle.1614 
In order to understand more fully the implications of complicity in contemporary international 
law, it is necessary to inquire into its potential role in international judicial dispute settlement. 
There is a further reason to inquire into the means available to hold complicit States responsible; 
namely, it is necessary to establish the responsibility of another State, i.e. the main actor, before 
responsibility for complicity can be established. Although situations may occur when all relevant 
States involved in a dispute have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a given court or 
tribunal, in the majority of cases this will not be the case. The issue whether the Monetary Gold 
rule will bar cases involving complicity has not been afforded a great deal of attention so far. 
Nevertheless, States appear to take this issue seriously. Namely, when the Federal Republic of 
Germany filed its declaration under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute in 2008, it expressly 
excluded the use of the German military armed forces abroad as well as the use of the German 
territory and other areas under German jurisdiction for military purposes by other States from the 
                                                          
1611 Genocide case, para. 148. 
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1613 East Timor case, para. 35.  
1614 Monetary Gold case, pp. 19, 32. 
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jurisdiction of the ICJ. A certain anxiety about becoming entangled in legal disputes in which 
Germany has participated only remotely emerges from these exceptions.1615 
The ILC has noted that the Monetary Gold principle may well apply to cases under Article 16 
ARSIWA, ‘since it is of the essence of the responsibility of the aiding or assisting State that the 
aided or assisted State itself committed an internationally wrongful act’.1616 The wrongfulness of 
the aid or assistance given by the former is dependent, inter alia, on the wrongfulness of the 
conduct of the latter. This may present practical difficulties in establishing the responsibility of 
the aiding or assisting State, but it does not necessarily weaken the purpose of Article 16 
ARSIWA. The Monetary Gold principle is concerned with the admissibility of claims in 
international judicial proceedings, not with questions of state responsibility as such. At the same 
time, the ILC has noted that ‘that principle is not all-embracing and … may not be a barrier to 
judicial proceedings in every case’.1617 States are entitled to assert complicity in the wrongful 
conduct of another State even though no international court may have jurisdiction to rule on the 
charge, at all or in the absence of the other State.1618 
The structure of international dispute settlement is largely bilateral.1619 However, adjudicating a 
situation which involves a complicit State will require an international court or tribunal to 
consider a triangular situation, which involves the injured State bringing the claim forward, the 
complicit State and – in order to find that aid or assistance has been furnished to an 
internationally wrongful act – the main actor to which the support has been granted. Usually, 
only two States will be involved in judicial dispute settlement. The lack of a procedure to 
compulsorily join parties to a dispute if they are implicated in wrongful conduct will in most 
cases hinder the possibility of adjudicating the cases of complicity.1620 As Article 59 of the ICJ 
                                                          
1615 Tams, C. J., and Zimmermann, A., The Federation Shall Accede to Agreements Providing for General and 
Compulsory International Arbitration – The German Optional Clause Declaration of 1 May 2008, German 
Yearbook of International Law 51 ( 2008 ), pp. 391–416, at pp. 413–14. 
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1617 Ibidem. 
1618 Ibidem. 
1619 Rosenne, S., The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005, Vol. II, 4th Edition, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2006, p. 539; Noyes, E., and Smith, B. D., State responsibility and the principle of joint and several 
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ICJ, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, Judgment, ICJ Rep. 1990, 92, para. 99; ICJ, Certain Phosphate 
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Statute protects the absent third State (i.e., the main actor) from the consequences of a binding 
judgment passed in its absence1621 it could be argued that the adjudication of a case between an 
injured State and a complicit State should not give rise to particular problems. The Court points 
to Article 36 of the ICJ Statute, which defines the Court’s competence to decide disputes 
between States.1622 The underlying principle of Article 36 is that of State consent to the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the Court.1623  
In more general contexts, it is noteworthy that the ICJ has been prepared to settle disputes, even 
if theoretically the dispute would also involve rights and obligations of third States not party to 
the case before it.1624 In light of what the ICJ determined in the Monetary Gold case and 
reaffirmed in its East Timor case1625, the wrongfulness of the act committed by the aided or 
assisted State would need to form the ‘very subject matter’ of the case at issue in order to trigger 
the Monetary Gold principle.1626 Arguably, it will not be possible to develop a clear-cut rule for 
all situations involving complicity. Whether or not the wrongful act of the main actor will form 
the very subject matter of the case or whether a determination of its wrongfulness would only 
affect the legal interests of the third State not present in the proceedings has to be determined in 
light of the individual case. The ICJ itself has affirmed that its approach in the Monetary Gold 
case represents the outer limit of its ability to decline jurisdiction: 
There is no doubt that in appropriate circumstances the Court will decline, as it did in the case concerning 
Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it where the legal 
interests of a State not party to the proceedings ‘would not only be affected by decision, but would form the 
very subject-matter of the decision’. The circumstances of the Monetary Gold case probably represent the 
limit to the power of the Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction; and none of the States referred to can be 
                                                          
1621 See also Bernárdez, S. T., The New Theory of “Indispensable Parties” under the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, in Wellens, K. (ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice. Essays in Honour of Eric Suy (The 
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regarded as in the same position as Albania in that case, so as to be truly indispensable to the pursuance of 
the proceedings.1627 
Other factors are conceivable which would allow the Court to find a basis upon which it could 
exercise jurisdiction in a dispute between an injured State and the complicit State without having 
to determine the responsibility of the State not party to a dispute. One such solution was 
advocated by Portugal in the East Timor case. Portugal argued that the wrongfulness of the 
Indonesian occupation of East Timor was already established by relevant UN Security Council 
and General Assembly resolutions.1628 The Court did not accept this argument. But it did not, 
however, generally rule out the possibility that the illegality of a given situation can be 
established by resolutions of the political UN organs. This can be inferred from the Court’s 
reference to the resolutions in question and its examination of the implications of the UN 
General Assembly continuously referring to Portugal as the ‘administering power’. The Court 
concluded that, ‘[w]ithout prejudice to the question whether the resolutions under discussion 
could be binding in nature, the Court considers as a result that they cannot be regarded as 
“givens” which constitute a sufficient basis for determining the dispute between the Parties'.1629 
Another situation under which the effects of the Monetary Gold principle could be reduced 
would be given when the main actor has expressed its general consent to the jurisdiction of the 
Court by means of a declaration under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. In this regard, one has to 
note that the concept of the indispensable third party is applicable regardless of the fact whether 
the absence of the third State is due to its voluntary decision or whether it has not been properly 
impleaded.1630 The existence of general consent to the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 
36(2) of the ICJ Statute thus does not render the Monetary Gold principle inapplicable. However, 
in such a case, its effects are greatly mitigated as the State which wishes to bring a claim against 
the complicit State could likewise file a case against the main actor, given that all other criteria 
are met. 
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In discussing the impact of the Monetary Gold principle on cases in which complicity is to be 
adjudicated, one should not forget the fundamental rationale of this principle: it is an expression 
of ‘elemental due process’1631 insofar as it prevents the Court from adjudicating disputes in the 
absence of a State.1632 It also works the other way around: without its consent, a complicit State 
cannot be dragged into ongoing proceedings between the main actor and the injured State.1633 In 
this perspective, the Monetary Gold principle may also appear as a safeguard against arbitrary 
courses of action which are directed only against a remote actor while the ‘main culprit’ is left 
unaffected. Although deplorable from a viewpoint of legal policy, the option to remain absent 
from dispute settlement proceedings still exists in the contemporary international legal order.1634 
Therefore, it is the task of the Court to find the appropriate balance between preventing parties 
submitting as bilateral disputes claims to the Court which discount third party interests, and not 
allowing the absence of third parties to deprive the Court of jurisdiction legitimately bestowed 
upon it by the parties.1635 In this respect, the ‘multilateralization’ of international disputes should 
be taken into account.1636 
The ICJ as the principal judicial organ of the UN1637 occupies a central place in considerations 
about the role which state complicity may play in judicial dispute settlement. During a long 
period of time the ICJ was the only international court in existence. It is still the judicial body 
that, at the universal level, possesses the largest jurisdiction. Its creation, after the First World 
War, under the name of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), was rightly 
considered a decisive path towards the submission of sovereign States’ activities to the 
international rule of law.1638 The mere existence of one international court was then viewed as a 
crucial element in the identification of one body of international rules and principles receiving 
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the same interpretation at a universal level. This remained true even if, as stated by the PCIJ in 
the Eastern Carelia Case, “it is well established in international law that no State can, without its 
consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to 
arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement.”1639 This single court system, already 
somewhat threatened by the persistent creation of arbitration tribunals and the multiplication of 
specialized regional international courts, such as the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (CJEC), the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, has undergone a radical change. New judicial institutions have been created, such 
as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Dispute Settlement System, and the ICC. All of them have a narrow function, but they are 
established at the universal level, as is the ICJ. Consequently, the proliferation of international 
courts and tribunals raises the issue of whether this phenomenon will lead to the fragmentation of 
the international legal system or, at least, to the fragmentation of the interpretation of its norms. 
In a time of ‘proliferation’ of international courts and tribunals,1640 it is, however, important to 
consider alternative avenues in which complicit States could be held judicially responsible. In 
this respect, the prospects are more promising: in no other international judicial forum is the 
protection of absent third parties as imposing as it is in the case law of the ICJ. However, the 
constraints of the scope of this dissertation do not allow to present the other various forms of 
dispute settlement in detail. The mere mention thereof will have to suffice in order to indicate the 
alternative possibilities for finding state responsibility for complicity in international courts and 
tribunals. These alternative mechanisms are merely listed here in order to point out alternatives 
for judicial and quasi-judicial dispute settlement involving complicit States (e.g. WTO dispute 
settlement, Dispute settlement under UNCLOS, The European Court of Human Rights, 
international arbitration, domestic courts1641). Not all of the systems mentioned have already seen 
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cases involving complicity. However, in none of them can it be ruled out that this will happen in 
the future.  
16.2. The International Criminal Court 
The main forum for adjudicating individual criminal responsibility for complicity is the ICC. As 
clearly provided for in Article 25(4) of the Rome Statute, ‘[n]o provision of this Statute relating 
to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of States under international 
law’. However, it is also apparent that determinations of individual criminal responsibility may 
very well affect, albeit implicitly, state responsibility: especially in the case of so-called 
‘leadership crimes’1642 a finding of individual criminal responsibility of a high-ranking State 
official will at the very least establish a strong presumption for concurrent state responsibility.1643 
These considerations may also inspire the concerns of non-parties to the Rome Statute about the 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over their nationals. In general, the ICC may exercise 
jurisdiction in three situations: if a crime has been committed on the territory of a party to the 
Rome Statute, if the perpetrator is a national of a State party or if the Security Council has 
referred a situation to the ICC.1644 In the first of these situations, it is relevant to note that through 
the territoriality principle embodied in the Rome Statute, the conduct of third States may come 
under scrutiny and that there is no procedural rule built into the Rome Statute, which would 
prevent the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case. It is thus conceivable that, implicitly, the 
conduct of a complicit State may come under scrutiny in the ICC proceedings.  
While no condition on State conduct is formally required for individual complicity in the 
“foreign assistance cases”, certain interesting parallels can be drawn with the crime of 
aggression. Namely, the latter is rooted on the basic assumption of identity between the conduct 
of the State and its political and military leaders. In the case of aggression, the only persons who 
can be held criminally responsible are those highest ranking organs representing the State as a 
whole and deciding the State general policies. Similarly, it has been argued in Part II that actus 
reus of individual complicity in the “foreign assistance cases” can be fulfilled primarily by 
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individuals occupying the highest decision-making positions in the political or military apparatus 
of the State. Hence, in the quest for applicable enforcement mechanisms for state complicity and 
individual complicity, respectively, important lessons may be learned from the enforcement 
mechanisms available for establishing individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility 
in the case of aggression. 
Aggression is strictly defined in terms of State conduct. The ICC cannot proceed against 
individuals unless there is a prior determination of the State act of aggression. This is due to the 
fact that “it is necessary to determine that a State act of aggression has occurred before it can be 
determined that an individual crime of aggression is at hand”.1645 Clearly, there is no such 
requirement in case of determination of individual criminal responsibility for complicity in the 
“foreign assistance cases”. Regarding the conditions for the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction in 
cases of a crime of aggression, the proposal of the PrepCom and the SWGCA reads as follows: 
Where the Prosecutor intends to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, the 
Court shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of 
aggression committed by the State concerned. If no Security Council determination exists, the Court 
shall notify the Security Council of the situation before the Court.1646 
 
This provision tries to co-ordinate the jurisdiction of the ICC with the SC’s power under Chapter 
VII, so that the Rome Statute is consistent with the UN Charter. If the SC makes a determination 
with respect to State aggression, then the ICC must take it into account. However, this does not 
solve the problem where the SC takes no action.1647 One could argue that the SC does not have 
an exclusive competence on determination of State aggression; rather, such competence could be 
claimed for other bodies as well, such as the UN General Assembly or the ICJ.1648 Namely, the 
PrepCom and SWGCA proposals include two alternatives: first, the ICC jurisdiction would be 
precluded if there is no prior determination of aggression made by a competent organ outside the 
Court; or second, the ICC would be able to proceed with the case without any such prior 
                                                          
1645 ICC-ASP/2/10, p. 385, <www.icc-cpi.int>, previously issued as PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, <untreaty.un.-
org/cod/icc/index.html>. 
1646 See PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, <untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>, and ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2, p. 4, <www.icc-
cpi.int>. 
1647 The SC has determined the existence of a state aggression only on very few occasions. Moreover, the inactivity 
of the SC is generally due to the veto power of the permanent member states. These states would thus be able to 
leave the ICC in a state of paralysis. 
1648 ICC-ASP/4/32, Annex II, paras. 63–74, <www.icc-cpi.int>. 
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determination.1649 These proposals enable different solutions, but at the same time show the two 
major problems concerning the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 
First, there is uncertainty over the legal effects of prior determination of State aggression (by the 
SC or another international body) with respect to the establishment of individual criminal 
responsibility by the ICC.1650 Second, these proposals seek to keep the determination of State 
aggression and the establishment of individual criminal responsibility for aggression separate, in 
order to preserve the autonomy of the ICC and to respect the basic principles of international 
criminal law. 
Turning to the case of complicity, similarly, a competence on determination of State complicity 
could be claimed for the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly or the ICJ. However, a 
prosecution of individual complicity in the “foreign assistance cases” by the ICC or ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals is not conditioned upon a prior inquiry regarding the Security 
Council’s potential determination of complicity committed by the State concerned. Nor is the 
ICC formally obligated to take into account a possible determination with respect to State 
complicity by the ICJ, Security Council or the UN General Assembly. Nevertheless, Part II has 
argued that international practice shows that the determination of individual criminal 
responsibility in the “foreign assistance cases” necessarily establishes the corresponding act of 
state complicity (the same actus reus). This implies the assessment of material conduct 
amounting to complicity by way of provision of military aid. Where there is such a prior 
determination of individual criminal responsibility for complicity, the question concerns the legal 
effects of this determination for the ICJ (in its adjudication of state complicity). It is submitted 
that the prior finding of facts relating to the material conduct amounting to individual complicity 
in the “foreign assistance cases” should be seen as a preliminary question necessary to establish 
state responsibility. This dissertation argues that in practice a certain consistency must be 
guaranteed when international rules defining complicity for provision of military aid under both 
state and individual criminal responsibility are concerned. Turning to the legal finding on State 
attribution, arguably the ICC cannot depart from it. While this particular aspect should have no 
direct impact on the subsequent trial of State leaders for complicity, it can play an indirect role 
                                                          
1649 ICC-ASP/2/10, p. 234, <www.icc-cpi.int>, previously issued as PCNICC/2002/2/Add.2, para. 5, 
<untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/index.html>, and ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2, p. 4, <www.icc-cpi.int>. 
1650 ICC-ASP/4/32, Annex II, paras. 60–62, <www.icc-cpi.int>. 
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before the ICC. Once the actus reus of complicity by a political or military leader has been 
established, the actus reus of a State act of complicity has in fact already been determined. The 
mens rea of political and military leaders can be easily inferred from the general criminal context 
surrounding state complicity. 
On the one hand, there is a clear need to maintain the separation between the determination of 
state complicity and the establishment of individual criminal responsibility. A certain autonomy 
for the ICC should be guaranteed. It is taken for granted that there must be a separation between 
the enforcement mechanisms of state and individual criminal responsibility. While the ICJ and/or 
the SC is considered as a competent institution to establish the existence of an internationally 
wrongful act of a State, the jurisdiction of ad hoc international tribunals and the ICC is limited to 
the prosecution of individuals for complicity. And this scheme has never been called into 
question concerning the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction over the crimes under Article 5 of its 
Statute. At the same time, in the “foreign assistance cases” it seems very difficult to keep the 
establishment of state and individual criminal responsibility for complicity separate. Prior 
determination of individual complicity by way of provision of military aid is likely to have a 
very profound impact on the ICJ. The same is true the other way around. Prior establishment of 
state complicity by the ICJ should influence the determination of individual criminal 
responsibility by the ICC or another international criminal tribunal. 
17. Conclusion  
The holding to account of persons or entities that aid and assist the commission of international 
crimes is not an alternative to pursuing the direct perpetrators of those violations.1651 A multitude 
of persons and entities can bear responsibility for the various contributions they might have made 
to serious breaches of international law.1652 States and their officials have undoubtedly 
contributed to the commission of core international crimes by States and non-state armed groups.  
States provide military and technical assistance to one another with various strategic objectives 
in a number of regions around the world. Relations between States are often reinforced by the 
provision of significant military aid. Many foreign armies are dependent, to various degrees, 
upon such assistance to function. In this context in many conflict zones around the world, the 
                                                          
1651 See supra note 2. 
1652 Schabas, W. A., supra note 508, p. 441. 
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provision of military aid is aimed at supporting mutual interests such as the deterrence of armed 
conflicts, the promotion of regional and global peace, stability and prosperity and other 
objectives. Part III critically examined whether foreign policies that result in the provision of 
different types of military aid necessarily amount to state complicity in international crimes, 
merely by way of providing such aid. While the current state of international law does not 
provide for a clear answer, this dissertation argues that the law of state responsibility requires 
more than a mere provision of aid or assistance to non-state actors for the assisting State to be 
liable for violations committed by such groups. Namely, the internationally wrongful acts must 
have been committed under the instructions or direction of the State, or the group must have 
been under the State’s effective control. While such a standard does not apply in the case of 
States knowingly providing aid or assistance to other States committing internationally wrongful 
acts, this dissertation argues that it must be shown that by the aid or assistance given the relevant 
State organ intended to facilitate the occurrence of an internationally wrongful act by the assisted 
State. 
Part III examined the status of the complicity norm in the international law of state 
responsibility. International law prohibits state complicity by providing for different layers of 
responsibility. Chapter 8.2 has demonstrated that the issue of state complicity involves a 
complex interplay between primary (substantive) and secondary (framework) rules of 
international law. Complicity rules of a primary nature exist both in customary and in treaty law. 
The ICJ held that a State may be responsible under customary international law for the rendering 
of unlawful ‘aid and assistance’.1653 The ILC sought to codify such responsibility through 
Articles 16 ARSIWA. Part III has argued that such a norm has been accepted as customary law. 
It argued that with respect to the subjective requirement in Article 16, intent on the part of the 
complicit State is required. This follows both from the analysis of international practice as well 
as from considerations concerning the drafting history of Article 16. The intent need not be 
focused on the eventual effect of the wrongful act of the main actor, but on the contribution of 
the complicit State to the commission of the wrongful act. This does not require the complicit 
State to actually intend for the outcome of the wrongful act. 
                                                          
1653 Genocide case, para. 420. 
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Complicity in the framework of the secondary rules of international law is discussed in the 
context of attribution. Where the link between perpetrators and the assisting State is strong 
enough to attribute the conduct of the perpetrators to the latter, the assisting State becomes a 
perpetrating State, giving rise to its international responsibility as such. Thus, such an assisting 
State bears independent or joint responsibility for breaching the negative obligation to refrain 
from violating international law. Chapters 13 and 14 have analysed the standards for attribution 
as set forth in the ARSIWA. In situations where the actor is, or can be assimilated to, an organ of 
the State, the conduct of de jure organs or de facto organs is attributable to the State. These 
would apply only if the perpetrators were under the exclusive control,1654 or in a situation of 
complete dependence1655 upon, the assisting State. The next set of attribution rules apply in 
situations where the actor is acting on behalf of the State in particular circumstances. The 
conduct of such a non-state actor may be attributed to a State when the actor is in fact acting on 
the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, a State in carrying out the conduct. In the 
absence of specific instructions, a fairly high degree of control has been required to attribute the 
conduct to the State. Absent direction or control, the conduct of a non-state actor may be 
attributed to a State when the actor is “exercising elements of the governmental authority in the 
absence or default of the official authorities”;1656 when the conduct is subsequently adopted by a 
State;1657 or when the conduct is that “of an insurrectional movement that becomes the new 
government of a State.”1658 
While provision of military aid was examined in various cases by the ICJ (i.e. the Nicaragua 
case, the Genocide case, the Armed Activities case and the Wall case) the Court has been little 
instructive on the issue of States providing military and other type of aid to another State or a 
non-state actor. The ICJ asserted that a complicit relationship, established by financing, 
organizing, training, supplying and equipping of an army of another State, is, on a traditional 
understanding of the rules of attribution, insufficient to render the conduct of the assisted party 
conduct of the State.1659 Particularly, in the Genocide case the ICJ affirmed the need for control, 
                                                          
1654 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 6 (2), pp. 43-44. 
1655 Genocide case, para. 393. 
1656 ILC Report on State Responsibility, p. 49. 
1657 Ibidem, p. 53.  
1658 Ibidem, p. 50.  
1659 See Nicaragua case, para. 109: The Court found that from 1981 until 1984 the US was providing funds for 
military and paramilitary activities by the contras in Nicaragua with the aim to support the opposition front in 
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thus rejecting the idea that a complicit relationship may be sufficient to attribute the conduct of 
non-state groups to the State.1660 Similarly, in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that substantial 
provision of military and other type of aid by the US to the contras (a non-state actor) did not 
warrant attributing to the US the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military 
operations in Nicaragua.1661  
The analysis of international jurisprudence concerning individual and state responsibility for 
complicity in international crimes by way of provision of military aid conducted in Part II and 
Part III, has revealed interesting parallels between the judicial attempts to clarify and apply 
appropriate standards for these two distinct, yet complementary forms of responsibility under 
international law. There is no requirement that the aid or assistance provided by the assisting 
State should have been essential to the performance of the internationally wrongful act by the 
recipient State; as with aiding and abetting under international criminal law, it is sufficient if it 
contributed significantly to that act.1662 Furthermore, ‘specifically directed’ criminal law standard 
in terms of actus reus of aiding and abetting international crimes is almost identical to the 
standard for state complicity. However, such comparison also revealed notable differences. In 
particular, in terms of the subjective element of complicity: for individuals it must be shown that 
they knew that their acts assist the commission of a specific crime and have a substantial effect 
on its commission, while for States that knowingly provide aid or assistance to another State, it 
must be shown that the relevant State organ intended, by the aid or assistance given, to facilitate 
the occurrence of the internationally wrongful act, and that internationally wrongful act is 
actually committed by the assisted State. This difference in approach proved fatal to the BiH’s 
submission on complicity in genocide by the FRY, which in Cassese’s view would have been 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
paramilitary and political operations in Nicaragua. The ICJ held that it was established that the US authorities 
largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the contras. However, there was no clear evidence of the 
US having actually exercised such a degree of control as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf. The 
Court found that the contras “constituted an independent force” and that the only element of control that could be 
exercised by the US was cessation of aid. While various forms of assistance provided to the contras by the US have 
been crucial to the pursuit of their activities, such was insufficient to demonstrate their complete dependence on US 
aid.  
1660 Genocide case, paras. 369 – 407.  
1661 Nicaragua case, para. 115: All the forms of US participation in the financing, organizing, training, supplying 
and equipping of the contras, and even the general control by the US over a force with a high degree of dependency 
on it, would not in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the US directed or enforced the perpetration of 
the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law. Such acts could well be committed by members of the 
contras without the control of the US. 
1662 ILC Report on State Responsibility, p. 66. On military support to other States, see Aust, H. P., supra note 1121, 
pp. 129–145. 
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successful had a criminal law standard been applied.1663 Whereas the same standards apply for 
individual criminal responsibility for the provision of military aid to another State, compared to 
aiding a non-state actor, international law envisages different standards for when a State is 
implicated in violations committed by an individual or a group (i.e. non-state actor), compared to 
when the same are perpetrated by another State.  
The jurisprudence in both contexts has been characterized by differences of opinion between 
international courts and by tensions arising from the pursuit of interpretations of the law of 
international responsibility that are viewed as either overly expansive or restrictive. The absence 
of a clear and unambiguous conventional legal standard for aiding and abetting applicable to all 
international criminal tribunals, and of a precise definition for the concept of control1664 in the 
context of attributing the acts of non-state actors to States, has allowed international judges to 
elaborate their own understandings as to the relevant tests and elements for individual and state 
complicity. The said resulted in legal uncertainty and lead to an inconsistency in the law of 
international responsibility given that military or political leaders can be individually responsible 
for actions conducted for the State, whereas the State itself incurs no responsibility. This 
apparent anomaly highlights the separate development of both legal regimes, but also suggests 
either that the standards applied to individuals may be too low, or that the rules of state 
responsibility are set too high. Part II has argued that the standards applied to individuals are set 
too low and proposed specific direction requirement as a solution to consistent application of the 
complicity rules in the law of international responsibility.  
While there is no perfect match between grounds of individual criminal responsibility and 
grounds of state responsibility, according to the current state of international law, when a 
political or military leader is individually responsible, also the State, to which his acts can be 
attributed, can nevertheless be held responsible. That is, as shown in Part III, individual criminal 
responsibility of a political/military leader may be complemented by responsibility of his State, 
based, inter alia, on breach of the principle of non-intervention, or breach of obligations of 
international humanitarian law.  
                                                          
1663 A. Cassese, On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide, 2007, 5 JICJ 
1, at 10-11. 
1664 See supra Sections 13.2 and 14.1.3.  
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A credibility gap is likely to develop if international law provides for increasing number of bases 
on which States can be held responsible without, at the same time, developing related procedural 
means. This concern mirrors general worries about the ineffectiveness of the enforcement of 
international law. The responsibility of States exists independently of procedural means to 
implement it. However, if structural reasons stand in the way of effectively implementing new 
bases of the responsibility of States, it is a legitimate question to inquire into these structural 
weaknesses and to seek change in that regard.1665 
A brief survey of procedural possibility for holding complicit States responsible shows that the 
Monetary Gold principle may prevent the ICJ from entertaining cases on complicity. Although 
the Court may have leeway to abandon its jurisprudence, the more promising prospects are 
offered by other judicial and quasi-judicial avenues (i.e. human rights bodies, domestic courts, 
CJEC, ICC, WTO). State consent plays a different role in these fora: in some situations, it 
respresents no obstacle, as all members to a treaty regime have automatically consented to the 
exercise of jurisdiction by a court. In other situations, third States are not legally affected by a 
decision of a court established under such a regime as they are not members of the regime. In 
this regard, it is the peculiar position of the ICJ which makes its reliance on consent so 
important: the effects of its jurisprudence are so readily apparent that the bindingness inter partes 
of a judgment is not a sufficient means of protection for third parties. This is arguably a less 
acute problem with respect to other courts, which are not acredited with the hallmark of being 
‘the principle judicial organ of the United Nations’. Although the Monetary Gold principle is 
sometimes presented as a general principle of law applicable beyond ICJ proceedings,1666 its 
effects will have to be carefully established with respect to the features of the judicial dispute 
settlement at hand.  
As no unified forum for adjudicating state as well as individual complicity exists, there is a threat 
of divergent jurisprudence emanating from different international jurisdictions, despite dealing 
with similar rules or legal notions. Thus, in order to prevent the fragmentation of the 
international legal system, it is imperative that elements of complicity in these two different 
                                                          
1665 Fastenrath, U. et. al., From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of Bruno Simma, Oxford 
University Press, 2011, p. 298. 
1666 Rosenne, S., International Courts and Tribunals, Jurisdiction and Admissibility of Inter-State Applications, in 
Rudiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, online edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2008, p. 7.  
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regimes of international responsibility develop in a similar way. The opposite trend will create 
dissatisfaction for the States concerned as it introduces a measure of legal insecurity. 
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PART IV – FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
1. The question of when does a State’s provision of assistance to foreign armies or armed groups 
cross the line from legitimate foreign policy to complicity in commission of international crimes 
represents one of the most difficult dilemmas in criminal justice, has profound normative 
implications and has provoked sharp splits among international tribunals. Whether such military 
aid should be viewed from the realm of individual criminal responsibility and/or the one of state 
responsibility continues to be probed in the world of international law. 
2. The dissertation clarified the current status of international law regulating how States and 
individuals should act when providing military aid to another State or a non-state actor operating 
in another State in order to avoid responsibility. It demonstrated that the respective normative 
frameworks for individual complicity and state complicity so far lack sufficient coordination and 
result in inconsistency when implementing international responsibility. Further, the normative 
framework of individual and state complicity was analysed with the aim to address the interplay 
between the two regimes of international responsibility in the given context. The existing 
doctrinal models of the relationship between state and individual criminal responsibility 
examined in Part I reveal the traditional dualistic model as the dominant doctrinal approach to 
this relationship.1667 This approach accepts certain connection and overlap between both 
responsibility regimes, but at the same time rejects the idea of formalized mutual dependency. 
While dualistic approach acknowledges double attribution and complementarity as the main 
characteristics of this relationship, it fails to provide for an adequate response to the relationship 
between state and individual criminal responsibility in the “foreign assistance cases”, as it 
suggests that both responsibility regimes are independent, separate and do not influence 
conclusions adopted in the other area of international law. While acknowledging that the finding 
of individual criminal responsibility in the “foreign assistance cases” before an international 
criminal jurisdiction cannot be a legally compelling argument for establishing state responsibility 
before an inter-state court, their legal, political and moral interconnectedness militates in favour 
of adopting a more holistic approach towards responsibility management. Accordingly, in 
“foreign assistance cases” criminal prosecutions of military or State leaders and state 
                                                          
1667 See supra Chapter 2.4. 
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responsibility proceedings should be viewed not only complementary, as suggested by the 
dualistic model, but rather mutually co-dependent. Treating them otherwise might result in 
inconsistent outcomes that would undermine the legitimacy of different courts involved in 
establishing responsibility. Accordingly, it is imperative that the respective normative 
frameworks for individual and state complicity are aligned so that both State and individual 
leader may be prosecuted for the same act/conduct. This dissertation argues that the current 
international law system does not provide for an adequate normative framework of complicity.  
3. The dissertation has sought to show that in certain cases state responsibility and individual 
criminal responsibility for international crimes should be regarded as mutually co-dependent and 
complementary. Many serious violations of international law should entail both international 
responsibility of a State and individual criminal responsibility of persons who have committed 
the said violations, either as officials, agents, or in any other respect. Part II has demonstrated 
that in “foreign assistance cases”, provision of military aid by a military or a political leader 
giving rise to individual complicity could be said to necessarily entail the implementation of a 
state policy, and should therefore be considered as an act of State in addition to an act of an 
individual. Acknowledging that the two regimes serve parallel functions within their respective 
spheres of application1668, they nevertheless both aim at the protection of fundamental values 
shared by international community as a whole and should therefore develop coherent rules in co-
dependence and appreciation of their mutual existence. 
4. Part II examined the landmark contemporary foreign assistance case where the State and its 
military leader have provided military aid to a non-state actor operating in another State, thereby 
demonstrating implications of new developments in international criminal law on responsibility 
of military (or political) leaders and the assisting States. Acknowledging that provision of 
military aid in contemporary armed conflicts which involve the commission of international 
crimes may, under certain circumstances, be characterized as complicity in those crimes, this 
dissertation seeks to draw the limit(s) of internationally permitted conduct for States and 
individuals, respectively, with regard to the provision of military aid. Thus, it provides further 
transparency of the current status of international law concerning responsibility of a military or 
                                                          
1668 For the difference between reparative v. criminal function of the two responsibility regime, see supra Part I, 
Sections 1.2.2., 1.2.4 and 2.4.  
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political leader(s) implementing a state policy on provision of military aid as well as 
responsibility of a State in that context.  
5. Unfortunately, recent developments in international criminal law have left it ambiguous 
whether the mere provision of military aid to another State or a non-state actor engaged in an 
armed conflict can be equated with aiding and abetting international crimes committed during 
such an armed conflict. In particular, the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Perišić case ambitiously 
drew new boundaries and set a lower threshold in terms of accomplice liability of a military 
leader when providing military aid to another State or a non-state actor operating in another 
State. Whereas Perišić Appeals Chamber imposed the stricter requirement of ‘specific direction’ 
for aiding and abetting international crimes, such has not been accepted in subsequent 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. The dissertation has argued that this subsequent approach 
fails to distinguish between aid to the commission of specific crimes and aid to the war effort 
generally, which is not inherently criminal for the purposes of the Statutes of ad hoc tribunals, 
particularly if the aid provided is of a general nature.1669 Such a standard, whereby military 
assistance given to a party to an armed conflict with the knowledge that international crimes are 
likely to be committed by that party, will result in a finding of responsibility irrespective of any 
humanitarian intent, significance, specificity, direction or impact of that assistance. Accordingly, 
this work has argued that the rejection of a specific direction requirement, or even a lesser 
‘purpose of facilitating’ standard as required by the Rome Statute, creates a threshold 
approaching that of a strict liability. 
Thus, from the perspective of international criminal law, it remains unclear whether aiding to 
wage a war is criminalized to the effect that provision of military aid in itself would amount to 
aiding and abetting crimes committed in that armed conflict. Recognizing the Perišić case as 
factually distinct from any of the cases that have come before international criminal tribunals, it 
is necessary to acknowledge the political implications for military and political leaders if the 
lower standard is to be applied in similar scenarios around the world. Further, the current 
confusion and ambiguity concerning the existing rules and standards of responsibility for 
provision of military aid renders possible that such aid is being given without as much as 
analysing the potential responsibility of a State or its actors. The international courts may have 
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initiated this discussion but it is far from being applied in the reality of international relations. It 
is alarming that after more than two decades of the existence of various international criminal 
tribunals, their jurisprudence is less, rather than more predictable. Nevertheless, after the two 
most recent and completely conflicting decisions in two strikingly similar cases of individual 
complicity for provision of military aid, namely the Perišić and the Taylor case, the elements of 
aiding and abetting in international criminal law are murkier than ever.  
6. The analysis of individual and state complicity understaken in Part II and Part III has 
demonstrated a considerable resemblance between both forms of responsibility. In cases of 
complicity by way of provision of military aid a strict separation between the state responsibility 
and the individual criminal responsibility would be but artificial. Specifically, in the Perišić case, 
the material breach amounting to complicity in international crime(s) was established in a very 
similar way and irrespective of the fact that it entails state or individual criminal responsibility. 
Notably, the manner in which the international criminal tribunal established the material 
(objective) element of international crimes is very similar to the manner in which the State act 
amounting to an internationally wrongful act may be demonstrated. In determining actus reus of 
individual criminal responsibility for complicity, the international court analysed state policy on 
provision of military aid, rather than the conduct of an individual, thereby blurring the 
boundaries between the two separate regimes of international responsibility. The general context 
of a violation played a fundamental role in proving that material (objective) element. The 
assessment of individual criminal responsibility for complicity in international crimes reveals 
traits of overlap with the assessment of States’ violations. At a minimum, it deals with the same 
facts that are capable of entailing state responsibility. The foregoing analysis has revealed that 
individual complicity in the “foreign assistance cases” has been defined in terms of State action 
and thus requires international criminal tribunals adjudicating such cases – if not to establish 
state responsibility – at least to take into account that the relevant individual conduct has taken 
place in the context of an internationally wrongful act by a State before ascribing individual 
criminal responsibility. Accordingly, it is submitted that Perišić’s conviction by the ICTY Trial 
Chamber can also be seen as a general recognition of state responsibility of the FRY. Thus, in 
this specific context, it is proposed that state responsibility should be viewed as an (inevitable) 
consequence of determination of individual criminal responsibility. 
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7. This dissertation demonstrated that complicity in core international crimes by way of 
provision of military aid takes place chiefly as a part of institutional, systemic or State 
criminality; thus, it should be ethically and legally appropriate to allocate the responsibility to 
different types of actors (individual and State) in respect of the same kind of wrongful 
conduct.1670 It is difficult to imagine individual acts of provision of military aid not forming part 
of a state policy that could produce substantial effect on the commission of the crime(s) by 
another State’s armed forces or armed groups operating in another State. Further, it is difficult to 
imagine how a ‘lone individual’ would be capable of orchestrating the system of provision of 
military aid directed at another State’s armed forces or armed groups operating in another State, 
that has a substantial effect on the commission of crimes by those armed forces or armed groups. 
It is argued that in the context of provision of military aid complicity standards require the type 
and quantity of military aid that can only be provided as a product of a state policy. This 
effectively means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts (that is, 
multiple acts of military aid and assistance) directed towards the principal offender(s), pursuant 
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to aid another State or a non-state actor. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the legal requirements imposed by the elements of aiding and 
abetting (specifically, the actus reus standard of substantial contribution) suggests that 
complicity by provision of military aid necessarily requires the backing of the State. Rather, it 
requires that the State actively promotes or encourages such an undertaking. It is proposed that a 
state policy the object of which is assisting a third State or an armed group operating in a third 
State, would be implemented by a State rather than by a sole individual. In the Perišić case, the 
ICTY has effectively addressed the collective dimension of international crimes. Accordingly, 
the punishment of a State organ(s) for international crimes requires, at least indirectly, a previous 
assessment of the same facts giving rise to state responsibility. While the Genocide case 
provided the ICJ with an opportunity to examine the various aspects of the relationship between 
state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility, regrettably, the Court avoided an in-
depth analysis on the matter.  
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Burchard, C., Triffterer, O., and Vogel, J. (eds.), 2010, p. 211 
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8. The comparison of the respective normative frameworks for individual complicity and state 
complicity under international law reveals both similarities and differences. Similarly, the 
analysis of the pertinent international practice reveals that there are various points of contact 
between the two regimes which can hardly be eliminated. The study of the landmark case of 
complicity has shown that in addressing accomplice liability when dealing with military aid, 
there is a substantial overlap and interaction between state responsibility and individual criminal 
responsibility.  
8.1. Firstly, it is interesting to note that the standard of significant contribution of Article 16 
ARSIWA is similar to that imposed by international criminal law – the accomplice’s assistance 
must have a substantial effect on the commission of the crime.1671 If a common denominator 
from the existing jurisprudence of ad hoc tribunals and the positions in scholarly works can be 
identified, it is the requirement that (military) aid must have made some difference for the main 
actor in carrying out its deed.1672 Similar considerations apply for complicity in the law of state 
responsibility. In order to find responsibility of a complicit State, its (military) aid should have 
changed the situation for the main actor. It must have made it ‘substantially’ easier to commit the 
internationally wrongful act.1673 It is noteworthy that the ILC required a very similar degree of 
causal impact in its commentaries to Article 2(3)(d) of the Draft Code of Crimes and to Article 
16 ARSIWA. Whereas the former clarifies that the commission of a crime must have been 
‘facilitated in some significant way’,1674 the latter refer to the requirement that the aid or 
assistance in question ‘contributed significantly’ to the wrongful act,1675 which has to be read in 
conjunction with the previously stated requirement that ‘the aid or assistance must be given with 
a view of facilitating the commission of that act; and must actually do so’.1676  
8.2. Secondly, if the applicable international criminal law standard in terms of actus reus of 
aiding and abetting international crimes needs to be that the aid was ‘specifically directed’ to the 
                                                          
1671 See, e.g. Simić Appeals Judgment, para. 85; Vasiljević Appeals Judgment, para. 45; Krstić Appeals Judgment, 
para. 238; Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, para. 51; Blaškić Appeals Judgment, para. 48; Tadić Appeals Judgment, 
para. 229.  
1672 Cassese, A., supra note 30, p. 214. 
1673 Report of the ILC work of its forty-eight session, p. 24. 
1674 Draft Code of Crimes with Commentary, Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its forty-eighth 
session, in 1996, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the work of 
that session (at para. 50). The report, which also contains commentaries on the draft articles, appears in Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two). 
1675 ILC Report on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 16, para. 5. 
1676 Ibidem, para. 4. 
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commission of the crime, the ‘specifically directed’ standard is, coincidentally, almost identical 
to the standard for state complicity and for attribution articulated in the ARSIWA. Thus, by 
raising the threshold requirement for accomplice liability under international law, the Perišić 
Appeals Judgment effectively synchronized the requirements of both forms of responsibility. The 
insistence on specific direction by the Appeals Chamber in Perišić required that the assistance 
had substantial effect on the crimes, namely that the assistance be directed/aimed towards the 
crimes, thereby establishing the requisite nexus between the acts of the accused and the crime(s) 
committed. Such requirement effectively raised the aiding and abetting standard by insisting on a 
purposive element, which has not been accepted by the subsequent jurisprudence of the ad hoc 
tribunals, although it is required by the Rome Statute. By insisting on specific direction, the 
Appeals Chamber adequately brought the standard of individual criminal responsibility for 
complicity closer to that of state responsibility as set out by the ICJ. As argued in Section 11.3., 
the Perišić Appeals Chamber had opted for this standard in search of the requisite “nexus” or 
“link” between the acts or conduct of the accused and the crimes. Even omitting the “specific 
direction” standard, the accomplice’s acts needed to have the necessary connection to the crimes 
in order to satisfy the requisite element of actus reus of aiding and abetting. Therefore, it is 
argued, the Perišić Appeals Chamber’s reasoning on the “specific direction” element is merely 
the fulfilment of the indisputably requisite element of substantial effect on the crime. 
Accordingly, the Perišić Appeals Chamber’s characterisation of specific direction did not 
amount to the introduction of any novel elements in the realm of the imposition of individual 
criminal responsibility. However, the subsequent rejection of the ‘specific direction’ standard by 
the ad hoc tribunals exposed the disconnection of individual criminal responsibility from state 
responsibility and added to the complexity and confusion. It would seem that the ICTY and the 
SCSL regard individual criminal responsibility as a result of an autonomous development of 
principles of individual criminal responsibility, which does not need to be derived from 
responsibility of the State. This dissertation has argued that it remains conceptually problematic 
to disconnect the responsibility of a military or a State leader, whose acts can only be explained 
by the fact that he acted for the State, entirely from the responsibility of the State itself. 
8.3. Thirdly, there are clear parallels between the judicial divergence that exists with respect to 
the scope of individual criminal responsibility for such assistance to international crimes and the 
disagreement between international courts that arose in relation to the appropriate standard for 
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holding assisting States responsible for similarly contributing to violations by non-state actors 
during situations of armed conflict (i.e. overall control v. effective control).1677 While clearly the 
pronouncements on issues of state responsibility are not within the competence of international 
criminal tribunals, the ICTY in Tadić nonetheless argued the “overall control” standard suffices 
for attribution of conduct of individual or a group to the State in the context of state 
responsibility. Specifically, the Tadić Appeals Chamber held that acts committed by the non-
state actor (i.e. VRS) could give rise to international responsibility of the State (i.e. FRY) on the 
basis of the overall control exercised by the State over the non-state actor, without there being 
any need to prove that each operation during which acts were committed in breach of 
international law was carried out on the State’s instructions, or under its effective control.1678 
Contrary to the ICTY, the ICJ asserted that it has to be shown that “effective control” was 
exercised, or that the State’s instructions were given, in respect of each operation in which the 
alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the persons or 
groups of persons having committed the violations.1679 Similarly to the reasoning in Tadić, the 
Trial Chamber in Perišić asserted that general dependence of the non-state actor (VRS) on the 
FRY/VJ sufficed for imposing accomplice liability. Based on the foregoing study, the Perišić 
Trial Chamber’s analysis of accomplice responsibility is similar to the standard of overall control 
advocated by Tadić, while specific direction standard advocated by the Perišić Appeals Chamber 
resembles effective control standard endorsed by the ICJ, requiring control and/or instructions in 
respect of a specific operation in which crimes were committed. Thus, if one holds that the 
applicable standard is that of the specific direction, a general (complete) dependence of an armed 
group is not sufficient for imposition of criminal responsibility on the accomplice.  
The ICJ clearly rejected the application of the overall control test in the context of state 
responsibility, considering that “the overall control test has the major drawback of broadening 
the scope of state responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle governing the law of 
international responsibility: a State is responsible only for its own conduct [...] the “overall 
control” test is unsuitable, for it”1680. Similarly, it could be argued that the complete dependence 
                                                          
1677 Darcy, S., supra note 522.  
1678 Tadić Appeals Judgment, paras. 131, 145, 156. 
1679 Genocide case, para. 400. 
1680 Ibidem, para. 406. 
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standard put forward by the Perišić Trial Chamber is too broad and thus unsuitable for invoking 
individual criminal responsibility of the accomplice.  
9. Notwithstanding these connections and overlaps between these two regimes of international 
responsibility, certain standards for individual complicity developed by international criminal 
tribunals diverge from the framework of state complicity rules.  
First, it is proposed that the division regarding the standard of fault required for state and 
individual complicity might be the most notable one. While the debate on the subjective (fault) 
element in Article 16 ARSIWA corresponds to the knowledge/purpose debate concerning aiding 
and abetting in international criminal law, the subjective elements for complicity of the two 
regimes of international responsibility diverge. The specific primary rule prohibiting state 
complicity requires that for a State providing military aid to another State to be liable for 
complicity in internationally wrongful acts committed by the receiving State utilizing contributed 
resources, the assisting State had to intend the contributed resources to be so used. In contrast, 
the requisite mental element of aiding and abetting under the case law of the ad hoc tribunals is 
mere knowledge that the assistance aids the commission of the specific crime of the principal 
perpetrator along with the awareness of the essential elements of these crimes.1681 Interestingly, 
the Rome Statute explicitly adopted a “purpose” mens rea for most crimes of complicity.1682 The 
ICC clarified that “unlike the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, article 25(3)(c) of the Rome 
Statute requires that the person acts with the purpose to facilitate the crime; knowledge is not 
enough.”1683 Nevertheless, the term purpose has been left undefined in the Rome Statute and 
may therefore be open to interpretation.1684 This might represent a window for a future alignment 
of the mental elements of the two respective regimes of international responsibility.  
Second, whereas the same standard applies for individual complicity by way of provision of 
military aid to another State compared to aiding a non-state actor, international law envisages 
                                                          
1681 Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeals Judgment, para. 159; Orić Appeals Judgment, para. 43; ICTR, Prosecutor v. 
Seromba Appeals Judgment, para. 56; Blagojević and Jokić Appeals Judgment, para. 127; Simić Appeals Judgment, 
para. 86; Blaškić Appeals Judgment, paras. 45-46, 49; Vasiljević Appeals Judgment, para. 102. 
1682 See Article 25.3(c) of the Rome Statute. 
1683 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, para.274 (internal 
citations omitted). Furthermore, the knowledge standard provided under Article 30 does not alter the purpose 
standard in Article 25(3)(c), as this standard falls within the “[u]nless otherwise provided” clause of Article 30.  
1684 Dubber, M. D., supra note 634, p. 1000; Farrell, N., supra note 479, p. 887.  
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different standards for when a State is implicated in violations committed by a non-state actor, 
compared to when those are perpetrated by another State. The law of state responsibility remains 
primarily focused on inter-state responsibility and needs yet to be adjusted if it is to apply to 
situations where States aid or assist individuals. Article 16 ARSIWA only concerns inter-state 
relations and fails to regulate aid and assistance to non-state actors. Simultaneous individual and 
state responsibility will not arise where violations of international law are committed by non-
state armed groups without any State involvement. However, non-state armed groups are rarely 
fully autonomous entities and very often receive military and financial assistance from States 
themselves. As shown above, where the wrongful acts were perpetrated by individuals or groups, 
it must be shown that they acted under the instructions, direction or control of the State “in 
carrying out the conduct” in order for the State to be responsible.1685 Articles dealing with the 
responsibility of States constitute an indispensable counterpart of the rules dealing with 
individual criminal responsibility. It is therefore required to elaborate and define the rules with 
regard to the responsibility of States for aid and assistance to non-state actors consistent with 
those developed in the regime of individual criminal responsiblity. These rules should not 
develop independently from the rules articulated by international criminal law. Furthermore, a 
consistent normative framework for complicity would require that the Articles on state 
responsibility govern aid and assistance to non-state actors similarly as they govern inter-state 
assistance.  
Third, the insistence on specific direction in Perišić did not require that the accomplice directed 
or controlled the crimes of the principal perpetrators, but rather that the assistance itself had 
substantial effect on the crimes. According to Perišić, such requirement is met when the 
assistance is directed/aimed towards those crimes, thereby establishing the requisite nexus 
between the acts of the accused and the crime(s) committed. In this regard the reasoning in the 
Perišić Appeals Judgment might be interpreted as an attempt to offset the more expansive 
approach to the scope of state responsibility taken by the Tadić Appeals Chamber that argued for 
the overall control requirement as the appropriate criterion applicable to imputing the acts of 
non-state actor to a State under the law state responsibility1686, which sought to eliminate the 
need for specific instructions or directions for the commission of the crimes. Nevertheless, it is 
                                                          
1685 Article 8 ARSIWA. 
1686 Tadić Appeals Judgment, para. 145.  
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argued that due to the subsequent rejection of specific direction standard by the ad hoc Tribunals, 
the legal requirements for individual and state complicity remain distinct,1687 leading to 
inconsistency in the law of international responsibility.  
10. The ICJ and the international criminal tribunals have autonomous, yet complementary roles, 
which would best be advanced if these institutions have broadly compatible rules regarding the 
determination of respective state and individual criminal responsibility for complicity. 
Accordingly, this dissertation argues for the adoption of the “specific direction” requirement in 
“foreign assistance cases”, thereby providing for greater consistency and predictability in 
application of complicity rules in both regimes of international responsibility. 
One might argue that individual criminal responsibility is a different form of responsibility and 
thus need not be governed by the same standards.1688 However, the introduction of lower 
thresholds of responsibility may create tension within both systems. Where the standard for 
complicity in international criminal law becomes significantly lower than that in the law on state 
responsibility, the possibility exists for an individual to be held criminally responsible for 
conduct that the State is permitted to undertake. In order to avoid such inconsistencies and with 
the aim to establish a coherent responsibility management, it is suggested that the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals’ dilemma concerning the contours of complicity should be 
resolved by consulting the limitations of complicity in the Rome Statute as well as the norms of 
inter-state complicity reflected in the Articles on State Responsibility. Beatrice I. Bonafè has 
referred to “the need to establish some form of co-ordination between these two regimes of 
international responsibility, which cannot be achieved by relying too rigorously on the principle 
of individual criminal liability alone”.1689 Perišić might be seen as an unsuccessful example of 
this. Bonafè notes that the reliance on modes of criminal responsibility, such as joint criminal 
enterprise, which focus on the collective nature of international crimes “has the effect of 
establishing individual criminal responsibility in a way which is increasingly similar to the 
                                                          
1687 Ruys, T., Of Arms, Funding and ‘Non-Lethal Assistance’: Issues Surrounding Third-State Intervention in the 
Syrian Civil War, 13 Chinese Journal of International Law, 2014, pp. 22-26. 
1688 This is expressly recognized in the Articles in the form of a “without prejudice” clause. See ILC Report on State 
Responsibility, p. 142. (“These articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under 
international law of any person acting on behalf of a State.”). 
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assessment of state responsibility for the same internationally prohibited conduct”.1690 Whereas 
no “direct legal connection” between the two forms of international responsibility exists,1691 the 
various connections between state and individual criminal responsibility for complicity in 
international crimes revealed by the case study and the study of international practice show a 
certain complementarity between these regimes. Accordingly, this dissertation calls for an 
establishment of a comprehensive normative framework capable of securing a more effective co-
ordination between these regimes.  
11. Furthermore, as shown in Part II, individual complicity by way of provision of military aid 
(necessarily) entails implementation of state policy on foreign assistance. Accordingly, this 
dissertation proposes that the determination of individual criminal responsibility for complicity 
in the “foreign assistance cases” should entail the presumption of state responsibility for the 
same act. Throught Part II and Part III this dissertation aims to show that the current system 
needs a full appreciation of the mutual relationship and coexistence of the two systems. The 
inquiry focused on situations where a general overlap exists between the elements of state 
responsibility and the elements of individual criminal responsibility. In situations where the 
conduct of political and/or military leader(s) and the State conduct is the same, the determination 
of individual criminal responsibility is almost inextricably connected to the determination of a 
State act triggering state responsibility. Thus, it seems impossible to speak of dissociation or 
complete autonomy of individual criminal responsibility as far as complicity by way of provision 
of military aid is concerned. Rather, individual criminal responsibility in such cases seems 
closely connected to state responsibility arising out of the same conduct. Accordingly, state 
responsibility for complicity by way of provision of military aid should be implicit in the 
conviction of military or political leaders as accomplice.  
12. An alternative plausible suggestion is that new developments in international criminal law 
should impact the rules governing the responsibility of States in this regard. If military and 
political leaders are to be held responsible for implementing the state policy of provision of 
military aid to another State or non-state actors in an armed conflict situation, then the assisting 
State should also be held responsible for that conduct. However, this development is less 
plausible as it requires lowering the normative threshold of state responsibility for complicity. 
                                                          
1690 Ibidem, p. 189. 
1691 Ibidem. 
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The long codification process of state responsibility attests to the difficulties of adjusting the 
responsibility schemes to the evolving realities of international law. The open question remains 
whether revision of the ICJ judgment in the Genocide case is plausible due to the recent 
developments of complicit responsibility by international criminal tribunals. This dissertation 
aims to open the discussion and debate on individual and state responsibility and to prevent 
States to hide behind an individual who, in his capacity of a State official, may now be exposed 
to individual criminal responsibility while States, the architects of the policy, are shielded by the 
current state responsibility regime which shields them from application of complicity norms by 
the ICJ. A State, if confident in its policy to provide military aid to another State or a non-state 
actor, need to be subjected to new norms and the law on state responsibility should be brought 
into line with the new developments in international criminal law in order to avoid inner 
contradictions. Ending the culture of impunity is a forward-looking enterprise. Oddly enough, 
despite repeated cases of state complicity, only limited formal efforts have been made to 
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